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Series Foreword
Those who undertake a study of American political thought must attend to 
the great theorists, philosophers, and essayists. Such a study is incomplete, 
however, if it neglects American literature, one of the greatest repositories 
of the nation’s political thought and teachings.
America’s literature is distinctive because it is, above all, intended for 
a democratic citizenry. In contrast to eras when an author would aim to in-
form or influence a select aristocratic audience, in democratic times, public 
influence and education must resonate with a more expansive, less leisured, 
and diverse audience to be effective. The great works of America’s literary 
tradition are the natural locus of democratic political teaching. Invoking 
the interest and attention of citizens through the pleasures afforded by the 
literary form, many of America’s great thinkers sought to forge a democratic 
public philosophy with subtle and often challenging teachings that unfolded 
in narrative, plot, and character development. Perhaps more than any other 
nation’s literary tradition, American literature is ineluctably political—
shaped by democracy as much as it has in turn shaped democracy.
The Political Companions to Great American Authors series highlights 
the teachings of the great authors in America’s literary and belletristic tradi-
tion. An astute political interpretation of America’s literary tradition requires 
careful, patient, and attentive readers who approach the text with a view to 
understanding its underlying messages about citizenship and democracy. 
Essayists in this series approach the classic texts not with a “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” but with the curiosity of fellow citizens who believe that the 
great authors have something of value to teach their readers. The series 
brings together essays from varied approaches and viewpoints for the com-
mon purpose of elucidating the political teachings of the nation’s greatest 
authors for those seeking a better understanding of American democracy.
Patrick J. Deneen
Series Editor

INTRODUCTION
Walker Percy, American Political 
Life, and Indigenous American 
Thomism
Peter Augustine Lawler and Brian A. Smith
Why do two political scientists say that an American Catholic novelist can 
teach us what nobody else can about our nation’s political life? In fact, we 
think it’s important that Percy was an American, a Catholic, and a novelist, 
not to mention a physician and a philosophical essayist. Percy explains that 
the novel itself is a Christian medium. Who’s read a really good Darwinian 
novel, or an atheistic novel, or a socialist novel? For all their wisdom, the 
classical Greeks never managed to write any novels. The characters in the 
dialogues and plays aren’t quite—and aren’t meant to be—fully fleshed-out 
human beings. The novel depends on the Christian discovery of irreduc-
ible inwardness or personal identity. In other words, the novel depends on 
the searching personal investigation found, maybe for the first time, in St. 
Augustine’s Confessions.
Even the novels of the officially atheistic Sartre, which Percy admired, 
shared the Christian discovery that being human is all about being stuck in 
a predicament not of one’s own making and about wondering and wander-
ing in search of who you are and what you’re supposed to do. For Percy, 
the existentialists—Sartre and especially Heidegger—offer personal or 
particular corrections to the impersonality of science ancient and modern. 
The existentialists observe that the human being is a leftover in the world 
described by modern science, and the Christians agree. Percy adds that the 
existentialists incorrectly slight or ignore the joyful discovery that the truth 
we can share in common is science. Percy painfully notes that the Christians 
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have more than a bit of history of dropping the ball when it comes to sci-
ence, but that’s often been because they’ve made the mistake of believing 
that they must choose between science and what revelation teaches about 
the origin and destiny of each particular person.
The harmonization of what we know through science and what we 
know through revelation is the rather distinctively Catholic project called 
Thomism. There’s a neglected American Catholic tradition composed of 
Orestes Brownson (author of The American Republic, 1865), John Court-
ney Murray (We Hold These Truths, 1960), and Percy that holds that a 
Thomistic interpretation of the greatness of our Founders’ accomplishment 
is the gift American Catholics can offer their country. What Percy offers 
that Murray and Brownson do not is philosophical depth, psychological 
subtlety, and the novelist’s gift for putting what he knows in action through 
the imaginative description of particular lives. Percy also offers, of course, 
the formidable literary and political resources of the Stoic/aristocratic and 
“Christ-haunted” American South. The Southern Agrarian criticism of 
the flourishing techno-republic of the industrialized North culminated in 
the indigenous Thomism of Walker Percy and Flannery O’Connor. What 
indigenous Thomism offers America, above all, is a better foundation for 
its liberalism than that our nation’s most prominent political philosophers 
have provided us—one expressed, as G. K. Chesterton said, with “dogmatic 
lucidity” in our Declaration of Independence, but one rarely systematically 
explored.
Thomism is often called moral and metaphysical realism. There is, as 
Percy explains, a real world out there, and we the have natural capability 
to discover the real truth about it. We, the beings hardwired, so to speak, 
for language, are open to the truth about all things. We are like the other 
animals in some ways, but we are given excellences and responsibilities 
not given to them. As the existentialists say, we can live either authenti-
cally—not diverting ourselves from what we can’t help but know—or inau-
thentically. We can’t help knowing the bad news that we’re born to trouble 
because of who we are as self-conscious, sinful beings, and there’s no merely 
environmental or chemical remedy for what ails us. But we also know that 
compensations for our misery include the love of other particular persons 
and joyful shared discovery. It’s not really true that each of us is absurdly 
locked up in him- or herself.
The founders of philosophy and science—the classical Greeks—taught 
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that the human being is distinguished by the capability to wonder, and that 
the world, as Leo Strauss reminds us, is the home of the human mind. 
There is nothing more wonderful than the intelligible regularities of nature, 
and the philosopher dies to himself as a particular being in contemplat-
ing, for example, the stars. The Christians think of the human being as a 
wanderer or pilgrim or alien wherever he or she might live in this world. We 
are homeless because we can’t help that our true home is somewhere else. 
The Christians correct the classical view, especially of Plato and Aristotle, 
that we are essentially natural or biological beings. We miss who we are as 
particular persons when we think of ourselves as essentially minds. Philoso-
phy, so understood, is a kind of self-forgetfulness, which for the Christian 
places it as an only partially truthful diversion from insistently personal 
reality. Our longings, the Christians say, are personal, deep down. Personal 
longings point us beyond our apparent biological limitations; our deepest 
longing is to be transparent just as we are before a personal God.
The Christians discovered that the being with speech—with logos—is 
neither essentially mind, as Aristotle thought, nor essentially body, as ma-
terialists from Thales to Epicurus to today’s “new atheists” and even less 
flamboyant neo-Darwinians and neuroscientists think, but a third kind 
of being that can’t be reduced to mind or body or even some incoherent 
combination of the two. As Pope Benedict XVI often reminded us, logos, as 
we actually have experienced it, is animated by and present only in persons. 
Such reason appears only in the personal God and the persons made in his 
image. As Percy explains, any aliens that are intelligent enough to be discov-
ered will be conscious, flawed persons too—not the benignly disembodied 
and apparently deathless alien minds described by the novelist Carl Sagan 
and not automatons of some sort. Like us, the aliens will be born to trouble 
and potentially a danger to us all.
Percy argued that beginning with Descartes, the characteristic 
modern philosophers agree that each of us is homeless—an alien—in the 
natural world. They quickly add that we can remedy this homelessness by 
transforming natural reality with the “I” in mind. The resulting scientific 
progress makes the “I” lonelier than ever. Such people know more and more 
about nature and less than ever about themselves, because science doesn’t 
explain who they are. The failure of material science to make the “I” more 
at home in the world leads to existentialism, to the conclusion that we must 
simply embrace our destiny as absurd leftovers in the cosmos. The mistaken 
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thought—one that’s contradicted even by the joyful experiences of the real 
scientists and existentialist novelists who express it—that a conscious being 
could possibly be isolated and alone produces the misanthropic conclusion 
that the true goal of science ought to be to zap the malignity of self-con-
sciousness out of existence altogether. As Percy puts it, these scientists seem 
to agree that it’s better to be a contented chimp than a pointlessly dislocated 
human, and he directs our attention to the dystopian possibilities that flow 
from this desire to “fix” human life.
The Bible is right that it’s not good to be alone, but it’s just not true that 
to be human is to be truly isolated. If it were true, Percy explains, then there 
would be no real argument against suicide or devoting one’s self to pointless 
diversions or to getting as drugged up as possible with mood-enhancing and 
consciousness-depressing drugs. We could erect no defense against the idea 
that our lives bear no meaning. Therefore, there would also be no argu-
ment against attempting to lose oneself in ideological wars about nothing, 
against the twentieth-century existentialism that culminated in Stalinism 
and Nazism. We now know that all those efforts to extinguish who we are 
are not only radically pernicious but also, thank God, destined to fail in 
their misanthropic objectives.
Percy’s twentieth-century Thomism attempts, in our view with great 
success, to use what we really know these days through science—includ-
ing evolutionary science and neuroscience—to show that the being who 
wonders is necessarily the being who wanders. The wondering being—the 
human self or soul, the human person—really can’t integrate him- or her-
self into the world he or she can otherwise explain through science. The 
cosmos—in the sense of all that exists—isn’t really a cosmos—in the sense 
of a homogeneous whole—as long as we’re around. But that doesn’t mean 
that the Cartesian/existentialist dualism between mechanistic (or stimulus-
response) nature and mysteriously unnatural human freedom is correct.
Man breaking into the daylight of language introduced in nature a 
fundamental discontinuity—a discontinuity evolutionary theorists should 
address but usually don’t, because it’s such an obvious and seemingly invin-
cible limitation to the explanatory power of their materialistic science. For 
physicists, such as the great Carl Sagan, nothing is more wonderful than 
the stars and the possibility of the unalienated pure mind that we can hope 
beings with extraterrestrial intelligence are. By contrast, for Percy, noth-
ing is more strange and wonderful than the wandering aliens or pilgrims 
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found right here on our planet. Percy observes that Sagan is so lonely that 
he hopes to make “contact” with beings elsewhere that he can’t make with 
beings here. He has mistakenly raised himself to pure “mind” by reducing, 
in theory, the rest of us to pure body. But even the theoretical physicist 
is neither pure mind nor pure body, but a particular third kind of being 
that can’t be integrated into theories that are all about minds and bodies. 
Because Sagan didn’t really understand who he was, he didn’t really under-
stand how strange and lovable each of us is.
Percy’s “theory of man” is, for him, a kind of Christian apologetics. It 
doesn’t prove that the Christian account of who we are is true, but it does 
show that believing in its truth is compatible with what we can see with 
our own eyes as knowers. What we really know about evolution suggests, 
in fact, special creation of our species and particular persons and the deep, 
irreducible reality of personal love. It even suggests that our freedom is not 
for private, incommunicable experiences of conscience but for both shared 
scientific discovery and participation in the truthful, institutionalized com-
munity called the church, organized for thought and action. In other words, 
it suggests what our freedom—our wandering—is for. Percy’s intention, of 
course, is not to politicize the church or to have public policy animated by 
the personal virtue of charity, but to show how our political life is limited 
and sustained by who we are as truthful, social, personal, joyful, and lov-
ing beings. We can be as home as we can be with our family, friends, and 
country and all the good things of this world when we understand the true 
cause—both through science and through faith—of our homelessness.
Percy reminds us that our Declaration of Independence isn’t simply an 
expression of the Cartesian theory of Locke. That theory, in Percy eyes, is 
that man is nothing but a particularly clever organism transforming his en-
vironment in pursuit of this-worldly, self-won happiness. If that theory were 
simply true, people would be happier than ever in our free and affluent 
society, more at home than ever in the world we’ve made for ourselves. Sci-
entists, as Percy would say, would know like angels. Ordinary people would 
flourish with expert help on how best to satisfy their needs. And morality 
would be on the way to perfection because people would understand better 
who they are and what they’re supposed to do as “autonomous” selves. But 
all the evidence, Percy observes, suggests that the theory isn’t true: people, 
Percy echoes Tocqueville, are more restless or miserably disoriented than 
ever in the midst of prosperity. And the pursuit of happiness has become 
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the feverish, flaky, and increasingly futile pursuit of diversion from what we 
think we know—or don’t know—about who we are.
The draft of the Declaration was the Lockean theory articulated by Jef-
ferson and Locke. The draft was amended by the more Christian members 
of Congress. “Nature’s God”—a past-tense God—became the judgmental 
and providential God—the living God—of the Bible. That compromise, 
Catholic Americans such as Brownson and Murray understand particularly 
well, really is providential. If our Declaration were simply Puritanical, it 
would theocratically criminalize every sin and be incompatible with the 
true freedom of persons and of the church. If our Declaration were purely 
Lockean, it would be too hostile to the whole Christian view of who we 
are. The compromise can even be called a kind of accidental Thomism—a 
reconciliation of reason and revelation not intended by either of the parties 
to the compromise.
But Percy suggests that absent a coherent theory of man that justifies it, 
this American compromise comes to nothing but confusion. The Christian 
understanding of who each of us is as a unique and irreplaceable being 
made in the image of God fades, and it’s replaced by inexplicable experi-
ences of homelessness that elude expert determination. So the providential 
accident of history that is our Declaration needs to be supported by a theory 
that understands better than our Founders did their political accomplish-
ment and defends better than they did the liberty given by God and nature 
to each and every particular member of our singular species. That, we can 
say, can and should be Percy’s contribution to American political science.
Peter Lawler named this theory, for the benefit of American political 
scientists and philosophers, “postmodernism rightly understood” (in his 
book of the same title) which, as far as we know, is the first effort to present 
Percy as an indispensable resource for our understanding of ourselves as a 
free, relational, and responsible people under God. Genuine postmodernism 
preserves what’s true about modern science and the modern understanding 
of the self while incorporating those partial truths into a more compre-
hensive moral and metaphysical realism, a return to the idea that we’re 
open by nature to the real truth about ourselves, others, and the cosmos 
in a way that gives us the guidance we need to know who we are and what 
we’re supposed to do. The essays in this book are all meant to contribute to 
making the political thought of the philosopher-novelist-physician-Catholic 
available in an accessible and informed way.
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Our collection opens with a biographical essay with particular focus 
upon Percy’s political life by Ralph C. Wood. Tracing the author’s family 
history and the particular problems of southern life that set him on his path 
to writing, Wood emphasizes how the Stoic legacy within which Walker 
grew to maturity shaped his thinking as well as the manner in which his 
predilection for scientific explanation opened up so many fruitful possibili-
ties in his later work. This essay sets the stage for the more focused efforts 
that follow and provides the reader with a ready reference for the key events 
of Walker Percy’s life.
In his essay, Woods Nash argues that Percy uses The Moviegoer’s 
character Binx Bolling’s habitual moviegoing as a metaphor for the ways 
Descartes captured the modern mind. Along the way, Nash provides a vital 
introduction to the nature of the Cartesian mind by surveying the dominant 
view of this subject among philosophers, supplying the basis for demon-
strating just how Percy uses the idea of the mind as a theater to explore the 
human condition. This analysis sets the stage for an exploration of Percy’s 
Moviegoer as depicting the effects of extreme individualism on individuals 
and their communities.
Beginning with The Moviegoer and proceeding to later works, Eliza-
beth Amato inquires into the pursuit of happiness in Percy’s America. She 
contends that Percy’s contrarian efforts to understand our society led him 
to the conclusion that our unhappiness bears clues about the poor choices 
we make and, perhaps more important, that his novels’ characters show 
Americans how their own self-destructive beliefs drive them to ever more 
impoverished conceptions of the good and happy life. Amato observes the 
ways Percy shows that our efforts to flee unhappiness through a kind of 
restless materialism in fact cause us to miss the clues that would lead us to 
consider a better sort of life.
Father James V. Schall’s contribution turns our attention to Percy’s 
distinctively Christian anthropology and the way he articulates this vision 
across his many essays and novels. Starting with Percy’s observation that 
many bad novels are “about searching for one’s self,” Father Schall discusses 
the many ways Percy reminds us that any genuine search for the truth must 
lead us outside of ourselves to a recognition of our “transparency before 
God” and into an acquaintance with the essential nature of life as requir-
ing participation in robust communities. In Father Schall’s analysis, Percy 
ultimately emphasizes the vital importance of all our choices in how to live 
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and why, and in the images of flawed creation, reminds us of our place as 
wayfarers.
Focusing on the internal problems at the heart of Percy’s attempt to 
create a philosophical anthropology, Nathan P. Carson argues that Percy’s 
vision of human nature contains a central flaw: Percy’s deep and sustained 
critique of modernity does show our incoherence and provides us with 
significant resources for understanding our present state, but this demon-
stration comes at the expense of a significant loss in man’s ability to develop 
a path out of this malaise. By diagnosing man’s “unsignifiability”—his in-
ability to fully describe or capture himself under the auspices of a symbol—
Carson suggests that Percy may paradoxically describe a creature incapable 
of understanding or cultivating real virtue.
Farrell O’Gorman’s contribution aims at demonstrating how Percy’s 
1977 novel Lancelot profoundly critiques a radical individualism that is 
both founded in and contributes to a displaced sense of the real. The essay 
also argues that this critique cannot be properly understood without due 
consideration of the novel’s particular subgenre and historical context. Plac-
ing Lancelot in the context of the Southern Gothic novel, O’Gorman shows 
that in the intensely flawed narrator, Lance Lamar, who embarks on a quest 
to uncover the messy truth of things, Percy actually holds up a mirror to the 
aspects of our politics and society that we least want to observe: the deadly 
effects of our radical individualism and quest for perfect autonomy.
Continuing the examination of Percy’s later works, Micah Mattix ex-
plores the role of scientism in Percy’s thought, specifically focusing on his 
last novel, The Thanatos Syndrome. Mattix argues that Percy’s diagnosis 
of a living death in American society is best understood as originating in 
our incapacity to understand ourselves rightly. Percy’s recurring motif of 
words having lost all meaning, being “used up,” bears special importance in 
his novels because without those words, the characters cannot even name 
the evils they face, let alone understand them. Mattix points us to Percy’s 
partial solution in Thanatos: the return to an understanding of man as more 
than merely reducible to stimuli and responses, but rather as a creature 
whose capacity for speech and understanding transcends all attempts at 
scientific reductionism.
Turning our attention to the nature of the South in Percy’s writings, 
Richard M. Reinsch II observes that Percy intimated in several addresses 
and essays his belief that the South is, in certain respects, capable of teach-
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ing the rest of the United States enduring truths of man’s nature and being. 
Reinsch argues that the South’s evangelicalism might help reawaken the 
region’s distinctive culture and demonstrate an alternative to the highly 
secular model blue states present. This is not to say that Percy maintained 
no misgivings about Protestant thought—his skepticism toward effusively 
emotional faith remained. But Reinsch argues he may have overlooked the 
deeper spiritual claims Protestants make—ones that rival those of Catholics. 
As a practical fact, evangelicals continue to maintain the South as a bastion 
of Christian faith and provide strong theological support to traditional mar-
riage and family life. Reinsch turns to Love in the Ruins, and specifically 
the images of love and marriage it presents, to show how southern evan-
gelicalism resists the desiccated and desiccating understanding of marriage 
posited by therapeutic liberalism. This complicates the picture of Percy as a 
specifically and narrowly Roman Catholic novelist, and demonstrates some 
of the ways his Kierkegaardian influences bear out in his writings.
Brian A. Smith’s essay explores the politics and psychology of Love 
in the Ruins. He argues that Percy’s value to political philosophers lies in 
the way he depicts the failures of modern morals and culture to recognize 
human imperfection. Percy suggests that while strong communities and re-
ligious beliefs once moderated our self-destructive tendencies, our culture 
has undermined these defenses. Percy develops a compelling account of 
how we might find our way back to a better sort of life together. In Love in 
the Ruins, Percy holds our way of life to a mirror and shows that the future 
we have to fear is not Nietzsche’s docile last man, but rather the danger that 
we might become trapped in the extremes of human life: at one extreme, 
we aspire to live like angels, abstracted from ordinary human cares; at the 
other, we immerse ourselves in bodily existence and lose sight of conscious-
ness itself. If Americans become “last men,” Percy seems to observe, we will 
do so in strikingly different ways that always betray the possibility of hope.
Brendan P. Purdy and Janice Daurio aim at uncovering the philosophi-
cal background to Percy’s political engagement with segregation by looking 
closely at what they see as Percy’s three deepest intellectual influences: se-
miotics, Kierkegaard, and Catholicism. Purdy and Daurio show how Percy’s 
work in these three areas demanded he take a more consistent stand on the 
issues of his day. They relate his ideas to those of others in the history of 
philosophy, painting a picture of Percy’s intellectual journey and his likely 
influences along the way, and show that Percy’s peculiar combination of a 
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consistently Catholic moral vision, his quest for a realist theory of language, 
and his intellectual relationship with Kierkegaard demanded he accept the 
moral principle of equality and embrace integration in the South.
Finally, Peter Augustine Lawler locates Percy’s thought, with the help 
of Alexis de Tocqueville, as a southern and Stoic criticism of American 
Cartesianism and a Catholic criticism of southern Stoicism. The result is 
the kind of aristocratic Christianity Tocqueville recommends as the way 
to reconcile proud experiences of great personal worth with the egalitar-
ian and charitable truth about the singular greatness of each and every 
particular human being. The southern Stoicism Walker Percy learned from 
the philosopher-poet who raised him, William Alexander Percy, shows us 
that Tocqueville was right that Americans, to learn the truth that they’re 
more than techno-beings with interests, have to be elevated by the experi-
ences of ruling oneself and others found in the magnanimous and gener-
ous literature of the classical Greeks and Romans. Tocqueville, of course, 
didn’t know what the Percys did: that the aristocratic antidote to America’s 
Cartesian excesses flourished for a while in the South. But that Stoic anti-
dote itself, Percy adds, was flawed by injustice and a lonely indifference to 
the ordinary reality of personal love. So American Thomism emerges as 
a Christian criticism of the self-deception of pagan magnanimity, and as 
magnanimous criticism of the self-absorbed yet self-deceived pettiness and 
even trashiness of democratic materialism.
In these essays, we hope to convince our readers that Walker Percy’s 
peculiar synthesis of ideas in philosophy and fiction does more than illumi-
nate our predicament—he shows us a way to think and talk about politics 
and society that will lead us out of today’s confusions. In many ways, Percy is 
vital for understanding the American present, and he can help show us ways 
to avert an enervating future. He can lead us away from the stale debates 
of contemporary conservative and liberal thought and back into considering 
the proper politics and community for human beings understood as wayfar-
ers in the world and strangers to ourselves. 
1Walker Percy
A Brief Biography
Ralph C. Wood
William Buckley once wittily remarked that all future presidents should be 
made to take a double oath of office. They should swear not only to uphold 
the Constitution of the United States of America but also promise to read, 
mark, learn, and inwardly digest Walker Percy’s novel of 1971, Love in the 
Ruins. “It’s all there in that one book,” Buckley declared, “what’s happening 
to us and why.”1 Such extravagant praise is meant to echo the extravagance 
of Percy’s satire. Yet the outrageousness of such an accolade, far from si-
lencing further consideration of Percy, prompts us to ask what kind of man 
stands behind such a book. Much of what follows is not original with me but 
a précis of Jay Tolson’s fine biography, Pilgrim in the Ruins, but will serve to 
orient the reader to the chapters that follow mine.2
Walker Percy was born in Birmingham, Alabama, on May 28, 1916, to a 
very distinguished family. He had French Catholic ancestors on his mother’s 
(Martha Susan Phinizy) side, and on his father’s side the family could trace 
its ancestry back to the Percys of Northumberland, who appear in Shake-
speare’s plays. Funeral monuments honoring the Percy family can still be 
seen in the cathedral at Beverley in Humberside. Walker Percy’s father, Le-
roy Pratt Percy, had graduated from Princeton University and Harvard Law 
School with honors, and he had taken up a career as an attorney and general 
counsel for Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad. Birmingham was known as 
the “Magic City” because it had grown so rapidly and prosperously since its 
founding in 1870. Yet the Percys were not newcomers to Birmingham. In 
fact, Walker Percy’s grandfather (also named Walker) had settled there in 
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1886 after graduating from the University of the South (“Sewanee”) as well 
as the University of Virginia Law School. Thus did the Percys rise rapidly to 
social and civic prominence in the raw and bustling city. Yet theirs was not 
a typical southern milieu but a decidedly multicultural place, with a large 
population of Jews, Greeks, Italians, and Russians coming to operate the 
new coal mines, steel mills, businesses.
Walker Percy’s father, like his forebears, had been imbued with the an-
cient ideal of noblesse oblige, a secular version of the biblical claim that “to 
whom much is given, of him will much be required” (Luke 12:48). The Percy 
family believed that the “nobility” who have achieved great material and 
social success are not meant to live in idle luxury; they are obliged, instead, 
to devote themselves to the commonweal. Thus were the Birmingham Percys 
active in various civic clubs, even as they were vigorous opponents of bigotry 
and narrow-mindedness, especially when it was directed against Catholics, 
Jews, and Negroes. They were also members of the Independent Presbyte-
rian Church, a congregation whose pastor had been ousted from an older 
Presbyterian church because he was a humanist who denied the existence 
of miracles and the divinity of Jesus. (Such moralistic Presbyterianism is 
satirized, by the way, in the figure of Ellen Oglethorpe in Love in the Ruins.)
Walker Percy described his Birmingham childhood as having many 
occasions for happiness. Together with his two younger brothers, he enjoyed 
hunting and fishing with a black caretaker named Elijah Collier (“Lije”), 
and the Percy brothers spent theirs summers at boys’ camps in cool Wiscon-
sin. The three Percys attended a small, select academy called Birmingham 
University School, where Walker was known as quiet and studious, but also 
as somewhat sickly, since he was afflicted with allergies. Though he was 
a much better student than athlete—excelling chiefly in Latin and math 
but also sending off short stories to various boys’ magazines—he was not 
an insufferable little egghead. On the contrary, nearly everyone found him 
funny. Yet nearly everyone also noticed something distant and aloof about 
young Walker, as if he were too vulnerable and frail a creature to be suited 
for the rough-and-tumble of ordinary life. In this regard Percy very much 
resembled his mother, who was also rather delicate and remote—indeed, an 
almost otherworldly figure. The boys were never close to her.
In 1924 the Percys left the Five Points neighborhood at the commer-
cial hub of Birmingham for a new suburban life. They moved over Red 
Mountain to a grand new home next to the Mountain Brook Country Club. 
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It was an elaborate mansion that would later become the model for the 
Vaughts’ “castle” in The Last Gentleman. Yet not all was well in the prosper-
ous Percy household. Leroy Percy was given to violent mood swings. At first 
he would be warm and cheerful, then suddenly angry and downcast. He 
was a brilliant, driven man who made exhaustive annotations in his Bible 
and who read the fiction of Joseph Conrad obsessively. He was obsessive 
about other things as well, especially gambling and golfing and hunting. He 
also seemed strangely determined to create rivalries among his sons, pitting 
them against each other, for example, in gun-shooting contests. They, in 
turn, came to dread the evening ordeal at the dinner table with a depressive 
father made edgy by alcohol. It seems that Leroy Percy’s misery may also 
have been complicated by an unconsummated love affair. As one of the 
Percy brothers later confessed, “It just wasn’t a happy family.”3 The father’s 
depression worsened, as did his maddening insomnia, until on July 9, 1929, 
the forty-year-old Percy went to the attic and blew his brains out. His funeral 
was held before Walker and his brothers could get back to Birmingham 
from their camp in Wisconsin. They were aged thirteen, twelve, and seven.
The world’s violent volcanic core had erupted into Walker Percy’s seem-
ingly tranquil existence. He later admitted that he had spent his entire life 
and work trying to answer a single question: “I guess the central mystery 
of my life will always be why my father killed himself.”4 The answer may 
be genetic no less than spiritual. “Melancholy and suicide,” writes Tolson, 
“have a prominent place in the Percy family saga.”5 The very first Percy to 
arrive in America, a Natchez planter named Charles, tied a sugar kettle 
to his neck, walked into an icy Mississippi creek, and drowned himself in 
January 1794. Walker Percy’s own grandfather had also killed himself in 
1917 after a long battle with depression. Thanks to the psychiatric help now 
available, Walker and subsequent generations of Percys have staved off the 
deadliest effects of melancholy. Yet the Percy urge to suicidal self-doubt 
is not only a biological tendency. The Percy men of this century have also 
been haunted by the high honor that their ancestors once achieved but 
that none of them has quite lived up to—at least in the political sense 
of becoming public movers and shakers. Their Mississippi forebears were 
men of action who carved prosperity out of the American wilderness, who 
rose to public prominence, who built strong levees to prevent the flooding 
of their native city of Greenville, who often stood down the Ku Klux Klan. 
Their twentieth-century epigoni, by contrast, have become mainly men of 
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thought rather than action, and thus are they haunted by a sense of failed 
honor.
As if Percyesque melancholy, unlike lightning, could indeed strike 
twice in the same place, Walker and his brothers were dealt a second 
deathblow in the spring of 1932. They and their mother, Mattie Sue, had 
come to live in Greenville, the ancestral Percy home in the Mississippi 
Delta. Taking a ride in the countryside with her ten-year-old son Phin on 
an April afternoon, Mrs. Percy drove her Buick off a wooden bridge and 
into a bayou. The screaming son grabbed his mother as the car began to fill 
with water. She squeezed his hand in response, but she neither spoke nor 
moved. Frantically he managed to make his way out a rear window, unable 
to drag his mother with him. No one knows whether Mrs. Percy veered off 
the bridge after suffering a heart attack or whether she in fact committed 
suicide, seeking to take her “baby” out of this sad world with her. In either 
case, the three Percy brothers were made orphans. Walker’s sense of loneli-
ness and homelessness, already acute, would now become permanent and 
incurable. In fact, Percy would later assent to Albert Camus’s contention 
that suicide is the major philosophical problem of the twentieth century: in 
a world which seems devoid of ultimate order and meaning and worth, why 
should one not do away with oneself?
The sixteen-year-old Walker Percy received a startling answer to this 
question not first by way of philosophical or religious argument but rather 
by ethical action. To the surprise of nearly everyone, he and his two brothers 
were adopted and raised by their father’s forty-four-year-old bachelor first 
cousin, William Alexander Percy. Walker was later to say of “Uncle Will,” 
as the boys came affectionately to call him, “that he was the most extraor-
dinary man I have ever known and that I owe him a debt which cannot be 
paid.”6 Such praise is not too strong. Will Percy was a veritable Renaissance 
man who embodied all the virtues of the Old South. He was a distinguished 
poet who wrote both English and Latin verse, a heroic soldier of the First 
World War, a onetime teacher of literature at Sewanee, a friend of William 
Faulkner and other literary luminaries, the proprietor of the Percy family’s 
large cotton plantation outside Greenville, and a graduate of Harvard Law 
School—though his legal career was of less moment than his civic work. He 
openly opposed the Ku Klux Klan, even carrying a pistol to protect himself, 
and he organized aid for local Negroes whose homes were ravaged by the 
floods of the 1920s before the Tennessee Valley Authority helped control 
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them. Thanks largely to efforts of such public-spirited citizens as Will Percy, 
Greenville became one of the most enlightened and progressive towns in 
an often benighted and repressive state. The local white high school, for 
example, was academically rigorous. Percy received a first-rate education 
there, contributing stories and editorials to the school newspaper edited by 
a buddy who was to become his best friend, his fellow writer, and also his 
lifelong antagonist: the relentlessly agnostic Shelby Foote.
Uncle Will raised Walker and his two brothers to be men of culture. He 
took them to New Orleans to see the opera, he read Shakespeare and the 
romantic poets to them aloud, he helped them appreciate the music of major 
composers from Bach to Stravinsky (especially Brahms), he taught them to 
read Plato and the Stoics, and he inspired them to follow one of the classic 
professions: medicine, education, the military, or the law. It is noteworthy 
that ministry was not on the list. Uncle Will was in fact a deeply religious 
man who had been raised as a Catholic and who as a youth had considered 
the priesthood. But during his undergraduate years at Sewanee he gave 
up not only his Catholicism but also his Christianity, choosing instead to 
become a religious humanist. “No priest could absolve me,” he wrote about 
his loss of faith, “no church could direct my life or my judgement.” From 
then on, he declared, “I would be living with my own self.”7 Yet Will Percy 
was no crusading anti-Christian; on the contrary, he loved the elegant En-
glish of the Book of Common Prayer, and he supported the church as one 
of the pillars of society, a necessary institution for maintaining social order 
and dignity. Even so, his beliefs were far more Stoic than Christian. For 
him the cosmos forms a massive closed cycle of beautiful repetitions and 
regularities, and our human purpose is to put ourselves in accord with the 
fundamental patterns of nature. Though the universe came from nowhere 
and is going nowhere, it is not a meaningless realm. For in accepting the 
finality of death and defeat, we can still attain a certain tragic, if also lonely, 
nobility. Uncle Will’s plangent autobiography, Lanterns on the Levee: Rec-
ollections of a Planter’s Son (1941), is his memorable account of his Stoic 
life and outlook. It offers a powerful lament over the loss of southern grace 
and virtue with the rise of what William Faulkner called the Snopeses, the 
cultureless money-grubbers who care nothing for the permanent things. 
That Will Percy was a closeted homosexual may have also contributed to his 
melancholy life, which ended in exhaustion at age fifty-seven.
At first Walker Percy seemed to be a disciple of Uncle Will’s Stoic 
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philosophy. It is certain, in any case, that the Percy who matriculated at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1933 was no Christian. He 
had been inspired by Sinclair Lewis’s novel Arrowsmith to become a medi-
cal doctor, thus fulfilling Uncle Will’s wish that his adopted sons contribute 
to the human good. Yet young Percy was not a moral idealist so much as 
a social pessimist. Here he followed in his adopted father’s train. Percy 
scorned the newly elected Roosevelt, for example, on the grounds that the 
human lot could not be improved by social legislation. Percy also held to the 
materialist conviction that human existence could be understood almost en-
tirely in physical terms, and that it could be improved only through medical 
advances and environmental changes. Here he had been much influenced 
by the work of Julian A. Huxley and H. G. Wells. He had learned from their 
book The Science of Life that the scientific method will eventually solve 
the world’s mysteries. Hence Percy’s own decision to take an undergradu-
ate degree in chemistry—a major whose intellectual impersonality echoed 
Percy’s own personal aloofness. Though he was a popular fraternity member 
and ladies’ man, the youthful Percy always held himself apart, never letting 
anyone get too close, women least of all. There was indeed a fatalistic streak 
in Percy that made him doubt the good that anyone could do. He became, 
in fact, something of a misanthrope who looked upon his fellow creatures 
and did not like what he saw. His favorite Dostoyevsky character was Ivan 
Karamazov, the atheist who believes in nothing but science.
Yet there was also a romantic and literary side to Percy’s existence that 
manifested itself during his Chapel Hill years. He took courses not only 
in chemistry, biology, and the other sciences; he also read Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche, and he became especially adept at German. Percy began 
less than auspiciously in English. He flunked the entrance exam and was 
remanded to remedial freshman composition for writing a convoluted 
description of the Mississippi River in imitation of Faulkner’s style in The 
Sound and the Fury! Yet Percy did well in the humanities, and he served as 
the movie reviewer for the Daily Tarheel, the campus newspaper. Moviego-
ing would become a lifelong Percy practice, a means of escape from the 
madding world—even if he would also make a devastating critique of the 
film world in his first novel, The Moviegoer (1961). The romantic state of 
Percy’s soul was even more plainly revealed in the summer tour of Germany 
that he took with his German professor in 1934. To his later shame, Percy 
found himself greatly impressed by the Hitler Youth—their moral serious-
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ness, their impressive uniforms, their motto of Blut und Ehre (blood and 
honor), their willingness to die for the sake of their country and their cause. 
That they supported the Nazi cause mattered less to Percy than that they 
belonged to what Tolson calls “the oldest strain of Teutonic romanticism, the 
Lebenstod (love of death) that runs from the oldest German sagas, through 
the romances, Wagnerian opera, and Weimar culture before erupting in 
the mythology and symbolism of Nazism.”8 It is also a troubling fact that 
neither Walker Percy nor his brother Roy resigned from their University 
of North Carolina fraternity when Shelby Foote, their friend and fellow 
Greenvillean, was blackballed from membership because of his partially 
Jewish background. Percy was elected to Phi Beta Kappa during his junior 
year, and he was graduated with honors in chemistry in 1937. Yet he was 
not tapped for the highest social honor—membership in Chapel Hill’s most 
prestigious secret society, the Golden Fleece. He was also rejected by the 
Harvard Medical School. Though seemingly minor defeats, they rankled 
Percy for the rest of his life.
Yet Percy was hardly doomed to mediocrity. Instead, he attended the 
highly regarded College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University 
in New York City, where again he did outstanding work. There at Columbia 
Percy became ever more enamored of the scientific worldview: its elegance, 
its order, even its strange logic in the mechanism of diseases. It was a world 
that Percy could so easily master that he was not often seen studying his sci-
ence books but reading novels and magazines. When the time came for him 
to choose a specialty, he elected pathology, perhaps because it allowed him 
to retain his personal aloofness: he would not be required to have firsthand 
dealings with patients. Yet Percy was also drawn to psychiatry. The reason 
seems clear: for all of his seeming suavity and easygoing manner, he was 
a very troubled man. Percy was losing much of his earlier enthusiasm for 
medicine, and he spent a good deal of his time at Columbia visiting Uncle 
Will’s New York friends, many of whom were either latently or openly ho-
mosexual. Moreover, when other students would be burrowing into books 
and lab work, Percy was slipping downtown for his weekly appointment with 
an analyst, Dr. Janet Brioche. She was a neo-Freudian whose foremost con-
cern was not with elaborate psychiatric theories but with the welfare of her 
analysands. Patiently she helped Percy deal with his many perplexities—his 
father’s suicide, his own loneliness and sadness, his uncertain sexuality and 
his even more uncertain future, his obsession with familial honor, and (not 
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least of all) his anger at never having known a mother’s love. In Percy’s case, 
the Freudian method of “transference” actually worked, as he gained such 
confidence and trust in Dr. Brioche that he was able to transfer many of his 
fantasies and feelings about his dead parents to this surrogate mother. But 
while Dr. Brioche could soothe Percy’s spiritual ache, she could not cure it. 
As he would later observe, “In my own experience the most valuable lesson 
of psychoanalysis was learning what it could not do.”9 No sooner, in fact, 
had Percy finished his medical degree at Columbia in 1941 than he lost his 
surrogate father. Will Percy died in January 1942, shortly after America’s 
entry into the Second World War. Percy’s world was falling apart in nearly 
every imaginable way.
Percy had elected to do his residency in pathology at Bellevue Hospital 
in New York City, where he performed autopsies on unclaimed bodies from 
Skid Row. Careless about wearing masks and gloves, Percy and three of his 
fellow internists (on a team of twelve) contracted tuberculosis from bacilli 
still alive in the cadavers of these derelicts. Though the physical causes of the 
disease had been discovered in 1882, still in 1942 it was thought also to be the 
result of moral defection—a product of corrupt character or weak will. Percy 
often wondered if this superstition were perhaps true. Before the discovery of 
streptomycin in 1946, the only known cures for consumption, as it was then 
called, were an optimistic attitude and an extended rest amid salubrious air. 
To ensure the latter, Percy was sent to the famous Trudeau Sanatorium on 
Lake Saranac in the Adirondack Mountains of upstate New York. Expense 
was no concern, since Uncle Will had left the Percy brothers a very generous 
estate. Yet if optimism were the key to Percy’s cure, his odds were not good. 
He was filled, on the contrary, with self-doubt and self-disgust as he lay in 
indolent ease while his two brothers went off to the war. Yet the convalescent 
Percy found that he did not miss medicine, and his illness also meant that he 
was saved from the grave choices he was dreading—decisions about marriage 
and career and what to do with himself in a world that seemed to make ever 
less sense. During his two years at the sanatorium, Percy became known as a 
cynical and nihilistic figure, a quick-witted but morose loner. Percy was later 
to write his first book—an unpublished novel called “The Gramercy Winner,” 
in imitation of Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain—about the decadence of life 
at a sanatorium. As a world with “no sweat, no love, no exercise, no injury,” it 
was a metaphor of our own moral decadence in a world that has also come to 
live amid moral indolence and ease.10
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Why, then, did Percy later describe his disease as a stroke of good 
fortune? The immediate answer is that it freed him from continuing the 
medical career for which he had lost all interest. More deeply it meant that, 
there on Lake Saranac, Percy began to find his spiritual life no less than to 
recover his bodily health. It was during these crucial months that Percy be-
gan to turn away not only from his scientific materialism but also from the 
Stoic humanism of Uncle Will. He was now in search of more substantial 
answers to the ache that gnawed at his soul. Percy spent much of his time in 
the sanatorium reading. He burrowed deeply into Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, 
Franz Kafka and Thomas Mann. But he also read theologians, including 
Augustine and Aquinas and Søren Kierkegaard. 
Percy got well enough to return to New York City in late 1944, where 
he enjoyed (thanks to the inheritance he had received at Uncle Will’s death) 
the carefree life of a young bachelor who had no intention of returning to 
medicine. Yet Percy suffered a relapse in mid-1945, and he was forced to 
convalesce again at a sanatorium in New Haven, Connecticut, where the 
playwright Eugene O’Neill had been a patient thirty years earlier. There 
Percy found himself strangely reborn, largely through re-reading Dos-
toyevsky’s Notes from the Underground. This angry and satirical book, with 
its powerful critique of nineteenth-century determinism, awakened Percy 
to his own true vocation: to be a writer. At last he knew what he really 
wanted to do: to write about twentieth-century man as also a creature in 
extremis.
Percy returned to Mississippi in 1946 to approach his thirtieth birthday 
not only joyfully but also fearfully. He had answered the great question of 
what to do with himself, but many other questions remained unanswered: to 
write in what setting, in what literary genres, about what subjects, and with 
what (if any) other human beings as his companions? There in Greenville 
and at Brinkwood, the family’s mountain retreat in Sewanee, Tennessee, 
Percy dated a series of local women. But as soon as the relationships would 
grow serious—even reaching the point of marriage—he would coldly aban-
don these women, leaving them crushed and causing them to regard Percy 
as a cad. It seems clear that Percy was toying with personal possibilities. 
Possibility, he had learned from Kierkegaard, can serve as both the ulti-
mate temptation and the ultimate threat. The open-ended liberty to create 
one’s own life tempts one either to godlike pride in choosing whatever one 
wants, or else it threatens one with the demonic despair of finding nothing 
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worth doing. The outward and visible locus of such pure possibility, Percy 
believed, is the American West. And so in 1947 Percy persuaded his old 
Greenville friend Shelby Foote to join him on a trip to New Mexico. Both 
of these young bachelors were aspiring writers, and yet neither of them had 
shown much more than promise. Perhaps they would find what they were 
supposed to do out there on those barren mountains and under the gigantic 
sky, where there were no complications of family and region and history.
It is also noteworthy that, at about this same time, Percy purchased 
the German Luger that his father had brought back from Europe but had 
later sold to a nephew. That Percy not only purchased this gun but also kept 
it near at hand makes one wonder: was he filled with a self-loathing that 
caused him to consider the act that his father had committed? It is not an 
idle question. In The Last Gentleman, suicide in the New Mexico desert 
looms large and, in The Second Coming, suicide with a German Luger 
becomes an awful possibility. Yet Percy knew that the true possibility is not 
death but life. Percy was not just jesting when he declared that the chief 
question of his life was whether he would kill himself.
He knew that, if he were not to commit self-murder, he would have 
to seek a radical newness of life that would produce radical ethical action. 
To Foote’s tremendous surprise, therefore, Percy announced that he was 
leaving Santa Fe and returning to New Orleans to marry Mary Bernice 
(“Bunt”) Townsend. It wasn’t an arbitrary decision. Percy had met her sev-
eral summers earlier while he was working at a Greenville hospital where 
she was working as a nurse. Percy had been smitten by Bunt because she 
wasn’t the proverbial southern belle, the fluttery coquette playing the ritual 
game of romance. She was straightforward in her manner, self-supporting 
in her work, and competent to do almost anything she turned her hand to. 
Bunt, in turn, was impressed with Walker’s almost painful modesty about 
his prominent family’s mystique. Because she was the only woman in whose 
presence he was completely comfortable, Percy felt not only eros but also 
philia toward her. Bunt was no mere prospective sexual partner but also a 
woman who could become his best friend. Yet Percy was extremely shy at 
social gatherings, and he dreaded a wedding that would serve as a huge 
familial event. But he didn’t put their courtship on hold. Bunt and Walker 
began dating again in October 1947, and they were married on November 6. 
With only a few friends gathered as witnesses, the ceremony was performed 
at the First Baptist Church of New Orleans. The pastor, Dr. J. D. Grey, 
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urged the couple to make their love as pure as the gold in their wedding 
rings. Shelby Foote, Percy’s best man, stifled his giggles because he knew 
that the ring he had just handed the minister was made of platinum.
The newlyweds lived at first in Sewanee and New Orleans, as Percy 
continued to read and write. He was also pondering his religious no less 
than his literary future. One of the figures whom Percy had first read at the 
Saranac sanatorium was the great Danish Protestant thinker of the nine-
teenth century, Søren Kierkegaard. Again Percy turned to Kierkegaard’s 
little essay called “On the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle.” 
There Kierkegaard argues that the genius outstrips the ordinary run of 
women and men by his superior intelligence and insight, by the sheer bril-
liance of his mind and the sheer inventiveness of his imagination. Shake-
speare, Michelangelo, Beethoven, Einstein (to supply obvious examples) are 
all geniuses whose work the world seeks to fathom. Yet eventually someone 
will do it, says Kierkegaard. Someone will completely comprehend their 
work, fathoming it fully, so that another genius will have to create yet a new 
masterwork of science or art. Sad to say, even the work of this new genius 
will finally be outstripped. The reason is not far to find. The humanist world 
of the genius, Kierkegaard contends, is a beautiful but sad world because it 
is confined within the realm of immanence. The genius discovers possibili-
ties that are latent within the human condition. He brings to birth, like a 
midwife, what is already potential within us. The apostle, by contrast, works 
within the sphere of transcendence. Though perhaps undistinguished by 
intelligence or eloquence or learning—indeed, he may be an illiterate fish-
erman or a humble tentmaker!—the apostle announces News from beyond 
the walls of the world: deliverance to the captives, sight to the blind, hear-
ing to the deaf—indeed, salvation to and for all. The apostle thus speaks 
with an authority not his own. He is called to announce Tidings that he has 
not himself discovered or invented. And there are only two responses to this 
apostolic Word. It cannot be declared merely interesting or made the object 
of further study: it must be either heeded or howled at.
“Here I am,” Percy later wrote, “a Catholic living in Louisiana, and 
the man to whom I owe the greatest debt is this great Protestant thinker.” 
“I suppose the great bombshell for me,” Percy also wrote, “was the famous 
passage of Kierkegaard describing Hegel as the philosopher who explained 
everything under the sun except one small detail: what it means to be a man 
who lives in the world and who must die.”11 No small lack, this! Kierkegaard 
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also wittily remarked that, after constructing the world’s largest philosophi-
cal system, Hegel had then to figure out how to draw his next breath. Hegel 
was a thinker, said Kierkegaard, who was forced to live in a shack outside 
the great crystal palace of his own philosophy. Percy saw that Kierkegaard 
was exactly right: while it possible to invent systems of thought, it is not 
possible to create a system of existence. Living is not systematic. We live by 
fits and starts, by backing and filling, by inching forward and falling back 
yet again.
While there is indeed a tremendous legacy of human wisdom, it cannot 
be transmitted progressively, so that each generation advances further than 
the previous. On the contrary, said Kierkegaard, each person and each age 
must begin over again at the beginning. Yet for all of Kierkegaard’s brilliant 
insight, Percy was troubled by the great Dane’s solitariness and sadness, 
and especially by his notion that faith is finally an absurd leap into the void. 
Even Kierkegaard regarded himself as a corrective rather than a cure. Percy 
was drawn, instead, to Catholicism because it offered him a theology that 
reconciled faith and reason. As a satirist who wanted to sting his audience 
out of spiritual torpor, Percy the Catholic would have not only a Kierke-
gaardian diagnostic tool for detecting the nature of our modern sickness; 
he would also have the authoritative and communal remedy to it. Percy 
thus came to believe, as he would later have his crazy character Dr. Thomas 
More confess, “the whole Thing, God Jews Christ Church.”12
Yet Percy’s conversion was not entirely an affair of the mind. It’s as if he 
and Bunt were renewing the Catholic cord that Uncle Will had snapped at 
Sewanee many years earlier when he gave up the faith. It’s also noteworthy 
that Percy the young agnostic had acquired a grudging respect for Catho-
lics. One his best friends at Chapel Hill had been Harry Stoval, a Catholic 
who rolled out of bed every Sunday for Mass while Percy and his room-
mates were still three sheets to the wind. When they complained about his 
disturbing their sleep in order to observe meaningless rites, Stoval replied: 
“Your religions may not mean anything to you, but you sure as hell better 
not trifle with mine.”13 Again at Columbia, Percy found himself drawn to 
Frank Hardart, another unapologetic Catholic. Once more, at the Trudeau 
Sanatorium, Percy was impressed with a New Jersey Catholic named Art 
Fortugno. Percy noticed that all these Catholic friends were imbued with 
certainty and serenity, with a clear sense of their difference and their dis-
tance from ordinary American values. Fortugno was also a man whose keen 
Walker Percy: A Brief Biography 23
theological arguments forced Percy to read Thomas Aquinas for the first 
time. Percy was impressed with the clarity and depth of Aquinas’s thought. 
He saw that Catholicism offered him a theological system altogether as 
impressive as modern science in its range and completeness and consis-
tency—yet without the reductionist pretense of modern scientism.
Walker and Bunt Percy did not seek instruction in the Catholic faith 
from a professional theologian or professor but from a practical-minded par-
ish priest (rather like Father Rinaldo Smith in Love in the Ruins). They were 
baptized at the Holy Name Church in New Orleans on Saturday, December 
13, 1947. Rather than dreading his first confession, Percy eagerly awaited it: 
“This is one of the main reasons I’ve become a Catholic,” he admitted.14 To-
gether with three hundred schoolchildren, they were confirmed on Easter 
in the spring of 1948. When the priest insisted that, as the only two adult 
converts among all of these young confirmands, they lead the procession 
into the church, the Percys politely refused. They marched, instead, at the 
end of the line. That they were thus made to seem like spiritual babes was 
no obstacle; on the contrary, they saw themselves as fellow pilgrims and 
wayfarers with all other Catholics and Christians, whether young or old, 
naïve or wise. They also sought to live a quiet and modest life, away from 
the decadence of the French Quarter on the one hand, but also from the af-
fectation of the Garden District on the other. They chose, instead, to live in 
the rather nondescript town of Covington, across Lake Pontchartrain from 
New Orleans. Drawing on the inheritance left by Uncle Will, they built a 
lovely home near a tributary of the Bogue Falaya. St. Joseph’s Benedictine 
Abbey was also located nearby, and the Percys would often worship in the 
great abbey church on high holy days, when the Mass would be chanted in 
Gregorian fashion.
They also became involved in local school and civic affairs. Percy the 
former segregationist took seriously the social teachings of the Gospel, 
especially as they were embodied by such Catholics as Dorothy Day in her 
work among the poor of New York City and Father Louis Twomey in his 
concern for the civil rights of Negroes. Though never an activist himself, 
Percy became unapologetic in his support for the desegregation of the local 
schools. He denounced the local White Citizens’ Councils, formed to keep 
blacks out of the formerly all-white schools, calling them “uptown” versions 
of the Ku Klux Klan. He also helped local blacks open their own savings and 
loan association, so they could secure credit that the white banks would not 
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grant them because they lacked the wherewithal to make down payments in 
purchasing homes. He also defended Archbishop Rummel of New Orleans 
when, in a pastoral letter, the bishop declared segregation to be sinful. He 
also argued that the Confederate flag could no longer represent anything 
other than “segregation, white supremacy, and racism.”15 Yet Percy was 
no righteous scourge of the racists. He admired the Baptist minister Will 
Campbell not only for his defense of black people against discrimination, but 
also for admitting that rednecks were still his brothers and sisters in Christ. 
Percy would write important essays on the race question for Commonweal 
and Harper’s as well as for the radical Protestant journal Katallagete. As a 
political centrist, Percy opposed the Catholic radicalism of violent Vietnam 
War protesters such as Daniel and Philip Berrigan. He also lamented the 
support that certain fellow Catholics gave to the Sandinistas in Central 
America.
Yet Percy sought primarily to live and work as a novelist, not as a social 
commentator. Soon he established the routine that he would follow for the 
remaining forty years of his life. He would read and write all morning, then 
have lunch and take a nap, then work again in his home study or town office, 
before breaking either for a walk, bird-watching, or a swim in the river. Yet 
Percy was no stay-at-home writer like Eudora Welty and Flannery O’Connor. 
He and his wife were eager travelers. Percy found that travel invigorated 
his imagination. As a pathologist no longer working with a microscope but 
now with words, he was always looking for telltale symptoms of the human 
ailment. He also sought to invigorate his work by subjecting it to the critique 
of others. He showed his fiction not only to the anti-Catholic aesthete Shelby 
Foote, but also to fellow Catholic converts Allen Tate and Caroline Gordon 
(and later to Thomas Merton). They offered both praise and criticism.
Yet Percy’s progress as a novelist remained agonizingly slow. He finally 
gave up on a 942-page work called “The Charterhouse”—a novel about con-
version—and burned it. He completed “The Gramercy Winner”—a novel 
about baptism—but no publisher would take it. Yet these failures were es-
sential to Percy’s apprenticeship as a novelist, and he would keep returning 
to his early concerns. Still, Percy’s promise as a writer had not yet borne 
fruit. For eight years he had travailed in his reading and his writing, but he 
had almost nothing to show for it. He was now forty, and he was beginning 
to get desperate about his future.
Percy decided to try a new tack. He had been reading not only liter-
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ary but also philosophical works during these years—Sartre, Camus, Hei-
degger, and Jaspers among non-Christian existentialists; Maritain, Marcel, 
Aquinas, and Kierkegaard among Christian thinkers; Whitehead, Russell, 
Cassirer, Husserl, and Carnap among strict philosophers; and especially 
the aesthetician Suzanne Langer. Seeking to put his own outlook into clear 
focus, Percy began to write philosophical essays, mainly about the relation 
of words to things, and whether their relation depends on a transcendent 
third reality: the person who uses words to refer to things, and the God 
whose own triune life makes such references real rather than arbitrary. 
Percy argued that language is our unique human faculty, that symbol use is 
the single capacity differentiating us from the other animals.
To his surprise, these essays were readily accepted by various philo-
sophical journals. Many years later, in 1975, they were collected into a vol-
ume called The Message in the Bottle. Percy’s philosophical concern about 
the nature of language also had surprising personal relevance. In 1948 
the Percys had adopted a ten-month-old girl whom they had baptized as 
Mary Pratt. When in 1954 their biological daughter, Ann, was born, it soon 
became evident that she was stone deaf. The Percys were not daunted. In-
stead, they employed a speech teacher named Doris Mirrilees, a woman cut 
from the same cloth as Helen Keller’s Annie Sullivan. The Percys wanted to 
ensure that Ann not only learn to use sign language but also to speak. Much 
of Percy’s later interest in semiotics—the science of signs—derives from his 
many hours spent teaching Ann to sound out the most fundamental words.
The real breakthrough essay for Percy was entitled “The Man on the 
Train: Three Existential Modes.” It was published in a 1956 issue of Par-
tisan Review, and it dealt with the modern problem of alienation—with 
the urban commuter who is a seeming success in the world, but who is 
personally miserable, yet who is utterly unaware of the fact, much less the 
cause, of his alienation. Percy explores the various means for diagnosing 
such alienation, how one seeks to escape from it, and yet how finally there 
is no avoiding the enigma of one’s own selfhood. It was as if, having got 
clear about the fundamental problem that he wanted to explore philosophi-
cally, Percy could also write about it novelistically. Percy would later make 
the following remarkable (if somewhat overheated) confession in a letter to 
Caroline Gordon: “Actually I do not consider myself a novelist but a moral-
ist or a propagandist. My spiritual father is Pascal (and/or Kierkegaard). 
And if I also kneel before the altar of Lawrence and Joyce and Faulkner, it 
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is not because I wish to do what they did, even if I could. What I really want 
to do is to tell people what they must do and what they must believe if they 
want to live.”16 Now that Percy at last had his philosophical and religious 
bearings, Shelby Foote suggested that he use New Orleans, a city that Percy 
knew intimately, as the setting for the fledgling novel he was trying to get off 
the ground. Though it took four painstaking years of writing and revising, 
The Moviegoer was finally published in 1961. Its popular sales were modest, 
but the critics liked it so much that it won the National Book Award (NBA) 
for fiction, the highest American literary prize. The Moviegoer is, among 
other things, a novel about Binx Bolling’s conversion—but also, and not 
least of all, Percy’s own metanoia. Because he was a great enthusiast for the 
presidency of John Kennedy, the event of November 22, 1963, threw him 
off track for an entire year, as he sought without success to write about it. 
Yet in 1967 he came forth with The Last Gentleman, a runner-up for the 
National Book Award. It too is a story about conversion—only in this case 
a pilgrimage in reverse, and it ends with an extremely ironic and marvelous 
kind of baptism. Love in the Ruins followed in 1971, and it again won the 
chief prize. Though not Percy’s best literary achievement, it is surely his 
funniest and perhaps his most prophetic work. Lancelot, Percy’s angriest 
but also one of his finest-crafted novels, was published in 1977. The Second 
Coming followed in 1980, and The Thanatos Syndrome in 1987. Neither of 
them lives up to the high standards set in Percy’s earlier work. Two more 
volumes of essays were issued: Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book 
in 1983, and Signposts in a Strange Land posthumously in 1991.
This is hardly to say that, once he had made his literary breakthrough, 
Percy passed swimmingly through the world. On the contrary, he remained 
a troubled man, even as his troubles also fed his fiction. What Tolson ob-
serves of the first novel is true of Percy’s work as a whole: “The drama of his 
life was less a story of events than an internal struggle—psychological but 
ultimately spiritual—to find a ground of certainty and security, a struggle 
to find an essential self, a soul. Percy had finally learned how to project this 
internal quest upon a believable fictive world.”17 Afflicted with inveterate 
insomnia, Percy joked that he tried not to lose too much sleep over it. He 
also suffered from other psychosomatic illnesses, including chronic diver-
ticulitis as well as bipolar disorder. About the latter, Percy quipped that his 
wife would like to see more of the manic highs and fewer of the depres-
sive lows. There were dark periods in Percy’s life when he found refuge 
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in women other than his wife, especially graduate students at Louisiana 
State University when he was teaching there. He could also be unspeakably 
coarse and curt, even toward his dear Bunt. There is also the indisputable 
fact of Percy’s dependence on alcohol to help quiet his demons. Thus did he 
both begin and end as a man whose spleen injured himself and others even 
as it inspired much of his art.
Yet these personal failings cannot cancel Percy’s courage and generos-
ity. He was almost entirely responsible for the publication of John Kennedy 
Toole’s hilarious novel A Confederacy of Dunces—after the manuscript had 
been foisted on him by the suicide of Toole’s importunate mother. Percy 
was also an unabashed opponent of abortion. He argued that we might as 
well kill the aged, infirm, and unproductive on similar grounds. It is no 
surprise that Percy should have become a staunch advocate of John Paul 
II’s Christian witness to our “culture of death,” as the pope called it. In a 
letter that the New York Times refused to publish, Percy sought to startle 
his fellow Americans by saying that we are now faced with a stark choice: 
“It’s either the Pope or Los Angeles.”18 Percy also became overt in his own 
personal witness, reminding Shelby Foote and other agnostic friends that 
they should not let their lives end without giving themselves to Jesus Christ. 
When Percy contracted prostate cancer, he volunteered for his doctors 
at the Mayo Clinic to use experimental medicines, in the hope that they 
might learn how to cure others even if he himself were not healed. He 
also joined a Benedictine lay confraternity in order to be buried among the 
monks at St. Joseph’s Abbey, located not far from his home in Covington. 
When death came, as it did near the end of his seventy-fourth year, Percy 
the pilgrim had reached his shrine and Percy the writer had finished his 
work. His grave marker declares simply: “Walker Percy, May 28, 1916–May 
10, 1990.”
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2The Moviegoer’s Cartesian Theater
Moviegoing as Walker Percy’s Metaphor for the 
Cartesian Mind
Woods Nash
Binx Bolling is the moviegoing protagonist of The Moviegoer (1961), 
Walker Percy’s first published novel. In an interview, Percy once referred 
to Binx as a “victim” of Descartes, to whom Percy attributed “many of 
the troubles of the modern world.”1 Did Percy intend some connection 
between Binx’s moviegoing and his unfortunate Cartesian heritage? In 
this essay, I argue that Percy used Binx’s moviegoing as a metaphor for 
his having a Cartesian mind. As Percy knew, many Descartes scholars 
regard the Cartesian self as a purely thinking thing whose mind is like a 
theater. Seated in that theater, the self entertains ideas, or mental objects, 
which stand like a screen between the self and the nonmental world. It 
is consistent with the two most widely held readings of Descartes on the 
nature of an idea to regard ideas as mental objects, as I note below. I then 
argue that there is ample evidence to support our seeing Binx’s moviego-
ing as a metaphor for his having a Cartesian mind. Next, I describe how 
our reading The Moviegoer in this way might enrich our understanding 
of this novel, Percy’s other work, and Percy himself. I conclude with some 
brief reflections on the implications of my reading for Percy’s regard-
ing modern society, individual character, and contemporary culture as 
Cartesian.
Before I can elicit the various connections that the novel makes be-
tween Binx’s moviegoing and Descartes, I must first briefly discuss Des-
cartes’ view of the nature of an idea. Only after considering Descartes’ view 
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will we be in a position to appreciate the nuances of Percy’s portrayal of 
Binx-the-moviegoer as a Cartesian specter and spectator.
Descartes on the Nature of an Idea: Two Interpretations
In his Meditations, Descartes famously concluded, from the mere fact that 
he thinks, that he could be certain of his own existence. It was impossible 
for him to be deceived in the belief that he, a thinking thing, exists, for, 
Descartes reasoned, to be deceived, there still must be something that 
is deceived and some thought about which that thing is deceived. Thus, 
Descartes achieved certainty about this: There is at least one thing in the 
world—namely, him, a thing that thinks. But what is it to think? To think, 
Descartes held, always involves having ideas. I take all of this to be a fairly 
uncontroversial reading of Descartes. What is a bit more contentious, how-
ever, is this issue: How should we understand Descartes’ conception of an 
idea? An answer to this question is important, for if the Cartesian self is 
characterized by thinking, and if thinking involves having ideas, then Des-
cartes’ conception of an idea informed his view of the self. Furthermore, if, 
as I will argue, Percy suggested that Binx has a Cartesian mind, then, to a 
great extent, Binx has a Cartesian self.
In the “preface to the reader” of his Meditations, Descartes com-
mented that the word idea is ambiguous. “Idea,” Descartes told us, can be 
taken materially and refer to an operation of the intellect, or a mental act. 
However, “idea” also “can be taken objectively, as the thing represented by 
that operation; and this thing, even if it is not regarded as existing outside 
the intellect, can still, in virtue of its essence, be more perfect than myself.”2 
Thus, in this passage, Descartes identified at least two senses of idea—
“idea” as a mental act and “idea” as a mental object. Given this ambiguity, 
we might ask: Did Descartes intend to use “idea” in one or both of these 
senses? Or did he hold some other conception of an idea—for example, 
“idea” as some combination of both mental act and mental object? Fortu-
nately, according to the argument that I wish to make, the way in which 
Percy used moviegoing as a metaphor for the Cartesian mind could be 
supported by either of the two most plausible readings of Descartes on the 
nature of an idea. Those readings are (1) every idea is some combination of 
both a mental act and a mental object;3 and (2) every idea is only a mental 
object.4 On both of these readings, the self, in thought, first encounters 
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mental objects. That is, in thought, mental objects are likened to a screen 
that separates the self from nonmental reality. For Descartes, that screen 
of mental objects is in place, so to speak, whether or not the self attains 
knowledge of any nonmental reality. The self, in thought, has no immediate 
access to nonmental reality.
Moviegoing as Metaphor for the Cartesian Mind
The novel’s title renders it obvious that readers are to think of Binx as a 
moviegoer.5 And this is not hard to do: in the course of the story, Binx 
attends several movies, and he often refers to films, actresses, and actors. 
When he leaves work at his uncle’s brokerage firm, it is his “custom” on sum-
mer evenings, he tells us, “to take a shower, put on shirt and pants and stroll 
over to the deserted playground and there sit on the ocean wave, spread 
out the movie page of the Times-Picayune on one side, phone book on the 
other, and a city map in my lap” (10). Choosing a theater in some remote 
neighborhood of the city, he plots a route to it.
Yet, beyond the literal sense in which Binx is a moviegoer, I wish to 
argue that Binx is a moviegoer in a metaphorical sense—that is, his lit-
eral moviegoing is a metaphor for his having a Cartesian mind. There is, I 
think, ample evidence to support this thesis. First, the novel suggests that 
a person can be a moviegoer in a nonliteral sense of that term. Second, 
Percy was aware that Descartes scholars have likened the Cartesian mind 
to an inner theater. Third, the novel alludes to Descartes when Binx refers 
to Archimedes’ “secret leverage point” (82)—a “point” that, as ghostly and 
nowhere, involves the sort of detached perspective that Binx maintains for 
most of the novel, especially in his moviegoing. Fourth, Binx often thinks 
of his life situations as if they were scenes in a film. In doing so, he allows 
his thoughts of movies to stand between himself and the world, just as, for 
Descartes, mental objects stand like a screen between the self and the non-
mental world. When these points are seen cumulatively, it becomes likely 
that Percy used moviegoing in this specific, metaphorical sense.
Nonliteral Moviegoing in The Moviegoer
First, let us note that the novel suggests that a person can be a moviegoer 
without literally going to movies. On the bus from Chicago to New Orleans, 
Binx talks with a young “romantic,” of whom he observes: “He is a movie-
32  Woods Nash
goer, though of course he does not go to movies” (216). If not in the literal 
sense, in what sense is this young man a moviegoer? Binx hints at an answer 
to that question, I think, in these musings: “Two things I am curious about. 
How does he sit? Immediately graceful and not aware of it or mediately 
graceful and aware of it? How does he read The Charterhouse of Parma? 
Immediately as a man who is in the world and who has an appetite for the 
book as he might have an appetite for peaches, or mediately as one who finds 
himself under the necessity of sticking himself into the world in a certain 
fashion, of slumping in an acceptable slump, of reading an acceptable book 
on an acceptable bus?” (214–15; my emphasis). Binx concludes that the 
young man reads and slumps mediately: “He is a romantic. His posture is 
the first clue: it is too good to be true, this distillation of all graceful slumps” 
(215). The young man’s actions are accompanied by his entertaining ideas 
of acceptable actions—ideas that mediate whatever contact with the world 
the young man achieves. He is not immediately immersed in, or engaged 
with, the world. Instead, holding in his mind an image of the distillation 
of all graceful slumps, he slumps. In short, this “romantic” is a Cartesian 
whose mental self is separated from the physical world by ideas—or mental 
objects—such as images.6 All of this is consonant with the two dominant 
interpretations of a Cartesian idea as—or, at least, as involving—a mental 
object. So, in the case of the young man on the bus, we might say that Percy 
used the label “moviegoer” as a metaphor for the young man’s having a 
Cartesian mind. We should also note that Binx seems to have an intimate 
understanding of the young man’s predicament—perhaps because Binx 
sees a bit of himself in this romantic (214–16).
The “Common Image” of the Cartesian Mind as an Inner 
Theater
Admittedly, this single example is, at best, scant evidence that Percy in-
tended to use moviegoing in any metaphorical sense throughout the novel. 
As further evidence, consider that Percy read closely Jacques Maritain’s The 
Dream of Descartes several years before he began writing The Moviegoer.7 
In Maritain’s work, Percy would have found a reference to Cartesian ideas 
as “pictures” that thought “discovers in itself.” Maritain wrote: “Locke’s 
formula: ideas are the immediate objects of thought, is a pure Cartesian 
formula. Idea-pictures, idea-screens. In short, we know only our ideas; 
thought has direct contact only with itself.”8 If the Cartesian self achieves 
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any contact with the world, that contact is mediated by ideas. It is quite 
plausible that, for a faithful moviegoer (as Percy was), Maritain’s character-
ization of Cartesian ideas as “pictures” and “screens” would elicit thoughts 
of the movies—or “picture shows,” as they were often called.
Furthermore, Percy was familiar with Arnold Toynbee’s The Growths 
of Civilizations, in which Toynbee compared the wall-watching experience 
of the people in Plato’s allegory of the cave to moviegoing.9 Though it is, of 
course, quite a stretch from Platonic to Cartesian metaphysics, Toynbee’s 
comparison might at least have set Percy to ponder moviegoing as an experi-
ence that could be used as a metaphor for other philosophical views.
Finally, in his commentary on Descartes, Jorge Secada drew on what 
he called a “common image” when he characterized the Cartesian mind as 
a theater “in which are displayed all the immediate objects of awareness. 
Keeping to the analogy, this inner theatre includes not only the stage but 
also the stalls, for the direct objects of the soul include both its formally 
existing acts of thought [that is, mental acts] and the objectively existing 
objects of these acts [that is, mental objects].”10 Given Percy’s interest in 
Descartes, it would not be surprising to learn that Percy was familiar with 
this “common image” of the Cartesian mind as an inner theater and that, 
in The Moviegoer, he replaced Descartes’ theater with the modern movie 
cinema.
Descartes and Moviegoing in the Novel: Moviegoer as 
Detached, Ghostly, and Nowhere
Alongside Binx’s encounter with the young romantic on the bus, there is 
another passage in the novel that seems to connect Descartes and moviego-
ing. Binx and Kate have just emerged from a cinema and are wandering 
across a university campus. Kate asks Binx about his “vertical search,” which 
is the search that he undertook years before he embarked on his current 
“horizontal” search. Earlier in the novel, Binx described his vertical search 
in these terms:
During those years I stood outside the universe and sought to understand it. I 
lived in my room as an Anyone living Anywhere and read fundamental books. 
. . . Certainly it did not matter to me where I was when I read such a book as 
The Expanding Universe. The greatest success of this enterprise . . . came one 
night when I sat in a hotel room in Birmingham and read a book called The 
Chemistry of Life. When I finished it, it seemed to me that the main goals of 
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my search were reached or were in principle reachable. . . . The only difficulty 
was that though the universe had been disposed of, I myself was left over. 
There I lay in my hotel room with my search over yet still obliged to draw one 
breath and then the next. (69–70)
Now, outside the cinema, when Kate asks Binx about his vertical search, 
Binx explains that the search was exciting because “as you get deeper 
into the search, you unify. You understand more and more specimens by 
fewer and fewer formulae. . . . Of course you are always after the big one, 
the new key, the secret leverage point, and that is the best of it” (82; my 
emphasis).
Commenting on this passage, Lewis A. Lawson noted that “that ‘secret 
leverage point,’ the Archimedean fulcrum to use in moving the world, is 
far, far outside the world, so that one must look at the world as if it were a 
movie.”11 Furthermore, Lawson observed: “That ‘leverage point’ was sought, 
as Percy well knows, by Rene Descartes.”12 Lawson went on to cite Norman 
Kemp Smith’s version of Descartes’ Second Meditation, where Descartes 
wrote: “Archimedes, that he might displace the whole earth, required only 
that there might be some one point, fixed and immovable, to serve in lever-
age; so likewise I shall be entitled to entertain high hopes if I am fortunate 
to find some one thing that is certain and indubitable.”13 Thus, we have this 
further association between Descartes and moviegoing: in pursuing the verti-
cal search, Binx had sought an Archimedean-Cartesian point—a perspective 
“outside the world” from which he could understand the world, viewing it 
“as if it were a movie,” as Lawson wrote.14 Furthermore, even though Binx 
claims to have abandoned his vertical search years ago, he remains drawn to 
the Cartesian ideal of an extraterrestrial vantage point. As Howland put it: 
“For most of the novel, Binx clings to his objective-transcendent viewpoint. 
He assumes that he can look at his life from the outside, as if he were Des-
cartes’s disembodied cogito, cut off from the world it would know.”15 Like the 
stereotypical Cartesian, Binx is “prone to taking a detached observer’s stance 
toward the world, to formulating experience reductively, and to abstracting 
and categorizing others—a form of alienation.”16 Here, it is also worth noting 
that, at the end of the novel, Binx appears to have abandoned both moviego-
ing and his former posture of Cartesian detachment. In this way, the novel’s 
association between Cartesianism and moviegoing is further strengthened. 
Below, I will return to this last point.
The Moviegoer’s Cartesian Theater 35
Finally, Percy paired the Cartesian mind and moviegoing by showing 
that Binx, in moviegoing, risks being nowhere, just as, for Descartes, there 
is a sense in which the self, or mind, is nowhere. To be sure, insofar as 
a mind and a body are “intermingled”—to use Descartes’ term from the 
Meditations (81)—a mind might be connected to, or associated with, the lo-
cation of a particular body. However, when that mind is considered by itself 
as a substance whose essence is thinking, that mind is neither temporal nor 
spatially extended or located. In short, the Cartesian mind is ghoulish. Wit-
ness Binx’s moviegoing during his vertical search: he tells us that, for him, 
there was “a danger of slipping clean out of space and time. It is possible to 
become a ghost and not know whether one is in downtown Loews in Denver 
or suburban Bijou in Jacksonville. So it was with me” (75; my emphasis). 
Binx also describes this danger in terms of his being “lost, cut loose meta-
physically speaking,” for he might be “seeing one copy of a film which might 
be shown anywhere and at any time” (75). Thus, Binx acknowledges that 
he is tempted to watch movies in a way that, paradoxically, positions him 
nowhere, just as the Cartesian mind is nowhere.
Furthermore, while Percy here used ghost imagery to suggest the dis-
location of the Cartesian mind, elsewhere Percy employed ghost imagery 
to characterize the movie theater itself. When Binx, Sharon, and Lonnie 
see Fort Dobbs, Binx describes the Moonlite Drive-In as “this ghost of a 
theater” (144). Percy’s image of the ghost for both Cartesian person and 
theater echoes Gilbert Ryle’s famous and abusive description of the Car-
tesian mind as “the Ghost in the Machine.”17 Five years before Ryle’s book 
was first published in 1949, Maritain, in The Dream of Descartes, referred 
to the Cartesian mind as “an angel inhabiting a machine.”18 As already 
noted, Percy was familiar with this work of Maritain. Given his interest in 
contemporary philosophy, it is likely that Percy was also familiar with Ryle’s 
book. So, it seems that, from Descartes, Percy borrowed the image of a 
mind that haunts the Newtonian world—which includes the body—and he 
refashioned that image as a moviegoer transfixed in an enveloping theater. 
Together in the dark, spectator and screen might suffer a ghostly dislocation 
from the machinations of their anonymous surroundings.
Movies as the Screen That Mediates Binx’s Life Situations
I have come to my fourth and final bit of evidence that Percy used movie-
going as a metaphor for the Cartesian mind: Binx often thinks of his life 
36  Woods Nash
situations as if they were scenes in a film. In doing so, he allows his thoughts 
of movies to stand between himself and the world, just as, for Descartes, 
mental objects stand like a screen between the self and the nonmental 
world.
Binx’s propensity to think of his life as if it were a movie began early. 
When Binx was a boy and his brother died, his Aunt Emily commissioned 
him to “act” like a soldier—a word that Binx understood in its movie-related 
sense of “take on a role,” for, just after Binx relates that childhood conversa-
tion with his aunt, he tells us that he became a soldier in Korea (10). “I could 
easily act like a soldier. Was that all I had to do?” (4). Below, I consider 
several examples of Binx’s frequent film-related references.
Besides Binx’s desire to “act,” the movies also intervene in his life by 
giving him “memorable moments.” “Other people, so I have read, treasure 
memorable moments in their lives: the time one climbed the Parthenon 
at sunrise, the summer night one met a lonely girl in Central Park and 
achieved with her a sweet and natural relationship, as they say in books. I 
too once met a girl in Central Park, but it is not much to remember. What 
I remember is the time John Wayne killed three men with a carbine as he 
was falling to the dusty street in Stagecoach, and the time the kitten found 
Orson Welles in the doorway in The Third Man” (7). Later, when Binx eyes 
an attractive woman sitting near him on the bus, it occurs to him that, 
if this were a scene in a movie, he would only have to wait and a perfect 
opportunity to meet her would arise: “The bus would get lost or the city 
would be bombed and she and I would tend the wounded. As it is, I may as 
well stop thinking about her” (12–13). Additionally, Binx says that he care-
fully maintains “a Gregory Peckish sort of distance” from Sharon (68). Binx 
later compares Sharon’s appearance to “snapshots of Ava Gardner when she 
was a high school girl in North Carolina” (93). All told, Binx references at 
least twelve films, thirty-seven actors, and eight actresses in the novel.19 By 
assuming a role or imagining himself in a scene or letting movies constitute 
his memorable moments, Binx is divorced from his immediate, physical 
surroundings. His life situations are mediated to him by film-related refer-
ences—as, for Descartes, mental objects might mediate nonmental reality.
Furthermore, as I briefly noted above, the mental objects that a Car-
tesian self entertains do not guarantee that person any knowledge of the 
nonmental world. When this point is considered alongside my thesis, it is 
not surprising to find that Binx senses the danger of his separation from 
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the physical world: “What is the malaise? you ask. The malaise is the pain 
of loss. The world is lost to you, the world and the people in it, and there 
remains only you and the world and you no more able to be in the world 
than Banquo’s ghost” (120). For Binx, the screen of Cartesian ideas is a 
nearly impenetrable divide. Everyday objects—like the collection of his 
wallet, keys, handkerchief, and pencil on his dresser—are often lost to him: 
“A man can look at this little pile on his bureau for thirty years and never 
once see it. It is as invisible as his own hand” (11). So, it is not difficult to see 
a connection between Binx’s experience of separation, or losing the world, 
and his moviegoing, at which times he is in danger of being “lost, cut loose 
metaphysically speaking” (75)—like a ghost, as we saw above. Howland 
made that connection in these terms: “Moviegoing is one stratagem that 
Binx uses to orient himself: while he is in the theater, all life is reduced to 
the image on the screen, and ‘real’ life [outside the theater] is temporarily 
suspended.”20
Finally, outside the theater, “Binx adopts the fictive world of the cin-
ema, impersonating the gestures and expressions of screen stars who, like 
William Holden, seem to have a ‘peculiar reality’ that he lacks.”21 Here, 
Howland invoked a passage in which Binx refers to the “resplendent” and 
“heightened reality” that movie stars possess when they are encountered in 
the flesh, which Binx contrasts with the “shadowy and precarious existence” 
of persons, like himself, who are sunk in everydayness (15–17). That contrast 
is, I think, reminiscent of Descartes’ contention that the objective being 
that ideas possess is “much less perfect than [the formal being] possessed 
by things which exist outside the intellect” (103). In other words, because 
Binx is a self long accustomed to entertaining a mere screen of ideas, it is not 
surprising that he would regard his own existence as “shadowy and precari-
ous” when compared to the glorious and cool 3-D formality of a screen star 
come to life. Merely to behold William Holden on the screen is fine enough, 
but to meet him incarnate in the French Quarter is surpassingly better.
In light of all of the evidence mustered in this section, I conclude that 
it is very plausible that Percy used Binx’s moviegoing as a metaphor for 
his having a Cartesian mind. Percy, it seems, deployed that metaphor in 
an astute way, for he focused on the point at which there has come to be 
scholarly consensus regarding the nature of Cartesian ideas—namely, that 
a Cartesian idea is, at least, a mental object that stands like a partitioning 
screen between a mental self and the nonmental world. Granting the plau-
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sibility of this reading of The Moviegoer, one still might wonder: How might 
this reading enrich our understanding of the novel, how does it position 
The Moviegoer in relationship to Percy’s other work, and what does it tell us 
about Percy himself? I will address these questions now in the final section.
Walker Percy and The Moviegoer: Rampant Disease in 
the Theater of Mind
When, to everyone’s surprise, The Moviegoer won the 1962 National Book 
Award for fiction, Percy commented in his acceptance speech that “it is 
perhaps not too farfetched” to compare his novel “with the science of pa-
thology.” He continued:
Its posture is the posture of the pathologist with his suspicion that something 
is wrong. There is time for me to say only this: that the pathology in this case 
had to do with the loss of individuality and the loss of identity at the very 
time when words like the “dignity of the individual” and “self-realization” 
are being heard more frequently than ever. Yet the patient is not mortally ill. 
. . . In short, the book attempts a modest restatement of the Judeo-Christian 
notion that man is more than an organism in an environment, more than an 
integrated personality, more even than a mature and creative individual, as 
the phrase goes. He is a wayfarer and a pilgrim.22
Yet, even as his book began to reach a wider audience, Percy was disap-
pointed that most readers did not find in the novel’s ending the suggestion 
that Binx becomes a Christian. That suggestion might be seen, for example, 
in Binx’s invocation of Kierkegaard—“As for my search. . . . I have not the 
authority, as the great Danish philosopher declared, to speak of such mat-
ters in any way other than the edifying” (237)—and in his reassuring his 
half siblings that Lonnie, their dying brother, will not be disabled when he 
is resurrected (240). “Somewhat melodramatically,” Jay Tolson wrote, Percy 
“concluded that his novel was unsuccessful, ‘since it apparently failed of its 
primary purpose: that it was meant to be a novel of hope in the midst of 
pagan despair.’”23 Percy vowed that his next novel would “be mainly given 
to ass-kicking for Jesus’ sake.”24
I want to suggest, first, that my reading of the novel is important because 
it helps to explain Percy’s urgency to have readers see that Binx’s search 
culminates in Christian faith. Percy’s urgency is related to the severity of 
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Binx’s predicament and to Percy’s belief that that predicament is both deep 
and wide in Western culture. In arguing that Percy accused Descartes, I 
am far from the first, of course, to frame Binx’s peculiar pathogenesis in 
categories provided by modern philosophy. Quite often, Binx’s predicament 
is defined somewhat narrowly in Kierkegaardian language: Binx longs for 
certification, it is said. Binx is an aesthete pursuing endless diversions. Binx 
is foundering at a stage lower than the religious. And so on. Surely, all of this 
is on target, and none of it is good news for Binx. But this standard Kier-
kegaardian diagnosis falls short, I think, in that it fails to see the popular 
prevalence of Binx’s predicament, its depth (that is, reaching to the very 
core of the modern self), and that both prevalence and depth have specific 
roots in Western culture—namely, in Descartes.
But neither am I the first to think of Binx as afflicted with a Cartesian 
malady. Patricia Lewis Poteat, in particular, noted that “Binx’s predica-
ment . . . bears the unmistakable mark of our culture’s tacit and wholesale 
adherence to the Cartesian picture of the self.”25 In her comments on the 
passage in which Binx says that the malaise renders him as insubstantial as 
“Banquo’s ghost,” Poteat said that Binx is experiencing
the plight of modern man exiled from the world, ironically, by the very sci-
ence which has transformed that world for his benefit and comfort. As one 
who feels that exile keenly, Binx speaks right to the heart of the dilemma. 
Indeed, his definition of the malaise might equally be described as a concise 
statement of what it is like to live as though the Cartesian picture of the self 
upheld by modern science were exhaustively true; as though the “I” were 
synonymous with a discarnate mind reluctantly inhabiting an insensate body 
and loosed upon a world of equally insensate and hostile objects.26
By describing several ways in which that “Cartesian picture of the self” 
is manifested metaphorically in Binx’s moviegoing, my reading of the novel 
points to our culture’s lens-dependence as symptomatic of our scientifically 
minded, Cartesian selves. (I use the phrase “lens-dependence” because, 
quite often, the screen and the lens go hand in hand, as they do in filming, 
editing, projecting, and watching movies.) We need the lens. It reinforces 
who we are—disembodied eyes that are given license to watch the world 
at a remove, to see without being seen. The Cartesian picture of the self 
consoles us as seers and knowers who have privileged access to the objects 
of our knowledge. And that picture of the self is deeply embedded in our 
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lens-dependent practices. By pointing to that depth in Binx’s affinity for the 
movies, my reading of The Moviegoer sheds light on the moral and spiritual 
urgency that Percy brought to having readers see that Binx, through both 
Christian faith and his engagement with Kate, eventually escapes the Car-
tesian theater. That theater is a lonely place. There is very little community 
there.27 Because Percy wanted us to see that, at the end of the novel, Binx 
has experienced a conversion, it should also come as no surprise that, in the 
epilogue, Binx does not mention the movies. He is no longer a moviegoer. 
He is no longer Cartesian.
Furthermore, my reading of the novel is important in that it brings 
together two aspects of many of Percy’s other works—(1) his antipathy for 
Descartes; and (2) the prevalence of our culture’s lens-dependence—that 
other commentators on The Moviegoer have not combined. Percy noted our 
fascination with both the lens and the screen in many of his works. Movie 
cameras appear repeatedly in Lancelot. In Love in the Ruins, the Love 
Clinic is equipped with a lenslike mirror through which ecstatic subjects 
can be observed. In The Last Gentleman, Binx’s father’s telescope resur-
faces in the hands of Will Barrett, Forney Aiken conceals a tiny camera in 
his necktie, and Uncle Fannin and Merriam are transported as they watch 
Captain Kangaroo on TV. So, like the lens of the projector that makes Binx’s 
view of the movie screen possible, Percy put these screens and lenses to 
uses that evince a desire to see without being seen—to assume, that is, the 
perspective of a ghost.28
Searching Percy’s other works, we also need not look far to find evi-
dence of his hostility toward Descartes. This example, from Lost in the Cos-
mos, connects neatly with Binx’s predicament: “The Self since the time of 
Descartes has been stranded, split off from everything else in the Cosmos, 
a mind which professes to understand bodies and galaxies but is by the very 
act of understanding marooned in the Cosmos, with which it has no con-
nection. It therefore needs to exercise every option in order to reassure itself 
that it is not a ghost but is rather a self among other selves. One such option 
is a sexual encounter. Another is war.”29 Binx tried war, and heaven knows 
he tried sexual encounter. Yet, more subtly, we might notice that Binx, like 
the Cartesian self, is “stranded” and “marooned”: “This morning . . . I felt as 
if I had come to myself on a strange island. And what does such a castaway 
do? Why, he pokes around the neighborhood and he doesn’t miss a trick” 
(13). Later, Binx tells us that, because he has awakened “to the possibility 
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of a search,” to pass a Jew in the street “is like Robinson Crusoe seeing the 
footprint on the beach” (89).
In this section, I have argued that my reading of The Moviegoer illumi-
nates Percy’s hope that readers both notice Binx’s conversion and see it as 
a salve, for Percy believed that the poisonous roots of Binx’s Cartesian pre-
dicament are both deep and widespread in Western culture. Furthermore, 
I have argued that my reading melds two aspects of Percy’s other works 
that other commentators on The Moviegoer have not combined. Those two 
aspects are Percy’s aversion for Descartes and our culture’s fascination with 
both the screen and the lens. I want to conclude, now, by suggesting that my 
reading of The Moviegoer reveals that novel to be more autobiographical 
than we had previously thought.
Like Binx, Percy was once an avid moviegoer. Also like Binx, Percy 
was once mesmerized by the wonders of science and prone to depend on a 
lens.30 As a medical student, Percy chose to specialize in pathology because, 
as he later put it, it was where “medicine came closest to being the science 
it should be. . . . Under the microscope, in the test tube, in the colorimeter, 
one could actually see the beautiful theater of disease.”31 Thus, in Binx’s 
moviegoing and in his scientific distance, the novel invests Binx with the 
same posture of Cartesian detachment that Percy had assumed in his youth. 
Furthermore, in the brevity of the novel’s epilogue, it is easy to overlook 
the fact that Binx is going to medical school, as Percy once did. This detail 
suggests that, converted though he may be, Binx is not yet out of danger, for, 
in studying medicine, Binx is moving toward yet other lenses (for example, 
ophthalmoscope, otoscope) and other screens (for example, computer moni-
tor, ultrasound machine), and he remains at risk of taking up research.
Cartesian Society, Cartesian Character, and Screen 
Culture
I want to conclude by suggesting that Percy’s portrayal of Binx as having a 
Cartesian mind has both moral and social implications for Percy’s under-
standing of many contemporary persons as latter-day heirs of Descartes. 
Furthermore, I wonder whether that portrayal might help us understand 
more about the Cartesian origins of our infatuation with screens.
When Percy gave Binx Bolling to be read, he was, of course, giving 
readers a fictional someone with whom he thought many of them would 
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identify. Percy, it seems, thought of Binx as representative of a condition 
that was—and might be still—more or less widespread in the United States 
and perhaps elsewhere. More than twenty years after the novel was pub-
lished, Lawson wrote: “It is by now pretty generally agreed that the theme 
of Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer (1961) is contemporary man’s experience 
of alienation.”32 On Percy’s view, Binx is not alone in his estrangement. As 
noted earlier, he regarded both Binx’s “pathology” and its real, rampant 
equivalent as having “to do with the loss of individuality and the loss of 
identity at the very time when words like the ‘dignity of the individual’ 
and ‘self-realization’ are being heard more frequently than ever.” Now, if I 
have been correct to contend that, according to Percy, the pathogenesis is 
Cartesian, what does that tell us about Percy’s view of society? As evidenced 
by other chapters in this volume, there are many ways to address that ques-
tion. Here, briefly, is just one of them: Percy’s Cartesian depiction of Binx 
tells us that he thought that we, like Binx, are prone to social detachment 
and isolation. We want to distance ourselves from others, to sit alone in 
our mental cinemas. Like Binx, we—to recycle an earlier quotation from 
Desmond—are “prone to taking a detached observer’s stance toward the 
world, to formulating experience reductively, and to abstracting and catego-
rizing others.” Typing in my stall, I have not spoken with my colleagues all 
day—and it is late afternoon. I find their chatter and laughter in the hallway 
an annoyance because they interrupt my thoughts. Given to disconnecting 
ourselves in such ways, we might be sick indeed, and perhaps we caught it 
from Descartes.
In addition to its social implications, what might my reading tell us 
about Percy’s moral—and, as he would have added, spiritual—view of 
persons? If Percy wished for us to see Binx as having a Cartesian mind, 
then it is plausible to suppose that Percy also wished for us to see Binx as 
a Cartesian self deeply invested with Cartesian character. So, my reading 
opens up a new approach to this question: How might Percy have regarded 
Binx’s character as morally deficient or praiseworthy? Through a close scru-
tiny of Binx, perhaps we could articulate whatever virtues and vices are, on 
Percy’s view, most at home in a Cartesian character or disposition. As we do 
so, we might disclose Percy’s view of the moral traits with which Descartes’ 
contemporary children are invested and learn something more about the 
human estate that Percy thought in need of conversion.
Finally, if my argument has been persuasive, Percy was, to my knowl-
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edge, the first thinker to trace to Descartes the roots of our culture’s love af-
fair with the screen. Thus, my reading of the novel also breaks new ground 
by posing this question: How might our Cartesian intellectual heritage 
have prepared us to attend so closely to the reality of, and to confer value 
on, screens? My reading of The Moviegoer depends on a somewhat simple 
structural similarity between the movie theater and the Cartesian mind. 
These days, it is no secret that many of us are, like Binx, often absorbed 
in, and transported by, screens. With regard to that experience, are there 
ways—beyond those specified by my reading—in which Descartes might 
be the patriarch of our times?
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3Walker Percy’s Critique of the 
Pursuit of Happiness in The 
Moviegoer, Lost in the Cosmos: 
The Last Self-Help Book, and 
The Thanatos Syndrome
Elizabeth Amato
Americans have exercised magnificently the right to pursue happiness. 
Americans enjoy, on the whole, comfortable lives and unprecedented 
political and personal freedom, but, as happiness studies show, not much 
happier lives. While happiness studies indicate that happiness levels re-
main flat, happiness researchers are optimistic that their research on the 
causes and correlates of well-being can be used as the basis of domestic 
and international policy to increase human happiness.1 Although many of 
these researchers have been highly critical of how most people identify the 
pursuit of wealth as nearly identical to the pursuit of happiness, they do not 
question the validity of the pursuit of happiness per se; they merely suggest 
that the pursuit of happiness be carried on by more effective means. In 
contrast, Walker Percy observes that the pursuit of happiness causes us to 
flee unhappiness rather than look into what our lingering discontent may 
indicate about ourselves. Our unhappiness, according to Percy, can either 
lead us to search for more sophisticated diversions or, as he hopes, guide us 
to understand ourselves as lost beings in need of each other.
Instead of treating unhappiness like a problem to be solved, Walker 
Percy explains that we must consider what our unhappiness reveals about 
ourselves. Unhappiness proves to be a fortunate starting point for self-
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reflective inquiry into why the self is unhappy—or the search, as Percy calls 
it. As Percy shows, the individual’s search to understand the discontent of 
being a self points him toward recognizing others as fellow searchers with 
whom he can share his search and thus experience, if not happiness itself, 
then at least the beginnings of it. Our search is not meant to be unpleasant 
or lonely. It depends on our recognition of others as fellow searchers with 
whom the search can be shared.
As will be shown in The Moviegoer, Lost in the Cosmos, and The 
Thanatos Syndrome, Percy repeatedly shows his characters rejecting the 
pursuit of happiness, embarking on a search, and discovering their need for 
others. Percy’s critique of the failure of the pursuit of happiness to satisfy the 
needs of the human person as a social being remains constant through his 
novels. The Moviegoer plainly illustrates how the diversions of the pursuit 
of happiness only fill time without fulfilling the individual and isolate the 
individual from others. In Lost in the Cosmos and The Thanatos Syndrome, 
Percy focuses on how the pursuit of happiness risks leading us away from 
political life toward rule by experts and destruction of the self in the name 
of increasing well-being.
The Moviegoer
In The Moviegoer, Percy presents the search as an alternative to the pursuit 
of happiness, which he identifies as the way of life sponsored by liberalism. 
The Moviegoer is the story of a young man, John Bickerson “Binx” Bolling, 
who is called upon by his formidable Aunt Emily to decide what to do with 
his life. At nearly thirty years old, Binx has had an undistinguished career as 
a failed researcher, a veteran of the Korean War, and currently as a prosper-
ous but banal stockbroker. Aunt Emily, however, aspires for her nephew to 
reject the mean, low way of American bourgeois life, to pursue greatness 
and nobility, and to accept his duty to make a meaningful contribution to 
humanity, such as a career in medicine.2 Binx does not feel under any such 
obligation. Instead of great ambitions, Binx carefully cultivates the “ordi-
nary life” or, as he also calls it, his “Little Way” (9, 99).3 Binx claims that 
he is “a model tenant and a model citizen and takes pleasure in doing all 
that is expected of [him]” as a typical American everyman (6). In addition 
to honoring customarily American concerns for security and comfort, Binx 
whiles away his time seducing his secretaries and going to the movies.
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Too reflective and self-conscious of his role-playing as the anonymous 
everyman, Binx knows that his dreary happiness is “the worst kind of 
self-deception” (18). The search, an alternative to Emily’s plan and Binx’s 
“ordinary life,” is heralded by “clues.” These “clues,” like the contents of his 
pockets which, although familiar objects, are suddenly strange and won-
drous, remind Binx to “pursue the search” (11). Binx struggles to follow his 
search’s clues, and his efforts are unsteady until he realizes that his cousin, 
Kate, is a fellow searcher who can bring steadiness and a kind of happiness 
to their joint search.
Binx associates the pursuit of happiness with “everydayness,” which 
he characterizes as the immersion of the self into the role of a consumer of 
goods, services, hobbies, and expert advice (13). In The Moviegoer, the chief 
representatives of everydayness are Nell and Eddie Lovell. Binx comments 
that Eddie “understands everything out there and everything out there is 
something to be understood” (19). For the Lovells, the world is “something 
to be categorized and explained, then dismissed” as they occupy themselves 
pursuing happiness.4 The pursuit of happiness disconnects them from seek-
ing to understand the world and their place within it. They have outsourced 
examination of the world to experts and so are “free” to pursue happiness 
as they please. The Lovells give themselves over to consumer immanence 
through products and prepackaged experiences and hobbies. As Percy 
makes clear, the pursuit of happiness does not succeed in bringing the 
Lovells contentment; instead, it serves to distract them from undertaking 
their peculiarly human task to seek an answer to the discontent they feel.
For the most part, the liberal pursuit of happiness is the attempt to 
make the self happy by the possession of goods. The individual believes he 
can make himself happy by possessing the things that are supposed to con-
stitute the happy life. Percy’s insight is that the liberal formulation of happi-
ness—primarily understood as security, control, and comfort—defines the 
objects of the individual’s pursuit and, in so doing, prevents the individual 
from being open to consider other goods and conditions for human happi-
ness. In distinction, Binx’s search is characterized by clues that point to an 
unknown final end—“to be aware of the possibility of the search is to be 
onto something” (13). Binx finds “clues,” but he and we readers do not know 
to what the clues point. Binx’s search remains open-ended. The importance 
of defining the ultimate end of the search recedes from view and instead 
the way in which one searches with others assumes more significance.
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The pursuer of happiness views other individuals as goods, or objects, 
to be possessed for the sake of a happy life. The individual does not need 
others to help or join him in his pursuit of happiness. This is why, for 
Percy, the pursuit of happiness is a nonstarter. Individuals, according to 
Percy, are not self-sufficient but rather are dependent and in need of each 
other to live well. The stumbling block to the pursuit of happiness is that 
it is a lonely pursuit that isolates one from others. Despite the modern 
exaltation of autonomy, dependency and need are not negative quali-
ties. Instead, for Binx, they become happy, or fortunate, conditions for 
individuals to gain the help they need from each other. As long as the 
individual persists in doggedly pursuing happiness by himself, he cannot 
become or be happy. But, as Percy emphasizes especially in Lost in the 
Cosmos and The Thanatos Syndrome, the danger does not end here—it 
cannot be contained within the private life of the unhappy individual pur-
suer of happiness, but will cancerously spread to the social and political 
body. The lonely pursuer of happiness, overcome with despair, may turn 
to violence and self-destruction. Fortunately for Binx, the sight of Kate 
looking for him stops him from descending into despair. Binx realizes that 
Kate is like himself—a being who is also troubled and in need of help to 
live well. The search can be shared and unites individuals in a common 
activity that brings felicity although it is not focused on happiness. Kate 
and he find their way to happiness not by looking for it, but by finding 
each other.
Through Binx, Percy shows us that the self’s dependency, which draws 
us to others, is a happier circumstance than pretending that the self is self-
sufficient. The Lovells believe they can find happiness by playing the role, 
or part, of a consumer. The Lovells play a part, but Binx realizes that he is a 
part in need of another. Being a part is better than playing a part. The pur-
suer of happiness denies his partiality and so experiences much uneasiness 
and unhappiness as a result. Percy’s search presents the possibility of some 
relief and respite from our unhappiness and loneliness when we realize our 
need for others. Rather than being a step down from self-sufficiency, being 
a part, needing others, becomes the occasion for greater happiness. Binx 
experiences gladness in finding in Kate another fellow wayfarer with whom 
he can share his life. Binx and Kate’s marriage represents not the resolution 
or end of the search but the way in which the two will continue searching 
together.
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Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book
In Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book, Percy playfully mocks 
the American desire for self-reliant, step-by-step techniques for well-being. 
Armed with self-help manuals, Americans believe they do not need anyone 
else to help them, because they can help themselves. It is do-it-yourself hap-
piness. However, Percy’s mockery is limited. First, the popularity of self-help 
books points to a broadly felt desire for self-knowledge and guidance that 
indicates some awareness that the self needs help. This differs somewhat 
from The Moviegoer. Everydayness is nearly impenetrable as described in 
The Moviegoer. Lost in the Cosmos shows that everydayness obscures and 
misdirects, but cannot suppress that Americans are searchers who look for 
help, if not always in the right places. Despite how little we may know about 
ourselves, yet it remains that we are knowers and so capable of coming to a 
fuller understanding of the self.
Second, in Lost in the Cosmos, Percy turns his attention more explicitly 
to ordering society and political bodies toward the highest goals of human 
life. For Percy, to answer how we should live in political communities, it is 
necessary to consider what is good for human beings and how those goals 
can be furthered collectively and individually. It is no surprise that the main 
action in Lost in the Cosmos is a political decision that Captain Schuyler 
must make for the sake of himself and the human race. Lost in the Cosmos 
ends with two alternative space odysseys in which World War III devastates 
Earth and a spaceship is sent to look for alien life. In the first space odyssey, 
the spaceship find aliens, but the aliens refuse to help the humans. The 
aliens do not help because it is not in their self-interest to help and they 
only risk disordering themselves by interacting with the spaceship. In the 
second space odyssey, the spaceship does not find aliens, and so returns 
to war-devastated Earth. With no possibility of help from alien life in the 
second space odyssey, the survivors must look to each other and deliberate 
about how best to live. Two options are set forth for the captain of the 
space crew—one that virtually ensures the continuation of the species and 
secures its well-being and one that proves riskier from the perspective of 
species survival and security but is better for fulfilling the human desire for 
happiness. Percy does not reveal the captain’s decision, but instead shows 
what would happen in either case.
Captain Marcus Aurelius Schuyler is an Air Force Academy graduate 
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who studied astronomy at MIT and has a background in history. NASA 
selects him to pilot a spaceship to investigate a possible signal from aliens. 
The slender hope is that aliens may be able to save humanity from its self-
destructive warfare. Captain Schuyler takes after his Stoic namesake with 
respect to his “dark view of the human condition” and his penchant to “t[ake] 
his pleasure in acting well even though he knew it probably would not avail 
and that things would end badly.”5 With his ancient perspective, Captain 
Schuyler is aptly suited to this mission as an individual ready to do what is 
necessary under bleak circumstances. The three women crew members are 
Tiffany, an astrophysicist-psychotherapist, Kimberly, a linguist-semioticist, 
and Jane, the ship’s doctor. Jane is also a religious minority affirmative-
action choice, as required by recent Supreme Court rulings. A Methodist, 
Jane represents the small Christian minority lingering in America. On the 
outward journey, she refuses to have sex with Captain Schuyler until he, in 
his capacity as captain of the ship, marries them. Twelve children are born 
to the space travelers.
Finding no aliens, the spaceship returns to Earth. Upon arriving in the 
Utah desert, they find Earth devastated by war, with but a few survivors. 
Aristarchus Jones, a loner astronomer who calculated when and where the 
spaceship would return, and Abbot Leibowitz, the abbot of a Benedictine 
monastery who leads a small community of monks and misbegotten chil-
dren, greet the spaceship. Radiation has contributed to birth defects and 
caused increasing sterility. The arrival of the spaceship with the crew and 
their healthy children present a chance that the human race might yet sur-
vive and thrive. Returning from space, the space travelers are like “aliens.” 
With their spaceship and healthy and fertile children, they represent the 
only hope for humanity. It is an undetermined hope. It is not clear what 
course of action would be best for humanity, because it is not settled what 
ends are best for human life.
Aristarchus and the abbot present the captain with two alternatives: 
either go to Europa, a habitable moon of Jupiter, or take their chances on 
Earth in Lost Cove, Tennessee. Aristarchus Jones argues that the human 
race cannot survive on Earth—it faces too much radiation and steril-
ity. Colonizing Europa presents a bright opportunity to make a new start. 
Civilization can be based on “reason and science” like ancient Ionia, free 
from the mistakes of Plato and religion (246). On the other hand, Abbot 
Leibowitz says that he does not know whether human life is finished on 
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Earth and gives a Christian account of humans as fallen beings, redeemed 
through the birth, Passion, and Resurrection of Christ, and waiting for the 
promised return of Christ. Abbot Leibowitz believes he may be the only 
person alive who can consecrate priests and so says that he will “stay here in 
case the human race survives and needs priests” (249).
Percy first shows what would happen if Captain Schuyler decides in 
favor of Aristarchus’s plan; he leaves nuclear war–ravaged Earth for Europa 
to realize Aristarchus’s utopian society. Named in honor of the original 
birthplace of science, New Ionia is “operated on the principles of Skinner’s 
Walden II modified by Jungian self-analysis, with suitable rewards for 
friendly social behavior and punishment, even exile, for aggression, jealous, 
hostile, solitary, mystical, or other anti-social behavior” (256). Instead of 
government, the New Ionians have daily group sessions “of self-criticism 
and honest appraisal of others,” in which they practice a new golden rule 
of “honesty, absolute honesty” (257). Furthermore, New Ionia is ostensibly 
free from pain and deformity (the deformed children were left behind on 
Earth). There is no political or ethnic conflict, and sex is free from inhibi-
tions. Much, however, of the group’s contentment and cooperation is drug 
induced. The air is much thinner on Europa and to compensate the New 
Ionians are given daily rations of cocaine. To encourage proper social be-
havior, they are daily expected to participate in dewalis sessions where they 
smoke dried lichen that “induce[s] a mild euphoria.” After many years, New 
Ionia becomes a “peaceful agricultural-fishing society” (256).
In New Ionia, the Captain sits outside his cave reading Henry IV and 
replays an old recording of Mozart’s fourteenth string quartet. Captain 
Schuyler is ironic about the utopian society and considers the group sessions 
akin to AA meetings. Jane and he are no longer married and Jane sulks 
in her cave by herself; she knows New Ionia does not tolerate sulking in 
the open. Two extraordinarily beautiful young women, Candace and Rima, 
attend to him and invite him to sleep with them. He agrees, but he is little 
moved by the prospect of sex.
If Captain Schuyler decides in favor of Abbot Leibowitz, he stays on 
postapocalyptic Earth and goes to Lost Cove, Tennessee. The community 
members grow traditional local crops like collards; they trap rabbits, enjoy 
tobacco, and drink whiskey. Radiation levels persist and sperm count varies. 
Even so, Lost Cove increases in numbers both from pregnancies and from 
other survivors. These survivors include “Southerners, white and Anglo-
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Saxon, and blacks, with a sprinkling of Hispanics, Jews, and Northern 
ethnics” (258). Both the physically sound and deformed children flourish. 
Unlike in New Ionia, the Lost Cove community has room for many types 
of individuals. To be sure, Lost Cove does not suit everyone. Some of the 
hippies voluntarily decide to leave and “move on” from Lost Cove (261). 
Presumably, they form or join a community elsewhere.
In addition to ethic and racial groups, many social and religious groups 
flourish in Lost Cove. On the Sunday that Percy shows us, some are at Mass, 
others are at Protestant services, and others, the nonbelievers, are “gath-
ered companionably.” The captain enjoys sitting on a hillside just above the 
cave where he is joined by other “unbelievers—non-church-goers and dis-
sidents of one sort and another” (259). It is an eclectic crowd of mountain 
men, former Atlanta businessmen, feminists, hippies, and vagabonds. The 
Sunday morning hillside nonbelievers debate about agricultural and po-
litical subjects such as corn co-ops and what Lost Cove ought to do about 
the violent (and snake-handling) community in old Carolina. The captain 
serves as the community’s leader and negotiates with an emissary from 
the violent Carolina community, which wishes to reignite old ethic and 
religious conflicts.
From the perspective of survival, the human race will be best served by 
going to Europa. Aristarchus Jones, however, promises more than survival. 
He promises that New Ionia will be a happy new beginning for human 
civilization. Free from the errors of the past and from biological defects, 
its colonizers build New Ionia on scientific insights into human sociability 
and well-being. To a great extent, New Ionia succeeds. As theirs is a fish-
ing community, the New Ionians enjoy much leisure, apparently free from 
backbreaking labor of procuring food and securing settlements. No other 
peoples on Europa exist to threaten them and so there is no need to defend 
New Ionia. In the absence of such basic concerns, New Ionia can focus 
on the group’s well-being. Life in New Ionia appears comfortable, secure, 
leisurely, and peaceful.
Despite its appearance, New Ionia falls short of the utopian promise. 
To be clear, New Ionia is not an Orwellian political dystopia but a scientific, 
nonpolitical attempt to construct a society conducive to human well-being. 
New Ionia succeeds insofar as well-being is concerned, but it lacks the 
richer, robust feelings associated with happiness. Much as in Brave New 
World’s World State, life is so well managed in New Ionia that its inhabi-
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tants have little to do. Captain Schuyler is like a man in exile, with only 
his books and music to relieve somewhat his old longings for action and 
decision. One commentator observes that Captain Schuyler reads Henry IV, 
Shakespeare’s play about leadership, but New Ionia needs no leadership.6 
Since individuals have little need of each other, they do not enjoy the hearty 
relationships that contribute to happiness. Captain Schuyler does not talk, 
discuss, debate, or bicker with the inhabitants in New Ionia. He has sex 
with the younger New Ionians—New Ionia is not unpleasant—but sex is a 
poor surrogate for the more “complex courtship” he enjoyed with the three 
women crew members on the outward journey to find alien life (235).7 New 
Ionia’s postpolitical society does not need a man of action, and so the cap-
tain retreats to the Stoic’s inner sanctuary. In this respect, Captain Schuyler 
experiences lingering aches for action and complex human relationships.
In New Ionia, public displays of unhappiness are not permitted. Jane 
sulks in her cave, because she knows she would not be allowed to sulk in 
public. In this respect, Percy shows that Aristarchus Jones’s plan to do with-
out political life and the errors of the past by imposing honesty—transpar-
ency—as the reigning virtue and key to happiness does not succeed. In fact, 
these so-called demands for honesty aim to suppress voices that question 
and disagree with the reigning ideology. In addition, group sessions aim 
to reduce difference among individuals, or “otherness,” so as to minimize 
social discord. New Ionia succeeds in keeping the peace, but New Ionia’s 
honesty policy prevents individuals from sharing their lives with others 
through private relationships. No spousal pairs, no families, no friends, no 
political parties, clubs, or other private associations smaller than New Ionia 
itself exist. Smaller private associations are treated with suspicion, because 
individuals may keep secrets with each other. Group sessions relentlessly 
aim to bring to light the internal feelings of its members. Those individuals 
who display behavior or sentiments antithetical to New Ionia’s founding 
principle can be exiled. It is unclear by whom or by what decision-making 
body or process dissenters are punished, but exile from New Ionia is surely 
the equivalent of a death sentence. No other communities exist on Europa 
to harbor dissenters, and there is little chance of any others coming into 
being.
It is unlikely that the captain is greatly moved by Aristarchus Jones’s 
modern enthusiasm for science’s ability to create a perfect society or by the 
abbot’s concern that the human race needs priests. It is worth considering, 
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then, why Percy gives this choice to a Stoic and how might the captain 
be swayed to make his decision in favor of Lost Cove—the choice for the 
complex and varied human relationships necessary for happiness. As a Stoic, 
Captain Schuyler possesses admirable qualities for leadership. He is resolute 
and confident in bleak circumstances. He is a leader and capable of making 
political decisions for the sake of those in his care. Despite his fondness for 
lost causes, Percy cheats the captain out of his lost cause and compels him 
to put his virtues in the service of the future and of the survivors. Captain 
Schuyler had enjoyed thinking he lived at the end of an age but, quite unex-
pectedly, he finds himself in the position of being the founder of one.
If the captain follows his preference for lost causes, he will choose New 
Ionia. Unlike Aristarchus, Captain Schuyler knows that New Ionia will be 
another failed attempt to escape the past and the self by relocating, just as 
the Puritans tried in the New World. With resignation, the captain would 
accept it as humanity’s fate to chase after new beginnings and happiness 
and end up disappointed. In New Ionia, Captain Schuyler would retreat, 
with his books and music, and live with thin contentment as he relied on his 
own internal resources for his happiness with scant regard for anyone else.
If Captain Schuyler chooses the Abbot Leibowitz’s plan, he is choosing 
in favor of being with Jane. The captain learns to include himself among the 
survivors—to make decisions as one of them, not on behalf of them. His 
original mission was a search for alien life, but instead, Captain Schuyler 
and Jane find each other on the journey. While on the way back to Earth, 
the crew members look forward to their return and eagerly chat about what 
they will do and where they will go when they arrive. Jane asks the captain 
if he would prefer to come to Tennessee with her, to which he responds 
that he would. Captain Schuyler’s preference for Jane indicates a reform in 
his Stoicism away from internal self-sufficiency and toward realizing that 
he needs other people and is not simply needed by them. The captain does 
not have to accept the abbot’s account of man as a fallen being awaiting the 
second coming of Christ to choose Lost Cove. The space mission with Jane 
revealed to him the possibilities of sharing his life searching with someone 
else.
Furthermore, as the pilot of the ship, Captain Schuyler enjoys a posi-
tion of leadership. To choose New Ionia would be to choose against himself, 
because New Ionia does not need his fortitude, confidence, and protection.8 
Decisions in New Ionia affecting the group will be managed according to 
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scientific-behavioral theories; once the appropriate conditions are set in 
place, there will be little room for individual intervention. In New Ionia, 
the captain is a relic (perhaps useful only as a fertile male), but in Lost 
Cove, he has much to do for the community’s political life. With respect to 
political life, Abbot Leibowitz’s plan is incomplete or partial. Political life 
is left up to the captain and the other members of Lost Cove. Through a 
hopeful prudence, Percy presents a practical demonstration in Lost in the 
Cosmos that New Ionia may promise happiness, but in Lost Cove there are 
happier people. Lost Cove is the choice for individuals making their way in 
life guided by particular human relationships.
Although he set forth the plan for New Ionia, Aristarchus Jones does 
not appear in either alternative future. In New Ionia, presumably, he wields 
the unseen power that directs the community. In Lost Cove, perhaps Jones 
withdraws from society to resume research, or perhaps he moves on to live 
elsewhere. Percy treats Aristarchus Jones rather kindly. Jones is a searcher, 
though clueless about his own existence as a searcher. He uncovered the 
old records about the spaceship’s scheduled return and, having faith that 
it would return, he traveled on horseback to the Utah desert in expecta-
tion of its arrival. However, the sense of a higher purpose, which justifies 
Aristarchus Jones’s slight regard for the particularity of human life, lead-
ing him to recommend leaving behind on Earth the misbegotten children 
and all the other survivors, comes under closer scrutiny in The Thanatos 
Syndrome, as does his confidence that science can find a solution to human 
unhappiness.
The Thanatos Syndrome
In The Thanatos Syndrome, Percy more forcefully illustrates how the sci-
entific approach to pursuing happiness sacrifices our capacity for happiness, 
our consciousness, in the name of promoting animalistic well-being. Felici-
ana parish is threatened by a utopian social engineering conspiracy that tries 
to re-create society free from the causes of human misery and unhappiness. 
The problem is not that the scientists fail and produce a dystopia, but rather 
that they succeed to a remarkable degree to alleviate social problems. Their 
“solution” extracts heavy costs. Members of Feliciana parish risk losing their 
self-awareness, humanity, life, and liberty. Percy defends unhappiness—not 
in itself good—but as part of the predicament of being a conscious self and 
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so as a clue to self-understanding that promises a greater and more fulfilling 
happiness. Unhappiness can direct us to a greater good of being in com-
munity with others that makes unhappiness seem less terrible and provides 
real relief from the restless pursuit of happiness.
Set in the near future, The Thanatos Syndrome begins as a mystery. 
Not quite a murder mystery or a medical mystery, but a psychological 
mystery. Dr. Tom More, a psychiatrist, “stumbled onto something” amiss 
with his patients.9 He sees clues and slight differences that point toward a 
peculiar sickness or loss of self among the inhabitants. His former patients 
do not exhibit their “old terrors” but appear to be cured of them. Instead of 
anxiety and discontent, they display “a mild vacancy, a species of unfocused 
animal good spirits” (21). His patients, while freed of their old fears, can 
barely communicate, and though they appear contented, they sometimes 
exhibit remarkable brutality and odd sexual behavior. More knows that 
unhappiness is a part of being a self, but also that we are happily situated 
to search with others by talking and listening. With the help of an eclectic 
group, More puts together the clues to uncovering who and what is behind 
the community’s loss of self.
More discovers that Bob Comeaux and John Van Dorn have been 
adding heavy sodium to the water supply as part of a project (called Blue 
Boy) to decrease crime and misery and increase well-being and happiness. 
The Blue Boy project enjoys significant and remarkable success. It reduces 
many social evils, such as crime, unemployment, suicide, violence, domestic 
abuse, teenage pregnancies, the spread of AIDS, drug use, depression, 
anxiety, and suicide. Moreover, it improves IQ scores. Although it decreases 
verbal and communication skills, heavy sodium improves mental recall and 
computations. For example, individuals cannot link together words and sen-
tences to tell a story, but they can recall information and make calculations 
much like a savant.
Although Comeaux and Van Dorn work together, they have apprecia-
bly different visions regarding the origin of social ills and how to correct 
them. Comeaux believes that evolution gave human beings unnecessarily 
large brains, which led to the superego’s excessive ability to inhibit ego. 
Evolution’s mistake can be corrected through the right therapeutic drugs. 
Release the ego from the superego’s hold over it and people are happier, 
less prone to the cares and anxieties that lead to most social problems. Co-
meaux’s co-conspirator, Van Dorn, thinks Comeaux has shortsighted goals 
Walker Percy’s Critique of the Pursuit of Happiness 59
for society and regards Blue Boy as just the first phase in the restoration of 
society and the promotion of human excellence. Van Dorn has contempt 
for Comeaux as a “technologist” and argues that “you don’t treat human 
ills by creaming the human cortex” (217). Van Dorn recognizes that hu-
man beings have to remain human “enough to achieve the ultimate goals 
of being human” (219). Van Dorn blames society for inhibiting the sexual 
energy that motivates the greatest achievements of artists and scientists. 
Proper education—intellectual, physical, and sexual—can release those 
energies. At Belle Ame Academy, which is “founded on Greek ideals of vir-
tue,” Van Dorn employs “the tough old European Gymnasium-Hochschule 
treatment” (214, 219). According to him, this rigorous method releases the 
repressed sexual energy necessary for “sexual geniuses” like Mozart and 
Einstein to achieve excellence in the arts and sciences (220). The Belle 
Ame teachers engage in pedophilic acts with the children as part of their 
educational training in excellence.
Blue Boy is an unauthorized project and Comeaux and Van Dorn know 
that releasing heavy sodium without consent is a politically dubious maneu-
ver. Yet, Comeaux and Van Dorn reasonably expect that when they reveal 
the positive statistics to the public, their project will be embraced by the 
current presidential administration. Comeaux and Van Dorn fear that More 
will expose Blue Boy to the public without the appropriate public relations 
that would lead to its acceptance, so they attempt to compel More to join 
their project.
More dislikes Comeaux and Van Dorn’s methods, but initially seems 
impressed with their results. He flounders to provide a counterargument 
to Comeaux and Van Dorn’s claim that their methods have superseded his 
own. More visits Father Smith, who sees through the scientists’ claims and 
links their abstracted love of humanity and eugenic policies to the Third 
Reich. In an impassioned speech, Father Smith explains that “tenderness” 
is a “disguise” and leads “to the gas chamber” (128).10 More finally decides 
to thwart Comeaux and Van Dorn’s project. Blue Boy is shut down and the 
people of Feliciana recover their former, troubled selves, but Van Dorn and 
Comeaux escape punishment.
One criticism of the novel is that Tom More cannot give an adequate 
explanation why the scientists’ project to improve the quality of human 
life and increase well-being is misguided. Although Tom More may be the 
ostensible protagonist of the story, many commentators believe the irascible 
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Father Smith is Percy’s true spokesman and, as one critic claims, “represents 
Percy’s most uncompromising attack on science.”11 Representative of this view, 
Mary Deems Howland observes with disapproval that More consistently fails 
to counter directly Comeaux’s argument that they share the same basic goal: 
to improve the human lot. Howland comments that “when More fails to tell 
Comeaux that what he is doing is wrong, the reader feels compelled to jump 
into the void left by Tom and confront Bob’s ideas directly.”12 Howland finds 
Father Smith’s uncompromising condemnation and refutation of Comeaux 
and Van Dorn’s project more satisfying. Whereas More is compromised by 
his breakthrough research on heavy sodium that made Blue Boy possible and 
his own ambivalent sympathies with Comeaux’s goal to reduce human suffer-
ing and improve the human lot (a carryover of his sentiments in Love in the 
Ruins), Father Smith remains staunchly and adamantly opposed.
Howland is right insofar as she observes that More consistently fails to 
confront Comeaux with a counterargument in the style of Father Smith’s 
impassioned defense of the dignity of the human person against Comeaux 
and Van Dorn’s devaluation of individual life. Father Smith’s argument is 
attractive because he is so uncompromisingly opposed to the scientists and 
has no doubt that every human being has dignity based on being a creature 
of God, created in his image and called to fulfill his vocation toward be-
atitude. But Father Smith’s argument convinces only if one already agrees 
with him. Instead, Percy opts to give a practical demonstration of the mutual 
help human beings may give to each other. More never directly confirms 
Father Smith’s metaphysical account of fallen human nature redeemable 
only through God’s grace. By his example, More defends the search with 
others against Comeaux and Van Dorn, who would do away with the unhap-
piness that leads individuals to seek to understand themselves through the 
aid of others. More does not defeat Comeaux and Van Dorn by theoretical 
argumentation. Instead, after foiling their conspiracy, instead of punishing 
or killing them, he offers to help them—an offer they refuse.
Percy sets The Thanatos Syndrome slightly in the future, in which he 
may suppose fictional but plausible political circumstances in which groups 
of individuals deemed of limited social utility are disposed of for the sake 
of improving the well-being of the whole. It is believed that individuals who 
possess limited personal autonomy suffer a compromised quality of life 
that renders their life not worth living. Although Blue Boy is unauthorized, 
Percy shows that given the public policies already in operation at the start 
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of the novel, the American doctrine of rights does not sufficiently protect 
individual life and liberty. The pursuit of happiness, instead of being the 
reason for life and liberty, becomes the justification to deprive individuals of 
life and liberty. Socially vulnerable groups, such as AIDS patients, children 
with severe mental and physical impairments, and the elderly, are already 
marginalized and deprived of life and liberty through ordinary political 
procedures. Congress cuts funding for Medicare but continues to fund 
the Qualitarian centers where the euthanasia of impaired and unwanted 
children and seniors is routine. By federal regulation, AIDS patients and 
children born with AIDS live under quarantine—a great deprivation of 
personal liberty. The Supreme Court creates a “Right to Death provision” 
through a series of rulings that support euthanasia of children and the el-
derly (199).
Comeaux and Van Dorn correctly see their project as a continuation of 
these public policies. The Supreme Court grounded its decision in favor of 
euthanizing unwanted or severely deformed or mentally impaired children 
on the proper respect for the family, the opinions of experts, and due con-
cern for children who may otherwise lead intolerable lives of abuse or suf-
fering. In consideration of the euthanasia of the elderly, the Court reasoned 
that life primarily characterized and prized for its autonomy must be pro-
choice toward death with a view to preserving individual independence. No 
doubt these are the reasonable considerations the Court would balance in 
its judgment. Percy takes care to add this detail to make the Court’s ruling 
plausible to the reader and thereby make the danger real.
In this way, Percy highlights deficiencies in current American public 
discourse that stem from flaws within our political order’s understanding of 
the human person. The doctrine of rights, because it is incomplete, does not 
sufficiently protect individuals who are considered lacking in self-sufficiency 
from oppression. Our public discourse relies too heavily on an abstract 
concept of the individual as an independent, self-sufficient being in whom 
autonomy is the essential characteristic. Giving primacy to the preservation 
of individual autonomy mistakes the autonomous self, a theoretical creation, 
for the good of the whole person. When public judicial and legislative delib-
erations focus on quality of life and dignity to preserve individual autonomy, 
they obscure the extent to which human beings are needy beings who need 
each other to live and to form the social relationships that contribute to the 
search for self-understanding. Comeaux confidently expects that just as the 
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courts have consistently upheld the addition of fluoride to drinking water—
for the mere but tangible benefit of improving the public’s teeth—they will 
uphold the addition of heavy sodium in the water supply as a true political 
and social panacea.13
The main objection More musters against the scientists’ plot is that 
they are “assaulting the cortex of an individual” without informed consent 
(193). More’s argument rests on familiar liberal grounds regarding the prin-
ciples of consent. By depicting More voicing this argument, Percy shows 
the weakness of solely liberal foundations to protect individuals from the 
kind of scientific manipulation conducted by Comeaux. Comeaux belittles 
the question of informed consent, calling it a “philosophical question”; he 
claims that the “real” question is whether human misery is caused by evolv-
ing unnecessarily large brains (194).14 Comeaux replaces a political question 
of consent that entails theories about social contract, rights, duties, and per-
sonhood in favor of a much simpler empirical, material question. He rejects 
political discourse regarding rights and consent as so much metaphysical 
nonsense that has overlooked the real or the material problem behind social 
problems that can be solved more effectively through chemical therapy. 
Without a stronger foundation than consent for the dignity of the human 
person, Percy underscores how precarious and unstable our political protec-
tion is against projects like Blue Boy, which promise and seem to deliver 
results that increase human well-being.
Turning the tables on More, Comeaux claims that he protects society 
from the real assaulters—criminal malefactors like murderers, robbers, and 
rapists. Blue Boy virtually eliminates those violent social malfeasants. By 
bypassing the usual political concerns for consent and rights, Comeaux and 
Van Dorn believe they achieve what the political process could not. Divisive 
political debates can be transcended by scientific solutions. As a case in 
point, Comeaux cites the rise in youthful pregnancies, which entails con-
tentious debates on “contraceptives in schools, abortion, [and] child abuse” 
(196). By adding a hormone that changes the female reproduction cycle from 
menstrual to estrus to school cafeteria lunches, youthful pregnancies virtu-
ally disappear in the test high school. With that simple biological alteration, 
intractable and endless arguments about abortion are bypassed, the state 
saves money, families stay together, and so “family life is improved” (197).
Such palpable results as Blue Boy’s appear to overcome objections 
based on rights and consent, because heavy sodium achieves the social con-
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cord and individual well-being that the doctrine of rights and politics failed 
to produce. Given the desperate and bleak situation of rampant crime and 
unhappiness, the public may well embrace Blue Boy, willing to do anything 
for the sake of a cure. Not only are our governing institutions unable to 
uphold individual life and liberty, it seems that the public itself may have 
lost the will to defend individual life and liberty. The ends of liberalism and 
even the pursuit of happiness can be better accomplished by other means. 
Blue Boy accomplishes what the political process has failed to do. Social 
ills are overcome, but lost is the individual freedom to answer the question 
“how to live” both for oneself and as a participating member of society.
Consequently, Blue Boy’s brilliant statistical success hides how these 
so-called social improvements come at the expense of the groups tradition-
ally and historically marginalized in American society. The spread of AIDS 
is reduced primarily because heavy sodium decreases the desire for drugs 
(fewer needle transmissions) and reduces homosexual tendencies. Comeaux 
proudly says that voluntarily the Gay and Lesbian Club at Louisiana State 
University disbanded, gay bars closed, and the sale of homosexual videos 
dropped. Crime rates have dropped. “Young punks” who used to menace 
the streets are “of their own accord” learning trades in occupations like 
plumbing and the service industry (198). The most dramatic presentation 
of the effects of heavy sodium is the image of the prison inmates in the 
fields—the men bare chested, the women wearing “colorful kerchiefs”—
singing old hymns (“Swing low, sweet chariot”) and picking cotton (266). 
Comeaux says that they are content and do not want to leave. Although he 
claims that he is “just a guy out to improve a little bit the quality of life for 
all Americans,” he has re-created society according to his own liking (200). 
Comeaux suppresses homosexuality to eliminate AIDS, gains control over 
women’s reproduction systems, channels troubled youths to service industry 
jobs, and converts prisoners (mostly black) into virtual slaves working the 
fields.
In contrast to that of the Blue Boy scientists, More’s approach to treat-
ment is less like a cure and more, as one commentator describes it, “a process 
involving mutuality and reciprocity between physician and patient.”15 More 
seeks to help his patients and also hopes to be helped by them. For example, 
although More is concerned about Father Smith’s mental and physical 
health, he seeks Father Smith’s advice about how to respond to Comeaux’s 
job offer and the heavy sodium in the water. Unlike the scientists, More 
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“understand[s] himself as related to, and dependent upon others.”16 More 
calls this his “best therapy,” in which he is “asking for help and helping by 
asking” (234).17
Tom More brings people together and unites them, usually by showing 
them how they can help each other. More explains that where movies and 
TV stories “go wrong” is that “you don’t shoot X for what he did to Y, even 
though he deserves shooting” (332). More knows that killing Comeaux and 
Van Dorn will not remove the human longing for death and self-destruction. 
The Comeauxs and Van Dorns of the world cannot be defeated entirely, nor 
can the impulse toward death be located within specific individuals whose 
disposal will set the world aright. Instead, More says, “you allow X a way out 
so he can help Y” (332). More’s strategy is not to convince someone that he 
is in need of someone else, but to show him how he can help another person. 
Individuals, perhaps most of all liberal individuals who value autonomy, 
enjoy thinking of themselves as benefactors rather than beneficiaries. More 
knows that this tendency is a matter of individual vanity and reluctance to 
admit the need of another. As a practical matter, when one individual helps 
another, the action is not simply external but also operates internally on 
the doer and so brings about good to the doer as well as the recipient. An 
individual is simultaneously a benefactor and a beneficiary. Needing and 
helping another person creates a relation to someone as another self and not 
an object to be manipulated. More sees the possibility of this full, compre-
hensive good, but it is impossible in Comeaux and Van Dorn’s envisioned 
society, where human freedom is enjoyed only by the few—the scientists. 
The scientists, by excluding themselves from the treatments they give to 
others, reveal a different hierarchy of values applied to themselves—they 
implicitly value their freedom more than mere animal well-being.
More is remarkably successful at rehabilitating many of the lesser par-
ticipants in the scientists’ scheme. But there is a limit to rehabilitation. Van 
Dorn returns to his “old self, his charming, grandiose, slightly phony Con-
federate self,” writes a splashy best seller, and becomes a regular on TV talk 
shows (344). Comeaux quietly disappears—rumor has it—to China to assist 
in its one-child-per-family policy. Despite More’s best efforts, Van Dorn and 
Comeaux refuse to be helped. The Thanatos Syndrome does not end with 
a perfect resolution. The project to add heavy sodium to the water supply 
is an example, even a crude example, not the real source of the impulse 
toward death and self-destruction. As Percy shows, “happily ever after” is 
Walker Percy’s Critique of the Pursuit of Happiness 65
a misguided ending, even for the “good guys,” who are also troubled and 
lost selves. Percy presents neither total triumph nor utter defeat, but shows 
that by searching with others for hope the self does not have to succumb to 
self-destruction.
In The Thanatos Syndrome, More wonders: if a drug can “turn a 
haunted soul into a bustling little body, why take on such a quixotic quest 
as pursuing the secret of one’s very self?” (13). If a pill can relieve the self 
of its cares and burdens, engaging in the task of searching the self seems 
self-indulgent and perverse. Although as a psychiatrist More can prescribe 
psycho-pharmaceuticals, he mentions that he rarely does so. The patient will 
feel better, he says, but “they’ll never find out what the terror is trying to tell 
them” (6). More points to the Enlightenment as the source of a distinctive 
type of modern anxiety and unhappiness: “This is not the Age of Enlighten-
ment but the Age of Not Knowing What to Do” (75). Consequently, pursu-
ing happiness is “an odd pursuit,” because it is trying to be something that 
you are not, which is like trying to have another eye color than the one you 
have. The deep problem with the pursuit of happiness is that the manner 
in which people pursue happiness blinds them from recognizing that their 
pursuit is precisely what keeps them from being relieved of their anxiety. 
More’s message to his patients who seek a cure is that there is no cure: 
“Maybe a cure is knowing there is no cure” (76). More does not cure his 
patients of their anxiety, he cures them of their expectation that they ought 
to be cured and helps them think of anxiety as a clue to self-understanding.
Likewise, through The Moviegoer and Lost in the Cosmos, Percy brings 
his readers to consider unhappiness as a starting place for joint searches. 
Unhappiness draws us together because it points us toward understanding 
how we need each other and how we may help each other. The liberal pur-
suit of happiness does not properly understand the human being as a needy, 
dependent being who, above all, needs other people to live well. Percy does 
not point to our dependency as good in itself but as a fortunate, even happy, 
circumstance. According to Percy, liberalism mistakenly exaggerates hu-
man autonomy or self-sufficiency. Yet humans are not helpless beings; they 
are able to help and be helped by each other. Through our capacity to help 
and be helped, our lives achieve greater well-being and contentment than 
we could know as pursuers of happiness. Percy reminds us of our common 
existential predicament and restores to us the fundamental question “What 
shall I do?” that the pursuit of happiness implicitly tries to answer. In his 
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quest to answer this question, Percy points to the search with our fellow 
wayfarers as the means for us to find peaceful respite now, in company and 
conversation with others and living in hope of happiness.
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4On Dealing with Man
James V. Schall, S.J.
I’ve always held that art and even novels were just as valid as science, just as 
cognitive. . . . Science will bring you to a certain point and then no further; 
it can say nothing about what a man is or what he must do. And then the 
question is, how do you deal with man?
—Walker Percy, interview with John Carr, 1971
Scientists are more interested in teaching apes to talk than in finding out why 
people talk.
—Walker Percy, “Questions They Never Asked Me,” 1977 
Why is it that the look of another person looking at you is different from ev-
erything else in the Cosmos? . . . And why is it that one can look at a lion or a 
planet or an owl or at someone’s finger as long as one pleases, but looking into 
the eyes of another person is, if prolonged past a second, a perilous affair?”
—Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos, 1983
Aristotle often compares the quest for happiness with the quest for health. 
With his medical background (a background Aristotle also seems to have 
shared with his own father), Walker Percy was quite aware of the difference 
between what a doctor does and what a novelist does. The one describes 
what exactly is the condition of this human body; the other depicts what 
precisely is the condition of this human soul. Both are equally “scientific.” 
They both must know and state what is, and, indeed, what ought to be in 
the context of what is there. What we are and what we ought to be come 
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together in the exact person that is. We live with the consequences of the 
health or lack thereof both of body and of soul. They both relate to our free 
accepting or rejecting of what we already are.
A doctor, qua doctor, Aristotle tells us, is concerned with the restora-
tion to health of this particular person. It is John or Sally Smith, lying there 
before him, not a “case” in a medical book. This restoration to health of 
this particular person is his end and the action directed to it. Whatever his 
intentions, if the health of this person is not his end, he is not a true doctor. 
The doctor, like all students of human biology, is also concerned in general 
with what it is for a human being, as opposed to an animal, to be healthy. 
The respective “what it is to be healthy” in a human being and an animal 
are both goods but of differing kinds. What it is to be a healthy horse is 
analogous, not identical, to what it is to be a healthy human being. The two 
differ according to the end or purpose of the being itself.
A doctor is useful to us individually when we are not healthy. His pur-
pose is fulfilled when this particular patient becomes healthy. The doctor is 
not concerned about medicine in general but with Sally or John as lacking 
health. His end is what is needed to restore health. Nor does the doctor 
as such “heal” the patient. The operative nature present in this particular 
patient does the healing. The doctor aids, removes, and helps (or sometimes 
hinders) this process. The doctor does not “invent” what it is to be healthy. 
He aids in its accomplishment.
Once a patient is healthy, the doctor, as doctor, has nothing further to 
say to the patient, except perhaps some advice on how to remain healthy. 
The free activities of the healthy man fall under the realms of ethics, 
politics, art, metaphysics, and theology. They concern “living well,” not just 
living. One strives to live and to live well, but merely being alive is not what 
human life is about, though it is its presupposition. Prius est esse—first it 
is necessary to be alive as this being before this being can do what it is for.
Plato and Aristotle both note that the doctor, who can do us the most 
good where our health is concerned, can also do us the most harm. He knows 
better what can damage us. This caveat is why we do not go to a doctor who 
is our enemy or hates us. This is also why we do not go to an incompetent 
doctor. Moreover, the patient participates in the doctor’s prescriptions. The 
doctor can do little for the uncooperative patient. Plato had already noticed 
this. If the doctor tells the patient to take a certain medicine or perform 
specific kinds of exercises, it is still up to the patient to do them. The doctor 
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cannot force him. If he does not do as the doctor recommends, the doctor 
can no longer treat the patient according to his art. The patient becomes his 
own doctor.
And not all doctors know what this particular patient needs here and 
now. This is why we have specialists. And if all efforts fail, we have death, 
which comes eventually to all men. No doctor or scientist can keep us alive 
forever in this world, though more and more are trying. They think that it 
is a good thing. It isn’t. 
The causes of death are investigated by pathology. But what death is 
concerns philosophy and revelation. The doctor pronounces us dead; he 
does not explain what death as such is, though we know it is the cessation of 
this human life. He merely declares that we are dead, if we are. Philosophy, 
Socrates said, is preparing to die. He was not speaking as a doctor. He was 
more important than a doctor. His jailer explained to Socrates, in a basic 
medical way, how the poison would kill him. He did not answer Socrates’ 
other question in the Apology about whether death was an evil. Socrates 
said that he knew that doing wrong was evil. But he did not know whether 
death was. Death was better than doing wrong. It is better to die than to 
do wrong. Our civilization is, or was, based on this fundamental distinction.
Plato even has a character who spends his whole life worrying about his 
own health and keeping himself alive. The man had no time, Plato thought, 
to live a human life. A full human life, properly speaking, begins when we 
are no longer concerned exclusively with our health. Real life begins, as it 
were, when we no longer think of our health. We just have it. The healthiest 
person thinks least about health. He pursues the activities that are properly 
human, the activities of health, as Aristotle called them.
But what are the activities of a healthy person? The activities of health 
are not the concern of the doctor, except insofar as he has his own healthy 
life to live. What is it, then, that we do when we are healthy? We are to live 
as human beings and live well. And living well means that we acquire and 
practice the virtues that are indicative of what we are—the practical and the 
theoretical virtues. Yet, we might have the virtues but not be using them. 
Happiness is using them. And we use the virtues in order that we might be 
what we are. Being is an activity, not just a state. When we discover what we 
are, we find, paradoxically, that we are not much concerned with ourselves.
The purpose of the virtues is not to “discover” ourselves, as if to say 
that we do not already know what we are, who we are, or that we are. It 
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turns out that we ourselves are not the primary object of our own existence. 
We do not make ourselves to be what we are. Our existence always faces ad 
alium, toward someone else. We are not “self-sufficient.” Our mind does not 
first think itself. It first thinks the what is that is not ourselves. To be what 
we are, we have to be more than ourselves, without ceasing to be what we 
are. We exist as a being to be completed, not as one already complete.
“The quest of the self is probably self-defeating,” Walker Percy said in 
an interview with Charles Bunting, “I mean if religion has any validity at 
all, then the quest for the self is nonsense, you know. It’s the quest for God, 
or as Kierkegaard, I think, said: the only way the self can become self is 
by becoming itself transparently before God. . . . I suppose a good deal of 
my novel-writing could be a satire on the theme of the so-called quest for 
the self, or self-fulfillment. . . . A great deal of bad novel writing is about 
searching for one’s self.”1 These are remarkable words.
Paradoxically, we will never find ourselves if we spend our lives seeking 
ourselves. We spend our lives seeking what is not ourselves, as Augustine 
said. If by living we find only ourselves, we imitate the loneliness of Aristo-
tle’s divinity, who evidently had no friends. It is the wonder of the Trinitar-
ian revelation that God is not lonely. It is the wonder of good novels that we 
discover that we, ultimately, are not lonely either, both because we live and 
love others of our kind and because of our “transparency before God,” as 
Percy put it. Ultimately the only lonely beings in the universe are those who 
choose themselves as all that is.
In Walker Percy’s Message in the Bottle, we find him concerned with how 
science can prevent us from having the primary experiences of seeing, 
hearing, or smelling things as they are. These are experiences, as Aristotle 
said, that we would want even if they brought us no pleasure. Yet, they are 
delightful in themselves. Percy speaks of our having “access to being” and 
the “recovery of being.”2 He is getting at something basic here. Do we need 
something called “science” to stand between ourselves and reality? If we 
do, can we really know anything that is not ourselves? In spite of our actual 
experiences, do we need “experts” to verify for us whether our experience 
of reality is real or not? Can we rely on our given capacities and powers?
We can have this problem because many scientific theories tell us about 
what we are, but only one “me” deals with it all. Early in Lost in the Cosmos, 
Percy amusingly asks: “Can you explain why it is that there are, at last count, 
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sixteen schools of psychotherapy with sixteen theories of the personality 
and its disorders and that patients treated in one school seem to do as well 
or as badly as patients treated in any other—while there is only one gener-
ally accepted theory of the cause and cure of pneumococcal pneumonia and 
only one generally accepted theory of the orbits of the plants and the gravi-
tational attraction of our galaxy and the galaxy M31 in Andromeda?”3 The 
obvious conclusion is that, if a theory is in fact true, it will eliminate those 
opinions that are not true. The reaching an agreed-upon, logical conclusion 
is a perfection of knowledge, not a denial of freedom.
This conclusion is simply common sense, the kind Aristotle is said to 
have possessed when he wrote: “We must, however, not only state the true 
view, but also explain the false view; for an explanation of that promotes 
confidence. For when we have an apparently reasonable explanation of why 
a false view appears true, that makes us more confident of the true view” 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1154a23–26). We know false views exist alongside of 
true ones. We can tell the difference.
One of the most amusing experiences in reading Percy is what I might 
call “coming across scientific theories that cannot be true.” The passage 
from his famous “self-interview,” cited above, with regard to teaching apes 
to talk rather than understanding why human beings speak makes this point 
in an epigrammatic way. Percy, even though he respected science properly 
understood, thought that something was wrong with much of the whole 
modern movement. But he often approached the problem by its popular 
effects. Wrong theories of mind will disrupt the world of ordinary men.
In Lost in the Cosmos, we find the famous parody sequence called 
“The Last Donahue Show.” Phil Donahue is largely forgotten today, but 
at one time his was a very popular TV show. Donahue would open up his 
show to popular thought on a variety of current issues. Percy’s satire of 
this show falls within the method of Lost in the Cosmos itself. It examines 
whether what is presented as popular makes sense. Percy calls this process 
a “thought experiment.” The very title of the chapter, “The Last Donahue 
Show,” implied that the format had simply become so silly that most normal 
people could see its absurdities. People often need to have humor to see 
truth.
Percy imagines a show, with Donahue as host, composed of four persons 
before the camera. One is an active homosexual male from San Francisco. 
He is said to have had five hundred random “contacts.” This statistic is bal-
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anced nicely by a prosperous married businessman. He seems to spend his 
lunchtime making about as many heterosexual contacts as the homosexual 
makes male contacts. The third member is a fourteen-year-old girl who is 
pregnant by the time-tested methods. Finally, we find a female sex therapist 
who runs a talk show on her specialty, how to cure sexual problems.4
Percy, of course, has great fun with this situation, which is both absurd 
and close to reality, as life often is. The sequence brings out the fact that 
natural law itself is revealed in the laughter or reaction of the audience 
to the “reasons” given by the interviewees to justify their activities. Each 
justification represents a separate moral disorder of soul that is now said to 
be “normal” and often a “right.”
The fourteen-year-old girl, paradoxically, seems in fact to be the most 
sensible of the group. The reason that she gives for her pregnancy is simply 
that she wants the baby. The therapist is appalled at this response. She im-
mediately blames the situation on the schools for not teaching sex education 
and how to prevent conception. She reckons with everything but the girl 
before her, who is not influenced by such strange theories.
Much to the older woman’s consternation, the pregnant girl tells the 
therapist that she (the girl) has been thoroughly indoctrinated in the schools 
about all the means available for preventing pregnancy, including abortion, 
the getting rid of failures to prevent. The girl knows that she is pregnant. 
She knows how she got that way. She is savvy. She knows that pregnancies 
produce human babies, nothing else. In this case, it will produce hers. She 
simply wants the baby because it is, well, something she wants, something 
good. Naturally, this response of the girl undermines the whole theory be-
hind modern sex education. What is prevented is what normal people want 
because of what it is. We have to conclude either the girl is nuts or that she 
sees something that the theorists and politicians do not see, namely, her baby.
Now, I cite this famous “thought experiment” because it comes up 
again in an equally amusing interview of Percy with Jo Gulledge, which 
originally appeared in the Southern Review. Gulledge wants to discuss Lost 
in the Cosmos with Percy. She sees that the book is “half-serious and half-
satirical.” Percy responds: “I wrote it as a primer and in a light tone to make 
it accessible and to avoid academic portentousness. Readers, I have discov-
ered, are not much interested in heavy works on semiotics. Nobody reads 
academic semiotics but semioticists, and I sometimes wonder if they do.”5 
Obviously, Percy himself was not overwhelmed by academia or its influence.
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Gulledge then turns to this academic reception of Lost in the Cosmos. 
“A major criticism seems to be what your reviewers called a hard line ap-
proach on homosexuality. . . . Do you think you are going to get any feedback 
from that?” What interests me here is how Percy dealt with this question, 
which implied some bias on his part, a major academic fault these days, 
no doubt. Percy responds that he does not see how he is any more critical 
of homosexuals than of heterosexuals. Both follow disordered agendas. He 
treated them both fairly on the basis of what they said of themselves about 
their activities. We begin with the truth that each stated what he did.
Percy asks the interviewer if she is thinking of the scene in Lost in the 
Cosmos where the San Francisco man describes in detail what he does in 
city parks and why he does it. Homosexuals, like the heterosexual business-
man, can be very “promiscuous, amazingly so.” He was only reporting what 
each man said he did. Anybody could understand that something abnor-
mal (the five hundred) was going on here. The audience members had no 
trouble comprehending that the businessman, who said that he was married 
and had his wife’s approval for his philandering, was out of order. They 
immediately “booed” him for thinking nothing was wrong with his frequent 
lunchtime activities.
In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy continues his examination of what follows 
from separating sex from personality and responsibility. Two heterosexual 
Nobel Prize winners, by opening their own sperm bank with their own 
presumably high level of offerings, propose to “benefit millions of women.” 
The two generous “scientists” think that millions of women are of inferior 
intellectual stock. But by using their sperm (not that of their husbands or 
lovers), they could improve the “quality” of the race. This assumption, no 
doubt, lets us know what these scientists think of themselves and their own 
intelligence. This path obviously would obviate the need of husbands except 
perhaps as caretakers for the supposedly higher-level sons and daughters 
now begotten thanks to the sperm of the elite scientists, who become evi-
dently fathers of thousands of sons and daughters. Much of this was in Plato.
Percy thus affirms that he was no more critical of homosexuals than of 
Nobel Prize Laureates or businessmen.6 So what’s the beef? Percy’s point all 
the way through, however, was that normal people could see quite clearly, 
when they are amusingly spelled out, the aberrations in such activities and 
see through claims that they are simply neutral or even good for everyone 
involved. Most of such activities and proposals, seen as “thought experi-
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ments” in Percy’s time, are now the subject of legislation whereby they are 
legitimated by positive law. The “thought experiment” has appeared above- 
ground. We are now doing what we recently only imagined.
Percy’s writings are filled with scientists who cannot make contact with their 
own souls, with novelists and artists who find that science and scientists 
have little to say about what a human being is. In a letter to Shelby Foote, 
Percy wrote:
What do you mean, what are we to the French and the French to us! A great 
deal to both of us and in entirely different ways—all going back to the old 
Cartesian split, a typical Frenchman who perpetuated a typical French di-
saster from which we have been suffering ever since—with of course exciting 
consequences—with you on one side of the split and me on the other. The 
French are ideologues, i.e. madmen, and yet without them, we’d sink into 
a torpor. The mind-body split, locked-in ghost in the machine on one side, 
structure and world on the other, me with the former, you with the latter.7
Contrary to what we might expect, however, Percy does not think that the 
resolution of this problem is to arrive at a mutual understanding between 
science and literary culture. Speaking in his own capacity as a scientist, 
Percy thinks that the proper solution lies within science itself. Basically, 
if the scientist and the novelist are both dealing with reality, what is their 
point of contact?
In his 1989 Jefferson Lecture at the National Endowment for the Hu-
manities, Walker Percy addressed the question of the place of science and 
arts in society. Percy begins the lecture in this striking way: “I wish to offer 
two propositions for your consideration. One is that our view of the world, 
which we get consciously or unconsciously from modern science, is radically 
incoherent. A corollary of this proposition is that modern science is itself 
radically incoherent, not when it seeks to understand things and subhuman 
organisms and the cosmos itself, but when it seeks to understand man, not 
man’s physiology or neurology or his bloodstream, but man qua man, man 
when he is peculiarly human. In short, the sciences of man are incoherent.”8 
Percy argues that this issue is really located in the Cartesian split between a 
world of things and a world of thought. The whole modern question is: How 
are these two worlds related to each other?
As Percy points out in a number of ways, he has no problem with 
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science if it is describing and analyzing the bloodstream, his or anyone 
else’s. We can look at a man’s finger as long as we wish, as I cited Percy in 
the beginning. The fact is that there is something in man that cannot be 
measured by scientific methods, which presuppose matter of some sort as 
their objects. Reductionism means that only that which can be measured by 
scientific method is real. Percy rather proposes the realism of the American 
philosopher Charles Peirce. Peirce affirms this uniqueness of man. Yet this 
same man has a real connection with the world that science investigates. 
This connection is seen in man’s capacity to name and understand things. 
He can distinguish between things. He can identify them as different.
“Precisely that which is distinctive in human behavior, language, art, 
thought itself is not accounted for by the standard scientific paradigm 
which has been sovereign for three hundred years, that indeed, science as 
we know it cannot utter a single word about what it is to be born a human 
individual, to live and to die.”9 This realism, Percy knows, is connected 
with the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition in which the mind is itself or-
dered precisely to the truth of existing things. The perfection of the mind 
is to state this truth as known. This affirmation can only be made if there 
is a reality in which both what is and our knowing converge in the same 
order.10
Those who are accustomed to reading Plato will be familiar with 
Percy’s arguments that lead us to the notion of the spirituality of things 
because we know them. Percy does not, to be sure, come up with a doctrine 
of forms. But he does offer a sophisticated argument, following both Peirce 
and Percy’s own experience of watching children learn to speak. Knowing 
what a thing is, that this word relates to that thing known, that that thing 
known is this kind of a thing, not that kind, indicates a spiritual power 
already in existence. It needs only the opportunity to manifest itself.
The world of physical reality and the world of literature are not two 
different worlds. They belong to the same world and belong to each other. 
But there is only one being within that world that combines both in his 
very being. We cannot teach apes to think. But babies do learn to know, 
to speak, to identify. That is, they put things together—words, things, and 
their expanding knowledge of the relationship between them. This knowing 
too exists in the same world, not as separate but as distinguished.
Percy argues that the “thing,” whatever we call it within us that enables 
us to perform this knowing activity, is a natural phenomenon. It is already 
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there. It is not something put there by human power. It is a human power 
in action. This power in us is “real as a cabbage or a king, but it is not 
material. No material structure of neurons, however complex, and however 
intimately it may be related to the triadic event, can itself assert anything. 
. . .  A material substance cannot name or assert a proposition. The initiation 
of a speech act is an act—or, that is, an agent. The agent is not material.”11 
Truth only exists when the agent knows the thing, himself, and the relation 
of his knowing to the thing known.
What is the significance of this analysis of the existence of a power usu-
ally called the soul? It exists and can be identified by our reflexive powers in 
analyzing how we know and what we know. In his interview with John Carr, 
Percy remarked that the key question is “How do we deal with man?” Does 
the scientist who examines him by methods that exclude this spiritual side 
know anything about him, about what he really is? Does not the novelist 
know more about man than the scientist? Percy has no intention of not go-
ing to the doctor to find out what ails him, even if he himself has decided to 
practice another kind of medicine. But because of this relation of language 
and world centered only in the human soul and mind, can we hold together 
the two worlds split apart by the “madness of Frenchmen”?
A reason can be found about why we cannot look into the eyes of an-
other human being for longer than ten seconds, whereas we can look into 
the eyes of a lion as long as we wish. The reason is that what lies behind 
the eyes of our friend is another person, not just another thing. When we 
look into the eyes and soul of another, they are looking back at our soul. 
The proper way to learn about that other person is to engage in those spiri-
tual and human enterprises whereby we know one another in freedom and 
friendship, where we discuss the highest things to indicate how it is that we 
ourselves live.
Percy has always been fascinated with language as well as by the place 
where he lives, in Covington, Louisiana, to be exact. Aristotle had already 
observed that man is the animal that speaks. His reason and speech are 
directly consequent on each other. We find in the same world “two worlds.” 
One exists out there; the other one is “spoken” on the basis of what is al-
ready out there. The speaking world is to state what the objective world is. 
Neither world is complete without the other. Thing leads to word, word 
back to thing.
On Dealing with Man 79
In his amusing and insightful self-interview, “Questions They Never 
Asked Me,” Percy writes:
I have discovered from experience that even if anyone has the ultimate solu-
tion to the mystery of language, no one would pay the slightest attention. In 
fact, most people don’t even know there is a mystery. Here is an astounding 
fact. . . . The use of symbols between creatures, the use of language in par-
ticular, appears to be the one unique phenomenon in the universe, is certainly 
the single behavior that most clearly sets man apart form the beasts, is also 
the one activity in which humans engage most of the time. . . . And yet it is the 
least understood of all phenomena.12
But once we establish the fact that we can speak, can speak of what is, what 
follows asks, more in detail: What do we speak about?
In his essay “Naming and Being,” Percy remarks that the fact that we 
can “name” a being is every bit as much a mystery as the fact that the being 
is there to be named. “If we must speak of a ‘need’ in connection with hu-
man behavior, let us speak of it as Heidegger does: ‘The need is: to preserve 
the truth of Being no matter what may happen to man and everything that 
“is.” Freed from all constraint, because born of the abyss of freedom, this 
sacrifice is the expense of our human being for the preservation of the truth 
of Being in respect of what-is.’”13 Percy was more interested in metaphysics, 
the science of being as being, than he was of the nature of politics. Yet at 
the same time, Percy did focus on how our modern world seems ready to 
fall apart. 
Percy is often considered an apocalyptic writer. Certainly The Thanatos 
Syndrome or other surreal atmospheres that we find in Love in the Ruins 
make it appear that he made up a world that is not familiar to us. This 
approach seems to be the reason why Patrick Samway chose the following 
passage from Percy’s “Notes for a Novel about the End of the World” to 
introduce his collection of Percy essays. Percy probably knew Robert Hugh 
Benson’s 1910 novel, The Lord of the World, a book that shows the same 
sort of concerns that Percy manifested in his essays and novels.
Percy wrote: “Instead of constructing a plot and creating a case of 
characters from a world familiar to everybody, he [the novelist] is more 
apt to set forth with a stranger in a strange land where the signposts are 
enigmatic and which he sets out to explain nevertheless.”14 What does this 
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comment have to do with “the end of the world”? Obviously, it refers to 
those passages in Scripture, in the book of Daniel or the end of the Gospel 
of Matthew, about the signs of the last days and their not being recognized. 
The novelist, at his best, relates the life of his characters not only within 
the ordinary situations of ordinary life, but within the whole purpose of 
human life in this world and the next. This account of each life reflects the 
particular purpose of each human person in the universe, which provides 
the scene of his deciding what he shall be.
In this sense, Percy is rather like Flannery O’Connor, whom he knew. 
She said that her apparently exaggerated, if not deranged, southern char-
acters were necessary to enable us to see what is normal. Our culture is 
itself so distorted that we need to be shocked by what appears to us to be 
abnormal to see just how abnormal our chosen everyday life has become. 
The only way we can see the disorder of our souls is to stretch them out, 
make them bigger than life, even make them to seem like monsters.
The signposts point to what is really important in our lives. Thus, we 
cannot be surprised that O’Connor gave her stories and novels Scripture-
sounding titles like The Violent Bear It Away. Percy has a similar kind of 
title, The Second Coming. As a novelist, Percy stands in judgment of his 
culture through the lives of characters so affected by the derangement of 
our times that either they cannot see themselves, or they cannot help living 
a life that is attached to some transcendent purpose whereby these pur-
poseful people can see what is in a way obscure or closed off to the citizens 
of our time. 
Percy’s novel The Thanatos Syndrome is but another form of what John 
Paul II called the culture of death. This connection between apocalypse 
and politics is always present in Percy. When he is not acting as a novel-
ist but as a social critic, he spells out themes that appear in his novels in 
sometimes preposterous forms. The very title Lost in the Cosmos is also a 
guide to where Percy thinks we are. Rational beings, according to our own 
understanding of ourselves, presumably have become more and more intel-
ligent due to science and modern folkways. But, at the same time, do we 
really know what or who we are? The cosmos itself is not lost. The cosmos 
does not know that it is a cosmos, let alone why it exists or why anything in 
it feels lost. Intelligence is the personal property of man. Its only source is 
ultimately the source of intelligence itself. Intelligence is not something that 
the cosmos can inaugurate. It properly belongs to what is itself mind.
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The only way we can get lost in the cosmos is not to know what the 
cosmos is in its relation to us. We are lost because we have rejected the 
explanations of what we are that were found in reason and revelation. We 
have made ourselves lost, curiously, because we did not want to live in the 
universe as it was explained and given to us, a universe in which we were 
central, but not as its creators. Each of us had a purpose to our lives that 
was given to us in our very creation. We had freely to complete ourselves, 
granted the fact that we already were human beings, not turtles, from our 
actual beginnings. It was this latter realization that Percy thought was the 
reason why novels themselves only arise in a Christian culture.
“Judeo-Christianity is about pilgrims who have something wrong with 
them and are embarked on a search to find a way out. This is also what 
novels are about,” Percy wrote.15 Why modern political philosophy differs 
from this view is that, as Eric Voegelin said, it is an effort to “immanentize 
the eschaton.”16 That is, it attempts to cure this thing wrong with human na-
ture by reforming politics and economics by human means, not by wisdom, 
grace, and sacrifice, which are looked upon as alienating. “Thus, it is no 
accident that the novel has never flourished in the Eastern tradition,” Percy 
continued. “If Buddhism and Hinduism believe that the self is illusory, that 
ordinary life is misery, that ordinary things have no sacramental value and 
that reality itself is concealed by the veil of maya, how can any importance 
be attached to or any pleasure be taken in novels about selves and happen-
ings and things in an ordinary world?”17
Yet, Percy’s novels and essays reinforce each other as we notice in them 
that the denial of God and natural law leaves modern understanding of the 
world subject to no norms other than what we put there. Once freed from 
any relation to a free acceptance of human nature that guides him to what 
he is, the new civic man builds himself on the rejection of the basic things 
that made man to be man. What happens in Percy’s novels is that the new 
self-made man becomes more and more of a monster. He not only defines 
himself, but he builds a new man in direct opposition to the kind of man 
offered in nature, the nature that was given with human being in the first 
place.
In Signposts, we find printed a letter to the editor to the New York 
Times on January 22, 1988. If we wonder what the New York Times is, its 
refusal to publish this letter by a prominent novelist on the fifteenth anni-
versary of Roe v. Wade is a good indicator of the deepest sort of dishonesty 
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of soul. This was the annual “Right-to-Life” day designed to call attention to 
the unnaturalness of this Supreme Court decision allowing legal abortions 
for any reason. I cite this letter, in particular, because it indicated the de-
gree to which our media will not permit a full discussion of what is at stake. 
But Percy clearly joins together the disorder of the public world, apocalyptic 
themes, and the clearest reasoning about the logic of erroneous positions.
“While it may indeed be argued that in terms of Judaeo-Christian 
values individual human life is sacred and may not be destroyed,” Percy 
writes in his unpublished letter, “and while it is also true that modern medi-
cal evidence shows ever more clearly that there is no qualitative difference 
between an unborn human infant and a born human infant, the argument is 
persuasive only to those who adopt such values and such evidence.” If these 
positions are rejected, for whatever reason, it follows that the pro-abortion 
logic is valid. The human infant is not a baby but a “produce of conception,” 
merely part of the woman’s body.18
Percy wants to give grounds why this impasse may not be definitive. 
What he does is stretch out the consequences that follow when we accept 
the position that the “destruction of human life” can be accepted in any 
way.19 History is instructive to us, as Percy thinks. He examines the eugenic 
laws that were passed in Germany in the Weimar Republic, before the Na-
zis were in power. These laws in no way were the cause of the Nazi position, 
though, contrariwise, they may have rather been instructive to the latter’s 
views.
What Percy suggests is that “once a line is crossed, once the principle 
gains acceptance—juridically, medically, socially—innocent human life can 
be destroyed for whatever reason, for the most admirable socioeconomic, 
medical, or social reasons—then it does not take a prophet to predict what 
will happen next, or, if not next, then sooner or later.”20 What Percy pre-
dicted has now happened with the advance of biotechnology and expansion 
of “designer” concepts of family and life by the same logic. But it is not 
merely a dismantling of the family. It is a replacing of it with scientific de-
vices designed to free women or to improve the genes or to lengthen life or 
to produce children outside of intercourse or to retract the need of a child 
for the mother and father that begot him.
Percy, who sees the logic of these proposals and techniques, tells us 
that “a warning is in order,” a warning almost identically repeated by Bene-
dict twenty years later in his encyclical Spe Salvi. What Percy adds is the 
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political dimension that is intrinsic in the logic of denying a natural order 
that does not depend on man’s will, except for choosing to recognize it: 
“Depending on the disposition of the majority and the opinion polls—now 
in favor of allowing women to get rid of unborn and unwanted babies—it is 
not difficult to imagine an electorate or a court ten years, fifty years from 
now, who would favor getting rid of useless old people, retarded children, 
anti-social blacks, illegal Hispanics, gypsies, Jews. . . . Why not?—if that is 
what is wanted by the majority, the polled opinion, the polity of the time.”21 
It is now more than twenty years since Percy wrote these lines. These posi-
tions, originally devised in the democratic Weimar Republic, now appear in 
all modern republics, including ours. They have been carried out. Each of 
these propositions Percy has foreseen is either proposed or is in effect. They 
are in the logic of his argument.
I have entitled these reflections on Walker Percy, using one of his own 
expressions, “On Dealing with Man.” He asked about man because he saw 
that the answer to this question was beyond the competence of what are 
normally called the sciences. Man cannot be “dealt with” from the outside, 
at least not the man who is free and understands that he and his fellows 
must involve themselves in any improvement—and of any degeneration, 
for that matter. Man is not an object to be improved by something outside 
himself.
As Plato said, the only way to improve the polity is to improve the soul. 
No doubt things about man can be known to be disordered. But to improve 
him, he needs his own input. He needs the virtues. He needs to understand 
that he must participate in his own improvement, his own happiness, even 
if he does not create himself in what this happiness consists. He participates 
only in whether he will choose what he ought to do.
Students of Descartes, which Percy is, have, like Jacques Maritain, of-
ten thought that Descartes’ theory of knowledge was like the angels. Unlike 
human knowledge in Aristotle or Aquinas, Cartesian knowledge required 
no body, to which it is the form, with which it in particular might contact 
the world. Souls with bodies were not unlike Augustine’s Manicheanism, 
theories that enabled us to do whatever we wanted with the body on the 
grounds that we were untouched by it in our moral lives. This was a strange 
kind of freedom, quite opposed to that freedom exemplified in Aristotle’s 
theory of virtue that told us that to reach the contemplative truth, we 
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needed to discipline ourselves so that we were free of the attachments that 
caused us to use our minds to justify whatever it was we wanted to do. The 
body was to become the servant of the mind in their mutual understanding 
of the world that is.
In a very short essay, written in 1969 and entitled “Eudora Welty in 
Jackson,” Percy brought up this angelism question. It seems to be a feature 
of modern writers that they are “alienated” from their city or their families 
or the cosmos itself, in which they are lost. Why Percy speaks in this context 
of Eudora Welty is because she was a very good writer who lived her life in 
her home. “What is most valuable about Eudora Welty is not that she is one 
of the best living short-story writers. . . . No, what is valuable is that she has 
done it in a place.”22 She knew her hometown of Jackson, Mississippi. She 
knew its complexities and the stories of the people who lived there because 
she lived there. Percy found this living at home characteristic also of another 
philosopher he much admires, namely, Kierkegaard in Copenhagen.
One is reminded here of the Christian theme that its founder lived 
most of his life in a small town, yet in a place where he was no prophet 
among his family. The ordinary folks around him did not recognize him, nor 
did the leaders of his land. And yet, Percy finds that there is a connection 
between this angelism and the need to recapture the normalcy of body and 
spirit that is found in the Aristotelian tradition. “It is at least possible to live 
as one imagines Eudora Welty lives in Jackson, practice letters—differently 
from a banker banking but not altogether differently—and sustain a rela-
tion with one’s town and fellow townsmen which is as complex as you please, 
even ambivalent, but life giving.”23
Whether in Nazareth, Copenhagen, or Jackson, the place of full human 
and unique existence can be recognized as local. “The time is coming when 
the American novelist will tire of his angelism—of which obsessive genital 
sexuality is the most urgent symptom, the reaching out for the flesh which 
has been shucked—will wonder how to get back into a body, live in a place, 
at a street address. Eudora Welty will be a valuable clue.”24 Likewise is 
Walker Percy. The body cannot just be “shucked”; we are not Manicheans, 
the first heretics, who believe the body is evil. The soul that does not know 
its normal relation to its body, with which it is one person, seeks shocking 
things to prove to itself that it exists.
“How do you deal with man?” Not really by studying apes or even the 
whole cosmos. You deal with man by knowing what he is and the drama 
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of his existence, which is not completed in this life, but which is neither 
completed without his body. The resurrection remains the connection that 
man most hopes for. All of our literature somehow tells us that we seek the 
face of another. What is the reason why we can only gaze into the eyes of 
another, even someone we love, for only a few seconds? It is not because we 
find nothing there. Rather, it is because we find another there who, like us, 
is made for God, and neither will find rest in anything less.
In “Questions They Never Asked Me,” Percy’s “self-interview” puts the 
final seal on those who think his reasoning, his plots, his doctrines are, well, 
silly. He is asked (that is, asks himself): “Q. Are you a dogmatic Catholic 
or an open-minded Catholic? A. I don’t know what that means, either. Do 
you mean do I believe in the dogma that the Catholic Church proposes for 
belief? Q. Yes. A. Yes. Q. How is such a belief possible in this day and age? 
A. What else is there?”25
In the end, amusingly, probably Percy would say that, for his part, this 
is “how he deals with man.” None of the dogmatic alternatives that Percy 
carefully spells out in his novels and studies deals half so well as this one 
with the actual inhabitants of Nazareth, Copenhagen, Jackson, Mississippi, 
or, I suspect, Covington, Louisiana, his hometown. In such towns of this 
world, the residents are neither angels nor bodies, but imperfect, fascinating 
human persons, possessing both. Each is on his journey that his very being 
sets before him.
Each person is intended for glory. The drama of human existence, best 
seen perhaps by a novelist like Percy, is whether and how each one finds 
this glory through loves and hatreds of others. No one is, finally, lost, either 
in the cosmos or in everlastingness, except through his own choices. This is 
the truth of our existence that makes the novel possible among the cities of 
men composed of living human persons.
Notes
1. Charles T. Bunting, “An Afternoon with Walker Percy,” in Conversations 
with Walker Percy, ed. Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A. Kramer (Jackson: Univer-
sity Press of Mississippi, 1985), 49.
2. Walker Percy, The Message in a Bottle: How Queer Man Is, How Queer 
Language Is, and What One Has to Do with the Other (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 1975), 51.
86  James V. Schall, S.J.
3. Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book (New York: 
Washington Square, 1983), 11.
4. Ibid., 48–59.
5. Jo Gulledge, “The Reentry Option: An Interview with Walker Percy,” in 
Lawson and Kramer, Conversations, 285.
6. Ibid., 286.
7. The Correspondence of Shelby Foote and Walker Percy, ed. Jay Tolson (New 
York: Norton, 1998), letter of March 4, 1978, 238.
8. Walker Percy, “The Fateful Rift: The San Andreas Fault in the Modern 
Mind,” in Signposts in a Strange Land, ed. Patrick Samway, S.J. (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1991), 271.
9. Ibid., 288.
10. Walker Percy, “Naming and Being,” in Signposts, 130–38.
11. Percy, “The Fateful Rift,” 287. See Robert Sokolowski, The Phenomenology 
of the Human Person (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
12. Walker Percy, “Questions They Never Asked Me,” in Signposts, 419.
13. Percy, “Naming and Being,” 137–38.
14. Percy, Signposts, frontispiece.
15. Walker Percy, “Another Message in the Bottle,” in Signposts, 366.
16. Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism (Chicago: Gateway, 1969), 
89.
17. Percy, “Another Message,” 366.
18. Walker Percy, “An Unpublished Letter to the Times,” in Signposts, 349.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 350–51.
21. Ibid., 351.
22. Walker Percy, “Eudora Welty in Jackson,” in Signposts, 222.
23. Ibid., 223.
24. Ibid.
25. Percy, “Questions They Never Asked Me,” 416.
5Walker Percy’s “Theory of Man” 
and the Elimination of Virtue
Nathan P. Carson
It is no overstatement to say that throughout his entire authorship, the cri-
tique of our current cultural anthropology, together with the formulation of 
a new “theory of man,” was Walker Percy’s central concern. In many of his 
earliest essays, most of which predate his first and highly acclaimed novel, 
The Moviegoer, Percy outlines what he sees as the currently fractured state 
of our theory of humanity and emphasizes the need for an empirically de-
monstrable consensus view regarding what human beings most distinctively 
are. Throughout his career, Percy repeatedly attempts to articulate just 
what such a consensus view could be, for without it, modern human beings 
(in his view) remain lost to themselves amid the ruins of modernity.1
In this chapter, I examine Percy’s theory of human nature, with a par-
ticular emphasis on what an ideal person in Percy’s economy might be like, 
including the virtues such a person must possess. In focusing on Percy’s 
anthropology, with its empirically evident and natural ground for virtues, 
I do not attend to Percy’s political thought as such. Rather, I will examine 
Percy’s account of our distinctive proper function as human beings, for it is 
a function that grounds political community and the virtues that sustain it 
and provides its teleological and hence normative dimensions. My ultimate 
aim is to determine how successfully Percy’s anthropology performs this 
task.
In this essay, then, after summarizing Percy’s critique of our incoherent 
Darwinian and Cartesian conceptions of humanity, I examine Percy’s view 
that symbolic representation is the unique capacity that makes us human. 
Then, I elucidate his claim that unlike everything else in our world, we 
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humans are “unsignifiable” and cannot be captured under the auspices 
of symbolic predication. I show that for Percy, unsignifiability entails an 
ineradicable and God-given anxiety, making both our self-placement in the 
world and transcendent orientation unavoidable. Then, after examining the 
necessity and normativity of our relatedness to other signifying selves, I 
conclude my exposition by examining what an ideal self-placement in the 
world might look like, including its ecstatic orientation toward the world, 
others, and God. Next, in the constructive portion of the chapter, I offer 
extended speculation regarding what virtues might be proper to the kind of 
beings that Percy thinks we are, and how such virtues positively sustain hu-
man inquiry, interpersonal communion, and the goods of community that 
undergird the human polis. Finally, however, I argue that Percy’s commit-
ment to human unsignifiability radically undermines most of these positive 
prospects. For this unsignifiability, which preserves for Percy our proper 
orientation toward the world, others, and God, is deeply incompatible with 
either virtue predication or virtue possession.
Present Anthropological Incoherence
Percy claims that, on the one hand, many people in the post-Enlightenment 
age see the human being as merely an “organism in an environment,” an 
anthropology built on the developments of Darwinian science and B. F. 
Skinner’s condition-response behaviorist theories. Percy exerts single-
minded persistence in demonstrating how inadequately the “organism-in-
environment” theory explains humanity. He argues that one cannot simply 
take “this or that laboratory hypothesis—say, learning theory as applied 
to organisms in a laboratory environment—and by verbal sleight-of-hand 
stick the label onto man.” For those in this Darwinian-behaviorist camp, 
says Percy, it may be “quite natural to think of man as you think of rats or 
chimpanzees, as an organism, a biological energy system, not qualitatively 
different from other such energy systems.” On this view, Percy adds, any 
unique characteristic of human beings is seen as “yet another evolutionary 
stratagem” for adapting to or conquering an environment. Yet if human be-
ings are mere organisms, Percy queries, how can it be that they are unhappy 
even in the most perfect environment? Even if we grant such qualities as 
abstract thinking, art, culture, and the use of tools as mere results of evolu-
tionary progress, this theory still is unable to account for many things. What 
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other organism makes war against its own species, commits suicide, or is 
vulnerable to manifold self-psychoses?2
However, what is the alternative? Here Percy notes that many people 
seem to know that humanity has unique properties that must be accounted 
for, and so they fill this gap by holding on to an anthropology—“implicit 
in Western civilization itself”—comprised of the leftovers of a burned-out 
Judeo-Christianity that includes such vague ideas as “freedom,” “mind,” the 
“sacredness of the individual,” and the like.3 Percy says that most people, 
while holding the organism theory in one hand, hold these “traditional” 
Greek and Judeo-Christian dualist teachings about the nature of human 
beings in the other. However, for Percy, this traditional view of the human 
self as an “intermediate being,” as a composite or synthesis of body and 
soul (for example), is unhelpful precisely because it is held incoherently in 
tandem with the “organism-in-environment” view and because the terms of 
traditional Judeo-Christian definitions no longer hold any meaning for the 
average Western person.4
What is more, the traditional Judeo-Christian “intermediate” view of 
humanity as both angel and beast suffers from a cultural Cartesianism that 
renders it deformed and unintelligible. For example, Percy situates many of 
his critiques of the intermediate view in the context of Cartesian dualism 
that split the consciousness of Western humanity into “body and mind,” a 
“strange Janus monster” that has subsequently been methodologically pre-
supposed in the natural and psychological sciences. In Percy’s view, then, 
we are incoherently positioned between the reductionistic organism theory 
of humans as Darwinian beasts and the unintelligible theory of humans as 
Cartesian angels, most of us holding to both without knowing exactly how 
the two hang together.5
Attempting to move beyond this predicament, Percy seeks an empiri-
cally accessible anthropological theory, one that overcomes the incoher-
ence and limitations of either the Darwinian beast view, the Cartesian 
angel view, or their awkward Frankensteinian marriage. As they presently 
stand, says Percy, none of these approaches is of any help scientifically; 
they are even a hindrance if we think they offer a comprehensive an-
thropological theory. As an alternative, Percy seeks something within 
science itself that can account for both humanity’s creatureliness and its 
intermediate uniqueness.6 So, he searches for an empirical insight that 
could offer a coherent, empirically accessible, and experientially validated 
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view of human beings, offering a way out of our present anthropological 
incoherence.
The Symbol-Mongering Being
To make a start at pinpointing such an insight, Percy says, “When man 
doesn’t know whether he is an organism or a soul or both, and if both how 
he can be both, it is good to start with what he does know.”7 What we do 
know, says Percy, is that human begins talk. Here is a starting point that 
everyone, theologians and scientists alike, can agree upon. For Percy, lan-
guage (and the symbolic representation behind it) is the unique marker of 
human being, but also fully empirically evident and hence something that 
may bring disparate theories together into a cohesive whole.8
The human phenomenon of language is no evolutionary advancement 
or adaptation, according to Percy. The appearance of a symbol-mongering 
being in the evolutionary record is, he argues, “as sudden as biblical cre-
ation.” The human brain, Percy continues, increased in weight by as much 
as 54 percent in a few thousand years, “much of this increase occurring 
in the cortex,” especially “around the Sylvan fissure implicated in the per-
ception and production of speech.” Taking his cue from writers, linguists, 
psycholinguists, and semioticians such as Charles Sanders Peirce, Suzanne 
Langer, Ernst Cassirer, and Noam Chomsky, Percy sees this breakthrough 
into the “daylight of language” as an “all-or-none threshold” and “a spec-
tacular quantum jump that made man human,” such that we now live in 
a whole new world. Hence, Percy claims, “so sweepingly has his [human-
ity’s] life and his world been transformed by his discovery of symbols that it 
seems more accurate to call man not Homo sapiens—because man’s folly is 
at least as characteristic as his wisdom—but Homo symbolificus, man the 
symbol-mongerer, or Homo loquens, man the talker.” Here Percy suggests 
that if human beings are truly unique in this capacity and acquisition, then 
“surely a good place to look for a minimum consensus view of man is as 
languaged creature, not man the mind-body composite.”9
In his examination of man the symbol-mongerer, Percy turns to the 
semiotic work of pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce and his distinction 
between the only two kinds of natural interactions in the cosmos: those 
involving “dyadic relations” and those involving “triadic relations.” The lat-
ter, Percy argues, is unique to human beings and different in kind from all 
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other physical or biological interactions that happen. A dyadic event may 
be briefly described as a cause-effect relation or a stimulus-response oc-
currence such as subatomic particle collision or a man’s response to female 
pheromones. For Percy, human transaction with symbols is the only kind 
of natural event that we know of that cannot be reduced to such a dyadic 
relation or causal interaction. Following Peirce, Percy calls such symbolic 
activity “triadic” due to this fundamental irreducibility between symbol 
(signifier), the object (signified), and the mind of the symbol user itself.10
Percy himself was struck by the uniqueness and importance of this aspect 
of being human while reading the story of Helen Keller’s breakthrough into the 
symbolic world. For the first seven years of her life, Keller seemed to operate in 
dyads, as, for instance, when her teacher, Miss Sullivan, “spelled C-A-K-E into 
Helen’s hand and Helen went to look for cake—like one of Skinner’s pigeons.” 
The qualitative leap between the “dyadic” Helen of those first seven years and 
the “triadic” person she becomes after April 5, 1887, captivated Percy and fu-
eled much of his anthropological theory. The significant occurrence happened 
as Miss Sullivan placed one of Helen’s hands under the running water at a 
well-house pump and spelled W-A-T-E-R in the other. In that moment, Helen, 
for the first time, understood the word water to be the substance running over 
her hand. She broke through the threshold of symbol and language when she 
finally made the connection between naming and being.11
With regard to this triadic breakthrough, Percy notes that “man’s 
capacity for symbol-mongering in general and language in particular is so 
part and parcel of his being human, of his perceiving and knowing, of his 
very consciousness itself, that it is all but impossible for him to focus on 
the magic prism through which he sees everything else.”12 Given her age, 
Keller’s case is valuable because her breakthrough is simply more discern-
ible as the amazing “quantum leap” that it actually is. This leap, though a 
precondition for myriad human maladies, is for Percy nothing less than the 
entrance of the child into full humanness. It is “the discovery of the world 
and the coming to oneself as a person” and involves “the secret of knowing 
what the world is and of becoming a person in the world.”13
The Human Task: Communion through Symbolic Naming
The connection Percy draws between triadic language, “discovery of the 
world,” and the task of “becoming a person in the world” is crucial. By vir-
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tue of our own nature as symbol-mongering creatures, we are saddled with 
the ineradicable and twofold task of naming the world, on the one hand, and 
of achieving selfhood by rightly positioning ourselves in the world, on the 
other. I will examine each of these tasks, beginning with the task of naming.
In Percy’s view, Homo symbolificus (or man the symbol-mongerer) 
not only has and responds to the cosmic environment, as do other organ-
isms, he also has a world. The sign-user goes around making signs, naming 
things around him, and creating a symbolic world of meaning within the 
physical world of the cosmos. Here, everything has a place, is accounted 
for, and named. Percy claims, “It is of the nature of the symbol-mongering 
consciousness to delineate and transform all sensory data into intentional 
symbolic forms. The whole objectizing act of the mind is to render all things 
. . . formulable.” Moreover, since the act of naming is a fundamental aspect 
of human consciousness, the symbolic rendering of all things formulable 
grants the sign-user epistemic access to the world around her. For Percy, 
triadic symbolization is a necessary condition for knowing or cognizing 
something as an object, since without a sign, precisely nothing is known or 
so cognized.14
So, for Percy’s triadic self, everything encountered must be known as 
something, or else it is not known at all: “Once it dawns upon one, whether 
deaf-mute or not, that this is water, then the first question is What is that, 
and so on, toward the end that everything is something. There has come 
into existence an all-construing mode of cognition in which everything 
must be formulated symbolically and known intentionally as something.” In 
order that a particular bird be “known and affirmed,” a “pairing is required: 
the laying of symbol alongside thing” (for example, that bird is a robin). In 
this way, naming moves the namer beyond mere biological orientation to 
an ontological orientation toward being, providing us with access to being 
such that the world may be discovered, unveiled, and celebrated with joy. 
Notably, the symbolizing activity in question here is “a means of knowing 
. . . not in the sense of possessing ‘facts’ but in the Thomistic and existential 
sense of connatural identification of the knower with the object known.”15
Here we reach the first significant point about Percy’s view of human 
selfhood as task, as I began to discuss above. One telos of this task of nam-
ing is the achievement of symbolic communion of the symbolizing self with 
everything other in the symbolic order, as the other is “fixed and formulated 
by the symbol.”16 Now, Percy holds that we can engage in this activity in bet-
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ter or worse ways, but our task of knowing by naming ideally opens up the 
created order, inviting it into a communion between knower and known; 
and it is a task that can occasion wonder and joy in the namers themselves.
I now turn to a second crucial aspect of the human task, occasioned 
by our encounter with things we either do not or cannot know. This, as I 
stated above, is the task of human self-placement in the symbolic world. 
Given our ubiquitous need for symbolically formulating our world, Percy 
contends that the absence of knowledge through symbolic communion may 
occasion helplessness or acute anxiety for the symbol-mongering self in the 
face of the unnameable and unknowable. And, as it so happens, Percy ar-
gues that the symbol-mongering creature himself can never be symbolically 
captured; she is utterly immune to any “stable symbolic transformation” or 
semiotic closure of being. Percy puts it this way: “It is the requirement of 
consciousness that everything be something and willy-nilly everything is 
something—with one tremendous exception! The one thing in the world 
which by its very nature is not susceptible of a stable symbolic transforma-
tion is myself! I, who symbolize the world in order to know it, am destined 
to remain forever unknown to myself.”17
To myself, the sign-maker, all significations apply, yet none of them ap-
ply. I cannot capture myself and pin myself down; I am a slippery being that 
is always, maddeningly, becoming. The selfhood of the symbol-mongerer 
amounts to an inexhaustible subjectivity that refuses the solidity and reduc-
tion that an accompanying symbol would entail. Percy famously depicts this 
view in Lost in the Cosmos:
Semiotically, the self is literally unspeakable to itself. One cannot speak or 
hear a word which signifies oneself, as one can speak or hear a word signifying 
anything else, e.g. apple, Canada, 7-Up.
The self of the sign-user can never be grasped, because, once the self 
locates itself at the dead center of its world, there is no signified to which a 
signifier can be joined to make a sign. The self has no sign of itself. No signi-
fier applies. All signifiers apply equally.
You are Ralph to me and I am Walker to you, but you are not Ralph to 
you and I am not Walker to me. . . . For me, certain signifiers fit you, and not 
others. For me, all signifiers fit me, one as well as another. I am rascal, hero, 
craven, brave, treacherous, loyal, at once the secret hero and asshole of the 
Cosmos.
You are not a sign in your world. Unlike other signifiers in your world 
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which form more or less stable units with the perceived world-things they 
signify, the signifier of yourself is mobile, freed up, and operating on a sliding 
scale. . . .
The signified of the self is loose and caroms around the Cosmos like an 
unguided missile.18
Percy calls this unsignifiability “the symbolic predicament of the self.” 
Nonetheless, says Percy, such “problematic” self-unnameability is precisely 
that which grounds the human being in the task of human becoming. It is 
indeed a creational given that roots the human self in relation to “other,” 
but only becomes “problematic” when, as Percy so aptly demonstrates in his 
fictional characters, a person attempts to grasp himself as an autonomous 
subject apart from such relationality. The symbolic and hence relational 
character of epistemology means that the self cannot know itself as “some-
thing” apart from relational pairing of itself with the “other.”19
This brings us to our next problem, which further illumines the nature 
of the self’s task. If the self is unnameable to itself, then the issue of self-
placement within one’s own symbolic world arises. Percy argues, “As soon as 
the self becomes self-conscious—that is, aware of its own unformulability in 
its world of signs—from that moment forward, it cannot escape the predica-
ment of its placement in the world.” For Percy, placing oneself in one’s world 
is inescapable, yet also highly problematic:
Please note that once the symbol-mongering organism has a world, he must 
place himself in this world. He has no choice. He cannot not do it. If he 
refuses to make a choice, then he will experience himself placed in this world 
as one who has not made a choice. He is not like a dog or a cat who, when 
deprived of all stimuli, goes to sleep. Unlike an organism in an environment, 
a man in a world has the unique capacity for being delighted with the world 
and himself and his place in the world, or being bored with it, anxious about 
it, or depressed about it. He can exploit it, celebrate it, be a stranger in it, or 
be at home in it.20
Why does Percy take the task of placing the unsignifiable self in a world 
of signs to be an unavoidable predicament? Self-unsignifiability is one part 
of the answer. However, the answer also involves recognizing Percy’s explicit 
debt to Søren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, in which objectless 
anxiety (over “nothing”) is an ineradicable and God-given emotion that re-
veals to people their transcendent orientation and inescapable freedom and 
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task to become selves before God.21 Unlike Kierkegaard, however, Percy 
treats anxiety as a necessary consequence of our nature as self-unsignifiable 
symbol-mongering beings: “The being of the namer slips through the fin-
gers of naming. If he tries to construe himself in the same mode by which 
he construes the rest of the world, he must necessarily construe himself as 
a nothing, as Sartre’s characters do. But this is not to say that I am nothing; 
this is only to say that I am that which I cannot name. I am rather a person, 
a namer and a hearer of names.”22
Here, borrowing from while altering Kierkegaard, Percy claims that 
self-unsignifiability and the attendant problem of self-placement in the 
symbolic world cause anxiety over “nothing.” Unlike object-based anxiety, 
says Percy, “the anxiety which follows upon symbolization is ambiguous” 
because it is anxiety over the “nothing” that is the unsignifiable self. As it is 
the native ability of the symbol-mongerer to name and place things in her 
world, when faced with herself as the unnameable, anxiety over nothing 
settles in. Since this situation is, for Percy, part of the very nature of what 
it means to be Homo symbolificus, we can conclude that for Percy, as for 
Kierkegaard, anxiety is a given and inescapable characteristic of human na-
ture. The catastrophic fall into a self-absorbed “suck of self,” shame, despair, 
and myriad inauthentic symbolic identifications of the self with either God 
or things in the world only occurs, it would seem, as a result of the sign-user 
freely “turning from the concelebration of the world to a solitary absorption 
with self.”23
This is further verified by Percy’s arguments, in “The Coming Crisis in 
Psychiatry,” against those in the human sciences who treat anxiety as purely 
pathological, since it is biologically counterproductive. If human beings are 
mere organisms in an environment, as many in the human sciences presup-
pose, asks Percy, then why do human beings seem to be the only organism in 
the cosmos capable of pure self-imposed misery in a perfect environment? 
Given their reductively biological view of humanity, says Percy, the social 
sciences must treat biologically useless anxiety as pathological. However, in 
doing so, these sciences render themselves “unable to take account of the 
predicament of modern man.”24
In opposition to this, Percy affirms Erich Fromm’s view that anxiety 
may be an “appropriate” reaction “for the man who confronts himself and 
discovers—nothing.” Thus does Percy suggest that “anxiety may be quite 
the reverse of a symptom” which, together with our symbol-mongering 
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and self-unsignifiability, point us toward “goals beyond the biological,” a 
“true estate” of human being involving “a concept of human nature and 
what is proper to it.” Indeed, Percy claims that anxiety marks an “incurable 
God-directedness” or transcendence in human beings. It is not merely the 
consequence of living in a consumerist age of biological needs satisfaction, 
though this surely makes its occurrence more acute.25 Rather, Percy holds 
that anxiety, an ineradicable indicator of our transcendent orientation, is 
ultimately entailed by our symbol-mongering nature and inability to fix 
ourselves under a stable signifier. The perennial character of this condition 
is further verified by Percy’s endorsement of the existentialist insight that 
anxiety reveals to us our freedom and task of becoming a self. Hence Percy 
comments that “anxiety may be quite the reverse of a symptom. It may 
be the call of the self to the self, in Kierkegaard’s words: the discovery of 
the possibility of freedom to become a self.”26 As mentioned above, anxiety 
only becomes pathological (and hence a form of despair), when the self 
encounters its own unsignifiability in a world of signs and responds with 
a self-conscious, narcissistic inward collapse, grasping to make of itself, in 
Cartesian fashion, a reified something in the world of signified things.
In The Second Coming, for example, Will Barrett runs into just such 
unsignifiability and task of self-placement, and his response is terribly mis-
guided:
He gazed at himself in the bathroom mirror, turned his head, touched his 
cheek like a man testing whether to shave. Presently his face canceled itself 
out. The bright-faceted forehead went dark, the deep-set eyes began to glow, 
the shadowed pocked cheek grew bright. The mirror, he noticed, did not 
reflect accurately. It missed the slight bulge of forehead, the hollowing of 
temple which showed in photographs. Even when he turned his head, his 
nose did not look snoutish as it did in a double mirror.
Something stirred in him. He looked at his watch. In three minutes Kitty 
would slip out into the cloud. When he thought of her standing in the sum-
merhouse, hugging herself, wrapped in fog, he smiled. She would sit on the 
damp bench, straddling slightly, her thighs broadening and filling the creamy 
linen skirt. Yes, it was in her, not in a mirror, he would find himself. Enter-
ing her, he would be answered, responded to, delineated. His life would be 
proved by her. She would echo him, print him out, trace his shape like radar. 
He could read himself in her.
His heart gave a big pump. Did Kitty want what she appeared to want? 
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Did she want him to fuck her in the summerhouse? Yes! And it was Kitty’s ass 
he wanted. Yes!27
Here, Will is looking for himself, but finds nothing. The mirror signifies 
some things, but it fails to pin Will down in his own symbolic world. In the 
mirror’s reflection, Will’s face “canceled itself out” as the mirror “missed” 
him and “did not reflect accurately.” He is stuck with the problem of self-
placement in his own world and, disappointed by the mirror’s inability to 
signify him or give him such a place, he turns excitedly to another mode of 
self-placement. Illicit sex with Kitty Vaught may be just what Will needs to 
be “delineated,” printed out, traced like radar.
While this passage appears to deal with anything but anxiety, anxiety 
is nonetheless the chief matter at hand, especially when we consider the im-
plicit connection here between anxiety and desire, a pairing that becomes 
explicit later in the novel. For Percy, nonpathological anxiety is precisely a 
form of desire and longing that attracts and repels as it coaxes the self out 
of its present state toward its telos of resting transparently under God in 
consciousness of itself as a self. Will Barrett, by contrast, responds to his 
own unsignifiability with despair. His creational “anxiety over nothing”—
the anxious longing for signification that marks the “God-directedness” in 
Will and compels some kind of placement in the world—is transmuted into 
a compulsive and inordinate sexual desire. Will plans to place himself in the 
world by “entering” Kitty Vaught.
In the forgoing discussion I have tried to show why, for Percy, the hu-
man task of self-placement in the world is unavoidable. If, as Percy supposes, 
anxiety indicates an “incurable God-directedness” that is mutually entailed 
by our symbol-mongering nature and our own unsignifiability, and if such 
anxiety reveals our inescapable freedom, then human beings are stuck with 
the predicament of placing themselves, unsignified, in a world of signs.
Proper Self-Placement in the World
I now want to turn to Percy’s constructive vision for what it means to be 
rightly placed in the world as an unsignifiable and nonpathologically anx-
ious human person. While Percy is undeniably a comic master at depicting 
and diagnosing mis-placements, I will focus strictly on his positive vision 
and ultimately on the virtues that might be needed to sustain this vision. To 
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understand Percy’s notion of proper self-placement, we must first grasp his 
view about social consciousness and co-signification. Along the way, Percy’s 
view of proper placement in the world will come clear, amounting also to 
a serious critique of the individualist or hyperautonomous Cartesian and 
Kantian ego. These points will also figure prominently in my later discus-
sion of Percian virtues.
Earlier I examined Percy’s view of the symbol as epistemic need, which 
is the view that without triadic-symbolic representation, human beings nei-
ther have nor know a world. A relation to the “other” that is my symbolically 
ordered world is an essential element in the constitution of the symbol-
making self, and communion with that other is one of its goals. However, 
Percy expands this position to a far more ambitious one: the notion that 
representational acts are irreducibly social, and indeed that consciousness 
itself is irreducibly social or intersubjective in character.
Put briefly, Percy claims that consciousness is not a psychological “state” 
of one sort or another, but rather a con scio, a “knowing with” or relation that 
occurs within the shared symbolic world of triadic co-signification. I am con-
scious that “this is a robin” not because I have conjured up a unique sign in my 
own private language, but because it is a robin “for you and me.” Reminiscent 
of Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning as use in a social form of life, Percy bor-
rows the view from George H. Mead that consciousness is “a phenomenon 
arising from the social matrix through language,” and hence meaning as well. 
Thus not only Descartes but the phenomenologist and the existentialist tell 
only half of the story, because awareness is symbolic in character, and such 
symbols are irreducibly intersubjective in character: “I am not only conscious 
of something; I am conscious of it as being what it is for you and me.”28
Hence, Percy flatly rejects any theoretical or normative conception 
of the human being as an autonomous subject, or even as a form of the 
phenomenologist’s prereflective transcendental ego. Percy contends that 
the “prime reality of human consciousness” is not the Cartesian cogito (“I 
am conscious of this chair”), nor the Sartrean prereflective and impersonal 
cognito (“There is consciousness of this chair”), since both of these ap-
proaches presuppose consciousness. Rather, for Percy, the proper construal 
of the “originary act of consciousness is the joint affirmation that the object 
is there for you and me,” a co-designation by means of symbol that “is itself 
the constituent act of consciousness” (“This is a chair for you and me”). 
This, says Percy, offers a “symbolic corrective” to both Anglo-American 
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empiricism and existentialism in their attempts to defeat both the Cartesian 
cogito and the Kantian transcendental ego. “The decisive stroke against the 
myth of the autonomous Kantian subject,” says Percy, “is the intersubjective 
constitution of consciousness. There is a mutuality between the I and the 
Thou and the object which is in itself prime and irreducible.”29
This means, among others things, that Percy envisions human beings 
as irreducibly in need of one another for that which makes them distinc-
tively human. Regarding the self that unavoidably must operate within a 
symbolic world, Percy says, “You—Betty, Dick—are like other items in my 
world—cats, dogs, and apples. But you have a unique property. You are 
also a co-namer, co-discoverer, co-sustainer of my world—whether you are 
Kafka whom I read or Betty who reads this. Without you—Franz, Betty—I 
would have no world.”30 To have no symbolic world is to be subhuman, or 
potentially human at best. For Percy, then, inasmuch as the symbol is hu-
manly requisite for epistemology, and shared meaning is a necessary condi-
tion of consciousness, symbol-mongering persons are irreducibly dependent 
on others for their very status as conscious human beings. Indeed, Percy 
claims that “it is inconceivable that a human being raised apart from other 
humans should ever discover symbolization.”31
From this social view of the nature of consciousness, Percy advances 
further, moving toward a normative conception of human relationality and 
intersubjective communion. Percy grounds this conception in the empirical 
reality of symbolic exchange between human beings. Moving beyond his 
initial Peircian triad—symbol-maker, symbol, and object—Percy pairs two 
triadic sign-transactions into his “symbol tetrad,” bringing the “utterer” and 
“receiver” together. He thus forms an integrated account and normative 
construal of consciousness that includes Marcel’s intersubjectivity, Buber’s 
authentic “I-Thou” relation (and the possibility for “I-it” inauthentic rela-
tion), and Mead’s social construal of consciousness:32
<DIAGRAM 5.1> 
 
I (organism1) You (organism2) 
 Symbol 
Referent 
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This “tetrad” adds new dimensions to C. S. Peirce’s triad, and it il-
lustrates that for Percy, without a symbolic meaning that is intersubjectively 
shared and co-affirmed, the symbol-mongerer has no world. However, it 
also clarifies that the “I-Thou” interpersonal relation is not only “the very 
condition of being and knowing and feeling in a human way,” as Percy claims, 
but that this relation also includes an inescapably normative dimension. 
Hence, Percy says, “The Thou is at once the source of my consciousness, 
the companion and co-celebrant of my discovery of being—and the sole 
threat to my unauthentic constitution of myself.” In a reversal of Sartre’s 
aggressively objectifying stare, Percy claims that the “look” of the other 
can disturbingly expose my inauthentic modes of self-placement, for what 
the look “discovers” and affirms about me is my literal “unspeakableness” 
(unsignifiability). Rather than affirming my unauthentic self-construal as 
an autonomous something or an object in its world, the truly intersubjec-
tive look of the Thou exposes me “not as a something” but as “nothing.” 
Moreover, when both the “I” and “Thou” mutually share this affirmation of 
unsignifiability, the mutual gaze turns from aggressive “exposure” to “love 
in the communion of selves.”33
Where authentic love occurs in such intersubjective communion, 
anxiety over one’s own unsignifiability turns outward into a direct desire 
for the other, and ultimately into an anxious longing for the transcendent 
source of that love, of which the love itself is a sign. Toward the close of 
The Second Coming, for example, Will Barrett comes to realize that Allie, 
and the love they share, is a gift and hence “a sign of a giver.”34 Thus, Percy 
does not bring Will through his entire pilgrimage simply to fall in love with 
a girl. There is indeed a “God-directedness” at the core of Will’s anxious 
longing, and Allie serves as a horizontal, sacramental sign, a message in a 
bottle pointing him to a vertical relation to God. For Percy, the experience 
of intersubjective communion between Allie and Will is not a tetradic end 
in itself, a closed system of human intersubjectivity. Rather, it is a relation 
that is, like Kierkegaard’s self-as-relation, a “derived, established relation” 
that finds its telos only in God.
Percy’s understanding of human nature and proper self-placement 
is further clarified by the one sustained moment in which he speculates 
on the nature of unfallen symbol-mongering beings. We catch glimpses 
of this in the novels, of course, but these glimpses are often intermingled 
with the intractable personal pathologies of Percy’s fictional characters. 
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Percy’s clearest speculation on unfallen symbol-mongering beings takes the 
form of a discussion about aliens, in which he reflects on the possibility 
that other intelligences in the cosmos could also have broken through the 
dyadic barrier into self-consciousness and the symbolic world, but without 
falling into the inauthenticity of grasping for themselves as autonomous, 
solitary somethings. Percy queries, “Might they not have achieved the world 
of signs without succumbing to the terrible penalty? Might there not exist 
preternatural [prelapsarian] intelligences who do not necessarily share the 
shadow-life of the earth-self?”35 If so, what does this Edenic life look like?
In the first of his two “Space Odyssey” short stories, toward the end 
of Lost in the Cosmos, Percy describes an imagined conversation between 
humans and another race of intelligent, sentient beings who seem to have 
retained their unfallen state. Claiming that their race possesses an unfallen 
“C1 consciousness,” the alien spokesman describes their “preternatural” 
state:
[It is] something like the consciousness of a child grown mature and sophisti-
cated but maintaining its innocence permanently and avoiding the malforma-
tions of self-consciousness, enjoying the beauty of our planet and each other 
and our science and art without weariness, boredom, fear, guilt, or shame. 
Like what you call the Helen Keller phenomenon . . . [which is] the joy of 
consciousness and the discovery of the Cosmos through the mediation of 
symbols and the cooperation of others and the preservation of this joy against 
the incursions of boredom, fear, anger, despair, shame, and the love of war 
and death and the secret desire for the misfortune of others.
To this, Percy adds that “a C1 consciousness is selfless . . . unaware of self, 
because it is looking out, seeing things, and symbolizing through intersub-
jective transactions with others.”36
With these unfallen aliens in mind, together with our analysis above, 
we may safely formulate Percy’s ideal conception of human nature, leading 
to fruitful reflection on the virtues of beings with such a nature. Although 
we are indeed intermediate “angel-beasts” and in some sense organisms, 
the chief unique human ability is triadic symbolization expressed in lan-
guage, and this makes human beings fundamentally relational and capable 
of intersubjective tetradic communion. Normatively, then, the ideal self is 
one that refuses, in its anxiety, to grasp for the “nothing” of autonomous 
being. Rather, it bypasses the narcissistic “fall” into solitary subjectivity 
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occasioned by its unsignifiability, and turns instead to place itself outward 
toward the world of signs, toward other signifying selves, and through that 
communion, toward the Sign-Giver.
The Virtues of the Symbol-Mongering Self
With a robust grasp of Percy’s theory of human nature and its proper func-
tion and tasks, we may now move to a speculative discussion about the sorts 
of virtues that such beings might need to possess. As stated above, such re-
flection is a necessary propaedeutic to Percy’s politics proper. For, through 
it we gain an initial understanding of how Percy’s “theory of man” and its 
complementary virtues both sustain and provide normative standards for 
the individual goods, communal goods, and practices that undergird the 
human polis. After some extended reflection on the positive virtue-ethical 
prospects in Percy’s economy, I will then argue, in the final section of this 
chapter, that Percy’s rather central notion of “unsignifiability” undermines 
most (if not all) of these positive prospects.
Intellectual Virtues
Some virtue and vice categories appear unavoidable in Percy’s economy. 
First, there are the intellectual virtues associated with our native task of 
signifying and so knowing and discovering the world as well as the wonder, 
delight, and communio entium that can result from this. This is an activity 
in which we symbol-mongerers can engage either excellently or not, and 
hence requires any number of intellectual virtues such as intellectual cour-
age, integrity, deliberative excellence, scientific knowledge, understanding, 
and intellectual equity.
More significantly, however, the communio entium brought about by 
the exercise of these virtues is finally nothing less than a communio perso-
narum, since we are irreducibly in need of one another in this task that is 
ultimately a co-naming of the world and placing ourselves in a life-giving, 
concelebratory orientation toward it. Here there appears a possibility for 
scientific practice, and the virtues belonging to it, that avoids the scientific 
self-abstraction of “angelism” Percy is so worried about. For the scientist 
can be rooted in a community of inquirers who together take delight in the 
open-handed intersection of naming and being. Central to this “angelism” 
corrective is Percy’s clear emphasis on the emotional dimension of the ac-
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tivity of naming, where the inquiry itself issues not in a theory abstracted 
from the inquirer herself, but in one that is intimately connected with her 
ordinary human passions and loves, as well as those of the others in her 
community of inquiry. This underscores the plausible and appealing suppo-
sition that the finest excellences or virtues of human naming are excellences 
of the whole person. An understanding construed as a purely cognitive and 
perceptual grasp of a body of knowledge is, in Percy’s economy, an impov-
erished sort of understanding compared to one that involves appreciation, 
or attunement to the evaluative dimensions of what is known, where such 
appreciation is partly constituted by the affective and motivational dimen-
sions characteristic of human love, joy, delight, and wonder.
Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence
A second group of virtues (and related vices) that appears categorically 
unavoidable in Percy’s world consists in what Alasdair MacIntyre calls the 
“virtues of acknowledged dependence.”37 For MacIntyre, these virtues 
include gratitude, humility, compassion, generosity, kindness, and gentle-
ness. Moreover, he approaches virtues of dependence by claiming that our 
human dependence and fragility are best understood by considering what 
we have in common with nonhuman animals, often at the biological level.38 
In striking contrast to this approach, Percy bases the need for virtues of 
acknowledged dependence on our qualitative uniqueness as human beings; 
these are the very traits of ours and correlative needs that cannot be re-
duced to the biological. Our own capacity for symbolic representation (for 
example), our ability to have a world, is fundamentally dependent on oth-
ers at the level of consciousness and nonreducible to the biological sphere. 
Moreover, both the activity of naming and the ability to enjoy our symbolic 
order at the intersection of naming and being are fundamentally dependent 
on the co-naming and co-celebration of other signifiers. Ultimately, that 
which makes me distinctively human—my triadic ability to name the world 
and celebrate it—could never occur apart from the existence and naming 
activity of other persons.
More important, perhaps, the virtues of acknowledged dependence 
are crucially needed for avoiding what Percy calls the great “suck of self.” 
This is Percy’s equivalent of the “fall” for human beings who, when becom-
ing self-consciously aware of their own unsignifiability in a world of signs, 
freely fall into a narcissistic self-absorption that includes construing oneself 
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as an autonomous subject to which stable predicates may be applied. The 
“I-Thou” exchange of intersubjectivity is critical here for, as we have noted, 
Percy holds that we are fundamentally dependent on others not only for 
co-validating our symbolic enterprise in the world as namers and knowers, 
but also for the sort of communion that can expose our inauthenticity and 
reaffirm the truth of our unsignifiability. Both the very fact of our unsignifi-
ability and the anxiety this produces and the fact of our fallen inauthentic 
modes of selfhood that deny such unsignifiability underscore the irreduc-
ible place of the other in preserving with us a proper orientation toward 
ourselves and the world.39
This becomes crystal clear when we consider Percy’s critique of 
the pagan Stoic code of honor in the aristocratic ideals of the American 
South. This virtue ethics—exemplified so well by Emily Cutrer of Percy’s 
The Moviegoer and the Compson family in Faulkner’s The Sound and 
the Fury—elevates personal, self-absorbed autonomy and self-sufficiency 
as the highest achievement in virtue. It is marked by a self-conscious and 
dignified protection of one’s own virtue, and it is this reflective and egoistic 
eudaimonism that motivates the concern for virtues like a sense of duty, 
generosity, nobility of soul, honor, and the like. Percy considered this sort of 
Stoicism, especially in its individualistic pop-Cartesian form in the South, 
as the perfect recipe for suicide, as demonstrated in the case of Quentin 
Compson. By contrast, Percy’s view that self-consciousness is pathological 
(excepting awareness of oneself as unsignifiable), consciousness is irreduc-
ibly social, and that communal intersubjectivity is central to the naming 
project, constitutes a counterideal to this Stoic “wintry kingdom of the 
self,” as he calls it.40 There is little place in Percy’s economy of virtues for 
such self-sufficient and self-reflective Stoicism, or indeed for an Aristotelian 
megalopsuchos or Nietzchean Übermensch who enjoys his self-sufficiency 
and benevolence while disdaining dependence on others.41
What virtues of acknowledged dependence, then, might be compatible 
with Percy’s vision? First, given that my only knowledge of the cosmos is 
mediated through triadic language, and given also that my symbolic world 
is essentially dependent on the co-signification of others (I have no inde-
pendent and self-sufficient consciousness), it would seem that the virtue of 
humility finds a natural home in Percy’s account, especially the virtue of 
epistemic humility. Recall that at least one case of madness in Percy’s novels 
involves Will Barrett’s descent into his Cartesian cave by virtue of a lust for 
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epistemic certainty about God’s existence. Note also the absence of this lust 
at the close of the novel, when it is chastened by the interrogative: “Is she 
[Alison Huger] a gift and therefore a sign of a giver?”42
Other-Regarding and Communal Virtues
Second, given Percy’s emphasis on the maladies of acute self-consciousness 
as well as our native orientation outward toward the world, others, and God, 
it would seem that other-regarding virtues are crucial in Percy’s economy, 
some of which are also virtues of acknowledged dependence. These virtues 
include, among others, gratitude, compassion, generosity, kindness, and 
gentleness. When the other is God, especially in light of our anxiously ac-
knowledged unsignifiability and consequent transcendent orientation, the 
theological virtues of faith and hope have an ineradicable place as well. In 
a moment of Kierkegaardian comparison, for instance, we could say that 
nonpathological anxiety over the “nothing” of unsignifiable selfhood can 
and should drive us toward transparent faith in the God who constituted us 
with this restless task of becoming a self.
Third, the virtues that sustain the goods internal to communities seem 
rather central, given Percy’s emphasis on both intersubjectivity and authentic 
“I-Thou” human community. Although some of these virtues aren’t directly 
forms of acknowledged dependence, they operate within a broader context 
of acknowledged dependence in that their expression in action exhibits a 
tacit appreciation of the value of the communities that sustain us. Here, 
I have in mind the virtues of collegiality, conscientiousness, appreciative 
regard and respect for persons, love, and the disposition to be forgiving.
Expanding on this, a community-sustaining (and other-regarding) vir-
tue that might be especially apt in light of Percy’s project is, in my view, the 
virtue of being disposed to be attentive to the good-making characteristics 
of others. The expression of this virtue in the activity of focused and just 
attention, expounded so ably by Iris Murdoch, is an explicit counter to what 
she calls the “gravity” of our self-centered egoism, whose chief character-
istic is the unimaginative reification of other persons under a limited set 
of signifiers. Illustrating the attentive counter to this, Murdoch imagines 
a case in which a mother-in-law (“M”) views her daughter-in-law (“D”) as 
“positively rude [and] tiresomely juvenile” as well as “vulgar.” However, M 
is self-critical enough to look again, giving “careful and just attention” to 
that which confronts her, resulting in her discovery that D is “not vulgar 
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but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous,” and so on.43 
This Murdochian vision seems at least compatible with Percy’s ideal for “I-
Thou” intersubjective communion. For the parties to a Percian community 
lovingly and attentively resist closure of predication, but instead seek new 
and ever-deepening appreciation of one another’s qualities, affirming the 
inexhaustibility of signifiers assignable to the being and personhood of the 
other.
The Problem of Virtue Predication and Possession
Up to this point I have discussed a number of virtue categories that we 
humans might need in order to flourish in light of our native and natural 
capacity for triadic language, the task of naming and knowing productive of 
communion, the interdependent character of consciousness and signifying 
activity, and self-unsignifiability. From intellectual virtues and virtues of de-
pendence to community-sustaining virtues and Murdochian attentiveness, 
Percy’s account of human uniqueness appears to offer a rich storehouse of 
virtues and their communal flourishing. However, there is good reason to 
think that, given Percy’s account, the storehouse is quite bare.
Here I want to focus on a special problem arising from Percy’s unsigni-
fiability claim which, as I have shown, is indispensably central to his account 
of human nature, our intersubjective communion, and our transcendent 
orientation. The general worry I have is this. Most traditional conceptions 
of virtue, from at least Aristotle on, hold that virtue is a hexis, a settled 
state or diachronically stable disposition of character such that it can be 
predicated of a whole person, rather than simply of his activities or actions 
in circumscribed roles or contexts.44 Now, given human unsignifiability, can 
virtue truly be predicated of a person? It would appear that the answer is 
no. However, if virtue cannot be truly predicated of an unsignifiable self, 
then it follows that one could never be truly praised or blamed for posses-
sion or nonpossession of a virtue. We then arrive at the very un-Percian 
conclusion that no matter how we place ourselves in the world, we cannot 
be morally or personally criticized for it. If I happen to place myself in the 
world like Binx Bolling, with a new MG and the thigh of a secretary to 
cure my malaise, then I cannot be criticized, for the predicate “inauthentic” 
cannot be applied to me.
Now, all of this depends on what Percy really means by the unsignifi-
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ability of the self. One obvious response to the above problem is to say that 
the unsignifiability of selfhood applies only to the first-personal standpoint, 
whereas it is perfectly possible and desirable for others to predicate certain 
virtue or vice terms of me, and especially authenticity or its lack. This reply 
could be drawn from the passage cited earlier:
Semiotically, the self is literally unspeakable to itself. . . . The self of the sign-
user can never be grasped, because, once the self locates itself at the dead 
center of its world, there is no signified to which a signifier can be joined to 
make a sign. The self has no sign of itself. No signifier applies. All signifiers 
apply equally.
You are Ralph to me and I am Walker to you, but you are not Ralph to 
you and I am not Walker to me. . . . For me, certain signifiers fit you, and not 
others. For me, all signifiers fit me, one as well as another. I am rascal, hero, 
craven, brave, treacherous, loyal, at once the secret hero and asshole of the 
Cosmos.45 
Here Percy predicates of himself both the virtue of courage and the vice of 
cravenness, while suggesting that a host of other contradictory predicates 
could apply, although he is ultimately stuck with none of them. For he him-
self stands at the center of his own signifying universe, looking out.
So, perhaps the point is that in the case of self-signification, it is neces-
sarily the case that we cannot predicate virtue of ourselves, and this might 
helpfully preclude virtue-ethical egoism or fastidiously Stoic preoccupation 
with one’s own virtue or flourishing. Notably, though, Percy also claims that 
others can both assign and rule out predicates in my case. So, the solution 
to the worry above might be this: I cannot truly predicate virtue of myself 
but you, as my co-namer and communicant, can engage in such predica-
tion. However, here we encounter another problem: Percy doesn’t think 
co-namers ought to be doing this.
For instance, elsewhere, Percy is absolutely clear that in the best cases 
of “I-Thou” communion, the communicants do not pin each other down 
with determinate and stable predicates, unlike the case of Murdochian at-
tentiveness. Rather, as I’ve noted above, the best cases of intersubjective 
communion are those in which the look of the other reveals to me my unfor-
mulability and unsignifiability, and so offers a corrective for any inauthentic 
modes of self-placement I may have adopted whereby I identify myself with 
some thing in the world, like a new car. It is only a nonloving or perverted 
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Sartrean stare that objectifies and so shames the other by reducing him to a 
thing, like an “ink pot on the table.”46
The Second Coming provides an excellent example of this. As Alison 
Huger is treating Will Barrett’s wounds after his fall into her greenhouse, 
the narrator comments, “It was no trouble handling him until he came to 
and looked at her. She could do anything if nobody watched her. But the 
moment a pair of eyes focused on her, she was a beetle stuck on a pin, arms 
and legs beating the air. There was no purchase. It was an impalement and 
a derailment.” However, when Will does look at Allie for the first time, “Her 
back felt looks,” but his “looks did not dart or pierce or impale. They did not 
control her. They were shyer than she and gave way before her, like the light 
touch of a child’s hand in the dark.”47
For Percy, while the other “can be objectized and relegated to the order 
of the stable configuration,” this is a fundamental falsification of intersub-
jective community and of the being of the persons involved. Hence he says, 
“The look is of the order of pure intersubjectivity without the mediation of 
the symbol,” and that what is revealed to me in “the discovering look of the 
other, is literally my unspeakableness (unformulability). To be taken for a 
nature, an ink pot, would be the purest happiness. No. I am exposed—as 
what? not as a something—as nothing, as that which unlike everything else 
in the world cannot be rendered darstellbar.”48 In other words, what the 
other discovers and affirms about me, in the best cases of intersubjective 
communion, is my unsignifiability. So, my unsignifiability cannot be limited 
merely to my own subjective self-consciousness; it is affirmed and discov-
ered by the look of the other. The difference, perhaps, is that while I am 
necessarily unspeakable to myself, it is merely possible that you recognize 
my unsignifiability, and this is what the best cases of human communion 
require. Why is this required? Because, for Percy, such appreciation of 
unsignifiability is authentically just; it gets at the truth of the matter about 
human beings. The truth is not that I am a “nothing” in the hypostasized 
Sartrean sense, but rather, as Percy says, “I am that which I cannot name. I 
am rather a person, a namer and a hearer of names.”49
This last quotation raises a new response to my worry. Doesn’t Percy 
simply object to codifying the human person in the same way that we codify 
beetles on pins or ink pots? Isn’t he just pointing out the truth of the ex-
istentialist insight that the being of persons is qualitatively different than 
the being of things in the world? For he clearly thinks that some stable 
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predicates or names apply to us, none of which is clearly predicable of 
nonhuman things. This list includes, for example, namer, hearer of names, 
talker, symbol-mongerer, person, and child of God.
This response is certainly on target. However, the problem is that these 
signifiers only isolate the sort of beings that humans are, and not the char-
acter traits or virtues that might be proper to such beings. As Percy himself 
notes, the realities of language, self-consciousness, and unsignifiability 
introduce for us “a concept of human nature and what is proper to it.”50 But 
the moment we begin talking about the excellences proper to such a being, 
where the excellences in question are stable character predicates like gener-
ous, just, or charitable, then it seems that we’ve contradicted Percy’s claim 
that “the one thing in the world which by its very nature is not susceptible 
of a stable symbolic transformation is myself!”51 The objection that the in-
ability to give stable (or any) predication applies only to the first-personal 
perspective fails, for we have already noted that the truth discovered in 
ideal cases of second-personal “I-Thou” communion is, for Percy, the same. 
Appreciation of the “Thou,” if it is just, does not assign virtue or vice as 
a stable disposition of character to the other (“Walker is generous”), but 
simply appreciates the kind of being that the other is: unnameable, a namer, 
a person, and so on. While we could predicate virtue of others, we should 
not, for such predication somehow limits or falsifies the unsignifiable being 
of the other.52
While this seems damaging enough, the problem also moves beyond 
mere speech and predication to the level of ontology. If, ontologically 
speaking, we are truly unsignifiable beings, then there appears to be a deep 
contradiction between the sort of beings that we are (unsusceptible of 
stable signification) and what the virtues of such a being would have to 
be, in order to count as virtues (relatively stable dispositions of character). 
If I do happen to have a virtue, an excellence that is a stable disposition 
of my character, then it runs ontologically counter to that unsignifiability 
that makes me anxious, aware of my freedom, and directed toward world, 
others, and God. In a very real sense, then, either virtue predication or 
virtue possession runs counter to that which makes me most deeply human. 
Put simply, if virtue predication limits or falsifies, then a fortiori (in Percy’s 
economy) genuine virtue possession does so as well. Given unsignifiability, 
human beings cannot coherently possess virtues.
I have not discussed every aspect of Percy’s thoughts on unsignifiabil-
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ity. So there may be some other promising way of reconciling it with both 
predication and possession of virtues that are proper to beings like us, such 
that our ecstatic orientation toward the world, others, and God is retained. 
At this point, however, I don’t see how. Given the unsignifiable sort of be-
ings that we are, it would seem that virtues either cannot or should not be 
predicated or possessed. However, surely we (and Percy) want to say that 
in the best cases of intersubjective appreciation, we can and should predi-
cate stable virtue characteristics of others when they in fact possess them. 
Perhaps I am in fact generous, kind, cruel, or niggardly. A just appreciation, 
while not reducing my being as a person to those characteristics, should rec-
ognize that those character traits are mine and, in a real and stable sense, 
are truthful ontological characteristics of me as a whole person.
At the end of the day, perhaps we should charitably note that Percy 
himself humbly called his anthropological theory “nothing more than a 
few trails blazed through a dark wood, most dead-ended. I should con-
sider it worthwhile even if it established no more than that there is such 
a wood—for not even that much is known now—and that it is very dark 
indeed.”53 Percy’s trailblazing, even if not systematically coherent, remains a 
rich storehouse of reflection on what it is to be truly human amid the ruins 
of post-Cartesian modernity.
In this chapter I have tried to articulate Percy’s critique of our current cul-
tural anthropology together with his formulation of a new “theory of man” 
from the empirical starting point of human language. I have tried to show 
that Percy’s account—including the sociality of consciousness, self-unsignifi-
ability, anxiety, and intersubjective communion—offers substantial resources 
for reflection on the human virtues. His conjunction of the ontological joys 
of scientific and philosophical inquiry, on the one hand, and radical depen-
dence, other-regard, and community, on the other, is a refreshing and rare 
combination. Indeed, this pairing forms a particularly apt prescription for 
our time in which, all too often, the activity of discovery in the sciences 
and the goods of interpersonal communities are seen as opposed at worst or 
irrelevant to one another at best. And although I have found some reasons 
to worry about whether we can genuinely predicate or possess such virtues, 
his critique of the modern malaise, articulation of the unavoidability of self-
placement, and ability to pinpoint human teloi beyond the biological remain 
profoundly important achievements for our age of the lost self.
Walker Percy’s “Theory of Man” 111
Notes
1. I must note here, as I do toward the end of this essay, that Percy himself never 
thought he had achieved a comprehensive anthropology. In the opening pages of 
Message in the Bottle, Percy’s most mature anthropological text, he writes this 
overly humble yet revealing disclaimer: “It [his theory of man] . . . is nothing more 
than a few trails blazed through a dark wood, most dead-ended. I should consider 
it worthwhile even if it established no more than that there is such a wood—for 
not even that much is known now—and that it is very dark indeed.” Walker Percy, 
“The Delta Factor,” in The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man Is, How Queer 
Language Is, and What One Has to Do with the Other (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 1975), 10. Hereafter I will cite this work as MB, followed by article 
title and page number(s).
2. Walker Percy, “Is a Theory of Man Possible?” in Signposts in a Strange 
Land, ed. Patrick Samway, S.J. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991), 
112–14. Subsequent references will be cited as SP, followed by the title of the 
article and page number.
3. MB, “The Delta Factor,” 9, 20.
4. SP, “Theory of Man,” 111–12. Clearly, what Percy refers to here as “the tra-
ditional Judeo-Christian teaching” is less Judeo-Christian than it is Hellenistic and 
Platonic. This may be due in part to Percy’s (self-admitted) oversimplification of 
the categories, wherein on several occasions he lumps “Greek and Judeo-Christian 
teachings” together to represent the same anthropological view (ibid., 111, 113). 
As far as I can tell, however, Percy does not hold this extreme dualism to be the 
proper Christian position, as ample evidence throughout his novels and other 
writings makes clear (cf. his sacramental realism and emphasis on the unity of 
the “angel-beast” wayfaring person). In the context of some of these “traditional” 
comments, then, Percy appears to be referring to Descartes’ “strange Janus mon-
ster,” the anthropology that has the trappings of Christianity but is responsible for 
“the fateful rift,” that “San Andreas Fault” between body and mind (SP, “Fateful 
Rift,” 271). For Percy’s more orthodox and Thomistic characterizations of “the 
Judeo-Christian tradition,” which affirm human possession of a soul and our place 
“between the beasts and angels,” see MB, “The Delta Factor,” 18, 23–24. Cf. also 
Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 208–12. Subsequent references will be cited as LC, 
followed by the page number.
5. Percy does not reject every aspect of each of these two theories. He com-
ments that he scientifically “subscribes” to the “Darwinian naturalistic concept of 
man.” Also, however, he theologically subscribes to the Judeo-Christian view that 
we have a soul. So Percy does indeed view the human person as an “intermediate 
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being,” a synthesis or composite entity composed of elements like body and soul. SP, 
“Theory of Man,” 113–15. Cf. also SP, “Rediscovering A Canticle for Leibowitz,” 
228. Cf. also Walker Percy, “An Interview with Walker Percy,” interview by John 
C. Carr (Georgia Review 25 [Fall 1971]), in Conversations with Walker Percy, ed. 
Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A. Kramer (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
1985), 63–64. Also, note Percy’s frequent fictional portrayals of the organic unity 
of the categories “angel” and “beast” as a return to the Edenic creational ideal, as 
in Love in the Ruins. In this novel the protagonist, Tom More, expresses his ideal 
for his psychiatric patients: “What if man could reenter paradise, so to speak, and 
live there as both man and spirit, whole and intact man-spirit, as solid flesh as a 
speckled trout, a dappled thing, yet aware of itself as a self!” Walker Percy, Love in 
the Ruins (New York: Dell, 1971), 35.
6. For instance, Percy says that “the source of the incoherence lies within sci-
ence itself, as it is presently practiced, and the solution of the difficulty is not to 
be found in something extra scientific, not in the humanities or in religion, but 
within science itself. When I say science, I mean science in the root sense of the 
word, as the discovery and knowing of something which can be demonstrated and 
verified within a community” (SP, “Fateful Rift,” 271–72). The sciences he has in 
mind include psychology, psychiatry, linguistics, developmental anthropology, and 
sociology. Cf. SP, “Fateful Rift,” 272–73.
7. MB, “The Delta Factor,” 9. Cf. also MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Exis-
tentialism,” 279.
8. MB, “The Delta Factor,” 7; SP, “Theory of Man,” 122.
9. SP, “Theory of Man,” 118–20, 122.
10. MB, “The Message in the Bottle,” 126. Cf. also MB, “Toward a Triadic 
Theory of Meaning,” 161–62. Percy writes, “From the beginning and for the most 
of fifteen billion years of life in the Cosmos, there was only one kind of event. It 
was particles hitting particles, chemical reactions, energy exchanges, gravitational 
attractions between masses, field forces, and so on.” The same dyadic exchange also 
characterizes all biological organism interactions on our planet. However, even 
those attempts by scientists to get chimpanzees involved in linguistic exchange 
with each other, or B. F. Skinner’s stimulus-response experiments with rats and 
“symbolic communication” exercises with pigeons, are simply dyadic interactions, 
though more complex. LC, 85, 90, 92–94, 100. Cf. also SP, “Theory of Man,” 
120–21.
11. LC, 95, 98.
12. MB, “The Delta Factor,” 29.
13. SP, “Naming and Being,” 130–31.
14. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 283, and cf. “Symbol as 
Need” in MB, 288–97. For instance, Percy says that a “symbol is the vehicle for the 
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conception of an object . . . the vehicle by which we are able to speak and perhaps 
to think about something.” MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 280. 
The “perhaps” here may be important, for otherwise, Percy’s view might implau-
sibly preclude pre-triadic symbol-making children from cognizing anything as an 
object through some sort of pre-linguistic mental representation.
15. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 281; SP, “Naming and Be-
ing,” 134; MB, “Symbol as Need,” 296–97.
16. For Percy, such a “fixing” or “formulating” carries an inherent risk. In its 
ideal employment, the symbol or the name assigned to something brings about—
for the namer—“a new orientation toward the world” whereby—in Heideggerian 
fashion—being itself is revealed or unveiled, discovered, and celebrated. However, 
the symbol or name may also ossify rather than unveil freshness of being: “the self-
same symbol which discloses being may be the means by which being is concealed 
and lost.” In the case of the above example, if a wonderful bird is “known” and 
“named” as a “robin,” eventually the wonderment of that creature is emptied out; 
it is relegated to the domain of the commonplace: that bird is only a robin. When 
such “words no longer signify,” as Percy’s fictional characters so often point out, 
freshness of being must be recovered through renewed deployment of symbols (SP, 
“Naming and Being,” 134–35).
17. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 283. In his article “Is a The-
ory of Man Possible?” Percy puts it another way: “Semiotics would call attention 
to the strange position of the symbolizing self in the world which it discovers. In a 
word, the self can perceive, formulate, symbolize everything under the sun except 
itself. A self stands in the dead center of its universe, looking out. The paradox of 
consciousness is that the stranger we meet on the street and glance at for a second 
or two we see more clearly than we shall ever see ourselves.” SP, “Theory of Man,” 
127. On anxiety in the face of the unnameable, see MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic 
in Existentialism,” 281.
18. LC, 106–7. Here Percy jumps directly from this unsignifiability into a de-
scription of fallen people in despair, “lost in the cosmos.” Given his other texts 
and comments on the reality of unsignifiability as a creational aspect of human 
constitution, we must not interpret this text in LC to mean that the unnameability 
of the self is only a fallen predicament. Certainly for Percy, unsignifiability is a 
huge postlapsarian problem. However, the reality that “the being of the namer 
slips through the fingers of naming” is a creational reality, tied as it is to the very 
makeup of triadic consciousness and being. And it is this unsignifiability that 
forever binds human beings to the “flux of becoming.” Hence human beings are, 
in Percy’s view, always tied to the task of human becoming. Cf. SP, “Naming and 
Being,” 136.
19. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 282.
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20. SP, “Theory of Man,” 127. Cf. LC, 109–10.
21. For a thorough treatment of the parallels between Kierkegaard’s The Concept 
of Anxiety and Percy’s project as a whole, see my unpublished Th.M. thesis, “At the 
Heart of Anthropology: Søren Kierkegaard and Walker Percy on the Nature and 
Shape of Creational Selfhood” (Regent College, 2007).
22. SP, “Naming and Being,” 136–37.
23. Ibid., 135; LC, 108–9. For Kierkegaard’s treatment of the “ambiguous” and 
yet revelatory character of “anxiety over nothing,” see Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, 
The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the 
Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. and ed. Reidar Thomte, in collaboration 
with Albert B. Anderson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 41–45. 
Subsequent citations to this work will be given as CA.
24. SP, “The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry,” 251–62. In this article Percy draws 
from Erich Fromm’s The Sane Society (1955), in which Fromm argues that in 
humanity there exists a “pathology of normalcy,” such that people who otherwise 
are considered “normal” by typical social standards are actually pathology ridden 
and desperately alienated from themselves.
25. Ibid., 252, 254–57. Note also the direct connection to Kierkegaard’s com-
ments in CA: “What effect does nothing have? It begets anxiety” (42). In addition, 
throughout “The Coming Crisis,” Percy treats the loss of self or the “nothing” of 
the self and its estrangement from its own being as a result of a society that defines 
human beings as isolated subjects and organisms in environments. This, of course, 
would prevent us from interpreting anxiety as a constituent element of human 
nature, since it would turn out to be a predicament brought about by pathological 
cultural factors. However, in the midst of his attack on the present maladies of 
this age, Percy also makes it clear that anxiety points us to a “transcendence” or 
“incurable God-directedness” that is “in man’s nature” and is no less than “the 
one distinguishing mark of human existence.” Thus, even though (here and else-
where) Percy argues against the cultural factors that bring about “the loss of the 
creature”—much in the same way that Kierkegaard takes issue with the loss of the 
individual in the Hegelian Christendom of Denmark—there is plentiful evidence 
that Percy views the creational self as necessarily marked by anxiety in light of 
semiotic unsignifiability, as I have demonstrated above. SP, “The Coming Crisis in 
Psychiatry,” 260–61. For further evidence supporting this view, see LC, 109–11.
26. LC, 255. Elsewhere Percy speaks of anxiety as the agent of “a summons to au-
thentic existence, to be heeded at any cost” (SP, “The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry,” 
259). In his supposition that anxiety is a mark of transcendence, Percy aligns quite 
explicitly with the existentialists, noting how they too “view man’s plight . . . as the 
perennial condition of human existence, a condition necessarily entailed by man’s 
freedom.” In the context of these comments on anxiety, Percy further states that ex-
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istentialists, theistic or atheistic, agree “that transcendence is the one distinguishing 
mark of human existence” that amounts to humanity’s “incurable God-directedness.”
27. Walker Percy, The Second Coming (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 
1980), 171–72. Subsequent citations to this work will be given as SC.
28. SP, “Theory of Man,” 124; MB, “Symbol, Consciousness, and Intersubjectiv-
ity,” 266, 268, 274. Although Percy affirms Mead’s socially constructed conscious-
ness, he argues that Mead’s thesis fails precisely at the point at which he treats 
human beings as dyadic creatures engaged in stimulus-response behaviors.
29. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 282–83.
30. LC, 101. To avoid confusion, we must note here that for Percy the presence of 
another human being is not a necessary condition for the existence of symbolic and 
socially constructed consciousness. Percy’s assertion that “all such triadic behavior 
is social in origin” (ibid., 96) is described in more detail in MB, “The Symbolic 
Structure of Interpersonal Process,” 200, where he states, “The second person is 
required as an element not merely in the genetic event of learning language but as 
the indispensable and enduring condition of all symbolic behavior. The very act 
of symbolic formulation, whether it be language, logic, art, or even thinking, is of 
its very nature a formulation for a someone else. Even Robinson Crusoe, writing in 
his journal after twenty years on the island, is nevertheless performing a through-
and-through social and intersubjective act.” 
31. MB, “Symbol, Consciousness, and Intersubjectivity,” 270, 272.
32. This diagram is a combination of two that Percy draws up. SP, “Is a Theory of 
Man Possible?” 124; MB, “The Symbolic Structure of Interpersonal Process,” 200.
33. SP, “Theory of Man,” 127; MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 
285.
34. SC, 360.
35. LC, 109.
36. Ibid., 208, 211. A contrast between this Edenic C1 self and the fallen C2 
self is helpful here: “A C2 consciousness is a consciousness which passes through 
a C1 stage and then for some reason falls into the pit of self. . . . In some evolv-
ing civilizations, for reasons which we don’t entirely understand, the evolution of 
consciousness is attended by a disaster of some sort which occurs shortly after the 
Sy [symbolic] breakthrough. It has something to do with the discovery of the self 
and the incapacity to deal with it, the consciousness becoming self-conscious but 
not knowing what to do with the self, not even knowing what the self is, and so 
ending by being that which it is not, saying that which is not, doing that which is 
not, and making others what they are not. . . . A C2 consciousness . . . looks out, 
sees, and symbolizes but has also become self-conscious. But the self is literally 
inconceivable—unlike a tree or a star or you, it cannot be conceived under the 
auspices of a symbol—and is referentially mobile.” Ibid., 211–12.
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37. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings 
Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999).
38. With MacIntyre, however, it is not clear why our dependence is supposed to 
issue from our commonality with other animals, since we appear to be far more de-
pendent and fragile, in many ways, than they. Moreover, acknowledged animality 
does not always lead to acknowledged dependence, as is clear in Aristotle, whose 
thoroughgoing acknowledgment of animality is quite compatible with an ethics 
that elevates human self-sufficiency.
39. For the best description of Percy’s “fall,” see LC, 107–9. For intersubjective 
exposure of inauthenticity, see MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 
285.
40. SP, “Stoicism in the South,” 83–89.
41. The obvious legitimacy of this critique of Nietzsche is perhaps less obvious 
in the case of Aristotle, for whom self-sufficiency figures less prominently in ethics 
than it does in the Stoics, for example. Here MacIntyre helpfully notes how it is that 
Aristotle throws up barriers to understanding human fragility and dependency: 
(1) in his ethical and political inquiry he systematically refrains from consulting 
women, slaves, and laborers (“for whom the facts of affliction and dependence are 
most likely to be undeniable”); (2) he says that manliness entails not wanting others 
to share our grief; and (3) that the magnanimous man likes to confer benefits, as 
this is the mark of a superior person, but does not like to acknowledge benefits 
received. All of these deficits appear to stem from Aristotle’s preoccupation with 
self-sufficiency. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 6.
42. SC, 360.
43. Iris Murdoch, “The Idea of Perfection,” in The Sovereignty of Good (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2001), 16–17.
44. This is of course only the traditional view. In the contemporary virtue ethics 
literature, a number of views affirm the “modularity” of virtues, that is, that they 
are limited to contexts and domains with which their possessor has adequate life 
experience. If I possess the virtue of courage on the battlefield, I may lack that 
virtue when suddenly faced with the realities of becoming a father for the first 
time. Much of the literature pursuing this treatment of virtue must, of course, 
either deny or mitigate the traditional thesis of the unity of the virtues. As far as 
Percy is concerned, it does not ultimately matter whether we take the traditional 
mutual entailment view or go with a modular view of virtues. For either approach 
requires predicating a stable virtue of a person; it is only the scope of the predicate 
domain that is different.
45. LC, 106–7 (for the phrase “to itself,” emphasis is mine).
46. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 284–85.
47. SC, 233, 236.
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48. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 286 (my emphasis on the 
word “discovering”).
49. SP, “Naming and Being,” 136–37.
50. SP, “The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry,” 257.
51. MB, “Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism,” 283.
52. Percy’s worry appears to be the reductive character of such a predication. 
Saying that “Walker Percy is generous” seems to amount, in his view, to a kind 
of wholesale identity claim. So perhaps Percy’s view is that for any predicate P 
assigned to any given person S (including the predicate “nothing”), it is not the case 
that P = S in the sense of exhaustively capturing S’s identity. But why does Percy 
worry about this? The copula is doesn’t perform this hypostasizing function in the 
case of anything else, so why should it in the case of persons? When I say, “That 
is a robin,” there is always the danger of reductively and absurdly claiming “That 
is only a robin.” But of course a robin is also a bird, a winged creature, a mother 
(in some cases), and Turdus migratorius. In the case of persons, the claim that 
“Walker is generous” is perfectly compatible with the claim that “Walker is kind” 
or “Walker is witty,” and so on. We’re simply adding noncontradictory predications 
to the original one.
53. MB, “The Delta Factor,” 10.

6Confessing the Horrors of Radical 
Individualism in Lancelot
Percy, Dostoyevsky, Poe 
Farrell O’Gorman
Lancelot is Percy’s richest and most challenging novel. It is challenging be-
cause its narrator is so beguiling and intelligent, so clearly right about many 
of the shortcomings of his society, and yet at the same time deadly wrong. 
To a degree the same might be said of Percy’s two other first-person nar-
rators, Binx Bolling and Tom More. But by comparison with either, Lance 
Lamar is at once more seemingly sure of himself and more extravagantly 
flawed. At the same time, his tale ends more cryptically, lacking the brief 
but hopeful family interludes that close The Moviegoer, Love in the Ruins, 
and The Thanatos Syndrome alike. The Last Gentleman is the only one of 
Percy’s fictions to end anywhere near as ambiguously as Lancelot, but this 
effect is greatly heightened in the latter novel by the obviously problematic 
nature of its narrator.
Properly understanding that narrator depends upon properly under-
standing Lancelot’s particular genre, which is likewise the key to under-
standing its fundamental concern with the pervasive influence of radical 
individualism in the late modern West. Furthermore, the richness of Lance-
lot might be viewed as a subtle function of—or better yet, response to—that 
concern. For this is the most substantively allusive of Percy’s novels, written 
as if to highlight T. S. Eliot’s argument in “Tradition and the Individual Tal-
ent” that great works of literature, like individual human beings, necessarily 
come into being only in relationship to a constellation of predecessors.
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As Percy himself put it, the “strange paradox about writing novels” is 
“simply this: there’s no occupation in the universe that is lonelier and that at 
the same time depends more radically on a community, a commonwealth of 
other writers.”1 Lancelot is written in such a way as to intentionally highlight 
such relationship, despite the fact that the literary works to which it alludes 
are generally concerned with the plight of the isolated and alienated indi-
vidual. My claim here is arguably true of the Arthurian legends’ accounts 
of the fallen Lancelot himself (though the written accounts of such legends 
vary widely). It is inarguably true of the many works of modern literature 
alluded to in the novel, the Shakespearean play whose protagonist is often 
deemed the first modern man—Hamlet—being one of the most subtly 
pervasive examples.2 Here I am concerned only with identifying the most 
crucial of those works.
I will argue that Lancelot is best understood as a problematically 
“confessional” and Gothic novel that is most fruitfully read in relation to 
two distinct sources: one a short novel, Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Notes from 
Underground, and the other a broad tradition of Anglo-American Gothic 
fiction particularly well represented in the work of Edgar Allan Poe. Percy’s 
general indebtedness to Dostoyevsky is well documented, and Notes from 
Underground was the one novel by the Russian master that he chose to 
teach in his Literature of Alienation seminar, but its startlingly close rela-
tionship to Lancelot in particular has never been explored.3 Both Notes and 
Lancelot were created by authors who embrace traditional Christianity but 
utilize obsessive and intentionally offensive post-Christian narrators who 
simultaneously critique and personify what the authors see as the horrors 
of the radical individualism engendered by modernity.4 Notes was not only 
the first of Dostoyevsky’s great Christian novels, but also the first to show 
subtle signs of his familiarity with the Anglo-American Gothic “tale of ter-
ror.”5 Indeed, the Russian novelist particularly admired the Gothic fiction 
of his American near contemporary Poe, whose name is quite conspicu-
ously inserted into the text of Lancelot—a novel which upon publication 
was immediately recognized as being so indebted to Poe as to openly invite 
the subtitle “The Fall of the House of Lamar,” after Poe’s famous story 
“The Fall of the House of Usher.”6 In the second part of this essay I will 
examine Poe and the Anglo-American Gothic tradition at length, arguing 
that understanding it is crucial to understanding Lancelot. But I begin with 
Dostoyevsky because his moral perspective with regard to the unnamed 
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narrator of Notes fundamentally resembles that of Percy with regard to 
Lance. That perspective is clearly rooted in an ancient Christian tradition 
that predates—and is in some respects only problematically related to—the 
literature of the United States.
Notes from Underground: Confessing from the 
“Mousehole” of Modernity
In general, I could never stand saying “Sorry, Papa, I’ll never do it again.” 
—Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man, Notes from Underground
What Percy most admired about Notes from Underground “was Dos-
toyevsky’s weaving of cultural criticism with his fictional characterization of 
a man in extremis.”7 He read the novel repeatedly throughout his life, and 
its influence was noticeable as early as The Moviegoer. One contemporary 
reviewer, Brainard Cheney, correctly emphasized that both novels are nar-
rated by individuals who identify and sense the limitations of “scientific hu-
manism” even though they themselves, to varying degrees, remain trapped 
within those limitations.8
This broad observation is only strengthened when one notes the differ-
ences in the specific cultural circumstances in which the two men wrote. 
Dostoyevsky lived a century and a hemisphere away from Percy. During 
his early association with the Petrashevsky Circle, a group of intellectuals 
attracted to the utopian socialism of Charles Fourier and to Western Euro-
pean liberalism generally, Dostoyevsky wrote his first novel, Poor Folk, as a 
reformer with seemingly clear political intent. But he soon took a radically 
different course. After his 1849 arrest by tsarist authorities and subsequent 
imprisonment in Siberia, Dostoyevsky reclaimed his inherited Orthodox 
faith and mounted a vehement critique of modern Western ideologies in 
his major novels Crime and Punishment, The Idiot, The Possessed, and The 
Brothers Karamazov. Notes from Underground, published in 1864, “initi-
ates the exploration of human separation from God” that dominates these 
mature works.” Furthermore, Notes arguably remains Dostoyevsky’s “most 
profound statement of the human need for Christ.”9
That statement is far from explicit. The text is in the form of a journal 
that the narrator claims will never be published but that nonetheless ad-
dresses—and insults—the reader at length. Most of the first part of Notes 
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reads as if it were straightforward polemic against the scientism and utopian-
ism current among the narrator’s educated contemporaries, but the second 
moves inevitably toward a resentful and half-retracted “confession” of the 
narrator’s own general loathsomeness—and of his horrific abuse of a fallen 
woman who finally offers him love. Notes generally resembles Lancelot in 
these respects and also in that the text itself masquerades as a dialogue with 
the reader (in Lancelot Percival doubles for the reader, to a degree) yet is on 
the most obvious level a monologue—that is, the narrator is speaking pri-
marily to himself. Other important parallels are clear from the beginning. 
Lancelot opens in a cell with a notably limited view, a hospital room wherein 
the narrator has previously been visited only by noxious therapeutic experts; 
likewise, the first part of Notes from Underground is pointedly titled “The 
Mousehole,” in which the narrator expounds at length from his cramped 
apartment on his sensation of being “walled in” by theories current in St. 
Petersburg, the most Western of Russian cities and also “the most abstract 
and premeditated city on earth.”10 Hostile to the virtual worship of science 
and medicine current among his peers, he begins by stating, “I’m a sick 
man,” a self-diagnosis that soon seems plausible enough—except for the 
fact that he immediately qualifies it with a mockingly reductive assertion: 
“I think there’s something wrong with my liver.” Yet both out of a desire to 
declare his independence and “out of spite,” the narrator refuses “to ask for 
the doctors’ help. So my liver hurts? Good, let it hurt even more!” (84–85). 
The reader of Notes therefore has the immediate sensation of being locked 
in a small room with an intelligent but also angry and destructively self-
reliant theoretician, as is the case in Lancelot.
Lance Lamar, too, is “sick,” though Percy—who knew the limitations as 
well as the promise of twentieth-century medicine—would prescribe him 
no simple course of therapy. Rather, he recognized the complex dynamic 
between his flawed protagonist and a flawed culture, the same dynamic that 
shaped Notes, in which the narrator “is not only a moral-psychological type 
whose egoism Dostoyevsky wishes to expose; he is also a social-ideological 
one, whose psychology must be seen as intimately connected with the ideas 
he accepts and by which he tries to live.”11 Accordingly, the Underground 
Man’s egoism must be understood in relation to his longtime immersion in 
the twin currents of rationalism and romanticism emanating from Western 
Europe in the wake of the Enlightenment—currents he now longs to es-
cape, though he ultimately finds himself unable to do so alone. His narrative 
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is therefore neatly divided into part 1, which forthrightly attacks the reduc-
tive excuses for “metaphysics and ethics” current in Russian intellectual 
circles and the “rational egoism” of the utopian Nikolai Chernyshevsky in 
particular, and part 2, which recalls the narrator’s life in St. Petersburg in 
the 1840s even as it satirizes that era’s “sentimental Social Romanticism”—
a romanticism that allegedly cultivated “a sense of spiritual noblesse” and 
“emphasis on individual moral responsibility” on behalf of the oppressed, 
but is revealed in Notes to be essentially “egoistic” in that it encourages 
its practitioner to see himself as a godlike savior.12 The common source of 
these two currents, then, is egoism: the solitary self, whether by thinking 
or by feeling, becomes the focal point of existence, the sole arbiter of what 
is moral and indeed of what is real. The irony that the Underground Man 
becomes keenly aware of is that a narrowly empiricist reason may convince 
the self that it does not even exist, or at least that it is not free, and that 
unchecked romanticism inevitably leads the self to an entrapping solipsism.
Lance is caught in these twin currents as well. He habitually attempts 
to maintain some control over the narrative of his life by posturing as a 
detached and hyperrational scientist or detective. This habit is clearly exem-
plified in his early desire to explain all sexual activity as merely a matter of 
“the touch of one membrane against another,” of “molecules encountering 
molecules and little bursts of electrons along tiny nerves—no different in 
kind” from those involved in houseflies scrubbing their wings (Lancelot 
17, 89). Yet Lance is simultaneously prone to a self-glorifying and isolating 
romanticism. That romanticism is inherently bound up with the utopian vi-
sion manifested both in his formerly progressive politics (his 1960s roughly 
correspond to the Underground Man’s 1840s) and in his current fixation on 
founding his own postapocalyptic Camelot in the Shenandoah Valley.
I will explore these characteristics of Lance below in relation to 
Percy’s specifically Anglo-American milieu and to Poe. But it is important 
to stress now that while Poe also wrote “confessional” narratives of a sort, 
he, unlike Dostoyevsky and Percy, steadfastly conceived of literature as es-
sentially amoral—as concerned primarily with “Beauty,” not with “Truth.”13 
To say that Dostoyevsky differs from Poe in this regard is not to say that 
the Russian writer’s work is merely didactic, of course; without discounting 
Dostoyevsky’s clear Christian commitment, Mikhail Bakhtin has famously 
analyzed the complex “polyphony” of voices present in his novels.14 A general 
understanding of how those voices function in Notes from Underground is 
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essential to understanding the model of confession Percy ultimately draws 
on in Lancelot.
Dostoyevsky had in fact considered giving the novel that became Notes 
the title Confessions, intending it in part as a satirical response to Rousseau’s 
self-celebrating autobiography of the same name. But when Dostoyevsky’s 
novel is read in relation to the larger European literary tradition, it is also 
properly seen as akin to a much older and quite different Confessions: his 
Underground Man is finally “a composite of Rousseau and Augustine, a 
Rousseauvian narrator struggling mightily to escape from the trap of Rous-
seauvian form—with its implicit values—and to gain the high ground of 
the Augustinian confession that would make him whole.”15 Such confession 
would, of course, ultimately have to be directed to God and to recognize not 
only specific individual sins but also original sin. The Underground Man’s 
bondage to original sin is arguably the deepest source of his sense of being 
entrapped or enclosed, but his own “secular, rational world view will not 
allow him to identify this as the root cause of his crisis” and so he constantly 
remains tempted to refer to “it as a disease, using the clichés of medicine, 
which, together with the other sciences, usurped religion in the 1860s.”16
Accordingly, the Underground Man never enters into explicitly Chris-
tian confession in the text itself. He resembles Lance in that and in that 
finally “in spite of himself he bears the potential for religious salvation; it 
lies in his refusal to accept a cheap version of reality, one in which salva-
tion can be gained through mere human activity in an exclusively material 
world or through empty Romantic dreaming.”17 That refusal is intriguingly 
grounded by the Underground Man in his closing paragraph. Having re-
counted his affair with and cruel emotional abuse of the prostitute Liza, he 
attempts to steer clear of overt remorse for his own actions and return to the 
mode of general theorizing that he favored in part 1. But his own develop-
ing thoughts begin to indict his previous embodied actions: “Why, today we 
don’t even know where real life is, what it is, or what it’s called!” he exclaims. 
“We even find it painful to be men—real men of flesh and blood, with our 
own private bodies; we’re ashamed of it, and we long to turn ourselves into 
something hypothetical called the average man. . . . Soon we’ll invent a way 
to be begotten by ideas altogether” (195). The narrator has earlier critiqued 
a reductive materialism that ultimately explains away human identity, but 
here he begins to intuit that the body—not merely the mind or spirit—may 
in fact be a proper key to approaching the real.
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The narrator begins to intuit, in other words, the traditional Christian 
anthropology that Dostoyevsky ultimately shared with Percy. It is worth 
noting, however, that these final lines can also be read in historical context 
as Dostoyevsky’s implication “that the only hope” for the narrator and his 
contemporary readers is to reject all “bookish, foreign, artificial Western 
ideologies, and to return to the Russian ‘soil’ with its spontaneous incorpo-
ration of the Christian ideal of unselfish love.” The issue for Dostoyevsky, in 
other words, was not only modernity’s pernicious influence on Christianity; 
it was godless theoretical Europe’s pernicious influence on holy peasant 
Russia. Dostoyevsky’s tendencies toward “Slavophile messianism” likely 
strike the contemporary reader as either a laughably quaint or a disturbingly 
nationalistic feature of his particular version of Orthodox faith.18 What is 
most important for our purposes is to note that Percy finally saw no such 
solution for Lance within his own national mythos, no quintessentially 
American embodiment of “the Christian ideal of unselfish love.” Yet for 
Percy, too, the body—if not any particular soil—was somehow essential 
both to apprehending the real and undermining the ideology of radical 
individualism. In order to fully understand this claim, we must consider 
Lancelot in relation to the Anglo-American Gothic tradition.
Poe’s Legacy: Individualism and the Gothic Tradition
The thousand injuries of Fortunato I had borne as best I could, but when he 
ventured upon insult I vowed revenge.
—Edgar Allan Poe, “The Cask of Amontillado”
Gothic literature is defined most broadly as the literature of terror or horror, 
often featuring supernatural or apparently supernatural events. It is most 
famously exemplified by nineteenth-century fictions such as Frankenstein, 
Dracula, and the tales of Poe. For some readers, to be sure, such fictions 
may seem excessively fantastical, melodramatic, or sensationalistic. Most of 
Percy’s fiction does not fit into this mold. But Lancelot does, insistently so, as 
it features an imprisoned and mentally unstable criminal narrator, graphic 
scenes of orgiastic sex and violence, and even some seeming elements of the 
supernatural in the extended hallucinatory sequences leading up to the cli-
mactic explosion of the Lamar mansion. In crafting such a narrative, Percy 
was well aware that his native region had fostered the long-established 
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genre (if not cliché) of “Southern Gothic” literature, generally characterized 
by “grotesque characters, explorations of abnormal psychological states, 
dark humor, and a sense of alienation or futility.” Indeed, in some respects 
Lancelot almost perfectly exemplifies a distinctly upper-class mode of the 
Southern Gothic, resembling works such as William Faulkner’s The Sound 
and the Fury and Tennessee Williams’s A Streetcar Named Desire insofar 
as it features the legacy of a “patriarchal plantation aristocracy, built upon 
and haunted by a racist ethic, besieged by civilization and democracy, and 
ultimately defeated as much by its own intransigence as by external forces.”19
Yet Percy would balk at the categorization of Lancelot as merely a 
Southern Gothic fiction, and rightly so.20 He followed Dostoyevsky’s model 
once again insofar as he intuited how his predecessor had “transformed 
the thematic and scenic commonplaces” of the Gothic so that they posed 
more profound “metaphysical riddles”; both authors ultimately revised a 
popular and potentially only titillating genre so as to demonstrate how “the 
language of the Gothic novel and its themes,” if given a “strong moral cast,” 
can offer “a powerful rhetoric for describing modern man’s predicament.”21 
Dostoyevsky aside, however, Lancelot is indeed properly read as respond-
ing to a peculiarly Anglo-American Gothic tradition—not necessarily a 
“Southern” one—that had its roots in an eighteenth-century British culture 
wherein hopes and anxieties regarding modernity often took shape in rela-
tion to the Roman Catholic past. This British tradition was communicated 
to Percy largely through the work of Poe, whose American revisions of it he 
in a sense completed, becoming a forthright Catholic critic of some of the 
fruits of the modern individualism that the earliest British Gothic fictions 
had implicitly touted.
Such dimensions of the Gothic have not always been fully appreciated. 
But prominent scholars have begun to reread the early British Gothic with 
regard to religion in ways that also illuminate the Anglo-American Gothic. 
Diane Long Hoeveler explains why the genre originated precisely in the 
late eighteenth century: “The killing of Catholicism in England took more 
than two hundred years, and the gothic charts that murder in all its convo-
luted moves. Killing the king becomes in the gothic the killing of a corrupt 
duke or monk, while the rationality so highly prized by Protestant individu-
alism and Enlightenment ideology moves to center stage, creating a new 
cultural ideal that chastised idolatry, superstition, hierarchy, and popery in 
all its forms.” This new cultural ideal was envisioned as essentially bodiless, 
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representing “Enlightenment beliefs in the self as unitary, reasonable, and 
located somewhere above and beyond the body,” but also was figured as 
“capitalist” and “male”—that is, autonomous and unfettered.22
The British Gothic, then, came into being at a time when a modern 
England that increasingly valued a self-reliant and essentially disembodied 
but figuratively masculine rationality sought in effect to exorcise its Catholic 
past—as manifested in prototypical Gothic novels such as Horace Walpole’s 
The Castle of Otranto (1764) and Matthew Lewis’s The Monk (1796), which 
are set in medieval Italy and in Spain, respectively. Such titles alone suggest 
the tendency of first English and then Anglo-American culture to associate 
Catholicism with threatening enclosures.23 If the Reformation and Enlight-
enment had offered enterprising Anglo-American individuals apparent 
liberation from the medieval past—room to breathe in, open space—then 
Catholicism might seem to threaten to lock them back up: in castles and 
cathedrals, monasteries and abbeys, dungeons and confessional booths—
figurative coffins all.
Among major American antebellum writers, Poe most obviously played 
on such stock Gothic images, which seemed safe reading to most early U.S. 
citizens: like the radical Calvinists who had originally settled New England, 
they could believe or at least hope that such evils properly belonged on 
the other side of the Atlantic, not in their new Canaan. Accordingly, Poe’s 
“The Masque of the Red Death” is a tale of moral and bodily corruption 
that features doomed aristocrats who lock themselves up in order to avoid a 
bloody plague that is killing their subjects—and the setting is not Poe’s own 
U.S. Atlantic seaboard, but rather an abbey conjured up out of the medieval 
past, an abbey wherein Death himself wears priestly vestments. In “The 
Black Cat,” the narrator kills his wife and walls her corpse up in a cellar “as 
the monks of the middle ages are recorded to have walled up their victims” 
(354). In “The Pit and the Pendulum,” a victim of the Spanish Inquisition is 
cast into a tomblike dungeon where he is bound by a “surcingle” (a belt for 
a clerical cassock) and subjected to “monkish ingenuity in torture.” On the 
walls of his hellish cell he sees painted “all the hideous and repulsive devices 
to which the charnel superstition of the monks has given rise” (310–11).
The word charnel generally refers to a house filled with dead bodies, 
but it is closely related to the word carnal, having to do with the flesh. And 
this narrator, like so many of Poe’s narrators, would finally like to believe 
that death and perhaps even the corruptible body itself are mere supersti-
128  Farrell O’Gorman
tions, figments of the imagination. Accordingly, these would-be disembod-
ied intellects attempt to remove all reminders of the flesh from their field 
of vision. As we have seen, Hoeveler maintains that such idealization of the 
disembodied intellect flourished in eighteenth-century England, but condi-
tions existed for it to take even more radical form in the early United States. 
Alexis de Tocqueville famously characterized early American individualism 
as inadvertently following the model of Descartes, whose “cogito ergo sum” 
initiated or at least concisely exemplified a major shift in Western thought. 
It did so not only by clearly valuing isolated individual thought over engage-
ment with community and tradition, but also by equating the individual self 
with the mind at the expense of the body. As Percy often remarked, such an 
equation, along with the Cartesian glorification of technology, left the self 
a mere theorizing ghost in a seemingly mechanistic cosmos—a potentially 
desperate ghost, one constantly tempted to reassert the reality of its exis-
tence via bestial violence or sex.24
It is just such violence (though not, significantly, such sex) that will 
ultimately bring us back to Poe. Philosopher Stanley Cavell has convincingly 
described both Poe and his contemporary Ralph Waldo Emerson as “odd” 
but nonetheless somehow legitimate literary and philosophical descendants 
of Descartes. His case in point with regard to Emerson is the essay “Self-
Reliance,” a source of well-known exhortations to individualism: for exam-
ple, “Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one 
of its members”; “Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist”; and 
“Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind.” Less quotable 
but striking nonetheless is Emerson’s extended assertion, “The nonchalance 
of boys who are sure of dinner . . . is the healthy attitude of human nature.” 
Emerson’s choice of the boy as the “healthy” human being, the “healthy” 
American, is in keeping with R. W. B. Lewis’s classic observation that 
mid-nineteenth-century American authors developed a literary mythology 
of the authentic American as a figure of heroic innocence, alone in a new 
world at the beginning of history—the American Adam. This is a version of 
Adam before the Fall, and, crucially, of Adam before Eve, a solitary male 
in a U.S. wilderness figured in the post-Puritan imagination less as a new 
Canaan than as a new Eden.25 This, then, is one long-standing vision of what 
it means to be an American: to be like Adam in the Garden, thinking for 
oneself without the apparent restraints of tradition or community or family, 
maybe even without the complications of the body—certainly of the female 
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body. And if Cavell is right, we can draw a line connecting Descartes to 
Emerson’s optimistic equation of ideal American identity with such youth-
ful self-reliant masculinity.
And then—by contrast—we have Poe. Cavell writes: “The sound of 
Poe’s prose, of its incessant and perverse brilliance, is uncannily like the 
sound of philosophy as established in Descartes,” as Descartes himself has 
“the air of a mad diarist” in works such as his Meditations. Yet finally Poe’s 
prose reads as if it “were a parody of [Cartesian] philosophy.” So it is that in 
Poe’s many confessional tales, the self-absorbed narrator generally begins 
as if he is searching “for a proof of his existence,” for “a proof . . . that he is 
alive.”26
And he does so by killing other people.
This is essentially what happens in “The Tell-Tale Heart,” one of Poe’s 
most chilling stories. Here the imprisoned narrator explains how he mur-
dered an old man who shared his house. Strictly speaking, this is not a 
confession in the legal sense—let alone the Augustinian sense!—for the 
narrator has already admitted his crime. He speaks because, bizarrely, he 
wants to establish his sanity as he explains just how methodically, just how 
rationally he planned and carried out the murder. He supplies only one 
motive: the old man’s diseased eye disturbed him. Why? Because, a close 
reading of the text reveals, the old man’s deteriorating body reminded the 
narrator of his own embodiment and mortality. As is often the case in Poe’s 
fiction, the two characters are clearly doppelgangers, or at least one sees the 
other as a reflection of some aspect of himself. Accordingly, the narrator has 
also imagined that his victim’s eye, though diseased, was in fact as power-
ful as a microscope—just as he emphasizes his own powers of observation 
in describing his meticulous preparation for the murder, observing the old 
man nightly by means of a single ray of light from a lantern, focusing on the 
eye like a surgeon so that the old man himself seems almost to disappear 
even before the act is committed. Lance Lamar practices a similar scientific 
detachment and focus before acting out in violence. This pattern begins 
with his comparison of discovering his daughter’s aberrant blood type to 
an astronomer’s analysis of telescopic photography and culminates with the 
filming of his wife’s adultery, which he carefully arranges in the second half 
of the novel.
“The Tell-Tale Heart” is characteristic of much of Poe’s fiction in its 
isolated, self-absorbed narrator, who seeks to attain the position of an all-
130  Farrell O’Gorman
transcending intellect by removing the human body from his field of vision, 
who asserts a kind of hyperrationalism that is inherently bound up with 
his murderous impulses, and who practices the kind of perverse science 
openly decried in Poe’s poem “Sonnet—to Science,” wherein the speaker 
complains to a personified Science that it “alterest all things with thy peer-
ing eyes.” He then asks Science accusingly: “Why preyest thou thus upon 
the poet’s heart? Vulture! Whose wings are dull realities” (21). This speaker, 
then, fears that modern science has claimed a monopoly on explaining real-
ity—presenting us, for example, with the hard cold fact that human bodies 
are ultimately corpses—and believes that the poet’s duty is to create an 
escape from that reality into the realm of imagination. Both of these traits 
are characteristic of Poe’s romantic milieu and are undergirded by modern 
assumptions about art, knowledge, and human identity that are not shared 
by Percy or earlier Catholic artists such as Dante, but that are ultimately 
relevant to understanding Lancelot as well as Poe.
Certainly those assumptions support the tendency of so many of Poe’s 
characters to wish to remove reminders of embodiment from their fields of 
vision. Generally, those reminders are other human beings; frequently, they 
are female. In this regard we should finally consider Roderick Usher, who 
buries his cataleptic twin sister alive in “The Fall of the House of Usher.” 
In doing so Roderick, a hypochondriac intellectual who resolutely avoids 
all sensual experience, seeks to reject the seemingly “feminine” fate of be-
ing enclosed—of dwelling in, and being born via, a bloody body that must 
inevitably die. He also has some reason to fear science, or at least what is 
being done to humanity in the name of science. He buries his sister in a 
vault beneath the ancestral family manor because if he buries her outdoors 
she will likely be dug up by grave robbers collecting cadavers for medical 
schools—grave robbers who in Poe’s time went by the grim name of “resur-
rection men,” perhaps revealing an increasing fear in the modern West that 
this is the only kind of resurrection in store for humanity.
All of Poe’s fiction is profoundly shaped by the fact that “the medieval 
idea of the homo toto, the whole and indissoluble man, [had been] supplanted 
during the Enlightenment by the concept of a self that divided at death.”27 
Accordingly the house of Usher itself, which strangely resembles a human 
head, has a pronounced fissure running down its middle—reminiscent of 
Descartes’ mind-body split, corresponding here to the Roderick-Madeline 
split. This fissure causes the entire structure to collapse at the end of the 
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story, prefiguring the fate of the Lamar house in Lancelot. In this regard 
it is highly significant that the supposedly “feudal” Usher manor has been 
identified by many critics as suggestive of a “Gothic” plantation house in 
Poe’s native Virginia, and that Roderick Usher bears some resemblance not 
only to John Randolph of Roanoke but also—in Allen Tate’s estimation—to 
Thomas Jefferson of Monticello.28
Tate’s reading of Poe is particularly important because it directly in-
fluenced Percy, whom he mentored to a degree. But before turning to it I 
should close my consideration of Poe by again emphasizing the prevalence 
of dead women in his work—another point of kinship with Lancelot, which 
features the deaths of Lance’s first wife, Lucy, his mother, and most crucially 
Margot. Poe famously wrote in “The Philosophy of Composition” that “the 
death of a beautiful woman is, unquestionably, the most poetical topic in 
the world” (680). He might seem to be in excellent company here: Dante 
and Petrarch wrote about dead women, after all. But in the Divine Com-
edy, Dante’s beloved Beatrice—whose voice opens Lancelot via the novel’s 
epigraph from Purgatorio—is not, of course, merely dead. A member of the 
communion of saints, she is Dante’s active guide to Paradise, where they will 
ultimately be reunited in company with others in worship of God in body as 
well as soul. Compare this with the bleak vision of Poe’s most famous poem, 
“The Raven,” wherein the lonely male speaker sits mourning the death of his 
beloved Lenore. He finally, passionately, asks the dark bird that has flown in 
his window whether or not in some afterlife he will “‘clasp a sainted maiden 
whom the angels name Lenore, / Clasp a rare and radiant maiden whom the 
angels name Lenore ?’ / Quoth the raven, ‘Nevermore’” (57).
Here even the speaker’s query is deeply perverse, because he knows 
in advance how it will be answered: “Nevermore” is the only word the bird 
has uttered all night. And the fundamental No that ends this poem could 
not be more different from the Yes that ends Lancelot. But we can better 
understand the subtly affirmative nature of Percy’s novel by reading it with 
Poe’s No, and his rendering of the Anglo-American Gothic, in mind.
Beyond Individualism: Detecting the Real in Lancelot
While the moral shortcomings of Dostoyevsky’s confessional narrator in 
Notes are clearly understood when juxtaposed with the author’s professed 
Christian conviction, Poe offers no explicit or implicit moral position from 
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which his protagonists and confessional narrators might be judged (though 
their frequent criminal insanity is self-evident enough). Even the presumed 
hero of “The Purloined Letter,” the ratiocinative French detective C. Au-
guste Dupin, bears a striking moral resemblance to the villain whom he 
finally apprehends. So how is it that Percy—who once described himself to 
his early mentor Caroline Gordon as inclined to be at least as much “a mor-
alist or propagandist” as he was a novelist—found himself prepared to draw 
on the morally ambiguous fictions of Poe so profitably in Lancelot?29 He did 
so in large part via the critical essays of Gordon’s husband, the prominent 
poet and critic Allen Tate.
It was from Tate, that is, that Percy learned to read Poe in the manner 
I have attempted above, looking beneath the surfaces of his fiction to see 
how on the most profound level it breaks with the earlier British Gothic 
model as it chillingly exemplifies the pathology of Cartesian thought and 
concomitant radical individualism. Tate’s provocatively paired essays “The 
Angelic Imagination: Poe as God” and “The Symbolic Imagination: The 
Mirrors of Dante” make this point directly and at length.30 Furthermore, 
Tate—a 1950 convert to Catholicism who had earlier been one the most 
prominent of the Vanderbilt Agrarians—helped Percy to see such Cartesian 
individualism as inherent in his own national and regional milieu. “The 
Angelic Imagination,” which equates the term angel with disembodied in-
tellect, briefly describes Poe’s antebellum Virginia as “a society committed 
to the rationalism of Descartes and Locke by that eminent angel of the ra-
tionalistic Enlightenment, Thomas Jefferson” (416). Poe’s regional identity 
is also the primary subject of the essay “Our Cousin, Mr. Poe,” wherein Tate 
describes the Richmond native as “a gentleman and a Southerner” whose 
protagonists are generally “hyperaesthetic egoist[s],” “dehumanized” men 
who seem to be mere “machines of sensation and will,” men whose violent 
betrayals of their own bodies and their human kin alike would, in Dante’s 
schema, merit “neither Purgatory nor Heaven; and only two stations in Hell” 
(389, 395). Tate, then, generally disparages Poe’s legacy. But as a southern 
writer of gentlemanly extraction himself, he has a horrified fascination with 
it: “I confess that his voice is so near to mine that I recoil a little, lest he, 
Montresor, lead me into the cellar, address me as Fortunato, and wall me 
up alive” (400). Such self-analysis underlies one of Tate’s later essays that 
helped Percy—as he wrote in a letter to Tate—to understand a certain sort 
of Confederate romanticizing as strangely bound up with “the narcissism-
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solipsism of the modern intellectual,” a connection he had previously sensed 
but not fully grasped.31 That essay, “Narcissus as Narcissus,” begins with 
brief reference to Poe but is in fact Tate’s explication of his own poem “Ode 
to the Confederate Dead”—itself mentioned by Lance in Lancelot (47).
In the novel, Lance Lamar’s dead father—whose figurative ghost still 
haunts Lance—most obviously embodies the sort of self-isolating romanti-
cism mentioned in Percy’s correspondence with Tate. But all of the forego-
ing discussion prepares us to understand the horrific character of Lance 
Lamar as we examine the novel directly in light of Poe and the Anglo-
American Gothic tradition, albeit with two qualifications. First, Percy much 
more directly than Poe ultimately writes of a radical individualism rooted 
in specifically American contexts. He does so by making Lance not only a 
somewhat “foreign” Gothic aristocrat but, more profoundly, a modern scien-
tist-detective and finally a violently self-reliant frontiersman—the American 
Adam with a bowie knife. Second, Dostoyevsky, not Poe, is Percy’s ultimate 
model in writing this problematically “confessional” novel that indirectly 
diagnoses the true illnesses of his society—though Percy’s subtle Catholic 
prescription, unlike Dostoyevsky’s implicit Russian Orthodox one, lacks 
reductive nationalistic or ethnic undertones. The Eucharist that figures in 
the final pages of Lancelot offers, in the view of Percival and Percy alike, a 
potential vision and taste of the real and of true community—a vision and 
taste that Lance has failed to attain throughout the novel, a vision and taste 
necessarily grounded in the body.
In what sense, then, does the novel read like a Gothic fiction? Poe is 
both explicitly mentioned and indirectly alluded to throughout Lancelot. 
This first-person narrative opens, like “The Tell-Tale Heart,” with a violent 
man locked in a cell, a man not entirely sure whether he has committed a 
crime or been diagnosed with a mental illness; and it proceeds in parts along 
the lines of “The Cask of Amontillado,” detailing the narrator’s obsessions 
with honor and vengeance. It also resembles “The Purloined Letter” in that 
Lance poses as a detective of sorts. But the novel most consistently mirrors 
“The Fall of the House Of Usher”: Lance’s first-person narrative stems from 
a visit by his boyhood friend Percival (reversing the narrator’s visit to his 
boyhood friend Roderick in Poe’s story); the ancestral family house that 
provides the setting is irrevocably destroyed at the end; and the narrative 
turns upon fear of and attempts to control not only women but human bod-
ies generally, ultimately playing on and revising earlier Gothic associations 
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of women, entrapping embodiment, and Catholicism—all three of which 
are violently rejected by Lance.
Despite his protests against the morally depraved world around him, 
Lance himself is clearly the chief horror in the novel. In certain respects he 
initially seems to be a stock early Gothic villain: he is aristocratic heir to a 
manor that, to visiting midwestern tourists, looks “as foreign . . . as Castel 
Gandolfo,” the summer residence of the pope (25); that manor is in over-
whelmingly Catholic south Louisiana, which has a faux-feudal history; and 
he has certain medieval obsessions, notably with his own perverse notion of 
chivalry. Yet it is crucial to note that he has absorbed his father’s admiration 
not of the real Middle Ages but rather of the Middle Ages imagined by 
the British Presbyterian novelist Sir Walter Scott. Romantic novels such as 
Scott’s Ivanhoe—as Percy wrote elsewhere—featured only “a Christianity 
which was aestheticized by medieval trappings and a chivalry abstracted 
from its sacramental setting.”32 In its Arthurian allusions Lancelot takes the 
bright nineteenth-century medievalism of Scott and gives it a dark Gothic 
face, though it does so in a manner that, as with Poe, ultimately focuses on 
a modern rather than a medieval horror.
For one thing, Lance himself is insistently post-Christian, and is de-
picted as a logical descendant of the sort of Virginia gentleman of Poe’s era 
whom Tate described as “a deist by conviction and an Anglican or Pres-
byterian by habit” (416). Lance’s milieu is less genteel than old Virginia, 
however, and more “Southern Western,” as he puts it—that is, closer to the 
old frontier (92). As Lance’s father told it, the Lamars descend from “Tory 
English colonials” who arrived in “corrupt” colonial Louisiana and fought 
to build their own “chaste and incorrupt little Anglican chapels” despite be-
ing surrounded on all sides by “savage Indians” and “superstitious Romans” 
alike (14, 116). This formulation of the Lamar family history strangely 
resembles the captivity narratives of early New England Protestant settlers 
who routinely conflated hostile Native Americans with enclosing Roman 
Catholics—narratives that in some respects prefigured Gothic fictions 
themselves.33 Lance’s father preferred to dream of a Louisiana somehow 
Anglicized and “suffused by gentle Episcopal rectitude” of the sort he as-
sociates with Robert E. Lee, but Lance himself—despite his open aversion 
to Christianity—at times prefers to posture as a more radical Protestant in 
the mold of Oliver Cromwell. He is a Puritan of sorts who will launch “a 
new Reformation” to save a corrupt America by violence (215, 177).
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Lance’s obsession with the seeming loss of “chivalry” in a United States 
in the throes of the sexual revolution is, therefore, more complicated than 
it seems. On one level it is a continuation of his father’s merely nostalgic 
fantasy of a purer past. But Lance becomes a nightmarishly modern figure 
of a self-reliant rationality that is both strangely puritanical and narrowly 
dichotomizing. What he calls “chivalry” in fact follows the nineteenth- 
century American pattern Tate attributed to Poe, whose “exalted idealiza-
tion of Woman . . . was only a little more humorless, because more intense, 
than the standard cult of Female Purity in the Old South” (389). That ideal-
ization is reflected in Poe’s quasi-Cartesian protagonists’ habit of professing 
“an impossibly high love of [woman], one that bypasses the body and moves 
in upon her spiritual essence” (404). Lance follows suit in his verbal recon-
struction of his deceased and virginal wife, Lucy, focusing steadfastly on her 
“opaque Georgia eyes” in contrast to Margot’s “sweet Texas ass”: Lucy “was 
a dream” and all the purer for it, in Lance’s eyes (85, 119). It is important to 
note, however, that Lance does not fear only female sexuality. He ultimately 
feels trapped by his own body as well, as discussed further below.
Lance’s generally Cartesian position of abstraction from his body is 
reflected in his narrative of his initial research regarding his wife’s infidelity, 
where he presents himself not as medieval knight but as a kind of scientist 
or detective. Near the novel’s beginning he calmly describes his discovery, 
a year previous, that he was not the father of one of his children. Science 
not only aids him in this discovery as he notes and researches his daugh-
ter’s blood type but also seems to offer him some solace as he uncovers 
increasing evidence of his wife’s infidelity. “As a physician,” he asks Percival, 
“wouldn’t you say that nothing more is involved [in the act of adultery] than 
the touch of one membrane against another? Cells touching cells” (16–17). 
It is highly significant that the priest here is also an M.D. and therefore a 
true authority on soul and body alike, while Lance is merely a theorizing 
layman whose technological society has conditioned him to see himself as 
an all-transcending intellect that properly manipulates physical reality.
Lance’s identity as detective is reflected in his reading of Raymond 
Chandler novels and references to the violent television show Mannix, but 
is best read as yet another nod to Poe, generally credited with inventing 
detective fiction. Lancelot resembles “The Purloined Letter” in that the 
object of Lance’s search—sin—is hidden in plain sight (that is, in himself), 
and also in that the detective himself is morally tainted. Furthermore, 
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Lance is a particularly American sort of detective. As he conducts a solitary 
investigation into his wife’s and finally his entire community’s sexual de-
generacy, he perfectly exemplifies the radical individualism underlying the 
American detective story in general: the solitary investigator “boring into 
the center of society to find it rotten . . . constitutes the fundamental drama” 
of the genre. Furthermore, “the mythology of American individualism” is 
such that the isolated detective’s own “moral heroism is always just a step 
away from despair. . . . The hero’s lonely quest for moral excellence ends 
in absolute nihilism.”34 No better description exists for Lance’s state in the 
final pages of the novel. Yet this description applies equally well to another 
archetypal American hero relevant to Lancelot: the frontiersman who has 
left civilization and its seemingly restrictive mores behind.
Lance comes to see himself in this role late in the novel as he persis-
tently recalls how his great-great-grandfather cut a man’s throat “from ear to 
ear” in a savage duel on a Mississippi River sandbar, using not a broadsword 
but a bowie knife—which Lance himself ultimately uses to kill his wife’s 
lover (155). Lance himself, then, is finally neither medieval knight nor Tory 
gentleman, but a self-reliant frontiersman who willfully and violently inflicts 
his abstract designs on nature—here, on human bodies.35 Here Percy de-
constructs his own family’s faux-Christian aristocratic heritage and places 
at the center of American history not Robert E. Lee and other aristocratic 
figures who might seem “as legendary and mythical as King Arthur and the 
Round Table,” but instead the likes of Daniel Boone or Davy Crockett—the 
American Adam with a bowie knife (116).36
Legends concerning such figures are as close to an autochthonous 
popular mythology as the United States has produced.37 Accordingly, 
whereas Dostoyevsky tended to see Russian “soil” as especially well suited 
to nurturing Christianity in the nation’s common people, Percy—or at least 
Lance—does not posit American soil or identity in any such light. Indeed, 
the only character who speaks of values springing from the “soil” is the 
utterly ungrounded film director Jacoby (114). This is ironic but also fitting, 
for Percy writes of an America far removed from that envisioned by the 
Vanderbilt Agrarians or the Jefferson who idealized the yeoman farmer. 
Lancelot’s America is one in which common citizens act “as if they lived 
out their entire lives in a dim charade, a shadowplay in which they were the 
shadows” and movie actors were “resplendent larger-than-life beings”; they 
are prone to believe that their own “reality could only be found in the illu-
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sions” of mass media (152). The late twentieth-century ascendance of such 
media and accompanying blurring of the line between reality and simulacra 
is a major theme in the novel, one connected to the tendency of Cartesian 
individualism to transform physical reality “into a mere hall of mirrors for 
the self-reflecting ego.”38 Indeed, playing roles and designing one’s own 
identity without regard to physical reality or “soil” might itself be seen as 
quintessentially American.39 What is finally “American” in Lance’s fixation 
on the violent frontiersman, then, may not be the frontiersman himself so 
much as Lance’s choice to play his role—as opposed to that of his father’s 
preferred Robert E. Lee, or some other figure altogether.
The novel’s consistent engagement with the seemingly arbitrary 
“play” of different identities (and of different texts) in part reflects Percy’s 
postmodern milieu. But Percy cannot be deemed a literary postmodern-
ist. Rather, he was a Christian realist who believed that Christianity itself 
guaranteed a number of essential “properties of the novel without which 
there is no novel,” among them “the density and linearity of time and the 
sacramental reality of things.”40 For Percy, there is a reality grounded in 
God’s ongoing presence in all Creation, and that reality is more particularly 
revealed in Christ and the sacraments administered by Christ’s Church—
without which humans are more prone to self-delusion than they would be 
otherwise. Lance’s relationship to the Church and sacraments, then, is a 
crucial indicator of his relationship to reality as Percy sees it.41
A post-Protestant himself, Lance initially expresses some distant admi-
ration for the Catholic Creoles whom his father saw as merely “superstitious 
Romans,” because despite their apparent moral laxity they—unlike his own 
family—seem to have found the “secret of leading ordinary lives well” (24). 
But Lance becomes increasingly angry with the Catholic Church for what 
he sees as its failure to establish and enforce clear moral dichotomies. The 
bulk of the narrative is, again, a monologue delivered Poelike in a mental 
hospital room that doubles as a potential confessional booth. But this stock 
Gothic element is cast in a new light when Lance expresses his anger at 
the Church’s apparent moral ambiguity: “With you,” he tells Percival, “ev-
erything seems to get dissolved in a kind of sorrowful solution. Poor weak 
mankind! The trouble is that in your old tolerant Catholic world-weariness, 
you lose all distinctions. Love everything” (130–31). “Damn you and your 
God,” he rails later. “Between the two of you, you should have got it straight 
and had it one way or the other. Either it [that is, sex or any other action] 
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is good or it’s bad, but whichever it is, goddamn say so. Only you don’t. You 
fuck off somewhere in between. You want to have it both ways: good, but—
bad only if—and so forth” (176). Lance is oddly innocent here, expressing 
a Manichean preference for seeing the world in black and white. Hence his 
anger at a Church that, as Percy’s coreligionist Flannery O’Connor once put 
it, is not necessarily composed of “good people”—the Creoles with their lax 
mores make this obvious to Lance—but “is composed of those who accept 
what she teaches, whether they are good or bad, and there is a constant 
struggle through the help of the sacraments to be good.”42 The Church’s 
complexity in this regard may seem too “effeminate” for Lance (note the 
traditional female pronoun used by O’Connor). Indeed, Lance explicitly 
blames the Church for “emasculating” the Christ he would prefer to fol-
low, a Christ who would demand immediate moral perfection rather than 
instituting the sacrament of confession for struggling sinners (178).
Lance is such a sinner himself, in Percy’s view. And because Lance is 
speaking to a priest, Lancelot not only echoes Poe’s Gothic fiction and the 
general form of Notes from Underground as a confessional novel; here, the 
actual sacrament of confession is directly relevant to the plot. Furthermore, 
the sacraments as a whole are crucial to understanding Percy’s ultimate revi-
sion of the Gothic. For what is finally horrifying in Lancelot is not Percival’s 
Catholicism, which via the sacraments stresses the union of body and soul; 
what is horrifying is Lance’s own tendency to deny and distrust the body, to 
divide body and soul, or—more precisely—body and mind, in two. While 
he prefers to contemplate his romantic “dream” of Lucy, as noted above, 
he is simultaneously drawn by animal lust to the physicality of Margot. 
This tension between romantic idealism and unbridled bodily urges comes 
to a head when Lance theorizes about and expresses his anger at a God 
or at least a nature that—his narrow scientific perspective has convinced 
him—has designed men to be compulsory rapists and women to submit to 
rape. By the end of the novel it becomes clear that, to Lance, human biology 
itself finally seems a trap, a limiting enclosure. He articulates this view most 
clearly using the language of Darwinian “evolution” (222–24). But interest-
ingly, in making this observation Lance begins to directly indict the God 
he has professed little faith in elsewhere, in a crypto-Gnostic assertion that 
the natural world as he sees it is simply too evil and entrapping not to have 
some sort of supernatural intelligence behind it.
Elsewhere Lance expresses this conviction in ways that recall the ear-
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lier Gothic association of the body with a confining Catholicism. Midway 
through the novel he compares Margot’s body to the “ark” of the covenant 
and speaks of “eating” that body sexually, as if it were some kind of Eu-
charistic sacrament (171). Read in context, however, this debased—because 
merely naturalistic—“sacrament” only serves to place Lance in quasi-
Darwinian competition with other sexual predators. The culmination of 
this pattern is the late scene where Lance secretly approaches Margot and 
her new lover Jacoby together in bed. The bed itself, he says, looks “like a 
cathedral, a Gothic bed, posts as thick as trees, carved and fluted and taper-
ing to spires and gargoyles above the canopy. The headboard was as massive 
and complex as an altar screen. Panels of openwork braced posts and rails 
like flying buttresses.” Lance kneels behind one of these buttresses, listen-
ing to his wife and her lover—who seem to be one body—posing himself as 
“an unconsecrated priest hearing an impenitent confession” (237). This is 
in fact Lance and Margot’s own marriage bed, and therefore an apt symbol 
of how Lance has come to see marriage and sex itself: not as potentially 
saving sacraments, but as Gothic enclosures—as further emphasized when 
he mounts the bed and clasps the two lovers together so tightly as to begin 
suffocating them.
If this were a tale by Poe, suffocation would be the end of it. But 
Percy simultaneously offers the reader breathing space and presents a moral 
quandary by framing the end of the novel with a question. Left quietly de-
spairing in the ruins of his own hyperrationality, Lance finally asks Percival, 
What are you going to do? “So you plan to take a little church in Alabama, 
Father, preach the gospel, turn bread into flesh, forgive the sins of Buick 
dealers, give communion to suburban housewives?” (256). Given his solip-
sistic outrage at society and his distrust of the body as anything other than 
a useful weapon, nothing could seem more useless to Lance than all these 
flawed individuals coming together—in the flesh—to confess their sins and 
receive the word and body of Christ.
To this question, Percy offers the potential beginning of an answer 
more specific and affirmative than any hinted at even in Notes from Un-
derground. For in the last pages of what has been a chilling monologue, 
the priest begins to speak. In answer to Lance’s question about his plans 
at the parish and broader questions as well, he repeats one simple word: 
Yes. The priest-physician—the Percival who is in part Percy himself—has 
listened intently, assuming a posture that some critics have seen as “femi-
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nine.”43 But he has now emerged in formal priestly garb as a knight in the 
service of a lady, the Church (163). He begins to speak with authority both 
in this regard and as a physician who will presumably prescribe to Lance 
a regimen of charity, the agape-Eucharist that will ground his identity not 
in disembodied self-reliance but in embodied communion.44 So the novel 
ends not with Poe’s Gothic isolation or even with the poignantly promis-
ing self-reflection that closes Notes, but with a real dialogue and therefore 
the possibility that Lance’s encounter with Percival might become a saving 
confession after all—that via word and sacrament Lance might escape not 
the body but rather a limiting intellectual inheritance that elevates the self-
reliant mind above all else.
It is fitting, then, that the novel itself exists so clearly in communion 
with earlier fiction—with that “community” or “commonwealth of other 
writers” upon which Percy saw his own work depending. He understood 
his larger culture and its capacity for self-understanding in relation to the 
work of that literary community. Hence Percy once observed that to many 
modern readers the Good News no longer seems new (or good) in part 
because the very vocabulary of Christianity seems “worn out,” which poses 
a particular problem for the Christian writer. How might such a writer get 
around this problem? By using “every ounce of cunning, craft, and guile 
he can muster. . . . The fictional use of violence, shock, comedy, insult, the 
bizarre, are the everyday tools of his trade.”45 Lancelot is Percy’s most direct 
attempt at this strategy, and its complex approach to revitalizing a Christian 
message for his contemporary culture is made all the richer by its relation-
ship to the work of Dostoyevsky and Poe.
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body split” and also “the ultimate sign of mystical community, enfleshed in the 
body and blood in the Eucharist . . . and in the many signs of the spirit that exist 
in the mystery of the communal, semiotic world” (Walker Percy’s Search for Com-
munity, 257).
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the Bottle: How Queer Man Is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to 
Do with the Other (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976), 118. Percy here 
explicitly references the example of O’Connor as Christian writer—one whom, I 
would add, has also been described as “Gothic” and who responded to Dostoyevsky 
and Poe in vital ways herself.
7Walker Percy’s Alternative to 
Scientism in The Thanatos 
Syndrome
Micah Mattix
Walker Percy’s The Thanatos Syndrome is often read, and rightly so, as a 
critique of scientism. Scientism is the belief that science alone can make 
truth statements about the world. For Percy, such a perspective always 
dehumanizes. Because man is viewed as matter, all personal and social 
ills are ascribed to chemical imbalances in the brain and call for phar-
macological solutions. In the novel, the solution is doses of heavy sodium 
introduced into the water supply. Amazingly, the solution “works.” Crime 
and anxiety disappear and pleasure is maximized through increased 
promiscuity. The problem, of course, is that this solution “kills” the self. 
Those who have drunk the contaminated water lose the capacity to use 
triadic signs, which, for Percy, is what distinguishes humans from animals. 
While they have been “cured” of “the familiar anxieties, terrors, panics, 
phobias,” they have a “curious flatness of tone,” Percy writes, and speak 
in “two-word chimp utterances.”1 They no longer have the capacity for 
hermeneutical context, and they mate openly and indiscriminately. They 
have become primates.
For Percy, the literal loss of the capacity of the characters to use tri-
adic signs in the novel is a symbol for the widespread loss of the self in 
America in the late twentieth century. Like the doses of heavy sodium that 
“zap” self-awareness, America’s constant production of immediate dyadic 
pleasures—pleasures (like pornography and roller coasters) that produce 
a direct physiological response—reduces the population’s capacity to use 
triadic signs. Thus, at the end of the novel, when Tom More arrives in Dis-
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ney World with his recovering wife, he notices that the retired Canadians 
and Ohioans “are amiable, gregarious, helpful—and at something of a loss” 
(338–39). They look “somewhat zapped” (339). Like the oblivion produced 
by the doses of heavy sodium earlier in the novel, these immediate dyadic 
pleasures also dehumanize.
Thus, the death syndrome that Percy diagnoses in the novel is found 
at all levels of American society. We live in a culture that, at a theoretical 
level, reduces man to matter, and in practice, kills our capacity for triadic 
signification—the source of our sense of self—as a “cure” for psychological 
suffering. Yet, what alternative is there? One possible critique of Percy is 
that his project is largely negative. Cleary he is a gifted diagnostician, but 
what good is it to know that one is dying if there is no cure?
While it is true that Percy tends to focus on diagnosing the modern 
malaise, he does, in fact, offer a possible “cure,” however partial or unreli-
able. It is found in the recognition that we are more than mere material 
entities, which is something that human language, particularly of the sort 
found in novels, always necessarily affirms. To examine this alternative in 
The Thanatos Syndrome, however, we must first retrace his view of lan-
guage and literature.
Following Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic theory of linguistic signs, 
Percy argues in “Is a Theory of Man Possible?” that the way humans use 
signs is qualitatively different from how other animals use them. Primates, 
such as chimpanzees, can learn to respond to words as stimuli. For example, 
it is possible to condition a chimpanzee to jump when the word “jump” is 
spoken by using a system of rewards. However, chimpanzees do not as-
sociate the word with the action. Like B. F. Skinner’s use of light as an 
associative stimulus in pigeons and Pavlov’s use of a bell as an associative 
stimulus in dogs, words, in this instance, are associative stimuli that pro-
duce a particular conditioned response in chimpanzees. This is what Peirce 
and Percy call a dyadic event.2
How humans respond to and use language is qualitatively different. 
Not only can humans respond to the word “jump” by jumping, but they 
also link the word and the action via a “coupler.” We link, furthermore, not 
discrete instances of jumping with the word “jump” but the characteristic of 
what we could call “jumpingness” with the word. Thus, the word “ball” sig-
nifies not individual balls, but the characteristic of a certain roundness.3 For 
Percy, this is why he distinguishes in “The Mystery of Language” between a 
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sign—“something,” he writes, “that directs our attention to something else” 
(in this case, particular instances of jumping)—and a symbol.4 In the latter 
case, the word and the idea expressed in it are mashed together—however 
arbitrarily—and become one. This is what Percy means when he writes: 
“Naming or symbolization may be defined as the affirmation of the thing as 
being what it is under the auspice of the symbol.”5 Thus, according to Percy, 
linguistic symbols are categorically different from signs. Symbols combine 
a sign (in this case, a phoneme or a script) and the “inescape” of a particu-
lar entity or attribute. This “inescape” is real, cognitive, and immaterial, 
and without it, meaning or signification would be impossible. For Percy, 
all material objects have an inescape, but so do immaterial attributes and 
emotions—“things” such as good and evil or the feelings of love and hate. 
For Percy, these attributes and emotions are no less real than our notion 
of roundness. They are universal and cannot be reduced to mean nothing 
more than “good for self-preservation” or “bad for self-preservation,” as 
many social Darwinists would have it.
Thus, the human language is a testament of being, and this testament, 
or knowledge, produces a satisfaction that is more complex and of a higher 
sort than the merely physiological pleasure of drugs or roller coasters. Again, 
in “Naming and Being,” Percy points out that when a child learns what the 
word “ball” means, he “will hold the ball and speak its name a thousand times 
to anyone who will listen, or to no one at all. In doing so, he experiences 
a joy which has nothing to do with the biological need-satisfactions which 
have determined all previous joys.”6 This joy, according to Percy, comes from 
the knowledge of being, the identity asserted between the sign (“ball”) and 
being (in this case, “roundness”). This is a ball. The pleasure is not produced 
because of the child’s understanding of some sort of natural link between the 
word and the thing being named. Most signs are arbitrary, according to Percy. 
In fact, the “scandal” of naming is that the less “natural” the relation between 
the sign and the thing being named, the greater the pleasure. This is Percy’s 
point in “Metaphor as Mistake.” The greater the gap between word and thing, 
the greater the validation of the thing’s ineffable “being” the word asserts:
For this ontological pairing, or, if you prefer, “error” of identification of word 
and thing, is the only possible way in which the apprehended nature of the 
bird, its inescape, can be validated as being what it is. This inescape is, after 
all, otherwise ineffable. I can describe it, make crude approximation by such 
words as darting, oaring, speed, dive, but none of these will suffice to affirm 
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this so distinctive something which I have seen. This is why, as Marcel has 
observed, when I ask what something is, I am more satisfied to be given a 
name, even if the name means nothing to me (especially if?), than to be given 
a scientific classification.7
Thus, without espousing a simplistic Cartesian dualism, Percy views human 
language as a testament to the reality of universal, nonmaterial attributes 
and emotions, even the human soul.
Percy writes that communication happens when “one person utters 
a symbol—a word—or draws a painting, whatever—and a second person 
receives the symbol and understands it—or perhaps misunderstands it—
to be about something else, which both persons have experienced.”8 The 
referent, or the “inescape,” that the symbol names becomes the object of 
both the speakers’ attention. Because there is no consciousness without 
intentionality, according to Percy (who follows John Searle is this respect), 
and because, he continues, we are not only “conscious of something; we are 
also conscious of it as something we conceive under the symbol assigned to 
it, . . . without the symbol, I suggest we would not be conscious of it at all.”9 
Thus, consciousness for Percy is “named” experience and unconsciousness 
“unnamed” experience.
While this is where the post-structuralist wolves begin to circle, Percy 
himself had little time for the strongly ideological application of Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s distinction between signifiant and signifié found in the work 
Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, or Derrida. In a footnote to his semiotic intermezzo 
in Lost in the Cosmos, Percy states: “Whatever the virtues of structuralism 
as a method of linguistics, ethnology, and criticism, it is the self-proclaimed 
foe, on what seem to be ideological grounds, of the very concept of the 
human subject.” “I do not feel obliged to speak of the deconstructionists,” 
Percy continues self-assuredly and not without a little wit.10 For Percy, the 
stating or writing of a linguistic sign by one person and its reception by 
another is a functional (if not always infallible) form of communication. This 
is possible because there is a God external to the cosmos under which the 
self and all other things are named, and who is a co-namer of the universe. 
Percy writes in “Semiotic and a Theory of Knowledge”:
The symbol meaning relation may be defined as not merely an intentional 
but as a cointentional relation of identity. The thing is intended through its 
symbol which you say and I can repeat, and it is only through this quasi iden-
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tification that it can be conceived at all. Thus it is, I believe, that an empirical 
and semiotical approach to meaning illumines and confirms in an unexpected 
manner the realist doctrine of the union of the knower and the thing known. 
The metaphysical implications of semiotic are clear enough. Knowing is not 
a causal sequence but an immaterial union. It is a union, however, which 
is mediated through material entities, the symbol and its object. Nor is it a 
private phenomenon—rather is it an exercise in intersubjectivity in which the 
Thou serves as an indispensable colleague.11
God is “an indispensable colleague” for Percy because he is external to the 
named world and can thus be an “objective” interlocutor.
For Percy, great novels and poems “name” the “inescape” not of things 
but of events or values such as the goodness of justice or the ugliness of 
selfishness. In “The State of the Novel: Dying Art or New Science?” Percy 
writes: “Good art tells some home truths about the way things are, the way 
we are, about the movement or lack of movement of the human heart.” 
“Art,” he continues, “is cognitive, as cognitive and affirmable in its own 
way as science, and . . . in the case of the current novel what it cognizes, 
discerns, knows and tells is of a unique order which cannot be grasped by 
the scientific method.”12 In “Metaphor as Mistake,” he writes that “poetry 
validates that which has already been privately apprehended but has gone 
unformulated for both of us.”13 For Percy, this produces both pleasure and 
discomfort at the same time. The pleasure one feels when reading a great 
novel is found in the identification of the moral nature of man that takes 
place in the novel. This is, in turn, a testament to the reality of such univer-
sal, immaterial attributes:
And does it not still happen with us that when we are reading a great novel or 
a great poem or seeing a great play or film or even listening to music, that in 
the best parts we experience this same expansion of consciousness, this same 
sense of discovery, of affirmation, when the novelist writes of an experience 
we’ve had and only vaguely recognized but had not had it pointed out until 
this moment. The response is an affirmation: “Aha! yes, that’s it! Sure enough, 
that’s the way it is! I never thought of it before but”—and so on.14
Unlike the cognitive scientist, who points to things such as variety and form 
as the source of pleasure in a work of art, Percy rightly points to the fact that 
the pleasure is ontological and moral. For what is named in a great novel 
or poem are immaterial things, like the “movement of the human heart,” 
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the “order which cannot be grasped,” and things “privately apprehended.” 
These are truths not about things per se but about the order of and relation 
between things, as well as desire, will, peace, and agitation. The more ac-
curate this naming, according to Percy, the greater pleasure one feels when 
reading a great work.
The discomfort one feels is due to the fact that as one’s sense of self 
increases as these attributes of the unnamable self are defined, so does the 
sense of anxiety at not being able to name oneself. “Of all the things in the 
world,” Percy writes, “oneself is the only being that cannot be symbolized.”15 
(Some higher being needs to name us, as Percy discusses at length in Lost 
in the Cosmos.) Furthermore, as one becomes aware of one’s self in the 
world, the sense that I might, in fact, be lost in what Dante calls a “dark 
wood . . . savage, dense and harsh” increases. In fact, in Dante’s Inferno, the 
poet’s realization of his utter perdition comes after he “came to” himself.16 
Be this as it may, Percy suggests in The Thanatos Syndrome and elsewhere 
that this negative consequence of self-knowledge is better than the alterna-
tive of either a self-imposed or mandated oblivion.
In The Thanatos Syndrome, Percy presents reading and writing as 
an alternative to the scientism of Bob Comeaux, Max Gottlieb, and John 
Van Dorn for dealing with the modern malaise and human suffering. We 
see this alternative, in particular, in Father Smith’s “Confession,” which 
is separated typographically from the novel itself and functions, like 
Shakespeare’s “play within the play” in Hamlet, as a story within the story. 
While Smith’s confession is presented in the novel as a piece of nonfiction, 
it has literary elements, like Saint Augustine’s Confessions, to which it no 
doubt alludes. In American Jeremiad, Sacvan Bercovitch argues that the 
first literary genre of the American colonies was the jeremiad—a sermon, 
following the prophet Jeremiah, in which the minister denounces society 
for its moral failings and calls for it to return to God—and William Rod-
ney Allen has made an interesting case that Father Smith’s confession is 
precisely this sort of sermon.17 (In fact, Allen goes on to note that Smith’s 
confession closely parallels elements of Lancelot.)18 In either case, while 
Smith’s confession is clearly nonfiction, it is of a rather literary sort (much, 
it is worth noting, like Percy’s own nonfiction). In fact, Smith refers to it as 
his “tale” (256).
Father Smith himself possesses all of the characteristic traits of the 
novelist. First, according to Percy, the novelist separates himself from so-
Walker Percy’s Alternative to Scientism 151
ciety, which often leads to personal catastrophe. In Lost in the Cosmos, 
Percy notes that the artist “transcends” the world “in his use of signs.” He 
separates himself from his fellow man in order to name them and the order 
(or disorder) that connects them. The feeling of transcendence is exhilarat-
ing but momentary—the artist must always “reenter” society. The results 
are often catastrophic. Because the transcendence offered by art is one 
in which the artist “names” if not the self, the attributes of the self and, 
therefore, participates in the momentary but nevertheless real “salvic effect 
of art,” the return from this momentary sense of salvation are often all the 
more hellish. Thus, when the artist reenters the mundane world, unable to 
escape again via art, he becomes a wasted drunk or commits suicide. Thus, 
Percy writes: “If poets often commit suicide, it is not because their poems 
are bad but because they are good.”19
Second, the novelist is both the sanest and craziest of people. In 
“Novel-Writing in an Apocalyptic Time,” Percy writes that in a time of great 
confusion and fracture, poets and novelists can go crazy (or seem crazy) be-
cause they perceive, with great clarity, the insanity of the present world. In 
times of catastrophe in the past, Percy writes: “Poets and novelists seemed 
to be possessed by a whole separate coven of witches, demons, terrors, and 
premonitions, of which the general population seems by and large oblivious. 
Either one is crazy and the other sane, or the former has gone crazy for 
reasons which the latter has not yet caught on to.” Percy continues: “And, 
to tell the truth, I am still not sure which is right: whether it is the poet and 
novelist who, like the man in Allen Tate’s definition, is a shaky man trying 
to reassure himself in a generally sane world, or whether it is the population 
at large which is slowly going mad and the poet who has the sensibility or 
vulnerability—thin skin—to notice it.” Of course, Percy does know, and it 
is clearly, for him, the latter. Hence, he writes that despite whatever “shaki-
ness” or “fecklessness” he might have, the novelist’s duty is to “record what 
other people, absorbed as they are in their busy and useful lives, may not 
see.”20 Of course, what they do not see is horrific.
Last and most obviously, the novelist traffics in triadic signs. He uses 
language. Yet, as Percy remarks in “Notes for a Novel about the End of the 
World,” his language must be unusual. Because everyday language itself is 
“worn out,” and the audience indifferent, the novelist, at least at the end of 
the twentieth century, must, through the “fictional use of violence, shock, 
comedy, insult, the bizarre,” somehow renew the devalued signs. If he is 
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successful, both “he and his reader may come to themselves,” as Dante does 
at the beginning of The Inferno.21
As noted above, Father Smith possesses all of these characteristics. 
Like most artists in the twentieth century, Father Smith has separated 
himself from society. He lives in a fire tower in Feliciana parish and sees 
few visitors, except Tom More and the faithful but simple Milton, and his 
physical separation is a symbol of his internal psychological separation. This 
separation, however, like the separation of the novelist, is done, at least in 
part, for the benefit of society. While the women in Father Placide’s office 
invent convoluted theories regarding Father Smith’s sudden retreat to the 
fire tower, Jan Greene, in a snort of common sense, says, “For God’s sake. 
Like Jonah. I mean, really. Has it ever occurred to anybody that he might 
be up there for a much simpler, more obvious reason? . . . He could be 
doing vicarious penance for the awful state of the world. It is, after all, good 
Catholic practice” (112–13). In other words, it could be that Father Smith is 
suffering, doing penance, in an effort to heal the world, to bring it to itself.
Furthermore, when he lived in society, he exhibited the same self-
destructive tendencies that Percy claims artists in the twentieth century 
develop. When More knew him from Hope Haven, Smith drank heavily 
and was (as he continues to be) misanthropic—he views people as either 
“victims or assholes” (243).
Smith, moreover, is both crazy and sane at the same time. When More 
first sees him, after Father Placide has told him that he cannot decide 
whether Father Smith is “a nut or a genius,” he is perplexed. At first, Smith 
looks the same as when he knew him in Alabama: “He still looks like an old 
Ricardo Montalban with a handsome seamed face as tanned as cordovan 
leather, hair like Brillo,” but More quickly notices that something “is differ-
ent” (115). “Then I see that something is wrong with him. He is standing 
indecisively, fists in his pockets, brows knitted in a preoccupied expression. 
He does not look crazy but excessively sane” (116). When More sees him 
again, he has just had a “spell”—he’s as “stiff as a board,” according to 
Milton—and at first he refuses to speak (231). He shakes and possesses the 
“thin skin” vulnerability that Percy sees as part of the essential character of 
the novelist.
Last, Smith traffics in triadic signs. He “spots” fires from his tower, 
calls a second tower, and the location of the fire is “triangulated” (119–21). 
This is an image of how triadic signs work. Yet, he is preoccupied, as good 
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novelists are, Percy argues, with the lack of signification, meaning, of signs 
in the modern world. When More first visits Smith, the good father falls into 
a frenzied explanation of his inability to “preach” (we might say, metaphori-
cally, to write): “Because—it doesn’t signify” (117). Words, Father Smith 
argues, have been emptied of their meaning. They no longer function as 
symbols, Smith argues, but are mere dyadic signs. This is demonstrated, 
according to Father Smith, in the fact that Tom More associates certain 
words—“clouds,” “Irish,” “Blacks”—not with certain “inescapes” but with 
the stereotypical connotations. However, the word “Jew,” which Smith be-
lieves has not been evacuated of meaning, is associated by More with real, 
living Jews—“Max, Sam, Julius.” “Since the Jews were the original chosen 
people of God,” Smith argues, “a tribe of people who are still here, they are 
a sign of God’s presence which cannot be evacuated” (123). For Smith, this 
unevacuated presence of God has its fullest assurance in the Incarnation of 
Christ expressed in the Eucharist.
If Father Smith can be thought of as a novelist, and his text is his 
“Confession,” that leaves us Tom More as the reader. He is, first of all, a 
Freudian psychologist who prefers to allow his patients to talk about their 
problems rather than practice more highly intrusive forms of therapy. At 
the beginning of the novel, he is confronted with a textual problem—why 
are the people of Feliciana parish acting the way they are acting—and, as 
the novel progresses, he is faced with a moral one. Throughout, he “reads” 
peoples’ actions and words. He notes the changed mannerisms and lan-
guage of his patients and his wife and, with the help of Lucy Lipscomb, he 
is able to access the files of the Louisiana Department of Public Health and 
thus uncovers Comeaux and Van Dorn’s secret plan to “cure” the folks of 
Feliciana parish of the ills of mental disease and crime.
Yet, while More is able to figure out the “textual” or scientific prob-
lem—why is it that people in Feliciana parish are acting apelike?—he is 
confused regarding the morality of the situation. While he seems to rec-
ognize innately that what is happening to the people of Feliciana parish is 
wrong, he is tempted by the ethical reasoning of Comeaux and Van Dorn. 
In a discussion with Lipscomb before they uncover the atrocities that are 
taking place at Belle Ame, More explains that he has been offered a job on 
“the team” and is unsure if he will take it or not (211). Even after the sexual 
abuse at Belle Ame is discovered, More is still unsure what he will do. 
When he arrives at Father Smith’s a second time, he explains the situation:
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I tell him about my latest discoveries about Dr. Comeaux’s and Dr. Van Dorn’s 
Blue Boy project, about their offer of a job, about their threats if I don’t take 
it to send me back to Alabama for parole violation. I mention the incidents of 
sexual molestation at Belle Ame Academy, but also tell him of Bob Comeaux’s 
impressive evidence of social betterment through the action of the addictive 
heavy sodium. “I’m not sure what I should do,” I tell him, frowning, troubled, 
but keeping an eye on him. As a matter of act, I do not know what to do. (234)
While Smith was at first unable to “preach,” overwhelmed by the fact that 
words no longer signify, a few lines after More’s own mini-confession, Smith 
overcomes his inability and recounts his story, his “Confession.” More at 
first is unable to understand what Smith wants to tell him, but after he 
leaves, he makes the right decision (according to the logic of the story), to 
refuse the offer from Comeaux and Van Dorn.
Smith’s “Confession” deals with his time in Nazi Germany and his at-
tachment to a young German soldier, Helmut, and Smith’s (now-shocking) 
longing to join Helmut and participate in what he saw as the SS’s heroic 
cult of death. On this score, it is interesting to note that Smith’s confession 
uses one of the tools Percy suggests novelists writing “in an Apocalyptic 
age” should use—shocking moral dilemmas and violence. Smith tells of 
his early disdain of “what my mother called religion” and of his “father’s 
fecklessness and his everlasting talk about the loftier things in life, Truth, 
Beauty, Freedom, Art, the Soaring of the Spirit in the Realm of Music,” 
which is contrasted with his deep attraction to the sense of duty at the SS 
expressed in Helmut. Quoting Churchill, he states: “There is nothing they 
would not do or dare; no sacrifice of life, limb or liberty they would not 
do for love of country” (242, 249). “This is my confession,” Father Smith 
continues. “If I had been German not American, I would have joined him. 
I would not have joined the distinguished Weimar professors. I would not 
have joined the ruffian Sturmabteilung. I would not have matriculated at 
the University of Tübingen or Heidelberg. I would not have matriculated at 
Tulane, as I did, and joined the D.K.E.s. I would have gone to Junkerschule, 
sworn the solemn oath of the Teutonic knights at Marienberg, and joined 
the Schutzstaffel” (248–49). Following this confession, Smith tells More of 
his arrival as an American soldier at the famous hospital Eglfing-Haar after 
its liberation. He asks the nurse about Dr. Jäger, one of the “more humane” 
members of the group of Weimar intellectuals, who believed that euthana-
sia should be used only to eliminate those who suffered, not those who were 
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useless “to themselves [and] to the state” (246). The nurse tells Smith of 
how Jäger would take disturbed children—children “in bad shape,” Smith 
tells us, “though nothing like what I saw at Dachau”—to a room called 
the “special department” to kill them. Smith concludes his confession and 
footnote: “It was a matter of some interest. Soldiers are interested, not hor-
rified. Only later was I horrified. We’ve got it wrong about horror. It doesn’t 
come naturally but takes some effort” (254).
At the conclusion of Smith’s “Confession,” More remarks, “I’m not sure 
I understand what you’re trying to tell me—about your memory of—about 
Germany” (256). However, it is after hearing this story that More decides 
decisively, as noted above, to refuse Comeaux and Van Dorn. More’s even-
tual decision to do the right thing after his encounter with Father Smith 
is presented as an alternative to the efforts of Comeaux and Van Dorn to 
cure man’s psychological and moral problems by medication. Smith’s story 
has reaffirmed More’s moral bearing. It has done the difficult work of nam-
ing horrible actions horrible and distinguishing between good intentions 
and right actions. At first, More does not recognize Smith’s naming. He 
asks questions in order to process the significance—“What happened to 
Dr. Jäger?” “What happened to the others you met?” “Are you trying to 
tell me that the Nazis were not to blame?” “Are you suggesting that it was 
the psychiatrists who were villains?” “Are you saying that there is a fatal 
flaw peculiar to the Germans, something demonic?” (254–56). Note that 
these questions begin with the basic details of the story itself—common 
questions about characters and plot—but move quickly to moral questions. 
Here we see More’s moral development. He senses that the naming that 
took place in the tale was a moral one, but perhaps because of his own 
moral failings, his lack of practice in naming the moral world, he at first 
struggles to recognize what Smith is saying. While Percy is too clever a 
novelist to provide us with a simplistic “aha” moment, it is clear that More, 
in the end, is able to determine the moral significance of the tale. Smith 
concludes his conversation with More: “In the end one must choose—given 
the chance.” More responds: “Choose what?” The answer: “Life or death. 
What else?” (257). After this, More decides to turn Comeaux and Van Dorn 
in (though, at this point in the novel, it is far from clear whether he will in 
fact be successful).
At the conclusion of the work, we find More reunited with his wife, 
who has recovered her regular oddness. While the world is far from perfect 
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at the conclusion of The Thanatos Syndrome, Percy’s final description of 
the various characters and scenes has a recognizable humanity to it. Ellen 
gives up “tournament bridge” and converts, first to the Episcopal Church 
and then to Pentecostalism. While she seems unhealthily attached to a TV 
evangelist, More states: “She’s happy, so I’ll settle for it” (353). The children 
now attend a Christian school that “teaches that the world is six thousand 
years old and won’t have Huckleberry Finn or the Catcher in the Rye in the 
library” but, More states, “it’s better than Belle Ame, and the kids seem 
happy and healthy” (354). The hospice is reopened, though Father Smith is 
unwell and becomes a patient at the hospice himself, and More begins his 
practice again, choosing it over the low-paying directorship of the hospice. 
These scenes can be contrasted with animal depictions of Mickey and Ellen 
earlier in the novel, or the depictions of wide-eyed abused children at Belle 
Ame. The contrast is the contrast of Percy’s view of humans as composite 
beings and the reductive materialist view of humans as matter alone. The 
former is clearly messier, more complicated, but an accurate depiction of 
who we are, the latter inhumane and horrific. This is not to make a com-
monsense argument, but rather to say that we recognize, empirically, our 
own human nature in the characters represented at the close of the novel as 
we recognize ourselves in a mirror.
Both Smith’s story and Percy’s Thanatos Syndrome have named the 
moral world, and this naming is both a testament to its existence and a call 
to affirm it in our actions. Although Ralph C. Wood criticized the novel in 
the Christian Century after it was first published for lacking any sympa-
thetic characters and being merely “an angry and admonitory novel,” there 
is an element of hope presented in the work.22 Percy holds out the hope that, 
through reading and writing, ethical and moral “triangulation” can still 
happen. People are still able to “do justice,” even at the end of the twentieth 
century, and the truth expressed in language and literature regarding who 
we are and what justice is facilitates this.
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8Love and Marriage 
among the Ruins
Richard M. Reinsch II
Walker Percy intimated in several addresses and essays his belief that the 
South was strangely capable of teaching the United States enduring truths 
of man’s nature and being.1 Separated from the larger country since the 
1830s by political rebellion, racial oppression, and economic torpidity, the 
South of the late twentieth century, Percy argued, was now liberated and 
needed in a new quest to save the Union. As Percy stated:
I come from the Deep South. I mention this only to call your attention to 
a remarkable event that has occurred in the last year or two, which has the 
most far-reaching consequences, and which has gone all but unnoticed. It is 
the fact that for the first time in a hundred and fifty years the South is off the 
hook and once again free to help save the Union. It’s not that the South has 
got rid of its ancient stigma and is out of trouble. It’s rather that the rest of the 
country is now also stigmatized and is in even deeper trouble.2
The maladies of America, Percy observed, went beyond the conventional 
list of various social, political, and economic inequalities, instead consisting 
in the “weariness, boredom, and cynicism” that threatened to rob humane 
democratic life of meaning in the late modern era.3 Of course, these ex-
istential problems constantly plague democratic government precisely 
because democratic authority depends on the human person for legitimacy. 
However, a democratic age bereft of a solid commitment to transcendental 
meaning and a belief in reason’s ability to discern certain truths of man’s 
dignity surely brings these perennial troubles to an acute stage.
Stimulating Percy’s historically unorthodox argument was the phenom-
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enon of economic growth and the shattering of de jure segregation in the 
South. Speaking in 1978 at the University of Georgia, Percy cannily observed: 
“Undoubtedly then, the lower Mississippi between Baton Rouge and New 
Orleans will become, is already becoming, the American equivalent of the 
Ruhr Valley. In the year 2000, Peachtree Street may have replaced Madison 
Avenue. I find these possibilities quite likely but not terribly interesting and 
certainly not decisive as the real issues of the future are concerned. They 
represent economic inevitabilities, more or less what was bound to happen 
once the South with its advantages in climate, resources, and energy got 
past the historic disaster which befell it.”4 Having retained a closer affinity 
relative to states in other regions of the country with smaller government, 
lower taxes, freedom of contract, and general common sense, the South 
received renewed business investment from corporations across the nation 
and also the world. However, the deployment of capital, brains, jobs, and 
the economic progress this represented was not, in Percy’s estimation, the 
ultimate measure of a changing South. Likewise, the end of segregation, 
which helped usher much of the continental business activity into the 
South—the region now safe for democratic capitalism—was not the final 
word on the region’s progress. This, of course, does not slight these very real 
achievements of civil rights and higher standards of living. Percy approved 
of the crushing blow that had been delivered to the cruelty and lawless-
ness of the South by passage of civil rights legislation. The author noted 
that the post–civil rights South, replete with air-conditioners and enforced 
rights for its black citizens, was superior to the political-social order that had 
preceded it. The practical import for Percy was in desegregation’s closing 
of the deep separation between the South and the rest of the nation. Percy 
asserted, “Southern slavery or Southern racial segregation either to defend 
or attack” would no longer preoccupy the region’s leaders or its detractors.5
The merging of the distinct South with the rest of America was by no 
means an unqualified moment of approbation for Percy. In coming to look 
like the rest of America, the South might forget or lose its best qualities while 
assuming the worst of late twentieth-century America. On this score Percy 
struck a pessimistic note: “What else to do in a Sunbelt South increasingly 
informed by a flatulent Christendom and Yankee money-grubbing? For the 
danger is that we are going to end up with the worst of both worlds, the 
worst of Southern Christendom—that is, an inflated media Christendom 
without the old Southern pieties—and the worst of Northern materialism—
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a kind of mindless money-sports Vegas culture without stern secular saints 
like Thoreau, Emerson, Melville, Hawthorne.”6 A rather mindless progress, 
Percy feared, would inform the South. Thus, having achieved its liberation 
from the burdens of race and widespread poverty, the South would forego 
its unique capacities and be unable to speak in its original voice to the larger 
republic. The generational reserves of the region’s caritas (the theological 
virtue of charity) would be marginalized by the seemingly endless possibili-
ties of an encompassing commercialism. Percy’s fiction is no less forgiving, 
conversing as it does with the lost self of the secular democratic age. Percy’s 
writing confronts us with our wondering wander, and how one might live in 
an age that Percy believed was authoritatively inauthentic. Racial tolerance 
and the growth of commerce were all fine things, but man’s formal occupa-
tion was always with the self and its relation with God and others.
In many respects, Percy’s predictions for the South have come true. 
The habits and practices of personal, family, and communal virtues that the 
Old South excelled in have largely receded as organizing elements of behav-
ior. The most popular contributions made by the South might be summed 
up as NASCAR, Southeastern Conference Football, and country music. Its 
great cities are now known almost exclusively for their robust business activ-
ity. Surely the rise of great poets and saints—persons whom Percy believed 
were essential in defining and making a culture—will not likely emerge in 
the business of this situation. For while the Mississippi of the early twentieth 
century may have scored abysmally low on indices of income and general 
welfare, it did produce William Faulkner, Eudora Welty, and Walker Percy. 
Percy teased that literature professors teaching at schools in New England 
and the upper Midwest may have been raised in superior circumstances 
as measured by sociological categories, but their academic careers largely 
consisted of both teaching and writing books about the books that Faulkner 
and Welty wrote. In short, is there even a culture that can still be shaped by 
the poet or saint in the contemporary South?
Implicit in a culture and political order almost exclusively defined 
by making and doing is a lost thickness of soul. The corresponding loss 
to personal relations from this fact is deeply experienced as the self is cut 
off from being and engages in the never-ending quest of self-definition, a 
process that inexorably informs one’s most intimate and sacred bonds. The 
persons within these orders no longer understand their being as grounded 
in the thought and will of God. Hence, their very person is defined or left 
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undefined by their activity and their making, which becomes furious in 
light of their sempiternal quest. Man finds himself in the condition of a 
great freedom, but without corresponding authority and responsibility in 
the guidance and measurement of his choices. He thus comes to deny the 
givenness of his being, defining it exclusively by will and desire. From this 
perspective the question can be phrased as follows: Is the South still ca-
pable of acknowledging man as a being grounded in the creative reason of 
God and thus able to embark on Percy’s quest to save the Union?
Complementing Percy’s reawakened South was and remains its bur-
geoning evangelical Christianity. Returning to Percy’s broader observations 
on the dreariness of life where all material needs are met and yet a crush-
ing boredom remains, one might posit that the South’s evolved, muscular 
Protestantism provides a foreboding challenge to the almost intractable 
problems Percy identified in the thin intellectual commitments of demo-
cratic America. While Percy was somewhat skeptical of effusive evangelical 
religion, he may have overlooked the spiritual provision it makes, in a sense, 
for the unchanging aspects of man’s being. This point seems vindicated by 
evangelicalism’s sustained growth in a philosophically materialistic culture. 
Moreover, evangelical Protestantism has maintained in certain respects the 
enduring religiosity of the South and, with it, a compelling theological nar-
rative of marriage and family life.
The quixotic quest that Percy defined for the South will emerge, if it does, 
from its philosophical and spiritual contact with being, of what is authentic 
about man. Produced by the philosophical and anthropological failures that 
Percy believed were inherent in Cartesian reductionism, or in the wholesale 
subscriptions to Darwin, Marx, Freud, and other latter-day theorists, are 
the larger failures in the human relationships of marriage and family. The 
distinctive capacity of the person to intimately love the other for the other’s 
own good is displaced, if not eliminated, by theorists who narrow man to a 
this-worldly preoccupation while simultaneously denying his unique aspects.
One injured element, broached by Percy in his novels The Second 
Coming and Love in the Ruins, is the shared love of the domestic family, 
which becomes misconceived and misshaped in an age no longer conversant 
with the sacramental significance of man. Percy’s discerning observations in 
these novels afford a unique purchase on the institution’s diminishment in 
the midst of a humanistic age. The failure of this basic and complex love is 
one of the most deeply and painfully felt consequences achieved by the in-
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trapersonal splits that have resulted from the age of theorist-consumerism. 
From man’s failures to move beyond ideology and theory emerge his in-
ability to even understand love’s connection with his existence. Defining 
reality from the inside out, as an attempt to endlessly accommodate the self, 
he is unable to make the self-gift of his love to the other. He is hobbled by 
and remains within his own chosen theory.
Love in the Ruins
Percy’s thoughts on the contorted reality of marriage in the present age 
emerge from the troubled character of Dr. Thomas More in the apocalyptic 
tale Love in the Ruins. Much is decaying in the grand United States of 
America; as Tom wonders at the outset, “Is it that God has at last removed 
his blessing from the U.S.A. and what we feel now is just the clank of the 
old historical machinery, the sudden jerking ahead of the roller coaster cars 
as the chain catches hold and carries us back into history with its ordinary 
catastrophes, carries us out and up toward the brink from the felicitous and 
privileged siding . . . that now the blessing or the luck is over, the machinery 
clanks, the chain catches hold, and the cars jerk forward?”7 Elsewhere, the 
reader learns that wolves freely roam the streets of Cleveland. Tom’s town 
and neighborhood face the return of barbarian Bantus and their incipient 
cousins: American hippies. Decay, Percy notes in the novel, is very much 
with Tom More and the denizens of the fading American age.
The failed marriage of Tom More and his wife, Doris, hints at the insti-
tution’s thoroughgoing dissolution at the hands of the “theorist-consumer” 
complex. The marriage’s ultimate end is heightened by the illness and death 
of the couple’s daughter Samantha. Tom More, however, intimately under-
stands that this particular tragedy was not the real doom of his marriage. It 
was rather in Tom and Doris’s refusal to forgive one another and the type of 
consolation each sought in the aftermath of Samantha’s death.
Doris, More informs us, sought a Gnostic cure: “Books matter. My 
poor wife, Doris, was ruined by books, by books and a heathen English-
man, not by dirty books but by clean books, not by depraved books but 
by spiritual books. . . . My wife, who began life as a cheerful Episcopalian 
from Virginia, became a priestess of the high places. But books ruined her. 
Beware of Episcopal women who take up with Ayn Rand and the Buddha 
and Dr. Rhine formerly of Duke University.” Percy’s notion of the theorist-
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consumer is concretely revealed here in Doris’s “Gnostic pride” and her 
“yearning for esoteric doctrines.” Doris seeks after spiritual theory to end 
her mounting gloom. Rejecting her native Episcopal faith long before her 
daughter’s death, Doris sought liberation in Eastern spirituality, warmly 
baked by self-actualization psychology. Doris’s Gnostic pride emerges from 
her acquisition of a peculiar knowledge that soothes her inbuilt anxiety and 
alienation, most keenly experienced in the wake of Samantha’s death. As 
Doris exclaims, “I must go somewhere and recover myself. To the lake isle 
of Innisfree.”8 The answers for Doris to the realities of man’s frailties, pain-
fully revealed by her child’s death and the alcoholic and somewhat cretinous 
response of her husband, Tom, are found in an excarnated spirituality and 
an accompanying belief in man’s essential goodness. For what Doris truly 
seeks is to be freed from the failures of man—the soul-body composite—
and to seek instead man as the angelic being succoring on the spiritual hosts 
provided by the latest Western “rotation” of Eastern religion.
Tom More takes a lower road that puts him in the dyadic response of 
creature to external stimuli. More lucidly observes: “What happened was 
that Samantha died and I started drinking and stayed drunk for a year—and 
not even for sorrow’s sake. Samantha’s death was as good an excuse as any to 
drink. I could have been just as sorry without drinking. What happened was 
that Doris and I chose not to forgive each other. It was as casual a decision as 
my drinking.”9 More submerges himself into the meaninglessness of sensual 
experience and a rather primitive interacting with his wife. Thus More’s 
lower road forgoes the unique givenness of the human person’s creative and 
purposeful interacting with his welt. In addition to More failing his wife, his 
dyadic responses obscure and diminish his vast scientific capabilities, which 
he recovers in the novel during periods of a more middling peace. From 
More’s subsequent clarity emerges the following observation, “She [Doris] 
took the high road and I took the low. She said I was like a Polack miner 
coming up out of the earth every night with no thought but to fill his belly 
and hump his wife.” Inverse to Doris, Tom has sought to lose himself in 
the apparent vitality of fleshly experience. As Doris explains to More, “You 
know the trouble with you, Tom? You don’t understand a purely spiritual 
relationship.”10 True, Tom senses, but as Percy explicates in the novel, no 
one is capable of such an understanding.
Percy’s analysis of the failed marriage in Love in the Ruins critiques 
the theorist-consumer age for its inability to make provision for married 
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love. Percy’s conception of the theorist-consumer evokes the fundamental 
corruptions that have emerged and accumulated on the backside of the 
Continental Enlightenment’s projection of geometric certainty in human 
reasoning. Man has furiously sought to perfect his abode on earth through 
an imperial reason and will. The theorist-consumer, in Percy’s designa-
tion, rebukes a receptive posture toward the world and to the knowledge 
of his own nature. Rather than seeing himself engaged in more moderate 
habits of being, which include reflection, a qualified reasoning, attempts 
at virtue, and appeals to divinity arising from preternatural anxiety, man 
now becomes the giant suck of self. In this posture man demands transfor-
mation, if not completion, by the seemingly limitless programs of modern 
ideological existence. Reality must be defined by a program that compresses 
it into a tightly honed package of propositions willed by the theorist. The 
consumptive element is best seen in man’s frenetic devouring of ideology. 
In contorted fashion these willed propositions feed the undeniable and 
indefinable spiritual part of man.
The effectual truth of Percy’s theorist-consumer is his profound loss 
of self-sovereignty, which is willingly handed over to the claimed theorists 
and experts of the day. Man’s former consciousness of his being as gift and 
mystery, a sign pointing toward transcendent reality, is radically denied 
and transformed by this loss. Percy also explained the age of theorist- 
consumerism as an outcropping of the scientific worldview applied to phe-
nomena beyond its competency:
But we miss the point if we say that the Western world and the life of West-
ern man has simply been transformed by scientific technology. This is true 
enough, but what has also happened is that the consciousness of Western man, 
the layman in particular, has been transformed by a curious misapprehen-
sion of the scientific method. One is tempted to use the term “idolatry.” This 
misapprehension, which is not the fault of science, but rather the inevitable 
consequence of the victory of the scientific worldview accompanied as it is 
by all the dazzling credentials of scientific progress. It, the misapprehension, 
takes the form, I believe, of a radical and paradoxical loss of sovereignty by 
the layman and of a radical impoverishment of human relations—paradoxical, 
I say, because it occurs in the very face of his technological mastery of the 
world and his richness as a consumer of the world’s goods.11
Percy here lays bare his high criticism of “scientism” and its forgetfulness of 
the Aristotelian understanding that one cannot expect more from a method 
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of knowledge than it can bear. The hubris described by Percy results from 
a belief that true knowing implies empirical certainty in diagnosis and re-
mediation of all the complicating elements of man’s experiences. Moreover, 
the application of physical laws and properties to man’s ailments is viewed 
as the only method for gaining leverage on his peculiar mental disabilities 
and shocking behavioral propensities. Seeking to displace the insights and 
deep-seated wisdom of premodern philosophical knowing and religiously 
grounded anthropology and ethics, scientism seeks to become the “all-
encompassing world view.”12
Problems with this methodological imperialism emerge immediately at 
the level of personal experience. Not filled by theory and ideology, whether 
it be Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, Sigmund Freud, or any other claimant, 
is the self, which remains the odd leftover. The leftover self is for Percy the 
sign of ideology’s radical insufficiency as applied to homo viator. “Darwin, 
Newton, and Freud were theorists. They pursued truth more or less suc-
cessfully by theory—from which, however, they themselves were exempt. 
You will look in vain in Darwin’s Origin of the Species for an explanation of 
Darwin’s behavior in writing Origin of the Species.”13 The culmination of 
Percy’s observation on human life surrendered to universal theory was the 
striking loss of personal integrity and freedom. On this point Percy argued, 
“What I do suggest is that a radical loss of sovereignty has occurred when 
a person comes to believe that his very self is also the appropriate domain 
of ‘them’; that is, the appropriate experts of the self.”14 Man is fully excar-
nated in Percy’s indictment; the ghostly self floats above the body and mind, 
awaiting its healing or transformation by the other, the expert. Unable to 
comprehend himself in his entirety, the person is interminably split. The 
result is a loss of freedom owing to the resignation of one’s sovereignty.
If the scientistic therapeutic approach to being—or, for that matter, 
any psychological or political theory—can never encompass the entire self, 
then, Percy states, sadness and distress will surely accompany the self who 
adheres to it.15 The leftover self nags the theoretical self by rubbing it with 
its implacable eccentricities and anxieties. Those who have consumed the 
ideological realm, or who have sought to placate the self in all manner of 
goods and services, realize their central problem of contemplating and plac-
ing the self has not been solved. Messages from the leftover self hint at the 
paradoxical condition that an age specifically designed by human will to 
please and comfort the self is in fact the source of the self’s most disori-
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enting and alienating experiences. As Percy noted, “Accordingly, the self 
finds itself ever more conspicuously without a place in the modern world, 
which is perfectly understood by theorizing.”16 The sadness and anxiety of 
the theorist-consumer age is for Percy an important sign. Signified by the 
agonized displacement of the theorist-consumer is man’s unique existence, 
which is also the source of his profound wonder. From such sadness, man 
regains his desire to inhabit the self and renew his quest for more enduring 
signs and clues to understand his tragic being and “where it belongs.”
This disorientation of the self that Percy diagnoses in these “dread 
latter days of the old violent beloved U.S.A. and of the Christ-forgetting 
Christ-haunted death-dealing Western world” portends even more dra-
matic consequences for marriage. The false surrender of the self results 
“in a radical impoverishment of human relations,” because the gift of the 
self to another becomes enfeebled.17 Paradoxically, the particulars of hu-
man experience—marriage, family, work, and community—become the 
abstract features of life. An existence lived without the possibility of a free-
dom led by higher loves morphs into a whirling vortex of perfection seeking 
among the airy heights. The common aspects of shared love, daily work, 
and child rearing come to be redefined in light of a universal, unending, 
and ultimately defeated quest for temporal meaning. How, then, can one 
understand a sustaining eros in an age where all experience must translate 
into the comfort and affirmation of the self?
The terrible irruption is that the goods of marriage, prized as love, 
fidelity, companionship, reproduction, even concupiscence, move beyond 
the grasp of husband and wife. Though highly prized by virtually everyone, 
these elements escape man’s comprehension if married love is conceived 
as a part of the theoretical fulfillment of the self. Marriage itself becomes 
increasingly extraneous and displaced in an age that seems unable to 
summon the honor and courage, much less love, to achieve the union of 
the complementary man and woman. Is the age of ideology and now post-
ideology, which is better described as boredom, able to even contemplate 
the sacramental love concealed within this most difficult and most neces-
sary of institutions?
Treated by Percy in the experiences of Tom More, and of Will Barrett 
in an earlier novel, The Second Coming, is a sacramental grounding for 
marriage exemplified in the multilayered communicability of persons. Curi-
ously, Tom senses this directly in his joy that spontaneously erupts from the 
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reception of properly ordered loves. In short, his marriage with Doris once 
worked because of his transcendent loves. A reception of an ultimate love 
makes possible his particular love for Doris. Tom states:
The best of times were after mass on summer evenings when Samantha and 
I would walk home in the violet dusk, we having received Communion and I 
rejoicing afterwards, caring nought for my fellow Catholics but only for myself 
and Samantha and Christ swallowed, remembering what he promised me for 
eating him, that I would have life in me, and I did, feeling so good that I’d 
sing and cut the fool all the way home like King David before the Ark. Once 
home, light up the charcoal briquets out under the TV transmitter, which 
lofted its red light next to Venus like a ruby and a diamond in the plum velvet 
sky. Snug down Samantha with the Wonderful World of Color in the den (the 
picture better than life, having traveled only one hundred feet straight down), 
back to the briquets, take four, five, six long pulls from the quart of Early 
Times, shout with joy for the beauty of the world, sing “Finch ’han dal vino” 
from Don Giovanni and “Holy God We Praise Thy Name,” conceive a great 
heart-leaping desire for Doris, whose lip would curl at my proposal but who 
was nonetheless willing, who in fact now that she thought of it was as lusty as 
could be, her old self once again, a lusty Shenandoah Valley girl, Apple Queen 
of the Apple Blossom Festival in Winchester.18
Prominently featured in Tom’s observation is the Catholic understanding of 
the Eucharist and the grace it both signifies and offers to the communicant. 
The gratuity of the teaching and its practice, which for Tom and Samantha 
was in a neighborhood church adjacent to their affluent neighborhood, 
marked the joy that accompanied it. The delight Tom finds in preparing 
dinner, singing hymns, drinking bourbon, and reveling in the love of his 
wife is enabled by the total gift of sacramental religious practice. In recog-
nizing the pure gift of being and, even more, God’s rapturous concern with 
man, Tom is left foolish. Tom’s delight points toward his reception of being, 
of locating it through and under God and also in Doris’s being, their love 
peculiarly opened to both of them through the hybridized transcendence of 
the Catholic Eucharist.
The grounding of Tom’s being in the reception of the Eucharist re-
turns the discussion to Percy’s diagnosis of the self’s interior disloyalty in 
the theorist-consumer age. Tom’s joy points directly to a transcendent God 
intimately acquainted with his personal destiny. Thus he is liberated from 
the false transcendence of the scientistic approach to being and its unneces-
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sary reduction of the human person to a quantifiable monad unable to place 
his loves, anxieties, hatreds, and eternal longings. Tom’s fullest appreciation 
emerges in one of his final recollections of his former marriage. Here, Tom 
relates a sacramentality of common life existing, paradoxically, in the at-
tempts of geographical escape he and Doris periodically attempted:
Sunday mornings I’d leave her and go to mass. Now here was the strangest 
exercise of all! Leaving the coordinate of the motel at the intersection of the 
interstates, leaving the motel with standard doors and carpets and plumb-
ing, leaving the interstates extending infinitely in all directions, abscissa and 
ordinate, descending through a moonscape countryside to a—town! Where 
people had been living all these years, and to some forlorn little Catholic 
church up a side street just in time for the ten-thirty mass, stepping up on 
the porch as if I had been doing it every year for some twenty years, and here 
comes the stove-up bemused priest with his cup (what am I doing out here? 
says his dazed expression) upon whose head hands had been laid and upon 
this other head other hands and so on, for here off I-51 I touched the thread 
in the labyrinth, and the priest announced the turkey raffle and Wednesday 
bingo and preached the Gospel and fed me Christ—Back to the motel then, 
exhilarated by—what? By eating Christ or by the secret discovery of the 
singular thread in this the unlikeliest of places, this geometry of Holiday Inns 
and interstates? Back to lie with Doris all rosy-fleshed and creased of cheek 
and slack and heavy limbed with sleep, cracking one eye and opening her 
arms and smiling. “My God, what is it you do in church?”
What she didn’t understand, she being spiritual and seeing religion as 
spirit, was that it took religion to save me from the spirit world, from orbiting 
the earth like Lucifer and the angels, that it took nothing less than touch-
ing the thread off the misty interstates and eating Christ himself to make 
me mortal man again and let me inhabit my own flesh and love her in the 
morning.19
The recovery of his self in Mass makes life possible for Tom in its most 
fundamental form. Percy’s reference to “orbiting the earth like Lucifer and 
the angels” touches upon the split persona inherent to the scientistic turn in 
human understanding. The scientist necessarily abstracts from his compos-
ite being in performing his exacting work of observation and measurement. 
He transcends, as it were, the particular existence in order to push further 
in his scientific work. Freed from the limitations of concrete existence, the 
scientist understands and makes known his conclusions while existing as 
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an ersatz spirit. The problem for the modern scientist and for the general 
modern is not the process of abstraction that necessarily accompanies the 
knowing scientist, but the worldview that seeks to make this process a uni-
versal condition. The self, however, remains leftover and hovering, seeking 
its means of reentry with the physical matter of existence. The scientistic 
worldview is unable to understand this necessary movement, its purpose, 
and its signs. Thus, it fails to comprehend alienation and the available 
remedies. In embracing scientism’s stunted depiction of the person, the 
ordinary man is doomed to replicate its errors and sadness.
Tom’s reception of the Eucharist and his ensuing joy in the common 
goods of life transcend the reductionism of the scientistic view. These 
extraordinary and common graces locate the self within time, in a place 
situated with other selves who now are comprehensible, even lovable. Thus 
the sheer commonality and limitations of everyday living stand revealed in 
their hopeful beauty and truth to the communicant Tom. To believe is to 
grasp in acute form the full measure of reality and man’s place within it. 
Self-consciousness ceases being an unending burden of anxiety and fear 
and instead becomes the medium of delight in the ordinary run of a man’s 
life. In stark contrast to this ameliorating reality, Tom becomes unable to 
place himself in the aftermath of Samantha’s death. Deserting his religious 
practice, Tom fades into a lesser existence. Untethered from his religion 
and ignoring his scientific acumen, Tom loses direction, groping forward as 
something of a drunk and a less than able physician.
The Second Coming
In The Second Coming Percy provides yet another avenue into the difficul-
ties of married love that arise from existential disorder. Will Barrett, a lonely, 
rich widower who barely stays this side of suicide, ventures into a cave to 
pursue his own Pascalian wager. Barrett will leave the cave only upon proof 
of God’s existence and, failing this, he will stay in Sourwood Mountain until 
his death, the waiting eased by sleeping medication. Barrett, of course, is 
not really in search of God as the meaning and guarantor of his existence. 
Rather, he searches for God as one seeking Gnostic certainty. Barrett’s 
experiment is to move beyond faith and possess the knowledge of God that 
will relieve his personal torment and the crippling memories of childhood, 
his father, his confused marriage to his now-deceased wife, and his failed 
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relationship with his daughter. In so doing, Barrett seeks to transcend the 
theological triad of faith, hope, and love and move toward certainty.
Barrett’s waiting God out ends not from any direct revelation or lack 
thereof but from an abscessed tooth, which drives him from the cave, 
vomiting in pain. In the very attempt to move beyond the limitations of 
his creatureliness and gain surety, Barrett is incapacitated by his physical 
weaknesses. The departure from the cave, however, brings Barrett falling, 
literally, into the arms of another searcher, Allison Huger, the daughter of 
his decades-old former love interest, Kitty Vaught. Barrett does not ascend 
from the cave like Dante’s pilgrim. Instead, he gets lost and falls into Allie’s 
greenhouse.
Allie is somewhat lost, an escapee of a sanatorium; her primordial aim 
is to reconnect with reality through language.20 Her attempts are fitful and 
incomplete in effectuating this object. Allie, however, does not despair. From 
the solitude of her greenhouse, which is protected and maintained by the 
natural rhythms of Sourwood Mountain, Allie stumbles upon her stratagem 
of being and arrives at her own sacrament of the ordinary: “All this time she 
had made a mistake. She had thought (and her mother had expected) that 
she must do something extraordinary, be somebody extraordinary. Whereas 
the trick lay in leading the most ordinary life imaginable, get an ordinary 
job, in itself a joy in its very ordinariness, and then be as extraordinary or 
ordinary as one pleased. That was the secret.”21 If, in Percy’s rendering, 
the disease of late modernity is a crushing existential disloyalty—man’s 
refusal to face his immutable nature and the obligations and ends it gives to 
man—then Allie, who has spent years in a mental facility, is the wayfaring 
pilgrim, desperately seeking the prospect of an existence where words and 
lives touch indispensable meaning.
After his descent into Allie’s cave-side home, Barrett’s recovery of his 
self-understanding and identity proceeds apace. A man unable to endure 
himself, caught between the abyss of suicide or the sterilized existence 
achieved by a psychotropic drug regimen, he begins his recovery in Allie’s 
care. Both are searchers. Allie’s quest is to grasp reality through language, 
which she does, at best, incompletely. Barrett desires to finally cut through 
his memories, his fugues, fits of falling, and deep periods of depression and 
thus answer the question of his own being. Strangely, their meeting one 
another provides the logos of meaning both require. Allie and Barrett have 
emerged from their own separate Platonic caves where therapeutic shadows 
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flickered on the walls attempting to erase the real pains of personal confu-
sion and depression. They now see themselves clearly. To be self-knowing 
for the first time in a long time is the authentic liberation.
In her newfound freedom Allie notices a nagging inconsolability that 
sets upon her in late afternoons. The ravening particles that surround her 
appear to take ferocious delight in terrorizing her loneliness. “Time became 
separated into good times and bad times. The nights and mornings were 
good times. Then along comes late afternoon—four o’clock? Five o’clock? 
She didn’t know because she had no clock and lived by forest time—but a 
time which she thought of as yellow spent time because if time is to be filled 
or spent by working, sleeping, eating, what do you do when you finish and 
there is time left over?”22 Revealed to Allie is the irreplaceable need for the 
other. Precisely who this person is or what she is to do for him remains un-
clear. Cataloguing prior romantic relationships leaves her even more remote 
from the prospects of a complete and final giving of her self. Love is an 
experience somewhat foreign to Allie, not just because of rather meaning-
less attempts with other men, but owing most prominently to the detraction 
dealt to Allie by the decisions of her parents. Allie gathers that her mother, 
Kitty, had preferred ensconcing her in a distant sanatorium rather than 
personally squaring with Allie’s difficulties. The abstracted manner of her 
mother’s care resulted from the daughter’s failure to be happy, adjusted, 
and pleased with self amid the other pleased selves. This had rendered Allie 
incomprehensible to her mother.
Will Barrett, or the stranger, as Allie understands him in their initial 
days together, has an immense need of her. Her first interaction is to “hoist” 
him from the ground after he tumbles into her home. Barrett is one who 
frequently falls, physically and existentially. Allie intuits that her irreplace-
able contribution to Barrett is the careful and loving hoisting of his person 
from the earth. In short, she is the Archimedean lift and life that collects 
Barrett and enables him to live without the constant terrors that have en-
feebled him. Allie proclaims to a local townsman, “I can do two things. . . . 
Sing and hoist. . . . With block-and-tackle, differential gears, endless-chain 
gears, double and triple blocks, I can hoist anything if I have a fixed point 
and time to figure.”23 Allie’s slow repairing of things around her is finally 
sensed by Barrett after another fall and Allie’s puzzlement, “Why didn’t you 
get up? . . . I mean either I am not understanding something or something is 
not understandable.” Barrett replies, “I blacked out . . . I tend to fall down.” 
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Allie responds, “I am a good hoister. When you fall down, I’ll pick you up.”24 
If Barrett is drenched in too much reality, then Allie is too far from it. Her 
insufficient memory and general forgetfulness are compensated by Barrett’s 
obsessiveness. Thus does their love find its function and its completion in 
their own natural and passing strange complementarities.
Percy’s depiction of Barrett and Allie ends with Barrett divesting him-
self of his deceased wife’s fortune, emerging from retirement and practicing 
law, and intending to raise his children from his marriage to Allie amid the 
community rather than in his robust mountain estate or in an alienating 
high-rise condominium in Manhattan where his elder daughter was raised. 
The sacrament of the ordinary, of delight in labor, home, and in his wife 
and children, marks a new promise for Barrett at novel’s end. Dispensed 
from isolation and therapeutic control, Allie also appears committed to a 
shared life lived on the renewed terms of a properly ordered and placed 
self. Percy set a similar theme in the ending to Love in the Ruins with 
Tom’s marriage to Ellen Oglethorpe, his dutiful clinic nurse and friend. 
Here, too, we are witness to marriage, the arrival of children, and life lived 
in more humble and thoughtful circumstances. Both settings witness the 
return of religious faith, if incompletely, to Barrett and Tom. Tom returns 
to sacramental practice and even takes to public penance at the end of the 
novel in reparation for former sins, the practice having been reintroduced 
by the novel’s fictional pope, John XXIV.
Percy hints that the absence of great wealth, mansions, and servants 
has liberated the characters, bringing them to an ease with their very selves 
that was obscured in former times. Tom reflects, “Here’s one difference be-
tween this age and the last. Now while you work, you also watch and listen 
and wait. In the last age we planned projects and cast ahead of ourselves. 
We set out to ‘reach goals.’ We listened to the minutes of the previous meet-
ing. Between times we took vacations.”25 To be sure, Percy is not proposing 
an anti-progress theme. The clarity experienced by More and Barrett does 
not result solely from material humility. The heights that they reached were 
possible because of a confrontation both men made with death and God. 
The searching of More and Barrett has led to attempted suicides, to an 
awareness of their death-in-life, and has also produced thick answers to the 
questions of why and how one should live. The leftover self, and its gaping 
difficulties with peaceful existence, has been the ultimate sign for each 
man, pointing to a reality that transcends the human will. The irrepressible 
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fact of eros, present even in the middle age of men who live in profound 
woe and self-displacement, is another sign of man’s incompleteness. Thus, 
the taking of more humble work, of marrying and having children, of living 
in modesty, enjoying early mornings on the bayou, reflectively understood 
through religion, are the mundane and profound clues left the reader of 
these two novels.
The Long Recovery
Percy may not be entirely at sea in his pronouncement on the larger ex-
istential crises moving in contemporary American life. Thinking through 
Percy’s presentation of the acute difficulties of marriage in the theorist-
consumer age leads one back to his initial prescription of a southern remedy 
for a late modern disease that vigorously burns in America. For what could 
be more fundamental to the flourishing of American civilization and its 
many achievements than the recovery of the self and, in turn, the domestic 
family? Moreover, his engagement of these issues through the personal 
maladies and marital disconnects of Tom More and Will Barrett connects 
with his broader observations on the redemptive capacity of the South for 
the rest of the nation.
The larger connection between the health of civilization and its fami-
lies is too seldom noted. The issue, however, is now joined by powerful, if 
not unpleasant, realities that press on America from several sides because 
of its familial failures. Percy’s underscoring of the severe loss to personal 
relations from the displaced self now issues into an acute traumatic stage.
Writing in the middle of the last century, sociologist Carl Zimmerman 
warned that the onset of the atomistic family which, he noted, emerged 
fully in the nineteenth century, would slowly drain the energy and resourc-
es of the West. Zimmerman’s thesis hinges on past historical episodes of 
atomistic familism, that is, marriage understood through shifting contracts 
and interests, which he locates chiefly in the decline of the Greek city-state 
period and the last two centuries of the Roman Empire.26 Zimmerman’s 
understanding of atomistic familism connects, in a sense, with the misun-
derstanding self of Percy’s writing. The alienation and displacement of the 
person in the theorist-consumer age leads directly to the tenuous condition 
of marriage.
Of interest are Zimmerman’s observations on the revival of these 
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declining family fortunes in prior ages. The revival that occurred in the 
aftermath of Roman decline was the commitment of the rising church and 
its most prominent theologians to fides (loyalty), proles (children), and sac-
ramentum (indissolvable unity of man and wife).27 In later reflection on this 
trinity of familial virtues, James Kurth observed, “This meant faith in one’s 
God, faithfulness in one’s marriage, and faith in the future of one’s next 
generations. In other words, at that most fundamental of bases of family 
and civilization was that most intangible of human motives—faith.”28 This 
movement of the spirit transcended the terribly short horizons that had 
shrouded moral action in the decayed and now collapsed Roman Empire. 
Eyes lifted to God, men found new meaning in the Christian language of 
an eternal destiny. Zimmerman documented the rise of the “trustee family” 
out of the ashes of Rome, which then slowly evolved into the full flowering 
of the domestic family in the Middle Ages.
If religious faith and the power of its upward pull on the soul of a civi-
lization is able to overcome the more limited and compromised moralities 
of the current order, then the South may be, as Percy sensed, able “to help 
save the Union.” Outside the old Confederacy the only state with similar, if 
not higher, religious observance is Utah, a state whose family demographics 
resemble those of the American 1950s. In the region’s receptivity to a reli-
gion committed to the unchanging nature and requirements of the person 
emerges its capacity to revivify the domestic family.
From the basic failure of marriage emerges the activist and tutelary 
state that is necessary to manage the unintegrated neediness of persons 
bereft of familial formation and care. More pressing is the basic inability, in 
light of familial failure, to even have civil society. Ultimately, the institutions 
of civil society are built by and minister to the needs of young and grow-
ing families. These intermediate institutions slowly lose their way as the 
contexts of self-government dissipate underneath the weight of the greater 
dissipation of the family.
The religion of the South, largely evangelical, although with pockets 
of revivalist Catholicism, is still able to speak restorative truths to the rest 
of the nation. The prescription of an evangelical South with significant 
elements of its population still widely actuated by the claims of the New 
Testament is hard to deny. From the prosperous suburbs of its “Ruhr 
Valley(s)” in Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, and now Charlotte, among other 
cities, to its still more static areas, there hover the spirits of a biblical Chris-
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tianity that are in great tension with the disloyalty to the human person 
that Percy identified. The central task that Percy anticipates is the need 
to mount beyond the platitudes of modern rights and face the problem of 
the intrinsic disorder of the modern self and its career of ruin imposed on 
personal relations.
Loyalty to man as the measured being finds hope not in the second 
reality of endless emancipations but in the contemplation of a completeness 
so thorough that man is driven by his self-consciousness to mount upward. 
This is not to deny the inroads made by cheaper and distorted understand-
ings of human love, worth, and self-giving that are surely present in the 
South as in any other part of the country. However, the vessel of authentic 
understanding remains and can still carry, if properly formed, the profound 
understanding of marriage offered by St. Paul and St. Augustine in the 
early Church. It is an understanding of human love that has proved to have 
remarkable staying power and a hold on nobler spirits even in distressing 
times. Perhaps the love that the finite and limited person senses between 
him and the eternal God proves ultimately too significant for the immediate 
interests of time-conditioned ideologies and pleasures. Thus does man seek 
to instantiate this love through his marriage and realize its fruits before 
his own eyes. The exercise of this twofold love between man and God and 
husband and wife is now the South’s unique task to communicate to the rest 
of the nation.
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9Walker Percy’s Last Men
Love in the Ruins as a Fable of American Decline
Brian A. Smith
Walker Percy set out to write novels that examined both obvious and latent 
maladies in our public life. Laden with allusions to philosophy and address-
ing the gamut of modernity’s political and social quandaries, Percy’s novels 
present images of our existence as wayfarers in a profoundly disturbed world. 
They also stand as near-apocalyptic warnings of where we as a people might 
soon go. In an essay on the role of the storyteller in modernity, he observed 
that a
serious novel about the destruction of the United States and the end of the 
world should perform the function of prophecy in reverse. The novelist writes 
about the coming end in order to warn about present ills and so avert the end. 
Not being called by God to be a prophet, he nevertheless pretends to a certain 
prescience. . . . The novelist is less like a prophet than he is like the canary 
that coal miners used to take down into the shaft to test the air. When the 
canary gets unhappy, utters plaintive cries, and collapses, it may be time for 
the miners to surface and think things over.1
This mandate transforms the novelist into something like a physician, look-
ing to diagnose our society’s moral, political, and spiritual diseases before 
they consume us. Following his own description of this role, rather than 
simply foretelling the future, Percy hopes to jar us out of our complacency 
so that his “prophecy in reverse” will not come to pass.2
Given the way Percy’s writings looked ahead to what are now contem-
porary cultural trends, the amount of critical commentary on the political 
and social aspects of his work remains relatively small.3 In Love in the Ruins, 
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he paints a particularly stark picture of a near-future America’s descent into 
apparent chaos and ruin. In this effort, he provides us with an alternative 
to the commonly cited liberal End of History, and suggests a very differ-
ent image of the “last man” to complement it, a vision that emphasizes our 
forgetfulness regarding the Fall.4
This essay explores the politics and psychology of Love in the Ruins 
and argues that Percy’s value to political philosophers lies in the way he 
traces out modernity’s warping effects upon our already fallen nature, and 
the consequences this has on our ability to resist self-destructive beliefs and 
actions in times of crisis. Where human community and sincere religious 
belief once restrained the extremes of human action, Percy develops a 
striking account of the way people unmoored from the old order lose their 
way and, perhaps more important, cannot develop a self-understanding that 
might lead them into a coherent, healthy life. Because we oscillate between 
the angelic and the bestial, our peril stems not so much from Nietzschean 
quiescence but from our alternating extremes of thought and behavior.5
Love in the Ruins presents the reader with a few days in the life of Dr. 
Tom More, an alcoholic psychiatrist living in Louisiana and “a bad Catholic 
at a time near the end of the world” (title page). More works and lives in 
Feliciana parish, a little corner of America torn by political, racial, intellec-
tual, and theological passions. The parish is dominated by the federal medical 
research facility where More serves and once had himself committed as a 
mental patient. More’s claim to the fame he desires rests with his invention of 
a device he dubs the Ontological Lapsometer, a sort of stethoscope capable 
of diagnosing and later treating the myriad diseases found in the human 
soul. Although the lapsometer is the means by which More hopes to make 
men whole again, its use is fraught with peril. While capable of temporarily 
manipulating the brain’s chemistry to seemingly “heal” the human condition, 
the device threatens More’s community and the wider world with disaster.
Exaggerated as they are, Percy hoped his characters would jar us into 
a renewed recognition of the dangers we face. While at times he endorses 
elements of Nietzsche’s assessment of how emotionally stilted, uninspiring, 
and risk-averse souls could grow to dominate our world, this forms only one 
part of Percy’s multifaceted diagnosis. Instead of a Nietzschean depiction 
of bourgeois mass men merely growing flat souled and increasingly alike, 
in Love in the Ruins Percy provides a rich exploration of the last men who 
inhabit a profoundly fractured American future.
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Early in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes a sort of spiri-
tual death among the world’s content bourgeois. Contrasting them to his 
human ideal in the “overman,” Nietzsche saw their failure to maintain great 
longings, inability to live with randomness and contingency, and love of 
comfort as portents of a world where men would slowly abolish danger and 
passion. Instead of political life, Nietzsche’s last man chooses that of quiet 
private existence where every man insensibly becomes more alike: “No 
shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: 
whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.” These last men 
claim to have invented happiness, he observes, “and they blink” when told 
of the things they miss in their pursuit of egalitarian pleasure.6 I argue that 
Percy’s account of these last men carries far more nuance and complication, 
not least because of the way he explores the extremes of even the ordinary 
human condition.
Dr. More’s America
At the outset of Love in the Ruins, Percy envisions a bleak future for the 
United States. He suggests that if a single, unified American ideal ever existed, 
that bond dissolved some time ago. A variety of competing visions emerged 
out of the old, fractured center of civic life and as a result, “our beloved old 
U.S.A. is in a bad way.” Neighbors turn upon one another, “race against race, 
right against left, believer against heathen” (17).7 Percy blends his characters’ 
beliefs and allegiances together in intriguing ways, for with these Americans 
politics and theology—or its replacement in a secular scientism or human-
ism—become hopelessly intertwined. Throughout the novel, More asserts in 
Pauline fashion that “principalities and powers are everywhere victorious”; 
Percy uses him to show a variety of ways that our theoretical misunderstand-
ings undergird malevolent political tendencies (5).8
In More’s America, both major political parties have changed their 
names, adopting epithets devised by their opponents. On the right, the 
Republicans acquire the label “Knothead” and print banners proclaiming, 
“No Man Can Be Too Knotheaded in the Service of His Country.” They 
totally unite religion and politics and cannot see the distortions their faith 
causes in society, and as a result, mindless defenses of patriotism and prop-
erty reign among them (17–18). Continuing the long American tradition 
of allowing their enemies to name them, the Democratic Party adopts “a 
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derisive acronym that the Right made up and the Left accepted,” which 
Percy tells us stood for “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, The Pill, Atheism, 
Pot, Anti-Pollution, Sex, Abortion Now, Euthanasia” and was shortened to 
“Leftpapa,” and then simply to “the Left” (18). The Lefts celebrate remov-
ing “In God We Trust” from currency (19) and, having removed the “meta-
physical baggage” surrounding life, they reduce the debate over euthanasia 
to one “curious squabble”: “Should a man have the right merely to self-
stimulation, pressing the button that delivers bliss precisely until the blissful 
thumb relaxes and lets go the button? Or does he not also have the right 
to throw a switch that stays on, inducing a permanent joy—no meals, no 
sleep, and a happy death in a week or so? The button vs. the switch” (122). 
Sparing neither party, Percy maximizes the story’s effect by exaggerating all 
the most divisive issues in our political life—this forms one element of his 
“prophesy in reverse.”9
Percy sets the story in Feliciana parish, a small niche where both Left 
and Knothead live in relative peace and harmony. More resides in an over-
whelmingly white neighborhood called Paradise Estates, where both par-
ties peacefully coexist. He divides his days between the solidly Knothead 
former hometown he serves, “a refuge for all manner of conservative folk . . . 
patriotic chiropractors, two officials of the National Rifle Association, and six 
conservative proctologists,” and the massive government scientific research 
complex known as “Fedville,” where he conducts his research alongside an 
assortment of mostly Left doctors and scientists. A vast swamp adjoins all of 
these places, and “the dropouts from and castoffs of and rebels against our 
society” call it home. The swamp’s residents include the African American 
“Bantu” guerillas that play a key role in the novel’s events (14–17).
More’s little corner of America serves as a microcosm of the wider 
world, yet he goes further and contrasts the relatively pleasant disorder of 
Feliciana parish with a vision of even more widespread political violence. 
More mentions in passing that his mother “predicted four out of the last 
five assassinations.” Yet her role as “seer and prophetess” bears greater im-
portance in his mind than the horrifying presence of such frequent political 
murder on the national scene (177). Not entirely oblivious, More sees the 
outbreaks of violence as a broader symptom of deeper concerns, but most 
characters find only the most extraordinary moments of butchery remark-
able, attributing them to madness without looking deeper. Amid the spec-
tacle of domestic mayhem, More’s America also finds itself embroiled in 
Walker Percy’s Last Men 183
another Vietnam-style intervention. This ongoing fifteen-year war (in which 
More served with the First Air Cavalry Division) takes place in Ecuador, a 
nation split between a Communist dictatorship in the north and a Catholic 
oligarchy in the south (19–20). While Left and Knothead each support their 
ideological brethren, Percy’s characters hardly acknowledge the ongoing 
war. Ignoring current events and news, they all betray the desire to simply 
forget about their wider world.
While Knotheads remain nominally religious but deeply enmeshed in 
worldly concerns, the Lefts embrace scientific materialism and pantheism 
with an equal fervor. Speaking radically incommensurable languages, nei-
ther party easily comprehends the depth of their disagreement, and largely 
retreats from any point where they might achieve compromise. Many of 
Percy’s creations remain two-dimensional; his use of them as archetypes or 
embodied ideas sharpens the novel’s objectives. He fills More’s world with 
a collection of people who lost sight of what it means to be truly human by 
embracing extremes instead of any more moderate course. Through them, 
we can see our own failures in understanding.10
A lapsed Catholic who flouts the Church’s moral teaching without 
remorse but nonetheless affirms its dogmas, More finds himself adrift 
within a Church divided into three parts, with the old Roman believers 
“a remnant, a tiny scattered flock with no place to go.” The majority either 
left for a Dutch schismatic wing “who believe in relevance but not God” or 
turned to an almost pagan American Catholic Church that plays “The Star-
Spangled Banner” at Mass and upholds a civic religion of “property rights 
and the integrity of neighborhoods” over any genuine theological doctrine 
(5–6). Dividing his imaginary Church between liberals and conservatives, 
“who somehow felt that segregation was part of orthodoxy,” Percy hopes to 
show the danger in subsuming faith into politics, a peril that exacerbates 
the alienation of men from one another within already fragmented com-
munities.11 Throughout these snapshots of life, Percy depicts the extreme 
possibilities of Tocqueville’s American individualist, who “gladly leaves the 
greater society to look after itself” and in time finds himself “forever thrown 
back on himself alone,” facing the “danger that he may be shut up in the 
solitude of his own heart.”12
Amid this social unraveling, More encounters a myriad of strange be-
haviors. Throughout the novel, Percy depicts the hapless doctor’s attempt to 
grapple with what the novelist saw as the distinctively human difficulty of 
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being divided souls—creatures neither able to transcend our bodies nor ca-
pable of evading the alienation imposed by the Fall. While all people share 
this condition, Percy implies that what makes More’s world so prone to crisis 
stems from the way man’s notions about himself provide no means of nam-
ing or articulating the anxiety alienated consciousness presents. Lacking 
a language within which we can comprehend our place in the universe, 
we remain ignorant of our real situation. More’s attempts to “solve” this 
dilemma in Percy’s last men form the subject of the next section.
Defining the Cartesian Self
Throughout Love in the Ruins, More obsesses over the nature of the modern 
soul. He makes for a curious investigator: his Catholic beliefs lead him to 
seize upon what his friends term “metaphysical” notions, such as the divided 
soul; in his role as scientist and medical doctor, he seeks means to measure 
and treat his neighbors not as embodied souls but rather as organisms that 
respond to stimuli.13 More strikes upon an idea that at least superficially 
seems to unify both concerns. Knowing he can measure electrical impulses 
in the brain, he asks a question: Given a machine that can read the location 
and strength of these changes, “could the readings then be correlated with 
the manifold woes of the western world, its terrors and rages and murder-
ous impulses?” (28–29). Because nothing avails “in science unless you can 
measure it,” More knows how important just such a device might become 
in saving Americans from their peculiar discontents—if he can link it to a 
treatment (106).
More dubs his discovery the “Qualitative Quantitative Ontological 
Lapsometer.” As “the first caliper of the soul,” More’s device allows him to 
correlate our varied emotional states with particular neurological readings, 
and after being modified by a shadowy government representative named 
Art Immelman, it later allows More to temporarily treat himself and his 
patients (107). In comparing various forms of life, More notes that the brain 
activities of animals never show the complex marks of full consciousness. 
Percy suggests that true human consciousness appears neurologically in our 
ability to be more than our nature. When More used his lapsometer on a 
monkey, attempting to measure its pineal activity, “its self, that is to say, 
coincides with itself.” By this, Percy suggests through More that monkeys 
and other lower animals have no real consciousness. Instead, “only in man 
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do you find a discrepancy. . . . Only in man does the self miss itself, fall 
from itself (hence lapsometer!)” (36). More’s device records and names the 
failure of the human person to be at home with itself. Humanity’s blessing 
and curse flows from consciousness. Percy’s writing emphasizes the ways 
that our simultaneously reasonable and passionate natures allow us to act in 
myriad ways that miss the truth about our lives. But More’s effort to reunify 
mind and body leads him into a hubristic fantasy; he becomes convinced he 
might undo the effects of the Fall itself.
Thus, until the end of the novel, More remains convinced he could 
bridge the gap between our inner and outer selves through technology. His 
hope rests in the idea that he might “hit on the right dosage and weld the 
broken self whole” so that man might “reenter paradise, so to speak, and live 
there both as man and spirit, whole and intact man-spirit, as solid flesh as 
a speckled trout . . . yet aware of itself as a self!” (36). Percy depicts a doc-
tor frustrated with those who use science to treat irreducibly human things 
as mere objects fit for manipulation via the behaviorist stimulus-response 
model, yet this same physician wishes to use that same science to manipulate 
the self back into a prelapsarian state. Admitting the theological nature of his 
ambition, More refers to himself as “the new Christ, the spotted Christ, the 
maculate Christ, the sinful Christ” who will finally reconcile man to himself 
(153).14 Percy highlights the irony that this machine, designed to measure 
the degree of fallenness, would be responsible for a more profound fall.
More attempts to reconcile human beings to their situation, but in 
doing so ultimately drives them away from their true nature. By driving 
away unpleasant feelings—our natural warning signs—the device allows 
its subject to defer or ignore the partial reconciliation that human com-
munity and faith allow us. In his blending of science and soulcraft, More’s 
theological beliefs and vain aspirations lead him in wildly different direc-
tions.15 Beaming ions into the patient’s brain, the lapsometer does cause 
a temporary improvement in the subject’s psychological condition: More 
soothes others’ rages and stabilizes his own shaky nerves, but in every case 
this evades what always remain principally spiritual and social crises. In 
merely treating symptoms rather than the source of pain, the lapsometer 
allows him to sidestep our distress and thereby makes us unaware of our 
own disorders and sin.
However delusive his ambition to “heal” fallenness, More nevertheless 
understands something about the human condition: that alienation always 
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exists alongside true self-consciousness, and that this causes us to fall away 
from ourselves in a way that reinforces our separation from God.16 In Percy’s 
imagined world and in his understanding of our own situation, we face a 
complicated dilemma in that our alienation manifests itself in unexpected 
ways.17 Through More’s narration, Percy traces the modern disaster back 
to Descartes, who inaugurated the “dread chasm between body and mind 
that has sundered the soul of Western man for five hundred years” (90).18 
Where Aristotle wrote that any man capable of living apart from the polis 
could only be a beast or a god, what haunts Percy and his literary creation is 
that human beings simultaneously exhibit the characteristics of both animal 
and deity.19 We live in such a way that no other creature could endure: “No 
animal would, for he is pure organism. No angel would, for he is pure spirit” 
(212). While the Fall imposes this basic situation upon us, the modern con-
dition exacerbates these extreme tendencies.
This division of the whole person and the inability to comprehend 
our real situation as fallen creatures commonly pushes us to vary between 
diametrically opposed modes of understanding the world. More terms this 
condition “angelism-bestialism.” Neither situation allows us to be merely 
human. Bestialism forms the simpler phenomenon of the two extremes. 
More sees it as a reduction of the human person to existence oriented 
around “adjustment to the environment,” as nothing more than a creature 
conditioned to respond to stimuli in predetermined ways (27). Percy’s im-
ages of bestialism center on love and sex. In both cases, More fears how his 
colleagues and neighbors reduce human relations to merely biological inter-
actions. Unable to see love as anything more profound than the outworking 
of an evolutionary imperative, the doctors at Fedville view couples having 
difficulty with sex as suffering from a “hangup” rather than any deeper 
source in their relationship (131–32). The danger here comes in the way 
human beings cannot live without recognizing or creating some meaning in 
their relationships beyond the physical connection. Having helped destroy 
the idea that love bears any mystery, the scientists and those who follow 
them find themselves falling prey to inhuman ideologies purporting to pro-
vide meaning to their lives.
Angelism forms the more complicated of the two extremes, and we can 
differentiate at least two different varieties of it in More’s world: active and 
passive.20 Both work to reason man out of his limitations and ordinary exis-
tence. First and more consciously, active angelism creates a situation where 
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man has “so abstracted himself from himself and from the world around 
him, seeing things as theories and himself as a shadow, that he cannot, so 
to speak, reenter the ordinary lovely world. Instead he orbits the earth and 
himself. Such a person, and there are millions, is destined to haunt the 
human condition like the Flying Dutchman” (34). More discovers many 
instances of this phenomenon, but many of the cases appear in those most 
invested in scientific or political theories. Thus, those possessed by this sort 
of angelism tend to view the world as little more than an experiment. So 
long as such abstracted scientists make progress in their research, they con-
sider any and all means legitimate. For Immelman and those like him, the 
promise of “healing” the human condition through social and psychological 
engineering leads directly into accepting monstrous sacrifices, as long as 
they serve progress. In a heated exchange with Immelman, More sums up 
how such angelism leads into horror: “If people cut each others’ throats 
meanwhile, it’s not your fault” for creating the conditions that led men there 
(363).
More observes that people suffering from angelism often reach that 
disposition as a direct result of their lofty ambitions and “higher” ideals. 
More’s wife, Doris, who left him to go “in search” of herself “was ruined by 
books . . . not by dirty books but by clean books, not by depraved books but 
by spiritual books. . . . Books ruined her” (64–65). Yet Doris—whom More 
calls a “priestess of high places,” who abandoned her marriage and died in 
pursuit of her lofty dreams of self-realization—posed little direct danger to 
the world. Her desires led her away from Tom and into a journey of what 
she saw as enlightenment. But her lack of religious faith, and her attendant 
“search” for her own truth, resulted in disaster. The danger in this mode 
of thinking—exemplified today in popular books like Elizabeth Gilbert’s 
Eat, Pray, Love—stems from the way it authorizes a flight from all the 
restraints of our ordinary life. Such beliefs suggest that if we do not find our 
authentic selves at home, we must leave, even if this means abandoning our 
commitments and vows.21 
Percy’s depiction of Doris and Tom reinforces his point that our ideas 
about the best human life matter in ways modern liberals fear to address: 
Doris’s dreams send Tom spiraling into isolation, and his wife to an ac-
cidental death on Cozumel. Much of the danger angelism poses comes in 
an indirect way: in Doris’s case, her abandonment of home and family in 
favor of some elusive self-discovery poses a grave enough difficulty for More 
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himself; yet for the society at large, the notion that family cannot trump 
individual desire results in disaster, especially because we need the moral 
reinforcement a family and community provide to check our disorder.
Percy’s concern is the way that any abstract ideal can possess people. 
He represents this through More’s realization that our goodness always 
remains fragile, and that “what lies beneath, some fault in the soul’s terrain 
so deep that all is well on top, evil grins like good, but something shears and 
tears deep down and the very ground stirs beneath one’s feet” (152). Those 
who fall into this pattern suffer from a sort of ethical blindness. Having 
lost their sense of being neither angel nor beast, people possessed by active 
angelism find it quite easy to commit monstrous deeds in the name of moral 
ends. Late in the novel, when the crisis induced by misuse of his lapsometer 
drives a portion of the population into angelism, More encounters a seman-
ticist and his students, who intend to “practice creative nonviolent violence, 
that is, violence in the service of nonviolence,” actions made noble in light 
of their intention to stand in solidarity with the rebels of South Ecuador 
(325–26). The influence of heavy sodium ion poisoning on their brains has 
removed all the sentimental restraints that keep modern humanists from 
doing violence and has made the victims think and act without moral re-
straint in pursuit of their philosophical goals.
Understanding the lapsometer metaphorically, we can see how Percy 
believes that some ideas quite literally rend the psyche. In the book, the 
lapsometer can cause man to become “totally abstracted from himself, 
totally alienated from the concrete world, and in such a state of angelism 
that he would fall prey to the first abstract notion proposed to him and will 
kill anybody who gets in his way, torture, execute, wipe out entire popula-
tions, all with the best possible motives and the best possible intentions, 
in fact in the name of peace and freedom, etcetera” (328). As a mirror of 
the twentieth century’s ideological wasteland, the description is a chilling 
one. But Percy moves beyond metaphor in the text. The worst angelism 
More encounters does not result from the lapsometer but rather from his 
neighbors’ native dispositions and ideologies.
To cite one example, late in the story, More meets a former professor 
of black studies and pro-football player who adopts the name Uru and leads 
the novel’s “Bantu” guerilla movement against the white Paradise Estates. 
During a rare moment in the novel where characters acknowledge their 
real differences, Uru and More discuss the situation frankly. Uru insists 
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he and his people can “build a new society” amid the ruins of old southern 
culture and displays his willingness to use any amount of violence neces-
sary to accomplish this. He rails against his less ideologically pure comrades 
who serve in their churches and wish to treat Dr. More with respect. He 
insists accommodation will get them nowhere, and that their political 
struggle amounts to civil war (104). Only Victor, a Baptist church deacon 
and old friend of More’s, saves him from Uru’s murderous intent (295–302). 
Throughout these scenes, Percy implies that ideology and abstraction from 
the ordinary restraints of the self go hand in hand. Both lead to destruction, 
and apart from community and faith, modern men have all too little defense 
against these forces—particularly because of the way they subtly warp our 
understanding away from the truth of our existence.22
Although the active version of angelism abets violent, radical politics, 
Percy suggests it ultimately poses less danger to America than the less obvi-
ous passive form.23 As a force that interprets events and shapes human con-
duct, passive angelism warps our vision and effaces our ability to recognize 
the reality of our situation. While some people lose sight of moral restraint 
and act in monstrous ways pursuing abstract ends, others simply lose their 
empathy for those who think and feel differently. This appears in various 
ways. Most characters in the novel continually interpret massacres as the 
work of madmen (9–10). Instead, More often insists that “there’s a reason” 
for this behavior, that it cannot simply be dismissed as insane and therefore 
beyond moral judgment. Because these scientists deny the real presence of 
evil in the world, More’s explanation stands outside their modern, secular 
understanding; people hear what More says but cannot truly acknowledge 
that he points them back to an absolute morality and the reality of sin (83). 
At other times, his colleagues see moments of angelism and bestialism 
inspired by misuse of the lapsometer as nothing more than “mass hysteria” 
akin to “St. Vitus’s dance in the Middle Ages” (241). Beyond acknowledging 
the strangeness of events around them, none of the characters in the novel 
comprehend the way their science misleads them.
Passive angelism manifests itself in at least one other way in the novel: 
the characters’ sense of place and time. The novel’s events create profound 
disturbance in men’s souls, such that More and his neighbors often seek 
some refuge from their ordinary lives. More himself creates a new home in 
an old, abandoned Howard Johnson motel. As the motel is a relic of the “old 
Auto Age” where no one ventures, More initially sees it as an opportune 
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place to get away with one of his three love interests, an employee in the 
Love Clinic named Moira Schaffner. The ruin serves as his refuge against 
the dangerous influence of Immelman’s experiment—taking the lapsom-
eters and testing the extent of their capabilities by driving people in the area 
around Fedville into abstract or animal frenzies.
Later, fearing the impending disaster, More hopes to wait out the 
lapsometer-triggered heavy sodium ion release by enjoying a “prodigal” 
woman half his age, living on cartons of canned goods, cases of bourbon and 
sherry, and “the Great Books stacked alongside.” “Think of it,” he enjoins his 
audience: “reading Aeschylus, in the early fall, in old Howard Johnson’s, off 
old I-11, with Moira” (258). The defective nature of this arrangement—its 
isolation, flight from responsibility for others, and ultimately hedonistic 
orientation—and its replication of Doris’s path away largely escape More’s 
notice. Yet while the abstract idea of life there appeals to More, all his 
experiences with Moira at the old motel remind him of his old family life. 
More’s dalliances constantly drive him to recollect his pain and sense of 
loss, giving him no relief from his cares. Despite this, he cannot understand 
his emotional situation: “Why does desire turn to grief and memory strike 
at the heart?” (138). More finds no answer; his deceased wife and daughter 
continue to haunt his memories and stifle his lust for Moira and his other 
lover, Lola Rhoades.
More knows that aside from a temporary “fix” via the lapsometer, “the 
only treatment of angelism . . . was recovery of the self through ordeal” or 
other powerful experience (37). His lost family and ties to the community 
root him in a specific time and place, but for most of the novel he remains 
torn between the life of a transient and his longing for a settled existence. 
Throughout the novel, More’s secretary and nurse, Ellen Oglethorpe, re-
tains a quiet role as his conscience and tie to possible future stability. A 
“strict churchgoer and a moral girl,” Ellen nevertheless lacks belief, finding 
herself embarrassed at the notion of a personal, supernatural God. Instead, 
she guides herself through the Golden Rule and tries to nudge Tom into 
doing the same (157).
Like More, Moira and Lola also live an ephemeral and transient exis-
tence, lacking the emotional connections of community and physical ties to 
a home. Twenty-two years old, Moira lives for moments of pure exaltation 
that draw her out of herself. As More observes, “Ruins make her passionate. 
Ghosts make her want to be touched.” She has traveled constantly; her very 
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lack of rootedness makes her compare the ruined motel to Pompeii, and she 
“thinks that the great motels of the Auto Age were the haunt of salesmen 
and flappers of the Roaring Twenties” (133–34). Lola betrays similar ten-
dencies toward historical unconsciousness; however, hers find expression in 
a nostalgic vision of the Old South. She lives in a “preposterous” re-creation 
of Tara from Gone with the Wind. Also half More’s age, Lola plans on 
staying in her gaudy replica mansion, minding her own business while the 
heavy sodium disaster proceeds. While Moira remains totally ignorant, Lola 
knows the world cannot long subsist in its state, but nonetheless gives in to 
an agrarian fantasy, claiming that she really only believes that “when all is 
said and done, the only thing we can be sure of is the land. The land never 
lets you down.” As he often does when speaking with a person he opposes, 
More genially agrees but admits he “never did know what that meant” 
(279). Percy implies that neither of them really do. Knowing little about 
history, both women nonetheless place faith in an abstraction rooted in how 
they imagine the past—they flee there from reality. With Moira, this comes 
from a generic belief in a lost age of mobility and infinite possibilities; Lola’s 
nostalgic imagination places her in an unrealistic pastoral vision. Neither 
this progressivism nor flight into the idealized past gives them a way to 
comprehend the political and moral situation in which we find ourselves.
Despite his awareness of the crisis and relative depth of intellectual 
resources with which to combat it, at different points in the novel More nev-
ertheless betrays all the symptoms of angelism-bestialism. Having initially 
tested the lapsometer’s diagnostic functions on himself, More confesses he 
discovered “a regular museum of pathology, something like passing a metal 
detector over the battlefield of Iwo Jima” (32). He finds himself stricken 
with “attacks of elation and depression, as well as occasional seizures of 
morning terror” (11). When he avoids ascending into lofty dreams of himself 
as the Nobel Prize winner who will rescue the world, More’s self-awareness 
saves him: “I, for example, am a Roman Catholic, albeit a bad one. . . . Some 
years ago, however, I stopped eating Christ in Communion, stopped going 
to mass, and have since fallen into a disorderly life. I believe in God and the 
whole business but I love women best, music and science next, whisky next, 
God fourth, and my fellowman hardly at all. Generally I do as I please” (6). 
As a result of the contradictions between his beliefs, desires, and actions, 
More finds himself largely isolated. More’s self-awareness is striking: he 
links his departure from the community of the Church to his descent into 
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disorder. Yet the solitude runs deeper. While married, he never used his 
wife’s living room to entertain, rarely did any of the things ordinary folk did, 
“never owned a pointer bitch, had no use for friends,” and generally lived 
apart from others (270). While his distance from others abets his tendencies 
to abstraction, his solitude ironically stems from the grasp he has over the 
real conditions of his world. It remains an asset—or liability—his colleagues 
and neighbors largely lack, but undermines his ability to find a home (148).
Where for Nietzsche, the bourgeois last men simply experience life in a 
flat, uncomplicated lethargy, Percy paints a much richer picture of modern 
emotional life. Instead of this empty soul, he evokes moody, death-haunted 
creatures constantly driven to extremes.24 This becomes even more appar-
ent in the way individual pathologies of angelism-bestialism work together 
in More’s world. Together they foster a peculiar set of political dilemmas 
and social sensibilities. In the next section, I explore some of the more har-
rowing dimensions of this imaginary landscape.
The Evacuated Center of American Social Life
Throughout More’s misadventures, he observes myriad political, cultural, 
and theological divisions in his small corner of America. Most of them bear 
a strong link to his understanding of how the angelic and bestial further de-
range our fallen nature. While on the basis of More’s story, we can infer that 
Percy’s concern with the modern malaise stemmed from a series of deeply 
existential concerns, we can discern important political consequences that 
follow from the state of modern souls. For Percy, the relative effectiveness 
of liberal democracy persuades us into thinking we can live divided lives 
within a defective self-understanding. The nature of the system encourages 
this belief: “The center did not hold. However, the Gross National Product 
continues to rise” (18). This encourages a pragmatic optimism that men can 
live increasingly disordered lives so long as prosperity endures. He implies 
that while our society may not require political and theological unity, the 
absence of even a minimal consensus creates profound distortions in how 
we live with one another.25
In More’s America, people view one another not as actual men and 
women but rather through labels and categories. The most salient abstrac-
tions here involve politics, religion, and race: Left versus Knothead, athe-
ist opposed to believer, and black against white. Yet in Feliciana parish, 
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the intellectual and cultural differences that separate these groups also 
manifest themselves in literal geographic and emotional separation. Hav-
ing broken apart from one another, most people elect to live in separate 
communities. All the novel’s various groups avoid genuine engagement with 
shared spaces and simply abandon directly contested ones. Whether or not 
Feliciana parish actually deserves the title of a community, it divides itself 
quite thoroughly. Rather than fighting to sustain life in common, the people 
let the public spaces fall into the same disrepair as America’s roads.
Percy weaves two exceptions into this overall story and each bears some 
examination. He presents the first in a vast and disparate collection of “the 
dropouts from and castoffs of and rebels against” American society who 
reside in the Honey Island Swamp adjacent to Fedville and the Paradise 
Estates. These include the African American Bantu guerillas, young whites 
“who live drowsy sloth-like lives,” psychopaths, pederasts, and many others 
(15–16). The other exists in More’s home, Paradise Estates, “an oasis of 
concord in a troubled land” where both Left and Knothead live in peace 
(17) but protect their homes with “an electrified ten-foot fence, a guard 
house at every entrance, and a private patrol” led by a retired colonel who 
drives an armored car sporting a turreted machine gun (31, 281).
Yet in both places, instead of forming genuine and unified communi-
ties where the residents recognize their disagreements and act with charity 
toward one another in light of them, the residents simply form opposing 
subgroups. In Paradise, the homeowners pretend they agree and largely 
ignore one another: “On Wednesday nights one goes to a meeting of Birch-
ers, the other to the ACLU. Sunday one goes to church, the other in search 
of the lordly ivory-billed woodpecker, but both play golf, ski in the same 
bayou, and give ‘Christmas gifs’ to the same waiters at the club” (19). In the 
swamp, all of the various sects live in splendid isolation from one another, 
each pursuing its own idealistic or monstrous ends. In Paradise, people talk 
and act as if everyone around them agrees, and More constantly encounters 
individuals who assume he concurs with their way of seeing things. Rather 
than proclaim his differences, More generally keeps silent. Nowhere do 
people communicate in a way that recognizes the reality of their plight.26
Exhaustion and decay rule More’s America. While individuals act as if 
their world proceeds without profound tension or difficulty, in the mean-
time, they let their physical environment fall into ruin. Roads and sidewalks 
crack (8–9). Everywhere More looks, weeds and vines sprout uncontrol-
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lably (94). In one of his less philosophical moments, More laments: “Don’t 
tell me the U.S.A. went down the drain because of Leftism, Knotheadism, 
apostasy, pornography, polarization, etcetera etcetera. All these things may 
have happened, but what finally tore it was that things stopped working 
and nobody wanted to be a repairman” (62–63). The deteriorating physi-
cal environment demonstrates society’s failure to care for itself. In More’s 
world, life’s prospects seem dim, and the general disappearance of vitality 
holds other consequences.
Having highlighted the way people divide up their living spaces and 
find themselves unable to reach any moral compromises, More goes further 
still. While he claims that “most Americans do well enough,” More even 
identifies peculiar medical complaints that emerge in Left and Knothead. 
Percy places the Knothead complaints in the body and the Left-leaning 
ones in the psyche, though neither monopolizes either type of symptom. 
The conservatives fall into “unseasonable rages, delusions of conspiracies, 
high blood pressure, and large-bowel complaints.” Leftists “contract sexual 
impotence, morning terror, and a feeling of abstraction of the self from 
itself.” Comically, this mix of symptoms vastly multiplies the number of 
proctologists and psychiatrists in Paradise (20).
Yet all the residents act and live in similar ways, developing an existen-
tial kinship to one another. Despite their divergent maladies, More claims 
not to “notice a great deal of difference between the two” (15). Both suffer 
equally from angelism-bestialism: the typical Knothead tends toward bibli-
cal literalism; the Lefts generally explain the world via scientific material-
ism. Both hope to embrace a complete system that orders their universe and 
eliminates the need to talk to anyone who disagrees. All of them periodi-
cally indulge themselves completely in unsatisfying material pursuits. None 
of them know how to live as whole persons between angel and beast, and 
their evasion of real community helps them ignore this fact. Throughout, 
their relationships remain superficial enough to help them evade this and 
obscure their despair.
Although Percy engages in a bit of imaginative excess in general, the 
story highlights the ways a purely scientific understanding of the world 
fails to come to grips with truly human things. To address this, he raises 
profoundly troubling questions of how we approach issues of human dignity 
in both sex and death. He does this by describing two interrelated projects 
More encounters at the Fedville medical complex, the Love Clinic and 
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Geriatric Rehabilitation. Euphemistically titled departments in the hospital 
that study sex acts and oversee euthanasia, each represents a case of what 
Percy sees as scientific materialism run amok. Both projects utilize a be-
haviorist understanding of human beings as creatures that merely respond 
to environmental stimuli, and each begins with the presupposition that a 
utilitarian calculus of pain and pleasure should define the whole of human 
life. More believes these labs disrespect and deny the essential human expe-
rience of self-consciousness, and that in doing so, they rob us of our ability 
to act as morally significant causes of events in the world.27
A tool like More’s lapsometer stands at the center of the hospital’s many 
psychiatric projects. Invented by Fedville’s director and called the “Skinner 
box,” this device stimulates the brain’s pain and pleasure centers to allow 
doctors to condition their patients’ “negative” behavior out of them while 
encouraging more “positive” varieties. Here, Percy plays on B. F. Skinner’s 
use of testing boxes on animals and hypothesizes what modifying human 
behavior in them might entail, with disturbing effect. Placing all behavior 
on a scale of sickness and health rather than moral value, Fedville’s doctors 
push their patients into acknowledging only their biological life. The most 
important difficulty Percy raises here is that science might even partially 
succeed in eradicating man’s natural intuitions regarding a healthy life, and 
thus cause him to lose his one path back to living well. Percy highlights this 
through his depiction of the tensions between More’s thinking and that of 
his colleagues.
Precisely because they cannot step outside their materialism, Percy’s 
scientists remain incapable of comprehending More’s various moral intu-
itions. Confronting Tom about his feelings regarding women, his colleague 
Max fails to understand why More’s failure to feel guilt over sleeping with 
various women bothers him:
“If you would come back and get in the Skinner box, we could straighten it 
out.”
“The Skinner box wouldn’t help.”
“We could condition away the contradiction. You’d never feel guilt.”
“Then I’d really be up the creek.” (118)
Percy seeks to demonstrate the consequences of conditioning away sin as a 
mere “problem.” He reminds us that human dignity inheres in our ability to 
make morally significant choices in light of a proper understanding of the 
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human condition. By evading the intractability of guilt, depression, and a 
host of other conditions, Fedville’s scientists seek to make people into little 
more than clever, well-adjusted animals.28
In the Love Clinic, doctors observe and record the neurological im-
pulses of individuals and couples engaging in various sexual acts. The entire 
process removes any emotional or relational component from these per-
formances; the scientists only seek to understand the precise mechanisms 
of orgasm to maximize the bodily pleasure of those participating. At no 
point do the doctors or volunteers link their sexual lives to emotion, much 
less procreation. Percy implies that this way of arranging our relationships 
is defective in that it effaces love as a generative force that binds people 
together over a full life. Instead, the doctors in the clinic and many of the 
characters in the novel embrace ephemeral connections, a way of living that 
strongly undermines community. Percy uses his story to demonstrate that 
not only is lasting love necessary for human happiness, but it also reinforces 
the possibility for genuine human community—the sort Paradise, Fedville, 
and the swamp lack.29
The first and foremost example of this defect is the fact that children 
hardly appear in Love in the Ruins. For a novel largely centering on the 
life and death of society, this is particularly noteworthy. First, More’s 
long-dead daughter, Samantha, haunts his dreams and he frequently turns 
to thinking about her at moments when he doubts himself or engages in 
misbehavior. Her memory tugs at More and reminds him of how his dal-
liances with younger women merely reinforce his alienation and solitude. 
With Samantha’s memory reminding him of the failings of his present and 
Ellen nudging him into accepting a new life in community, More eventually 
finds his way to a stable life.
The second example comes early in the novel when More treats a 
dehydrated newborn whose parents reside in the swamp. Members of a 
“love community” there, the parents hope to raise the little boy in “a life 
of perfect freedom and peace” (50). Of course, no such thing exists among 
fallen creatures. By stripping away the supposedly social causes of evil, the 
love community hopes for heaven on earth rather than an actual commu-
nity realized between flawed human persons. Even at his most confused, 
More recognizes the unrealistic assumptions that drive people into the 
swamp: the grateful parents encourage More to join them, but he repeat-
edly demurs. Through this, Percy conveys the notion that the swamp is 
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not a truly human place. Finally, in the aftermath of the novel’s events, 
More mentions his own two children. But these could come about only 
after some distinct changes in his life and that of the community as well. 
The absence of children, and the new life they represent within the novel’s 
events, betrays one of Percy’s fundamental concerns about fostering life in 
a period little inclined to accept its transcendent value. This brings us back 
to the scientistic denial of life More observes in Fedville.
The Love Clinic strips sexual acts of their interpersonal components 
because no actual communication occurs there. The doctors dictate how 
and when various acts should be undertaken, measuring and recording the 
sexual activities without speaking with the subjects, only at them. They 
actively discourage the participants from doing anything but directly en-
gaging in the act. When the couples find performing difficult, the doctors 
treat the issue as nothing more than a technical problem they must over-
come (121–32). Because of its frankly authoritarian character, the entire 
procedure bears little relation to love. In treating human beings as little 
more than lab rats, the clinic’s doctors break the natural bond sex generally 
reinforces between couples, instead making sex alone the object of their 
relationship.30
In More’s America, old age carries far less pain and decline in bodily 
functions than today, yet in many ways the senior citizens of his time live 
profoundly unhappy lives because doctors so frequently separate them from 
their families and from any organic community. Geriatric Rehabilitation, or 
“Gerry Rehab,” aims at “reconditioning” senior citizens who exhibit “cranki-
ness, misanthropy, malcontent, solitariness, destructiveness, misery” despite 
the most perfect physical comfort. More tells the reader that this range of 
behaviors has become known as the St. Petersburg Blues; confronting a life 
of comfortable exile, perfectly healthy seniors simply lose their will to live. 
Instead of letting the elderly carry on the way they want, federal policy aims 
at making them fit in, at forcing them to enjoy their retirement in the way 
society expects.
When the seniors arrive at Gerry Rehab, doctors implant electrodes 
in their brains. Following Skinner’s model for conditioning rats, they then 
place the elderly patients in a “recreational environment.” They reward 
those who engage in the suggested leisure activity through a mild electric 
current that induces “a pleasant sensation, an unlocated euphoria, hypotha-
lamic joy.” With all the other patients, the doctors administer “a nasty shock 
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through electrode B inducing a distinct but not overpowering malaise.” The 
government ships those who fail to respond properly to the Skinner box off 
to the “Happy Isles,” a soft euthanasia facility where doctors simply take 
those who “behave antisocially” and shock them into bliss. Once there, the 
seniors soon learn “to press the button themselves,” inducing a mental state 
of “dreaming so blissful that they pass up meals”—that is, until they pain-
lessly expire (121–22).
With the Love Clinic and Gerry Rehab, Percy notes how the doctors 
design procedures to eliminate guilt, painful emotions, and physical suf-
fering. Percy continually draws our attention, however, to the truths that 
these form necessary aspects of human existence: psychological discom-
fort can lead us to seek to reintegrate ourselves into our community in a 
healthy way rather than just treating the outward symptoms of alienation 
and disorder. Eliminating psychological pain poses a real danger in that 
we lose our principal signal that something is wrong. Even more profound 
consequences follow from America’s growing failure to reckon with death 
itself. The practice of sending unhappy seniors to a separate place to die—
that is, sparing the healthy and young the burden of knowing what awaits 
them as well as eliminating one duty of family—places a profound limit on 
community. Knowing we bear no personal responsibility of care toward our 
elders may enhance our freedom, but it also allows us to evade the reality of 
our condition as flawed, mortal creatures.
The novel’s central confrontation occurs in a medical theater called 
“the Pit.” A debate between More and a colleague, Dr. Buddy Brown, tran-
spires over the case of Mr. Ives, whose doctors transferred him to Fedville 
after he engaged in all manner of antisocial behavior at a nursing home. 
Ives seems immune to the Skinner box, and because he refuses to speak or 
respond to stimuli for a month, More’s opponent Dr. Brown presumes the 
old man has suffered a stroke and demands that the hospital send him to the 
Happy Isles center for what he euphemistically terms “separation.” Brown 
and the other behaviorists in the room insist that a man like Ives deserves 
release from his qualitatively poor existence, and that medical ethics should 
always lead responsible doctors to recommend a swift end to life. 
With the extraordinary power of the lapsometer, however, More is able 
to “measure the index of life, life in death and death in life” of Ives. He 
determines that Ives is fully conscious of his activities but is utterly enraged 
at his situation (190). Dosing him gently, More then coaxes Ives into speak-
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ing and he reveals the reasons for previous his silence. The director of the 
medical center asks:
“Why have you neither walked a step nor uttered a word during the last 
month?”
Mr. Ives scratches his head and squints up the slope. “Well sir, I’ll tell 
you. . . . There is only one kind of response to those who would control your 
responses by throwing you in a Skinner box.”
“And what would that be?” asks the Director sourly, knowing the answer.
“To refuse to respond at all.” (234)
In the logic of what Percy sees as an inhuman sort of science, an old man 
who rebels by refusing to act at all denies his right to life.31
Through More’s eyes, Percy shows us a world where the pursuit of a 
pleasant, supposedly more fulfilled life overtakes all other priorities. Percy 
fears that materialism destroys human dignity; the fact his protagonist can-
not convey this message to others renders the consequences of this in a very 
human form. An ambivalent man attached to neither the Knotheads nor 
the Lefts, More acts as the sole opponent to various “qualitarian” projects 
aimed at making life more comfortable. Neither Tom nor Ellen supports the 
geriatric wing’s agenda. She simply insists that “it’s not right” but, much like 
many Americans today, she cannot provide reasons for her dissent (158). 
Like Ellen, More can only bring his Christian moral intuitions to a debate 
but almost always stops short of explaining them in a direct way. At the 
same time, however certain his opponents seem in their “reasonable” belief 
that “it’s the quality of life that counts,” they all blush at More’s use of the 
word “funeral” in the showdown with Brown (197, 224). In a sense, neither 
More nor his opponents live in full awareness of their language and beliefs. 
The behaviorists cannot acknowledge the moral reality of their actions, 
yet at the same time More remains unable to articulate the depth of his 
disagreement or ultimately explain the theological basis upon which it rests. 
Percy implies that a public culture closed to differing beliefs—especially 
religious ones—makes real communication impossible.
More himself shares some guilt for attempting to manipulate and heal 
the world through scientific means. In his hubris, he forgets that this is 
impossible. Nevertheless, he always hopes to use the Ontological Lapsom-
eter in service of an understanding of human beings as more than clever 
animals or biomechanical machines.32 Possessed by reductive abstractions, 
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his interlocutors cannot imagine anything beyond their immediate sense 
perceptions and the scientistic theories they use to explain the world. Even 
the most sympathetic cannot understand More’s theological intuitions; 
instead, most presume their materialism to be something with which no 
reasoning person could disagree.33 In many ways, this communicative im-
passe presents an end to American life. Yet in the end, much of the novel’s 
action occurs under the threat rather than the actuality of catastrophe. My 
final section concerns the political consequences of this conclusion.
A Politics for a Time Near the End of the World
Percy frames Love in the Ruins around the possibility that More’s lapsom-
eter might cause a chain reaction that would permanently damage enough 
of the population to cause a national catastrophe.34 At first, the device seems 
to send the world into a momentary freefall, one profound enough to cause 
More to view it as perhaps nothing less than the removal of God’s bless-
ing from the United States—for as he says, up until this point, America 
would seem to have enjoyed such good fortune that even atheists almost 
thanked God (3–4). More’s pride causes him to imagine that his lapsometer 
could either cause such a disaster or, even more absurdly, definitively heal 
America’s damaged psyche. In the same breath as he admits his hubris, 
More nevertheless hopes that the options remain simple and clear-cut: ei-
ther the lapsometer “could save the world or destroy it,” with no third option 
(7). More seemingly desires the heavy sodium disaster to herald the end, if 
only because that would present him a much simpler scenario than the one 
actual people face: being forced to muddle through life’s complexities. This 
brings the novel’s political dilemma to a point because in communities we 
encounter the subtle variety of human life. There our abstractions fall apart, 
and our relationships draw us away from mere animal life.
While the “end of the world” Percy heralds in the opening of Love 
in the Ruins certainly does not provide an excess of hope for the future of 
American politics, it may well have more to do with the failure of modern 
man’s self-understanding than a literal failure of political order.35 To cite 
one example, throughout the novel characters repeatedly construe acts of 
violence and mayhem as nothing more than instances of madness. They 
never condemn such behavior in a way that implies the culpability of the 
wrongdoers.36 This flight from moral praise and blame bears mention be-
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cause at the end of the novel, More discovers that a “love community” from 
the swamp committed all the murders throughout the book, a group whose 
“leader is quoted as saying his family believes in love, the environment, and 
freedom of the individual” (386–87). Their beliefs in love understood solely 
as free sex, in the environment as a greater good than human persons, and 
in the sort of freedom that grants license to murder become something of 
an ideal type of deranged life—the perfect image of existence oscillating 
between angelism and bestialism. With those forces walking hand in hand, 
that “community” embodies all the worst tendencies in More’s world.37
Despite the love community’s violence, More’s semi-hallucinated 
apocalypse never quite materializes. More falls asleep as the entire com-
munity appears to stand on the brink of an angelic and bestial civil war. 
Yet when Ellen wakes him a few short hours later, she assures him that the 
town has mostly returned to normal while he slept, and that there “was no 
real trouble” (365–66). Coming from any other character than Ellen, this 
might seem like yet another example of an individual unable to come to 
grips with the reality of her situation.38 Instead of suggesting any one person 
has “healed” the community, Ellen observes that things returned to normal 
because “people like it like this,” a farcical conclusion in light of Percy’s 
apocalyptic lead-up (366).39
By writing Love in the Ruins, Percy hopes to avert what he sees as 
the likely Cartesian End of History. Yet reclaiming the dignity of com-
munity cannot eliminate the oscillation between angelic and bestial—after 
all, fallen human nature persists. However, the restraining influences of 
faith, community, and family mitigate the worst in human nature. Precisely 
because the picture Percy paints is not that of the utterly vacuous, spiritless 
nothings Nietzsche evokes, hope may still remain for the world, but only if 
we find a way to live in the middle ground between the angelic and bestial. 
Particularly in the novel’s conclusion, Percy suggests that only concrete 
links to a particular community and sacramental faith that works to protect 
the family will accomplish this. As addled as More often made himself, he 
never considered genuinely radical changes in human living to be healthy; 
he never thought he could change human nature so much as heal its extraor-
dinary wounds. Even if he did so serially, Tom always envisioned remaining 
with and marrying only one of his love interests. Here, his utter refusal early 
in the novel to partake in the life of the swamp bespeaks his rejection of the 
ethos “love communities” embrace (46–55).
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In an epilogue set five years after the novel’s events, Tom marries El-
len and makes a new life for himself (396–99). More’s lapsometer could 
not save the world—or even More himself. Instead, Ellen’s love helps him 
recover a more moderate life.40 He abandons his loftiest aspirations and 
instead focuses on making a decent life as a small-town doctor and father to 
his young children. More largely gives up his alcoholic lifestyle and earns a 
very modest income tending to his neighbors. His life reordered, he even 
agrees to help his friend Victor—the deacon who saved him from death—
manage the local politics of a run for the U.S. Congress (400–401). Most 
important, the pace of his life changes: “Here’s one difference between 
this age and the last. Now while you work, you also watch and listen and 
wait. In the last age we planned projects and cast ahead of ourselves. 
We set out to ‘reach goals.’ We listened to the minutes of the previous 
meeting. Between times we took vacations” (381–82). Finally rooted in 
a community, More recovers a sense of his moral limits. In his new life, 
he feels guilt and mostly avoids indulging in his old desires. While he 
changes, he now knows he cannot remake himself or heal the world.
Although Percy sketches elements of a world that might come to pass, 
he denies any of this might become inevitable. As a “prophecy in reverse,” 
Love in the Ruins stands as a warning and as a challenge to reknit com-
munity. The crisis More imagined in such a disproportionate manner led 
him into the realization that something had to change. For Percy, moments 
where civic and political institutions fray along the edges create a similar 
possibility for society as a whole to recognize its situation. In such moments, 
the danger opens men up to renewed self-understanding. Love in the Ruins 
conveys the notion that while America’s political consensus may be illusory, 
nevertheless people manage to overcome their differences through life in 
local communities. Flawed as it is, the American project remains more 
resilient than its critics would like to admit. This persistent fact may help 
remind us that our nation began not in real unity but rather in profound 
disagreement.
More carves out a place for himself in the midst of personal tragedy and 
disaster, one largely untouched by the manic politics of his age. His pain, 
suffering, and guilt remain important components of healing and recon-
ciliation. The problem with science, materialism, angelism, and bestialism 
stems from the way they deaden us to the signs that might drive us to rec-
ognize our frailty and seek to reconnect with God and our neighbor. While 
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Love in the Ruins presents us no clear political prescription, Percy conveys 
the hope that we might reknit our communities amid the ruins of our old 
understandings. Leaving the details up to us, he insists that any revival of 
community must also carry with it a recognition that human fallenness will 
always push us to extremes, dangers we can resolve only by confronting the 
real nature of our situation, particularly in the poverty of our current ideas 
and language concerning how men should live. Only then might love in the 
fullest sense reign.41
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The Second Coming 
of Walker Percy
From Segregationist to Integrationist
Brendan P. Purdy and Janice Daurio
This essay looks at three strands of Walker Percy’s thoughts through 
the decade or so before his 1956 Commonweal article, “Stoicism and 
the South.”1 These three strands of thought are semiotics, Catholicism, 
and Stoicism. Percy’s work on semiotics, his reading of Kierkegaard, 
and his conversion to Catholicism led him to make the change from 
being a segregationist southern moderate to an integrationist southern 
moderate. Or, to put it more precisely, Percy realized that being a 
southern moderate no longer allowed for the segregationist viewpoint. 
After examining these three strands, we consider “Stoicism in the 
South” with respect to historical, cultural, philosophical, and theologi-
cal concerns.
As a frame of reference for this chapter, consider the following story 
about Percy. During spring break in 1936, Percy and his best friend, 
Shelby Foote, a novelist and historian (most famously the author of the 
magisterial three-volume opus The Civil War: A Narrative), took a bus 
trip to New York City. While traveling Foote opined that integration 
would “probably not be a bad thing.” Shocked, Percy replied, “I cannot 
believe that you, a southerner, would say that.”2 This is the position 
that Percy began with and the purpose of this essay is to describe the 
Second Coming that transformed Percy from a segregationist to an 
integrationist.
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Semiotics
Language and Consciousness
As an admirer of Charles Sanders Peirce and a novelist, Percy valued 
language highly. In fact, the analysis and study of language dominates his 
nonfictional work. In particular, he was interested in semiotics and the 
philosophy of language. Percy understood the human person to be a symbol 
maker by nature, as is clear from his essays on semiotics, for example: “Cul-
ture: The Antinomy of the Scientific Method,” “Semiotic and a Theory of 
Knowledge,” and “Symbol, Consciousness, and Intersubjectivity.”3 He also 
understood that changing language changes ideas, and that what language 
one uses and the manner in which it is used reflect on the unacknowledged 
body of beliefs of the community. In particular, Percy believed that naming 
is a social activity. Naming, and the “misnaming” of metaphors, both makes 
and reflects one’s world. Human beings are embodied consciousnesses that 
are part of the natural world, so it is no radical claim to say that naming 
objects in the world makes the world. However, there is vigorous debate 
within contemporary philosophy on proper names, and since this debate 
can be traced back to Peirce’s thought it bears mentioning.
Saul Kripke, in the most important work on the philosophy of language 
to be published after Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (originally 
published in 1953), argued in Naming and Necessity that proper names 
are “rigid designators,” that is, they designate the same object in all pos-
sible worlds in which that object exists and never designate anything else.4 
Thus, a rigid designator merely denotes; here Kripke was arguing against 
the descriptivist theory of naming of Frege and Russell, who argued that 
all words, including proper names, have both a sense and a reference (loci 
classici).5 Thus, Kripke was arguing against the Anglo-American analytic 
tradition.
One important aspect of Kripke’s theory is that an object is “baptized” 
and this fixes the reference of the object. From here the “name denoting 
that object is then used to refer to that object.”6 From this one can see 
why Kripke’s theory is called a causal theory of reference (as opposed to a 
descriptivist theory like those of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, et al.), since 
the name is assigned by an initial community of speakers and then from 
that point on “the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain.”7 
To explain Kripke’s thought simply: for example, at a certain point in 
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time, there was a baptism by the New World colonists to call blacks “slaves.” 
One such individual is John Punch.8 Kripke would argue that while “John 
Punch” would refer to the same individual in all possible worlds (unless he 
does not exist in one of those worlds), it is only (tragically) accidental that in 
this world “John Punch” is the same as “first African slave in the American 
colonies.” From the time of the baptism (1640) until the end of the Civil 
War and the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, the meaning 
of “black” was generally the same as “slave,” at least in the South. However, 
while the meaning changed (contra Frege, Russell, et al.), the reference 
remained the same. So at least in respect to looking at the dehumanizing 
tendencies of speakers, Kripke’s theory is existential in a sense that Percy 
would appreciate: John Punch is a man and it is only accidental that he can 
be described as a slave, but it is not who he truly is since there are possible 
worlds where Punch is a freeman. The use of the term “slave” demonstrates 
the power of language that Percy was so keen on emphasizing.
As is often the case in philosophy, even for such an original mind as 
Kripke’s, there are precursors. Peirce, who so influenced Percy, held a 
theory of direct reference like Kripke, at least for proper names: “Every 
language must have proper names; and there is no verb wrapped up in a 
proper name. Therefore, there would seem to be a direct suggestion there 
of a true common noun or adjective. But, notwithstanding that suggestion, 
almost every family of man thinks of general words as parts of verbs.”9 
Through Peirce, part of the landscape of Percy’s thoughts on language 
is a view that shares affinities with Kripke. There is no claim here of any 
explicit relationship between Percy and Kripke, but elaborating on the 
affinities between Kripke and Peirce allows for a precise formulation of 
naming as a communal process. Note that the original title of Percy’s “The 
Mystery of Language” was “The Act of Naming,” and unsurprisingly this 
article is about sense and reference, without all of the logical hand wringing 
of the analytic tradition.10 How does this interlude into analytic philosophy 
relate to Percy becoming an opponent of segregation?
Percy asserts that people don’t have an idea and then search for words 
for it; rather, people become comfortable with certain words and phrases 
and this ease of use changes our ideas. Words accommodate certain ideas 
and uses of language and forbid others. The universal dignity of the hu-
man person forbids thinking and speaking of any marginalized people as 
a problem to be solved or a nuisance to be gotten rid of. Returning to the 
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example above, John Punch was clearly treated as a problem to be solved, 
with horrible consequences for the United States.
An example of the relationship between semiotics and religious belief 
can be found in the divergent views of the Eucharist within Christianity. 
The traditional view of Catholicism and Orthodoxy is that the Eucharist is 
the body and blood of Christ (see John 6:54); however, the Protestant belief 
is that the Eucharist is merely a symbol. Thus, when the Reformers changed 
the meaning of the Eucharist, they also changed a number of concomitant 
theological ideas. For example, “priest” became “minister” and “mass” be-
came “service.” Late in his life (1989) Percy quoted Flannery O’Connor on 
the Eucharist: “If it’s only a symbol, then the hell with it,” and this gets back 
to the Eucharist being a rigid designator for the body and blood of Christ.11
Percy argues that a common mistake about language (mistaken in be-
ing incomplete) is that the purpose of language is to convey information. In 
addition to conveying information, “words are potent agents,” Percy writes in 
“Metaphor as Mistake.”12 The words segregation and integration do more than 
convey information; in fact, conveying information is the least thing they do. A 
thorough reading of the dictionary entries for these words does not encompass 
them. Each comes with a long train of history (like Kripke’s “links of a chain”) 
and evokes groups of committed persons with complex philosophies; each 
word has a picture (cf. Wittgenstein’s “picture theory”).13 This is undoubtedly 
true as well about what Percy calls the three mysteries of the Christian faith: 
the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the real Presence in the Eucharist.14 
In present thought, there is a wide rift between those who think that 
the study of consciousness is and only is a “third-person” affair and those 
who think that first-person, lived consciousness is the primary category. For 
the former group, psychological consciousness is to be studied objectively 
and as a matter of science. Once all of the psychological causes of conscious-
ness are stated and neuroscience explains what causes consciousness, then 
there will be no more left to do.
For the latter group, phenomenal consciousness, individual experience 
of one’s own consciousness, gets the primacy. It is the primacy of lived con-
sciousness, that is, the first-person consciousness of subjective experience. 
On this view, one cannot give a full and complete account of consciousness 
with respect to its causes and structure, as studied in cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience, without remainder. As David Chalmers puts it (using 
Kripke’s notions of possible worlds from Naming and Necessity), in creating, 
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once God had fixed all the microphysical facts, he still had more work to do; 
there was phenomenal consciousness left.15 In his own way, Percy discusses 
this in “The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry” (first published in 1957) where he 
writes that psychiatry must decide if it is a biological science or a humanistic 
discipline.16 In other words, is consciousness without or with remainder?
Consider a zombie world: a molecule-for-molecule identical world, 
but populated with beings without consciousness. Chalmers argues that 
such a zombie world is conceivable and therefore logically possible. If it 
is logically possible, then lived consciousness must be something over and 
above the physical facts. Consciousness supervenes on the microphysical 
facts in our world, the natural world, but it does not do so in every possible 
world. Therefore, in the same way that language is more than mere mean-
ing, consciousness is more than mere matter, which is a belief that Percy 
certainly shared.
In a prescient essay in 1958, Percy suggests a reason for this rift in 
views of consciousness and a way to close the gap between psychological 
and phenomenal consciousness. So central does Percy take language to be 
to human knowledge that he makes this startling claim for its importance: 
the rift has resulted “from a failure to appreciate the extraordinary role 
of the symbol, especially the language symbol, in man’s orientation to the 
world.”17 Percy likes the primacy that Husserl gives to first-person conscious-
ness, but regrets Husserl’s failure to appreciate the social dimension of that 
consciousness. Mind and consciousness develop within a social process: 
that’s why the morality of segregation may seem like common sense. Their 
sensitivities or background commitments are developed within a society 
with a coherent belief system.
In the article, Percy continues in the Peirce-Kripke vein: he argues that 
what happens when someone learns the meaning of a word is the grasping 
of the concept not of a thing but of an event. Further, when we learn a word, 
“what we wish to know is what happens.”18 The meaning of a (noun) word is 
as much a reference to what happens between people (speaker, hearer) as 
it is a reference to a thing. “Denotation is an exercise in intersubjectivity.”19 
When two supporters of segregation are talking about segregation, however 
objective they try to be, this talk is still first and foremost a meeting of two 
subjects, an “I-Thou” meeting, whose thinking is constrained by their con-
ceptual categories and rigid designators. When they speak of segregation, 
they are not aware of it (period); they are speaking of what it is for them 
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qua southern Stoics. What seems to be commonsensical and self-evident is 
always the common sense and self-evidence of the community.
Conversations have a way of reinforcing the beliefs people already 
have. And this kind of reinforcement is pleasant; it cements the community. 
The discordant voice of the integrationist, especially when it is the voice of 
one of the members of the community, is much more jarring. Every act of 
consciousness is a participation in a community; pace Husserl, there is no 
isolated ego-consciousness. “The I think is only made possible by a prior 
mutuality: we name.”20 
Language and the Psalms
The communal language of the Israelites, which became and still is the 
communal prayer book of the Catholic Church, is the Psalms. It is unsur-
prising that “Negro spirituals” of the New World were often comprised of 
the Psalms since these praises of David often have as their subject matter 
the downtrodden, oppressed, and forgotten, as Jesus Christ during the Cru-
cifixion, as reported by both Matthew (27:46) and Mark (15:34); “Eli, Eli 
[Eloi, Eloi] lama sabachthani” is the first line of Psalm 21 (22): “My God, 
My God, why have you forsaken me?” Also, as a lay affiliate (oblate) of the 
Roman Catholic monastic order of St. Benedict, Percy prayed the Office of 
Lauds. The psalm prayed on Sundays, Feasts, and Solemnities in the Divine 
Office (Liturgy of the Hours) is as follows:
O God, you are my God whom I seek; For my flesh pines and my soul thirsts 
like the earth parched, lifeless and without water. Thus have I gazed toward 
you in the sanctuary to see your power and glory, For your kindness is a 
greater good than life; my lips glorify you. . . . But they shall be destroyed who 
seek my life, they shall go to the depths of the earth; They shall be delivered 
over to the sword, and shall be the prey of jackals. The King, however, shall 
rejoice in God; everyone who swears by him shall glory, but the mouths of 
those who speak falsely shall be stopped. (Psalm 62)
Many of the Psalms take this form: the psalmist praising God while de-
claring his own unworthiness, followed by stanzas of rejoicing at the destruc-
tion of his enemy. The Psalms have spoken to the least among humanity from 
the times of the Babylonian exile of the Hebrew people (circa 350 BC) until 
the present day. Why do the Psalms bring so much comfort to the afflicted? 
And further, what do the Psalms have to do with language and integration?
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The theology of the Psalms is the theology of blacks in the South, the less 
powerful in the land of the powerful, the Africans in the antebellum South 
held in their own Babylonian captivity.21 Pity is a distinctly Stoic emotion, 
and in Walker Percy’s uncle and adoptive father Will’s Lanterns on the Levee 
(originally published in 1941, republished with Walker’s introduction in 1973), 
he shows himself an exemplar of southern Stoicism. He writes at the begin-
ning of the chapter entitled “A Note on Racial Relations,” “A superabundance 
of sympathy has always been expended on the Negro, neither undeservedly 
nor helpfully, but no sympathy whatever, so far as I am aware, has ever been 
expended on the white man living among the Negroes. Yet he, too, is worthy 
not only of sympathy but of pity for many reasons. To live habitually as a 
superior among inferiors. . . . To live among a people whom, because of their 
needs, one must in common decency protect and defend.”22 This quotation, 
in addition to demonstrating the Stoic virtue of pity, also demonstrates the 
Stoic view of those lower than them socially. This quote is very jarring to 
modern ears, but one must remember, as Percy pointed out, that his uncle 
“was regarded as a liberal, a dangerous liberal” by his contemporaries.23 
But in the Psalms, pity or compassion (rachamim) is almost exclusively 
reserved for God.24 Therefore, it is inappropriate for the landowner to be 
compassionate toward his servants. The relationship of humans to each 
other is as children of the same father. To take a compassionate attitude 
toward other human beings is to usurp the place that must be held by God 
alone. It is not pity that is called for, but solidarity and love.
The Psalms contain some the most powerful words in Hebrew Scrip-
ture because they demonstrate through poetry and song the closeness of 
God to his people, particularly the oppressed or forgotten. The Psalms, 
then, are demonstrative of the potency of language. The theology of the 
Psalms is in stark contrast to the ethos of the Stoic. In his article “Stoicism 
and the South,” Percy asserts that, with respect to integration, there are just 
two attitudes available to the southern moderate: either that of the Psalms 
or that of Epictetus, who ironically was born into slavery himself.25 Having 
rejected southern Stoicism, Percy’s obvious choice would be the Psalms.
Integration
Through his study of semiotics Percy came to see the power that words 
have, and how the words of the Psalms or Epictetus are strong enough 
either to make one firm in one’s convictions as a segregationist or to induce 
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one to become an integrationist. Further, since the understanding of a word 
is, according to Percy’s semiotics, experiential, then if one is experiencing 
the evils of segregation and reflects upon the language of the Psalms and 
the teachings of the Church, then one must become an integrationist. But 
before we turn to Percy’s awakening, we have to discuss the thought of a 
Lutheran that led him, in part, to Catholicism.
Catholicism
Kierkegaard
By the end of the 1940s Percy exchanged the southern Stoicism of his early 
life and of his class for the Christian, specifically Catholic, worldview, shown 
in his change of heart (and mind) on segregation. How a person comes to 
change a fundamental worldview remains ultimately mysterious. We can 
say this of any person, but particularly of a private and scholarly person 
like Percy. What happens in the internal forum, the place where the self 
meets and converses with the self—and with God—can only be guessed 
at, however. Further, when Percy did sit down to explain his conversion in 
an essay, he left the reason for the conversion unstated, as we will discuss 
below.
Though Kierkegaard is Protestant and Percy became a Catholic, we can 
assume Kierkegaard’s influence on Percy by his quoting Kierkegaard in the 
epigraph to The Moviegoer. Consider Kierkegaard’s signature narratives of 
the three types of people: the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious. Percy 
shared Kierkegaard’s view of Christianity as a “scandal” to the unbeliever, 
even the morally upright unbeliever. For Percy to break with his society 
in general and his family in particular, and that for the sake of the South’s 
minority religion of Catholic Christianity, can rightly be called a scandal.
In Kierkegaard’s three stages, one progresses from the aesthetic 
through the ethical to the religious. The characters in Percy’s books often 
progress through these steps or, as in the case of Binx in The Moviegoer, skip 
the ethical and graduate directly to the religious.26 The aesthetic man lives 
for beauty and pleasure, in part as a way to escape boredom and depression. 
In his college years, Percy pursued beauty and pleasure. As a tuberculosis 
patient hospitalized for months, Percy, it can safely be assumed, battled 
boredom. As he was the grandson and son of suicides whose mother died 
early in a car accident (possibly another suicide), it seems just as safe to as-
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sume that Percy battled depression and existentialist despair. As Binx mulls 
over in his own mind in chapter 3 of The Moviegoer, beauty is a strong 
motivator (though perhaps not as strong as avarice). At this stage, Binx (and, 
early on, Percy) is Kierkegaard’s aesthetic man.
Before his gradual and mostly hidden shift in worldview, Percy per-
sonified the ethical man. A good reputation is also a strong motivator: the 
desire to seem noble in his own eyes and in his community’s can carry a 
person far. Such is the wellspring of action of the moral person, if the person 
is a southern Stoic in Percy’s sense of the term. Such was, apparently, the 
wellspring of action for William Percy and other southern Stoics. But the 
highest kind of individual, according to Kierkegaard and certainly affirmed 
by Percy, is the religious man.
Why isn’t morality enough? Why add religion? In the mid-twentieth 
century, a groundbreaking essay by G. E. M. Anscombe halted the unstint-
ing march of academic ethics toward greater independence from religion by 
pointing out that rule-based morality, whether consequentialist or deonto-
logical, suffered from the incoherence of laws without a lawgiver.27 But with 
the Kierkegaardian view, one’s religious commitment is rightly restored to 
its place as the capstone of all other commitments, including ethical ones. 
Ethics in light of religion looks different and leads to different commitments 
and positions than ethics on its own, even assuming that there is such a 
thing.
Those who would consistently develop the virtues over many years 
require sufficient motivation. Religious commitment provides that motiva-
tion. A leap-in-the-dark faith commitment to God, for Kierkegaard, is good 
in its own right. Returning to the motif of language, one can see a similarity 
between Kierkegaard and the early Wittgenstein (that is, the Wittgenstein 
of Tractatus): the ineffable begins where language loses its meaning. Percy 
felt the same way about the ineffability of faith, in particular the Incarna-
tion, the Trinity, and the Eucharist; fiction better suited Percy’s purpose 
than careful philosophical analysis.
When asked in 1971 about the difficulties of being a Catholic writer, 
Percy responded, “The main difficulty is that of language. Of course the 
deeper themes of my novels are religious. When you speak of religion it is 
almost impossible for a novelist because you have to use standard words 
like ‘God’ and ‘salvation’ and ‘baptism,’ ‘faith,’ and the words are pretty well 
used up. They’re old words. They are still good words, but the trick of the 
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novelist, as the Psalmist said, is to sing a new song, us new words.”28 So we 
can see the fundamental problem for Percy when writing about religion: he 
has to use words, and words are idea formers as much as, or more than, they 
are idea conveyors. Word choices are also subtle persuaders. The words of 
the Psalms, the daily bread for Benedictine oblates, must have formed and 
reflected Percy’s intellectual development. Further, Percy’s semiotics are 
reflected in the above quote since the meaning of words are grasped qua 
experience.
Truth is good in its own right. What Percy takes from Kierkegaard, 
too, is that truth must be valued, not merely known. It must matter to the 
individual; it must be true to the individual. Moral values flourish against 
a horizon of nonmoral values. Rightly understood, the ethical is dependent 
on the religious. The religious dimension is not an add-on to the ethical, as 
the example of Binx makes clear. A moral view, that is, a moral view that 
avoids despair and boredom, can exist only, or can exist best, when there are 
other things we value more: “Seek first the kingdom of God and all the rest 
is added.” Thus, “What matters is to find my purpose, to see what it really is 
that God wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth that is truth 
for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die.”29 
For inspiration and motivation for a sustained commitment, morality 
is not enough. Given the attractiveness of a life of pleasure (the aesthetic 
life), why be faithful to (moral) laws without a lawgiver? Morality without 
the religious foundation becomes complacent and accepts the status quo 
values of the community. Even given its virtues of tolerance and courtesy, 
the southern Stoic morality is little more than the life of pleasure, the life 
of the aesthetic, or at best like Uncle Will, the ethical man. It seems as 
if morality without the inspiration of being a Catholic, at least for Percy, 
left him unable to see the wrongness of segregation. It took the jolt to his 
imagination that came with his conversion and religious commitment to 
break through to integration.
In The Moviegoer, Kate Cutrer says that she knows herself and wants 
to be a religious person: someone who, with her last rational act, surren-
ders her rationality to one who will guide her. It does not take a novel-as-
autobiography view to see that Percy was thinking out his own decision in 
a piece of fiction; novelists write about what they know. Kate will make the 
leap of faith; so had Percy.
A religious commitment, at least of the kind that Percy made when he 
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became a Catholic, helps in a system of morality in a number of ways. It 
provides motivation and inspiration; it serves as a reminder that the moral 
life is never finished, that perfect justice is a hope and not a premortem 
reality. It provides a way of seeing. One’s religious commitment is always 
in tension with one’s political commitment. Percy’s becoming a Catholic 
endangered his membership in the southern Stoic community.
There is a bumper sticker that reads: “You cannot be both Catholic and 
pro-abortion.” Is this true? Walker Percy’s bumper sticker might read: “You 
can’t be both Catholic and pro-segregation.” Can one? As a matter of em-
pirical fact, one can, since some Catholic groups favored segregation. But 
of course the point of our hypothetical bumper sticker is to proclaim that 
segregation, and the set of principles in which it is nested, is inconsistent 
with Catholic principles.
Percy’s segregationists are nice people; above all, they are polite. 
Percy’s southern white segregationist contemporaries graciously accepted 
their position of superiority in the community, but treated their black infe-
riors well. It took a jolt in the form of a religious conversion to move Percy 
from silent advocate of segregation to active spokesperson for integration. 
Not only had he moved from the ethical to the religious; the religious had 
transformed the ethical.
Conversion
Walker Percy traded the metaphors and myth of the American South’s ver-
sion of Stoicism for the more demanding and more complex metaphors and 
myth of the Catholic vision of reality. Walker Percy is first and foremost a 
literary man, not a philosopher. His argot is myth and metaphor. In “Meta-
phor as Mistake” he expresses his approval of “what [Owen] Barfield called 
‘that old authentic thrill which binds a man to his library for life: the meta-
phorical.’” He notes: “The theorist is insensitive to the beauty of metaphor.” 
Welcoming myth and metaphor, the fiction writer, like “the primitive,” 
“comes face to face with something . . . so distinctive that it might be said to 
have a presence.” Myth and metaphor are associated in Percy’s mind with 
the thing apprehended and validated for you and me by naming.30
The Catholic myth’s answer to the old philosophical problem of appear-
ance and reality is this: the way things appear to be is not the way things 
are. The new myth for Percy was the Catholic vision of the way things really 
are: despite appearances, all human persons have infinite worth and are de-
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serving of unqualified and undifferentiated respect. The worth of persons is 
not dependent on how they look, on what they do, or on their contributions 
to society. This myth grabbed Percy’s intelligent and active imagination.
The myth Percy embraced is the inspirational one captured in Corpus 
Christi, a daring idea that takes the preposterously high view of human be-
ings implied by a high Christology. The commingling of human beings with 
the divine in the person of Christ is not to be understood primarily as the 
lowering of the divine to the human but as the uplifting of the human into 
the divine. In the words of the Catholic liturgy when the wine is mixed with 
the water: “May we come to share in the divinity of Christ, who humbled 
himself to share in our humanity.”31
Percy explained the other part of the appeal of Catholicism in the 
essay “Why Are You Catholic?” Percy wrote, “The reason I am a Catholic 
is that I believe that what the Catholic Church proposes is true.”32 This 
answer is evasive, a kind of nonanswer. In fact, although the article is 
purportedly written to answer the question, Percy spends the first half 
of the essay saying he won’t and then the second half going no further 
than stating that he accepts the Judeo-Christian viewpoint but explicitly 
refusing to state why he picked the “Catholic brand.” So the reader is left 
at the end of the essay where he was at the beginning: Percy is a Catholic 
because he believes that the Catholic Church is the guardian of depositum 
fidei, the deposit of faith.
Percy accepted what the Catholic Church teaches on moral, social, 
and political issues (Kierkegaard’s ethical man) because he first accepted 
the Catholic vision of the way things should be. His imagination guided 
his reason; as befits a disciple of Kierkegaard, his being as a religious man 
guided his being as an ethical man. In fact, Percy gives Kierkegaard’s The 
Difference between a Genius and an Apostle partial credit for his conver-
sion.33 The relationship between religion on the one hand and politics and 
morality on the other is asymmetrical. The former shapes and evaluates the 
latter but not vice versa.
That one’s religious commitment is first and foremost an act of the 
imagination might help explain why many an intelligent person stays Catho-
lic even in the face of the current scandals over the abuse of children and 
adolescents by Catholic priests and the concomitant cover-up by bishops. It 
makes all the more sense to think that imagination is the organ of commit-
ment, especially for Walker Percy, since he was a religious man and not just 
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a literary man, just as Kierkegaard regarded the religious man as higher (in 
fact, two steps higher) than the aesthetic man.
A person committed to a certain religious tradition does not and should 
not tolerate everything in moral matters; his religious commitment alters 
and shapes his imagination to see beyond conventional morality. He returns 
to the vision of that tradition through imagination, and works out the moral 
system from that insight of his imagination. It is tempting to reduce Ca-
tholicism to moral theory or a political theory, but it is neither.34 It is being 
committed to a comprehensive, sacramental view that is a kind of seeing-as. 
Being a Christian is not a matter of becoming one more political party;35 it 
is being formed as a person of a certain sort who brings the vision of who he 
is to his decision about what he does.
Kierkegaard’s Individual View vs. Catholic Community View
Part of the Catholic version of the Christian view is the priority of the com-
munal over the individual. Percy rejects what could be called the Lockean 
“punctuated self” and what Charles Taylor calls “the buffered self.”36 In his 
otherwise superb biography of Percy, Jay Tolson misrepresents Percy’s posi-
tion as solitary and isolated.37 It is true that his position was solitary and 
isolated in the sense that he was very nearly the lone dissenting voice in 
the southern Stoic community, but as a Catholic he understood himself not 
as an isolated individual but as a member of a worldwide community, “the 
Church militant.” He was very much alone in that he broke with his fam-
ily’s—and especially his influential uncle’s—southern Stoicism, but what 
Tolson calls his “solitude” is better described as his leaving one community 
to join another, effected by his conversion. Like many early Christians, he 
left his biological family to join his adopted church family, which is what 
Christ called his followers to do: “If anyone comes to me without hating his 
father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, and even his own 
life, he cannot be my disciple. Whoever does not carry his own cross and 
come after me cannot be my disciple” (Luke 14:26–27).
But once Percy got to that new community, the Catholic community, 
he was unfortunately alone, there, too. Many of his white Catholic contem-
poraries were segregationists. A white person living in the South at Percy’s 
time who failed to be a Stoic might be one who rejected his superior status, 
as perhaps Thomas Merton did, as a contemporaneous southerner (via 
France, England, Rome, and New York) at Gethsemani monastery. Flan-
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nery O’Connor, or at least many of the characters in her short stories, did, 
too. For example, in “A Good Man Is Hard to Find,” the grandmother sees 
the murderer as her son: a relationship of family. Also, in O’Connor’s “The 
Displaced Person,” the old priest, representing the Catholic world order, 
sitting on the porch with the white landowner for whom the Polish refugee 
worked, sees all before him as God’s created order.
Embracing a Catholic Identity
It is rare to find people who say that they reject morality. Some people 
espouse a view of morality that we would rightly call faulty or have their 
own code of ethics: it is disordered, distorted, or incomplete; they are like 
members of the Mafia, who hold themselves to elaborate rules of conduct 
founded on a sharp distinction between their own and those who are not 
their own. Their code is similar to the personal code of Count Vronsky in 
Anna Karenina. “These principles were laid down as invariable rules: that 
one must pay a cardsharper, but need not pay a tailor; that one must never 
tell a lie to a man, but one may to a woman; that one must never cheat any 
one, but one may a husband; that one must never pardon an insult, but one 
may give one.”38 
The moral rules of the southern Stoic, like the Mafia’s and Count Vron-
sky’s, are based on the dichotomy of self and the other. The southern Stoic 
must welcome other southern Stoics to his club but must not let in blacks; he 
addresses whites with titles and by their last name and his black servants by 
their first names. He is polite to all, because politeness self-valorizes.
A change in a moral code comes with the widening of the scope of 
those included as one’s own. To return to the previous example, an improved 
Count Vronsky would see that he must repay all his legitimate debtors, not 
just those to the right people; that women as well as men have intrinsic moral 
worth and deserve honesty; that no one should be cheated, and so on. Such 
changes are much more likely to result from a burst of imagination than an 
improvement in reasoning. Thus, the grandmother in Flannery O’Connor’s 
short story “A Good Man Is Hard to Find” speaks from a sudden burst of 
insight, seeing the serial murderer as one of her own, not the other. And 
Thomas Merton, walking down a familiar street, sees passersby no longer 
as not-monks, as “other,” but as his own. He sees that his status as a monk 
does not privilege him over others. In fact, it is this very status as a monk 
that requires him to give up seeing himself as privileged. The preconverted 
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Percy, so strongly influenced by his Uncle Will, thought it was ethical to 
treat blacks differently from whites in a way that confirmed the former’s 
status as occupying a lower place in society. The postconverted Walker 
could not; he sided with Archbishop Joseph Rummel of New Orleans, of 
whom more is said below.
Kant and other modern deontological moral philosophers think that 
the properly exalted view of a human being is attributable to his status as 
an individual, acting alone, with the aid of the categorical imperative. Even 
Kant’s “community of ends” is best thought of as a cohesive set of indepen-
dent agents. But for Percy, that exalted status, including and exceeding a 
proper morality, follows from the whole human community’s relationship as 
community to the divine. It is his acceptance of the Christian exalted view 
of the human person—or, more accurately, the Catholic Christian view of 
the human community—that marks the turning point for Percy. The mod-
ern scientific view, definitionally separated from the religious view, is, like 
the purely ethical nonreligious view, “radically incoherent when it seeks to 
understand man qua man.”39 In his acceptance of the Catholic communal 
view, Percy truly is isolated in the sense that he is part of the diminish-
ing minority of Americans who reject the radical individualism of the self 
characteristic of the twentieth-century United States. 
Even those blacks who accepted their stable but inferior position in 
the mid-twentieth century South still tried to limit the boundaries of their 
inferiority. The black servant in the Cutrer family, in The Moviegoer, shows 
by his posture that although he is a chauffeur he is not a servant.
Mercer lets me in . . . Today he does not say “Mister Jack” and I know that 
the omission is deliberate, the consequence of a careful weighing of pros and 
cons. Tomorrow the scales might tip the other way (today’s omission will go 
into the balance) and it will be “Mister Jack.”
For some reason, it is possible to see Mercer more clearly today than usual. 
Ordinarily it is hard to see him because of the devotion. . . . He is thought to 
be devoted to us and we to him. But the truth is that Mercer and I are not at 
all devoted to each other. My main emotion around Mercer is unease that in 
threading his way between servility and presumption, his foot might slip. I 
wait on Mercer, not he on me.40 
This passage is rich with insights into Percy’s incipient move toward an 
antisegregationist view. Mercer’s superficial politeness layers over and belies 
222  Brendan P. Purdy and Janice Daurio
his rebellion against inequality, especially insofar as that inequality follows 
not so much, or not fully, from his having willingly accepted the position of 
servant but from white society’s expectation of blacks as “naturally” occupy-
ing that position. Finally, note that “devotion” is a virtue of the southern 
Stoic; so is politeness. Alas, the part of the southern Stoic code prescribing 
politeness might not only hide but exacerbate the enmity between classes; it 
is this Stoicism that is discussed next.
Stoicism
Historical Considerations
George Washington, commander in chief of the Continental army and first 
president of the United States, was the quintessential Southern Gentleman 
in the cavalier tradition. The cavaliers came from the south of England to 
Virginia predominantly between 1642 and 1675, the second wave of perma-
nent English immigration to North America.41
The society of the cavaliers was founded on a “moral of manners” 
much stronger than a mere sense of appropriate behavior. These morals 
became part of the fabric of culture for the young gentry through formal 
education (for example, memorization and writings) as well as informally 
by experiencing colonial Virginian culture. For example, among the ear-
liest writings of Washington is a list of 110 rules of manners. The young 
cavaliers like Washington were given “freedom of will” not as end in itself, 
but in the Greek manner as a means of achieving virtue. As David Hackett 
Fisher writes in his seminal Albion’s Seed about the colonial cavaliers, “It 
was a stoic ideal which cultivated a calm acceptance of life. It taught that 
one must fear nothing and accept whatever fate might bring with courage, 
honesty, dignity, and grace. The mastery of this stoic creed was one of the 
central goals of socialization in Virginia.”42 
While Washington was not a bibliophile, he is known to have read and 
owned a copy of an English summary of Seneca’s Dialogues and Addison’s 
Cato. Further, as has oft been told of Valley Forge, Washington ordered and 
attended a production of Cato for his officers during the bleak, bitter winter 
of 1777–78. If one peruses his corpus, one sees that Washington returned 
again and again to Cato.
The difficulty that all Americans must face is the irreconcilable tension 
between two facts: two of their greatest Founding Fathers, Washington and 
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Jefferson (of whom more will be said later), created a nation founded on the 
inalienable rights of “justice and liberty for all” yet owned slaves. In the 
case of Washington, he directed that his slaves were to be freed upon his 
wife Martha’s death (in fact, she freed them in 1800, two years before her 
death). So in some sense, Washington must have known that slavery was 
wrong, yet he was bound by an evil current in his time and place.43
This cavalier tradition was epitomized in the gentry of the American 
South and with it came the tensions between the highest Stoic ideals and 
slavery, and later segregation. This contradiction between slave owner and 
Founding Father can be properly understood only in light of the Stoic influ-
ence on the cavalier. This tension did not go away with the abolition of 
slavery—the evil festered with Jim Crow laws. A Stoic, as Seneca taught, 
must treat both those below him and those above him in status with respect 
and kindness. This is why the southern Stoics crusaded against both the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK) and the integrators. They were opposed to the former 
since the KKK used fear and violence (two non-Stoic attributes) against 
those “beneath them in dignity,” and they were opposed to the latter since 
they were upsetting the social order of master and servant.
Philosophical Considerations
Why didn’t good people in the mid-1800s figure out, all on their own, that 
slavery is wrong? Why didn’t good people in the mid-1900s in the South 
figure out, all on their own, that segregation is wrong? For one thing, as 
mentioned above, change happens with community. Also, it must be said, 
no coherent worldview is wholly devoid of praiseworthy elements. The 
American myth of slave owners and slaves living in peace, although false, 
must have been in some instances at least somewhat true. And the word 
“separate” in a phrase with “but equal” has an undeniably intuitive appeal.
The appeal of both myths, the peaceful slave/master relationship and 
peaceful segregation, is founded on that quintessential American value: 
individual freedom, at least for the slave owner and the white segregation-
ist. The myth is threatened by the same value: blacks did not freely choose 
either arrangement. Arguably, however, even whites in the South did not 
fully agree to segregation, even when they thought that they did. Consider 
these three elements in the acceptance of a moral theory.
First, moral theories, like all theories, including scientific ones, 
require imagination as much as rationality. It takes a significant infusion 
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to the imagination by a powerful counter-myth to awaken change. White 
southern landowners might have agreed to segregation because they lacked 
the imagination to picture anything else. Their own paradigm of moral-
ity—Stoicism—worked well for them. Furthermore, blacks themselves, 
for a long time, did not protest; they might not have been able to imagine 
another way, given the violence they faced in retribution if they did imagine 
freedom and equality.
Second, the general moral theory of Stoicism, or more precisely the 
specific theory of southern Stoicism, succeeded well enough. And at first 
it succeeded very well. The southern Stoicism of upper-class whites in the 
South succeeded well enough to scare off the “scalawags” and “carpetbag-
gers.” But, like the characters in Alice in Wonderland who had to run just to 
stay in place, southern Stoics would have to change their concept of moral-
ity in order to keep moral.
Third, an individual’s views of morality depend strongly on the views of 
his community. It has to be this way for most people, who are not visionar-
ies. Percy was a visionary and even he, after his conversion, never entirely 
repudiated his southern Stoicism.44 Like the prisoner in Plato’s cave who 
escaped into the full light outside the cave and then returned to report 
his vision, he had to lead his fellow southern Stoics from Stoicism to a new 
vision of morality: a view he described as the true Christian one.
A way to bring these three elements of the acceptance of a moral be-
lief together is with evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory 
is the analysis of dynamic strategic interactions using such notions from 
biological evolution as replication and mutation. The theory is widely used 
in all of the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. A germane applica-
tion of evolutionary game theory is to the evolution of norms, which is of 
particular interest to philosophers.45 What evolutionary dynamics elucidates 
about a culture is that if a large proportion of the population has a certain 
belief, in this case “Segregation is correct,” then it is difficult for mutants 
to invade (a “mutant” in this sense being an individual who has beliefs that 
differ from the norm). Thus, evolutionary game theory tells us that Percy’s 
decision to become a mutant (that is, an integrationist) in a population of 
segregationists was a very difficult one to make. Note we are using game 
theory not to explain why Percy became an integrationist but rather, again, 
to demonstrate the difficulty of a minority belief becoming a majority belief.
Last, returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this section, 
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it is difficult for an otherwise intelligent and moral individual to pull back 
the veil of his prejudice. While this difficulty may help explain why good 
people believe in an evil societal structure, it by no means justifies such a 
belief.
Southern Stoicism
There are many kinds of Stoicism, including the ancient Greek one (Epicte-
tus) and the ancient Roman one. The latter is obviously important to Percy. 
The Moviegoer’s aunt leaves a quotation from Marcus Aurelius at Binx’s 
door after the two have a particularly important conversation.46 But the 
main Stoicism here is what Percy calls Southern Stoicism. In general, Sto-
ics—Greek, Roman, cavalier, and southern—believe that while all should 
be treated with respect; those beneath in dignity, such as slaves, are to be 
treated with a kindly paternalism. This kindly paternalism, of course, masks 
an inherent belief in the inequality of men and thus violates the modern 
notion of egalitarianism. An important example of this egalitarianism is the 
1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education, which ruled that 
separate is not equal.
To get a grasp of the thought of Stoicism, consider Roman Stoicism’s 
most eloquent proponent, Marcus Aurelius: “If it turns out that there is no 
life beyond the grave, then be assured that this is for the best. The gods 
would not have arranged it that way if it were not for the best.”47 Tranquil-
ity is Stoicism’s emblem, as can be found in Epictetus as well as Marcus 
Aurelius: “Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine 
stolen? Say to yourself, ‘This is the price paid for apathy, for tranquility, 
and nothing is to be had for nothing.’”48 One can say that the South’s social 
arrangements between classes are also, presumably, for the best; otherwise, 
whatever god or gods there are would not have so arranged things or al-
lowed such things. And regardless, the Stoic bears suffering with tranquil-
ity, making it an eminently traditional philosophy that doesn’t really lend 
itself much to change.
This emphasis on tranquility leads to the more political notion that the 
status quo should be kept because that is what the gods intended. Marcus 
Aurelius continues, “When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast 
forgotten this, that all things happen according to the universal nature.”49 
Noble submission to what is constitutes the hallmark of Stoicism. There-
fore, accepting the status quo is morally right, and trying to change it is 
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not only morally wrong but impious. Trying to change things is a rebuke 
to the gods.
In the case of the southern Stoics, they were trying to keep the status 
quo from attacks by the Ku Klux Klan on one side and by the integrationists 
on the other. While their opposition to the Klan is admirable, it is hard to 
parse: Was this done for true moral reasons or merely to defend the status 
quo—that is, to keep society tranquil?
However, defense of the status quo is not automatically the morally 
wrong choice; it depends on the status being defended. For example, the 
current status quo in the United States is integration, and this should be 
maintained. A moral individual has to be able to look beyond the norms of 
the culture and consider whether certain behaviors are right or wrong. This 
is where the southern Stoic clearly failed. For example, the early Christians 
in the decadent and bloody pagan Roman society stood out from their con-
temporaries because they were opposed to abortion, infanticide, adultery, 
and a whole litany of behaviors acceptable in Roman society.50 Thus, defense 
of an indefensible status quo is a negative outgrowth of the Stoic emphasis 
on tranquility.
It is easy to judge the sinners in the past when one has the benefit of 
enlightened views, which is why taking contemporary historical and philo-
sophical considerations into account is so important.51 In particular, it is 
easy to say to Percy, “Why did you not realize that segregation is evil ear-
lier?” Given that the southern Stoicism of the cavalier tradition permeated 
Percy’s life, one can see that his rejection of the status quo was difficult for 
him and thus all the more admirable. In the context of evolutionary game 
theory, it was difficult for Percy to become a mutant. Percy’s rejection of 
segregation means that not only did he come to the morally correct conclu-
sion about integration, he went one step further by publicly proclaiming his 
moral dissatisfaction with segregation. Both of these acts oppose the heart 
of Stoicism; the second act must have been more difficult than the first, 
since in performing it Percy publicly rejected southern society.
Perhaps one of the reasons that Stoicism was so prevalent in the 
American South, in addition to the cavalier tradition, is that it shares some 
affinities with the “Protestant” (broadly conceived) view that most southern 
Christians held. That view makes a distinction between the saved and the 
damned, where no action of the individual can change things. In fact, think-
ing that one’s actions can effect the most important change, salvation, is 
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sinful. So while it cannot be said that a Protestant view supported southern 
segregation, it might be said that destabilizing the current order needed an 
additional push from a non-Stoical ideal—in this case, Catholicism.
It is easy to see that a society permeated with both the cavalier tradi-
tion and Calvinist predestination would find it difficult to break free from 
the status quo. Of course, there were various events that broke the unholy 
edifice of treating blacks as second-class citizens, and we highlight a handful 
of the more notable ones here. First, there was the integration of the U.S. 
Armed Forces by Harry Truman in 1948 by executive order, first proposed 
by the Gillem Board in 1946. Second, Brown v. Board in 1954 (referred to 
by Percy as “the Decision”) was a momentous decision by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The economist Thomas Sowell eloquently expresses how important 
this Supreme Court decision was:
May 17, 1954, was a momentous day in the history of the United States, and 
perhaps the world. Something happened that afternoon that was all too rare 
in human history. A great nation voluntarily acknowledged and repudiated 
its own oppression of part of its own people. . . . Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion was clearly much more than another legal case to go into the long dusty 
rows of volumes of court decisions. It represented a vision of man and of the 
world that touched many hearts across the land and around the world. The 
anger and rancor it immediately provoked also testified to its importance. In 
a larger historical context, that such an issue should reach the highest court 
in the land was itself remarkable. In how many places and in how many eras 
could an ordinary person from a despised race challenge the duly constituted 
authorities, force them to publicly defend their decisions, retreat, and finally 
capitulate?52 
President Dwight Eisenhower used the National Guard to enforce 
Brown and to compel integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Ar-
kansas, in 1957. This was a watershed moment in the struggle for civil rights 
since the federal government was finally formally acting to end American 
apartheid. In addition to these federal actions, the organic growth of the 
civil rights movement, led by (the Protestant) Martin Luther King (most 
publicly from 1955), contributed to the demise of the status quo. 
Percy’s conversion to Catholicism influenced his transition to the inte-
grationist viewpoint. Percy never alluded to Protestant/Catholic difference, 
but Tolson suggests it in his biography of Percy. He says that Percy “might 
even have been attracted to the idea of Catholicism as the foundation for a 
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renewed human community, though Percy’s concern for the social dimen-
sions of his faith seems to have come somewhat later” than his conversion.53 
The Stoic view is a moral view, but it is a moral view in which some set the 
standards for all. Whether it’s whites setting standards for blacks or the 
reverse, southern Stoicism seems to betray the ancient classical Stoicism, 
which moves toward equality based on shared rationality. But because clas-
sical Stoicism’s inclusivity is founded on shared rationality, it is very different 
from any kind of inclusivity in the Judeo-Christian order upheld by Percy. 
On the Christian view, inclusion comes from shared membership in the 
kingdom of God: very different from the Stoic or the Enlightenment ideal.
As Percy began to publicly enter into the debate over integration, he 
realized that his conversion to Catholicism a decade or so earlier put him 
in a unique position as a southern moderate. Uncle Will, William A. Percy, 
Percy’s larger-than-life hero and adoptive father, was also a southern mod-
erate, as were almost all of those in the upper-class cavalier tradition. But 
Uncle Will instantiated the model southern cavalier in the Stoic tradition. 
Will considered himself a moderate: he battled against one extreme, the 
violence and fear of the KKK, and against another, those blacks who no 
longer would accept apartheid.54 Will could not countenance the civil rights 
movement because he could not support the overturn of the established 
social order of the grand southern tradition. In this sense, one can see why 
Uncle Will considered himself a moderate: a moderate was for tranquility 
and tradition.
Percy wanted to both honor his uncle and support desegregation; he 
tried to serve these two masters but could not (cf. Matthew 6:24).55 What 
Percy received from the Catholic Church and what he learned from Kier-
kegaard was confirmation of his repudiation of Uncle Will’s admiration for 
Stoicism. While the Stoic-Christian southerner thought that he was living as 
a Christian, Percy pointed out in the 1956 Commonweal article that he was 
not. He was living the life of the Stoic, and while being a southern Stoic and 
a Christian are not mutually exclusive, a true Christian Stoic is a Christian 
first and a Stoic second.
It is easy to understand why Thomas Jefferson who, like Washington, 
was a Virginian of the cavalier tradition, famously modified the New Testa-
ment as the Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth, wherein he excluded the 
Trinity, divinity, miracles, angels, and the rest but kept the “moral” teach-
ings of Jesus. For the cavalier Jefferson, Jesus is no longer Christ, but in fact 
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merely another Stoic thinker. One may wonder what Jefferson’s response 
was to the Acts of the Apostles, chapter 17, when St. Paul directly confronts 
the Stoics at the Areopagus with the Gospel of Christ.56 The Athenians 
would not have been upset if Paul had merely proclaimed the morals of 
Jesus, but claiming a man as God was more than they could countenance.
It is too simple to say merely that Will was a segregationist and Walker 
was not. It is too simple because for a long time Walker did accept Uncle 
Will’s romanticized view of the South, with everyone in a segregated status 
quo enjoying bucolic peace with politeness and deference, as Tolson notes: 
“The romance of the Old South had never been more slickly packaged, but 
Walker fell for [Margaret Mitchell’s] Gone with the Wind at least as hard 
as Uncle Will did. . . . Apart from its anecdotal interest, Percy’s enthusiasm 
for Gone with the Wind sheds some light on what he then [summer 1936] 
thought about southern society and history. It suggests that for all his wari-
ness about the southern romance—the idealized picture of the southern 
gentry, the happy submissiveness of blacks, the codes of honor and chivalric 
heroism—he was still [then] very much under its sway.”57 
“Stoicism and the South”
In his important contribution to Commonweal in 1956, Percy judges be-
tween Epictetus and the Psalms in favor of the latter. Percy begins the 
article by discussing the current state of the “upper-class white Southerner,” 
who is no longer the “champion of the Negro” but rather has “unshouldered 
his burden for someone else to pick up”; “he is either silent or he is lead-
ing the Citizens Councils.” The reason the cavalier has laid down Kipling’s 
white man’s burden is that he is “now fighting the same good fight as his 
fathers, who kicked out the scalawags and carpetbaggers and rescued the 
South.”58 But, Percy argues, while the southern Stoic believes himself to 
be unchanged and thereby fighting the same fight as his forefathers, he is 
not. He has changed, and further, the societal structure has changed. The 
edifice of the southern stoa is collapsing, since the cavalier ethos can no 
longer support it.
These white southerners fought the fight and won the race against past 
villains (scalawags, carpetbaggers); are they not entitled to rest from their 
labors and enjoy the respectability those victories bring them in society? 
The simple answer, according to Percy, the self-described moralist, is no, 
and that for two reasons.
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First, if one’s society changes around one, then one is required to adapt. 
(The general principles of morality, at the most abstract level, do not change, 
but the immediate rules of everyday existence have to change, precisely in 
order to be faithful to the unchanging general principles!) If for no other 
reason, because blacks themselves no longer found the peaceful imbalance 
acceptable, white southerners must change their mores. While morality and 
culture are intrinsically related in societies, the former must supersede the 
latter; otherwise, the culture dissolves into anarchy and violence. A recent 
example of this is the August 2011 riots in Britain that were initially a pro-
test against the Metropolitan police but became destructive and bloody. 
And while governments can support morality, they cannot properly create 
it, and if their policies help to destroy the family unit (the foundation of all 
morality), as slavery did to black families and social welfare policies have 
done in the West, then we are left amoral narcissists with a sense of entitle-
ment that is matched only by our refusal to accept responsibility for our 
own actions. Such a society cannot survive since there will be no one left 
who cares enough to save it, and in the end it will die in indifferent despair.
Second, social change can reveal that an apparently just societal ar-
rangement in the past not only does not work now but did not even work 
that well in the past. That societal arrangement never was what it claimed 
to be. The protective (because respectable) label “Christian” does not and 
did not ever apply to the imbalance of respectability between whites and 
blacks in the South.
While there are various reasons for the societal change (Brown v. 
Board, most prominently), none sufficiently explains why Stoicism is a failed 
ethical theory. Percy elaborates on how the “greatness of the South, like the 
greatness of the English squirearchy [that is, the cavaliers], has always had 
a stronger Greek flavor than it ever had a Christian.”59 Percy describes in 
poetic terms how the southern Stoic differs from the Christian, and while 
the upper-class white southerner lives in a Christian edifice, it is but an 
illusionary edifice that masks the stoa.
The segregationist arrangement was Roman Stoical, not Christian. In 
the Commonweal essay, Percy quotes the very passage from Marcus Au-
relius that Binx’s aunt puts in her note to him in The Moviegoer: “Every 
moment think steadily, as Roman and a man, to do what thou hast in hand 
with perfect and simple dignity, and a feeling of affection, and freedom, and 
justice.”60 This moral system, according to Percy, is inconsistent with the 
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call to bravery in “the Decalogue, the Beatitudes, the doctrine of the Mysti-
cal Body,” and shows that the southern Stoics’ allegiance is to Epictetus, not 
the Psalms.61 In their condescending attitude to blacks, whites displayed an 
arrogance that showed that they considered themselves to be superior. Note 
what Binx’s aunt says at the end The Moviegoer:
I’ll make you a little confession. I am not ashamed to use the word class. I will 
also plead guilty to another charge. The charge is that people belonging to my 
class think they’re better than other people. You’re damn right we’re better. 
We’re better because we do not shirk our obligations either to ourselves or to 
others. We do not whine. We do not organize a minority group and blackmail 
the government. We do not prize mediocrity for mediocrity’s sake. Oh I am 
aware that we hear a great many flattering things nowadays about your great 
common man—you know, it has already been revealing to me that he is per-
fectly content so to be called, because that is exactly what he is: the common 
man and when I say common I mean common as hell.62 
Most important, as a result of the old (unjust) societal structure in the 
South, “the white man has lost his oblige, the black man has lost his man-
ners, and insolence prevails.” And then echoing Washington, Jefferson, and 
all the other cavaliers: “Southern society was above all a society of manners.” 
But the Stoics have a further problem—while Christians consider hope to 
be a virtue, the Stoics do not have real hope; rather, their “finest hour is to 
sit tight-lipped and ironic while the world comes crashing down around” 
them.63 But irony does not support a crumbling empire nor lead to salvation.
Christianity has a way to build a New Jerusalem from the ruins of the 
Stoic South. The southern Stoic sees insolence in his former charge, “and 
this is what he can’t tolerate, the Negro’s demanding his rights instead of be-
ing thankful for the squire’s generosity.” For the Stoic this “insolent” attitude 
is particularly troublesome since the individual is not intrinsically precious; 
rather, it is one’s attitude toward him that matters. Thus, the insolence of 
the Negro reflects poorly on the southern Stoic.64 Thus, the decay of good 
manners and respect between black and white meant that the whites were 
failing as good Stoics. One can see the helplessness of the southern Stoics 
and understand why they remained silent among the debris of a shattering 
apartheid. But for the Christian, the human person is not, to paraphrase 
Percy, lost among the ruins; all humans have intrinsic, sacred worth. The 
way to rebuild the structure of southern society is through Christ.
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Toward the end of his article, Percy talks about Archbishop Rummel. 
As archbishop of New Orleans from 1935 to 1964, though largely lacking 
support from his own flock, Joseph Francis Rummel desegregated the arch-
diocese and, more slowly, the Catholic schools: “Ever mindful, therefore, 
of the basic truth that our Colored Catholic brethren share with us the 
same spiritual life and destiny, the same membership in the Mystical Body 
of Christ, the same dependence upon the Word of God, the participation 
in the Sacraments, especially the Most Holy Eucharist, the same need of 
moral and social encouragement. Let there be no further discrimination 
or segregation in the pews, at the Communion rail, at the confessional and 
in parish meetings, just as there will be no segregation in the kingdom 
of heaven.”65 Percy writes that unfortunately, “again the upper-class white 
Catholic has not distinguished himself. . . . They can no longer afford the 
luxury of Creole Catholicism.” Percy points out that the “Stoic-Christian 
Southern is offended” when Rummel calls segregation sinful since he 
“cannot help feeling that religion is overstepping its allowed area of mo-
rality”—sexuality, alcohol abuse, and gambling. The southern Stoic “is 
therefore confused and outraged when Christian teaching is applied to 
social questions.”66 In recent times, American life has not become any less 
complicated for the Christian in the public square. When Christian leaders 
speak out for life (from the moment of conception to natural death) or 
marriage, they are often met with a misunderstanding of the First Amend-
ment. Whether attacked by the cavaliers of the 1950s South or the moral 
relativists of today, the Christian faces scorn and hatred for living and 
proclaiming the Gospel of Christ.
Percy concludes his article by stating that the South must answer Rum-
mel’s question, but as of yet it has not been answered. “And the good pagan’s 
answer is no longer good enough for the South.”67 
In this essay we have argued that there are at least three strands that led 
to Walker Percy’s Second Coming from segregationist to integrationist. To 
purposefully use a religiously loaded term, Percy had to be converted from 
his belief in an immoral social system to a moral one. These three stands 
of Percy’s thought detailed here are semiotics, Catholicism, and Stoicism. 
While for the purposes of exposition, these strands were pulled apart, they 
are actually intertwined and form a cord. Since this cord is, in the end, held 
together by truth—that is, the Gospel of Christ—it is unbreakable.
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Walker Percy, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, and the Stoic 
and Christian Foundations of 
American Thomism
Peter Augustine Lawler
According to John Courtney Murray in We Hold These Truths, the task of 
American Catholics is to supply a theory adequate to the greatness of our 
Founders’ practical accomplishment.1 The dominant theory of our nation 
is Lockeanism, the theory of a middle-class country. We Americans, so 
the thinking goes, are basically beings with “interests” and so beings with 
“rights.” We are free beings who work and demand that everyone work for 
him- or herself. We are middle class insofar as we’re free, like aristocrats, 
to work like slaves, and we’re enlightened enough to know we risk being 
suckered if we rely on the love or the trust of others instead of ourselves. 
So we pride ourselves in methodically resisting social instinct with selfish 
calculation. Each of us is compelled to sustain his or her being in freedom, 
and so we work hard to push back our dependence on nature—including 
our dependence on the instincts we’re given as social animals. That under-
standing of the “abstract” individual, everyone knows, doesn’t do justice to 
the experience of free persons who love and die. It doesn’t do justice to us 
as either relational or properly proud beings, as beings personally privileged 
by the longings and capacities that distinguish each human soul.
For the American Catholic novelist/philosopher Walker Percy in Lost 
in the Cosmos (1983) and elsewhere, there are two indigenously American 
ways of criticizing or elevating the middle-class way of life.2 The first is the 
experience of the southern aristocrat—more specifically, the Stoic or philo-
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sophic consciousness of the best of those aristocrats. The other is Christian-
ity. Percy was raised by perhaps the most remarkable and penetrating of 
those Stoics. From his “Uncle Will” (the poet William Alexander Percy), he 
learned to appreciate the place of the aristocratic virtues of generosity and 
magnanimity in the formation of the character of a properly proud human 
being. And he learned what’s true about the aristocratic criticism of the 
petty, calculating materialism of the American middle class. This criticism 
is of people without “class,” without a social, rooted orientation in habit and 
thought that would tell them who they are and what they’re supposed to do 
as ladies and gentlemen in the world—and as beings open to the genuine, 
moral responsibilities they’ve been given by their natures and by their place 
in the world.
By turning to Christianity, Percy also learned the limits of such Sto-
icism: its denial of human equality, of justice, of rights, of what we owe 
in love to our fellow creatures. For Percy, American Thomism is what 
comes from an honest, Christian correction to what’s true about the Stoic 
criticism of middle-class life. That correction results in a very tentative, but 
very real, appreciation of the gains achieved by ordinary people—such as 
African Americans—under the influence of the middle-class conception of 
justice. Rights can be understood as not merely or even mainly the pos-
session of self-interested individuals in competition with each other for 
scarce resources, the possession of producers and consumers. They can also 
be understood as what’s given to free, loving, truthful, lying, wondering, 
wandering, irreducibly mysterious, unique, and irreplaceable beings under 
God. They can be understood to be rooted in the full, natural truth about 
the ontological difference that privileges members of our species.3
Because the South is now both the most aristocratic and the most 
Christian part of our country, Percy makes it clear that American Thomism 
could originate nowhere else. But American Christianity hardly originated 
in the South, and the southern, Stoic aristocracy was not really Christian at 
all. And we can turn to our friendly French observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, 
for evidence that Percy’s Thomistic insight about America is hardly new. 
For Tocqueville, too, reconciling human greatness or the full truth about 
human individuality with the egalitarian justice that has its source in our 
Creator depends upon both Christian and aristocratic corrections to the 
middle-class American’s self-understanding about what human liberty is. 
Tocqueville, like Percy, occupied a kind a privileged position as a person 
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with a genuinely aristocratic social and intellectual inheritance living in a 
democracy, and both men saw, finally, that Catholic Christianity, purged of 
aristocratic prejudices (but not aristocratic wisdom), is both the religion and 
the philosophy or metaphysics (Thomism) most suited to defend the truth 
about human liberty.
My purpose here is to show the similarity between Tocqueville’s and 
Percy’s analysis of American disorientation, of a people confused by not 
knowing the whole truth about who they are and what they’re supposed to 
do. So my purpose is to show that the seeds of American Thomism, at least, 
are already in Tocqueville’s two-volume Democracy in America (1835, 
1840).4 American Thomism, of course, might describe the project of Walker 
Percy—the attempt to put together what is true about southern Stoicism, 
Christianity, modern science, and even middle-class egalitarianism in a 
comprehensive understanding of who we are.5
The Pop Cartesian Americans
Percy remarks that he especially admires Tocqueville’s remarkable in-
sight that the Americans are Cartesians without having read a word of 
Descartes.6 The Cartesian method is also the democratic method, and it’s 
that democratic method that keeps Americans from reading the words of 
philosophers—Descartes or anyone else. Democratic intellectual freedom 
means thinking for—and finding what one most needs in—oneself. Modern 
democracy—based as it is on individual rights—depends upon skepticism 
or Cartesian doubt when it comes to being ruled by the words of others. I 
see no reason to privilege any opinion over my own, over my own view of 
my own interests, of what’s best for me. The “I” or the self is disconnected 
from other “I’s” in order to be autonomous or self-determining. And so the 
“I” denies that self-consciousness is essentially knowing with or for others. 
The “I”—in truth, an abstraction from the whole social being—confuses 
the experience of “selfish” disconnection with the whole truth about who 
he is. He does so to maximize his freedom, but in such a way as to make the 
real exercise of freedom, of conscious, responsible choice, impossible.
For Tocqueville, some shared dogma or shared certainty about who 
we are is a “salutary bondage” that makes free thought and action possible. 
Having to invent oneself out of nothing is an impossible task, one not even 
shared by God himself (2.1.2). The result of experiencing oneself as being 
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stuck with that task is anxious, paralyzing disorientation, what Percy de-
scribes as the hell of unguided or pure possibility.7 I know I’m not nothing, 
but I might be anything. So I find it impossible to choose to be anything 
in particular. I can’t simply choose to be who I am. To live well, I must 
somehow know who I am and what I’m supposed to do, and I can’t do that 
all by myself.8
So Percy and Tocqueville agree that the pop Cartesian “I” lacks the 
resources to separate himself from what Percy (following Heidegger) calls 
the “they” and what Tocqueville calls anonymous public opinion—opinion 
determined by no one in particular.9 The Cartesian self, untethered from 
others, turns out to have no content beyond the ineradicable experience of 
its “leftover” existence. I refuse to be ruled by other persons—to be suck-
ered out of love. But public opinion, being an anonymous, unerotic force 
that envelopes us all equally, doesn’t involve the same sort of undemocratic 
submission. The “I,” by rejecting all personal authority—the authority of 
beings with names—ends up submitting to anonymous self-surrender. My 
particular being becomes filled up with opinions that come from no one 
in particular. The individual, by regarding the social passions of love and 
hate as dangerous threats to his own self-sufficiency, becomes unerotically 
locked up in his petty self, unable to be moved to thought or action on his 
own.
The isolated or abstracted “I” has no intellectual or emotional point 
of view—no spirit of resistance—to display the unique and irreplaceable 
individuality characteristic of real or whole human persons. Doubt that 
animates resistance to personal rule by others is turned on oneself and 
eradicates the possibility of proud self-rule. The good modern, egalitarian 
news, Tocqueville observes, is that I can say nobody is better than I. The 
corresponding bad news is that I have no reason to say I’m better than 
anyone else (even if I deeply desire to do so). And so I—in particular—
can’t say why I shouldn’t submit to public opinion, just like everyone else. 
Public opinion provides ready-made answers to the questions anyone needs 
answered in order to live well, answers I’m in no position to discover for 
myself (2.1.2.)
That’s why, Percy and Tocqueville agree, the modern tendency is to 
replace the egalitarian and personal religion of Christianity with the egali-
tarian and impersonal religion of pantheism (2.1.7).10 There’s no better relief 
for the anxiety of being an isolated “I,” it would seem, than the thought that 
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we’re all alike—everything is alike—and we’re all God—or lacking in noth-
ing. Percy and Tocqueville both show that pantheism—in forms such as 
Western Buddhism—should be attacked as an enemy of human freedom or 
real individuality. Pantheism is a diversion from what we really know fueled 
by the isolated “I’s” impulse toward self-surrender. It’s a seductive lullaby 
that pushes individuals away from truthful thought and effective action.
The individual aims to lose himself in a whole in which he is a perfectly 
indistinct part by drawing upon the mind’s desire for a unified vision that 
admits of no irrational or accidental exceptions. So the movement from 
personal to impersonal religion today is the surrender of any attempt to 
understand or defend one’s own particular existence. Percy makes it clear 
that pantheistic self-surrender is finally impossible, but that’s not to say we 
aren’t personally diminished by the effort.
Percy does worry a good deal about the possibility of the chemical sup-
pression of the anxiety that accompanies self-consciousness. Drug-based 
psychiatry promises quick relief without any need for self-understanding. 
But even here, Percy is more worried about what such efforts will do to us 
than any real chance of their ultimate success.11
Tocqueville agrees that the reason poetry will never fade away, even in 
the seemingly most unidealistic or unadorned of democratic times, is that 
our most truthful or least deluded experience is of the particular, contin-
gent individual existing for a moment between two abysses, stuck, as it were, 
mysteriously between ignorance and knowledge when it comes to himself 
(2.1.17). Tocqueville sometimes echoes the Christian Pascal in describing 
the greatness and misery characteristic of particular members of our spe-
cies alone, which will always be fit subjects for the poetic imagination.
Tocqueville and Percy agree that Christianity, as Pascal says, knows 
man, or sees each of us as the “who”—not just the “what”—each of us re-
ally is. And that is why they defend personal religion—religion that distin-
guishes between Creator and creature and sees each and every particular 
creature in his or her uniqueness—against every alternative, ancient or 
modern, superstitious or seemingly scientific (2.1.3–7). That’s not to say that 
for either Tocqueville or Percy Pascal’s unadorned Christianity expresses 
the whole truth, maybe even about Christianity. Pascal is too much about 
anxious misery—about the absence of God and the experience of personal 
contingency—to account for the joy that we’re given as beings who can 
know something, if not everything, about ourselves, each other, and the 
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world we share in common.12 The truth is that we necessarily wander, as the 
beings who are self-conscious and wonder in the cosmos, and that the being 
who knows is necessarily somewhat of a mystery to himself. So our anxiety 
and joy are inseparable, and we’re much more than miserable accidents.13
Tocqueville and Percy also agree that the Cartesian self too readily 
defers to the impersonal or materialistic authority of modern science. To 
say you should do what I think is my attempt to rule you. So you—the Car-
tesian “I”—won’t defer to allegedly reasonable words of intrusively personal 
philosophers like Socrates, especially if I display my personal wisdom by 
recommending them to you. But if I recommend that you do what “studies 
show,” we both defer to the impersonal, objective authority of science.
Science becomes objective by abstracting from the “I,” by displaying 
material or “objective” or impersonal reality as the whole of reality. The 
scientist can’t help but detach himself as scientist from the reality his study 
displays, but the status of the scientist is not the topic of his study. He doesn’t 
hesitate to explain that the “I” that I think I am is an illusion, that he can ex-
plain what I am and what I do. The self-help he offers me is explaining that 
my experience of being a leftover can be alleviated by embracing scientific 
truth and living according to the insight that my desires can be satisfied in 
the way those of the other social animals can. Tocqueville follows Pascal 
and Percy follows Kierkegaard in observing that science has nothing to say 
about the situation and destiny of a particular individual, and it is powerless, 
of course, to theorize the irreducible fact of individual particularity out of 
existence (2.1.17, 2.2.15).14
Tocqueville says that what offends him about materialistic theoreti-
cians is that they proudly turn themselves into gods by reducing those 
they study to brutes. Percy says that they understand themselves as pure 
minds orbiting a cosmos of pure bodies. They describe people as organ-
isms-in-an-environment and then exempt the experience of themselves as 
minds—meaning their intellectual, social experience of the joy of shared 
discovery—from that description. The experience of being pure mind isn’t 
that of the Cartesian “I.” For the scientist, consciousness is consciousness 
with other scientists, and truthful discovery that’s not self-discovery is a so-
cial experience not shared with other social animals. But when the ordinary 
pop Cartesian turns to the scientific expert for help, he finds only what the 
scientific studies show without the experience of the scientist.15
The scientists are surely right to show that there’s no place in the cos-
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mos for an isolated, pointless “I,” just as they’re surely wrong in implicitly 
understanding themselves as a community of pure minds wholly detached 
from ordinary human concerns. The scientists, as more or less than minds, 
are stuck with reentering the social world of parents, children, friends, and 
so forth, and this they can’t do so as scientists. They can’t help but find ordi-
nary lives dreary, and so it’s not so surprising that nothing they say can make 
us nonscientists as happy as they think we should be with the way they think 
we live. The scientist—by thinking in terms of minds and bodies—offers no 
insight into the connection between mind and body, and he thinks of both 
himself and nonscientists too simply.16
That’s why Tocqueville says that “aristocratic science”—which is 
all about the pleasures of the mind—is too proud and “democratic sci-
ence”—which is all about satisfying the pleasures of the body (that is, 
technology)—is too humble (2.1.10). And that’s why Percy is so clear that 
people are neither minds nor bodies nor even some mixture of the two. To 
be human, to be self-conscious as we are, is to be born to trouble in many 
senses, but one is to be full of longings that can’t be attributed to either 
minds or bodies, which elude theoretical articulation, simple satisfaction, 
and scientific measurement.17 The aristocrat Leo Strauss rightly said that the 
world is the home of the human mind, but Strauss himself was more or less 
than simply mind. The world described by the physicist, as Percy adds, has 
no place for the physicist.18 And Tocqueville experienced a kind of dizzying 
disorientation when thinking too purely or apolitically, because the reality 
he experienced had no room for Tocqueville or any great defender of hu-
man liberty as something more than mere philosophy.19 For Tocqueville and 
Percy, human reality is irreducibly personal or particular, and the universal 
truth can only be known by particular persons. The Christian and genuinely 
scientific teaching is that logos can only be found in persons, in the only 
relational, the only alienated, and the only creative beings in the cosmos.
What the allegedly pure minds offer the isolated, displaced “I” is the 
relief from anxious, dislocated human misery that accompanies experienc-
ing oneself as other than a body or an organism in an environment. That 
program of self-help through self-denial, Percy and Tocqueville agree, 
mainly makes at least lots of people more anxious and restless than ever. 
They try, as Tocqueville emphasizes and Percy observes, to lose themselves 
in materialistic or consumerist diversions, sometimes, as Tocqueville says, 
with an insane ardor (2.2.13). The seemingly decent American material-
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ists, Percy and Tocqueville observe, are actually loony; they don’t know why 
they’re doing what they’re doing. Their material calculation only diverts 
them quite imperfectly from what they think they really know. As the great 
anti-Communist dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn put it, it’s easy to find just 
under the surface of their methodical pragmatism the howl of existential-
ism.20 Percy writes to replace that howl with the possibility of delight in 
sharing what we really know by putting back together what’s true about 
modern science with what’s true about European existentialism.21
Tocqueville says only the Americans’ religion keeps their self-destruc-
tiveness from literally becoming suicidal. When they lose their religion 
or some other limiting explanation for their experiences of displacement, 
Percy agrees, the more thoughtful or insistently self-conscious or undiverted 
among them do become suicidal. Despite our best efforts, we’re unable to 
find in public opinion or scientific expertise the guidance we need in know-
ing who we are or what we’re supposed to do. Not knowing how to live, we 
either lose ourselves with uneven success in diversions, or decide not to live 
at all.
Both Tocqueville and Percy seem to class Americans as either shallow 
and easily diverted—those Tocqueville calls decent materialists (2.2.11)—
or deep and self-destructive, at least when their individualism isn’t coun-
tered by religion or the pleasures of political life. For Percy and Tocqueville, 
the struggle of our time is to come to terms with the possibility of suicide 
and reject it (2.2.13).22 That struggle, in other words, is to rediscover the 
goodness and gratuitousness of created being, including one’s own being.23 
For Tocqueville, much of the goodness of being human can be discovered 
through the proud pleasures of political responsibility. Percy, of course, was 
aware of that possibility through the southern Stoics, and he understood the 
proud rational man ruling himself and others, with Tocqueville, as a form 
of natural human perfection. But it was not, he thought, given to him or as 
a real possibility for most prosperous Americans today.
For Percy, the remedy of faith in a personal Creator whose infinite and 
loving being corresponds to our deepest longings is the only one available, 
in most cases, these days. Percy, of course, thought that remedy was not 
only effective but true, the one that corresponds best to what we really 
know through science about who we are. Tocqueville, meanwhile, while 
open to faith and especially the Pascalian thought that Christianity knows 
man, thought himself unfortunate because he couldn’t quite believe. He 
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was, to some extent, stuck with his anxiety insofar as he couldn’t quite ac-
cept—while denying that he had any privileged right not to accept—the 
Christian account of the creation of particular persons by a personal, rela-
tional Creator.
Tocqueville seemed to worry that unerotic individualism would make 
American materialists so decent or herdlike that they would surrender any 
thought about their futures (including, of course, about their mortality) to 
a providential soft despotism of meddlesome, schoolmarmish bureaucrats 
(2.4.6). But he also said that religious madness was the inevitable result of 
the attempt to divert oneself from the needs of the soul (2.2.13). And Percy 
seems to agree that both the religious madness and the secular ideologies of 
the twentieth century—especially ideological wars or, in a way, huge wars 
over nothing—were natural reactions to the emptiness of pop Cartesian-
ism. Some Brave New World or therapeutic despotism might come, Percy 
was able to see, but probably not. He, as a believing Christian, may have had 
a bit more faith in the resilience of the human soul or distinctively human 
nature than did Tocqueville. He seemed pretty certain, at least, that we 
would remain ensouled creatures until the end of time. As he shows, for 
example, at the end of Lost in the Cosmos, our efforts to drug ourselves into 
serenity or blow ourselves out of existence will likely fail, and love, faith, and 
politics will emerge from again from the ruins.24
That the pop Cartesian experts offer us no guidance concerning who 
we are and what we’re supposed to do is the point of Percy’s hilarious “Last 
Donahue Show” in Lost in the Cosmos.25 Appearing on that show out of 
nowhere are two figures from America’s allegedly discredited but genuinely 
countercultural past—Colonel John Pelham, Jeb Stuart’s legendary artiller-
ist, and John Calvin. Both the southern Stoic warrior Pelham and Calvin, of 
course, are certain about who they are and how to act. They are equally—if 
differently—repulsed by the sexual and personal irresponsibility displayed 
on the Donahue Show, by the ignorant indifference to our duties as self-
consciously relational beings.
Calvin can’t grasp what “sexual preference” could possibly mean; it 
doesn’t occur to him that acting or being sexual is just a personal whim. For 
him we’re creatures, made to obey God’s toughly judgmental law. Pelham, 
a gentleman who knows who he is, a rational man and a member of a noble 
class, has no trouble knowing how to treat a lady. His knowledge owes noth-
ing to religion; he respects such belief, he says, but he adds he doesn’t give 
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it a second thought. Pelham defines himself by having fought for his way of 
life. He doesn’t regret fighting, although he knows he lost. So he accepts 
what, to him, is the obvious result—the rule of “white trash.”
We can also turn to Tocqueville to flesh out Percy’s insight that the 
American “countercultures” are Calvinist, Protestant Christianity and 
southern Stoicism (1.1.2, 1.2.8, 1.2.10). Americans aren’t Cartesian to the 
extent that they’re either Christian or aristocratic. The first Americans, he 
reminds us, showed up in New England and Virginia. The New Englanders 
were the pilgrims; they left their homeland in the service of an idea that’s 
both religious and political. They were enlightened family men and women, 
out to found an egalitarian city in accord with Christian, biblical principles. 
And so they did. New England was the most democratic place in the world 
since ancient Athens. It was, more precisely, the most democratic place ever. 
The Puritan “idea” wasn’t like the Platonic “city in speech.” It was intended 
to and did become real, and it was based on an “idea” that extended equally 
to all human beings. The Puritans’ idea of justice was far more universal or 
nonexclusionary than the one found either in Athenian practice or Socratic 
theory, but it still remained political or embodied in a real place in this 
world (1.1.2). The ancient democracy, of course, was composed only of citi-
zens and depended on slaves; equality was merely political or conventional 
and didn’t extend beyond the gates of the city or to all people living within 
those gates.
So even ancient democracies, Tocqueville observes, were really aristoc-
racies, and even their best thought was distorted by aristocratic prejudices 
(2.1.5). But the Puritan city included, in principle, all human beings, and 
it was based on the biblical principle that all human beings are equally 
ensouled creatures under God. On that faith-based idea the Puritans built, 
in this world, in the direction of universal civic participation and universal 
education. No creature rules another by right, and every such creature, 
to avoid being seduced by vain or satanic frauds, has to read the world of 
God for himself. On that egalitarian insight, the Puritans’ political theory, 
Tocqueville observes, was amazingly free from prejudice (1.1.2). 
In middle-class America, universal literacy was caused by the require-
ments of earning a living for oneself. For the Cartesian, individualistic, 
egalitarian American, nobody is above—and nobody is below—having 
interests (1.1.3). The Puritan agrees that everyone has a duty to work for 
himself and in service to others, and so education, contrary to what aris-
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tocrats believe, isn’t all about the cultivation of some leisure class. But, 
not sharing the Cartesian skepticism about the spiritual dimension of our 
existences, the Puritan adds that each of us is more than a being with 
interests—and so universal education is about much more than techno-
utility. The Puritan finds content and so social duties and an eternal 
destiny in the irreducible, irreplaceable “I” each of us knows ourselves to 
be. So for the Puritan, egalitarian education is also liberal education or 
“higher” education.
Tocqueville, it’s true, didn’t call the Puritans Calvinists, but he de-
scribed them as much like the idealistic citizens of Calvin’s Geneva, about 
whom Tocqueville knew much, at least through his reading of Rousseau. 
The downside of the Puritans, in his eyes, was their ridiculous and tyran-
nical legislation, their attempt to draw their law from the Old Testament 
books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, their attempt to criminalize 
every sin. Tocqueville himself didn’t regard such legislation as properly 
Christian, but peculiarly Puritanical or Calvinist.
Tocqueville explains that the Gospels themselves don’t contain any 
specific political teaching and so are compatible with a variety of political 
orders, including easygoing liberal modern democracy. Tocqueville em-
phatically distinguishes Christianity from Islam insofar as Christianity isn’t 
about the “law” in the sense of political legislation (2.1.5). It’s Christianity, 
by teaching the equal freedom of all human beings from enslavement by 
any particular political “cave” and its degrading civil theology, that freed 
every particular individual from political domination. That’s what Toc-
queville means when he says that Jesus Christ had to come to earth to 
show us the ways in which all human beings are equal (2.1.3). What Jesus 
shows us, he believes, is true—even if what Jesus claims about being God 
isn’t. (There’s no evidence at all that Tocqueville thought Jesus was God, 
that the Resurrection actually occurred, that the Trinity is credible, and so 
on.) The aristocratic philosophers, Tocqueville does say, were blinded by 
their class insofar as they accepted slavery as inevitable, just as Percy said 
(and the example of Uncle Will confirms) that the southern Stoics were 
blinded by their class to their racist paternalism. The Christian teaching 
concerning equality differs from Cartesian skepticism in not being focused 
on the isolated individual. It is, as Tocqueville explains, the main antidote 
to American self-obsession (2.1.3). Christianity, like every religion, teaches 
creatures that they have duties they share in common. They have such com-
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mon duties because their souls have some shared content, a foundation in 
their Creator through which they can know and love one another. Christi-
anity teaches Americans that they are more than empty or self-contained 
“I’s”—psychologically self-sufficient yet dependent for their very beings on 
their contingent and ephemeral bodies. American preachers, Tocqueville 
explains, speak about humility, and so officially are against pride. But by 
telling people each of their lives has a unique and irreplaceable immortal 
destiny, and that there are pleasures far higher than the pleasures of the 
body, just as there are duties that go far beyond mere material utility or 
deference to the rights of others, Christian preaching actually inspires the 
pride connected with any form of irreducible individuality or moral respon-
sibility or experience of soul (2.2.15).
Tocqueville does find what can be called secular justifications for some 
residually Puritanical American legislation—which has to be taken as evi-
dence that he sees Christianity’s personal “anthropology” as true even in 
the absence of revelation (2.2.15). He praises how seriously the Americans 
take the virtues of chastity and marital fidelity, as well as the ways in which 
they exempt women from the rigors of middle-class productivity (2.3.8–12). 
American women calculate that religion serves their true interests as beings 
born to be wives and mothers, and they, in a seemingly Christian way, sur-
render many of their claims for justice to sustain personal love. Tocqueville 
displays the alliance of American priests and American wives and moms 
against the ridiculous claims for the unerotic self-sufficiency of American 
men.
Christianity, Aristocracy, and the Greatness of Human 
Individuality
Tocqueville’s final discussion (2.2.15) of religion in America moves away 
from any concern about political utility toward sustaining the sublime 
qualities that distinguish human individuality from all else that exists, from 
being absorbed into some homogeneous, materialistic account of the world. 
There, he calls Americans’ religion their most precious inheritance from 
aristocratic times, and the way they have known the aristocratic truth, 
found in the philosophic doctrine of Socrates and Plato, that we are beings 
capable of transcending our biological limitations in the direction of immor-
tality. Tocqueville praises the rest commanded by American law and belief 
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on what might be called the Puritans’ Sunday. That leisure is for beings 
who know their longings to be more than mere bodies can be satisfied, for 
reflection on who they are in light of their true destiny. Without Sunday, the 
Americans could easily lose themselves in the frenzy of restless diversion. 
They could easily, by thinking of themselves as less than they really are, 
become less than they are meant to be.
Christians believe, against the pretensions of the materialistic experts, 
that they are more than material beings, and so they’re inspired to have 
thoughts and perform deeds that stand the test of time. Christianity also 
curbs their restless materialism by giving them a view of humanly worthy 
leisure (which they enjoy on Sunday), by keeping them from believing that 
they need to be constantly diverted from the ephemeral insignificance 
of the isolated “I.” Tocqueville, in evaluating Christianity’s effect on the 
individual, divides the philosophers into pre-Socratic and Epicurean mate-
rialists and the Platonists serious about the soul’s immortality. Christianity 
originally emerged, he explained, as part of the soul’s rebellion against the 
Epicurean excesses of the Romans (2.2.12). The pre-Socratic claim about 
the transience of everything human was a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
None of the pre-Socratics’ writings were preserved intact over time. Mean-
while, the works of Plato, attuned as they are to the true longings of souls, 
remain with us as wholes.
Tocqueville pointedly says that Christianity expresses, for Americans, 
what’s always true about the aristocrat’s proud view of the high purposes of 
particular individuals. According to Tocqueville, Christianity functions for 
the Americans as a kind of Platonism for the people, a kind of aristocracy 
that includes everyone—the egalitarian aristocracy of the Puritans. For 
Nietzsche, Platonism for the people suggests that Christianity is a religion 
for slaves being diverted from living well now by illusions about their true 
home in some other world. Christianity is a diversion or opiate for the weak.
The southern Stoics, Will Percy reminds us in Lanterns on the Levee, 
actually agree with Nietzsche (310–21). He explains with elegant directness 
that the Christian hope for personal salvation is what “the Negroes,” given 
their natural and social incapability for truthful self-rule, can’t help but 
believe. Christianity frees people from any sense of responsibility for what 
they do in this world, and it exalts emotional enthusiasm at the expense 
of reason. It’s true that Will Percy’s aristocratic criticism here is clearly of 
southern fundamentalism—the religion shared, in his view, by Negroes and 
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white trash. It’s not of the kind of Christianity that Tocqueville praises, 
the source of the Americans’ common moral code that limits their self-
obsession. Will himself was a Catholic as a young man, and he understood 
his belief as an admirable—almost fanatical—code of personal perfection. 
But he took it as a sign of Stoic or rational maturity that, one day, he just 
couldn’t believe. He was stuck with living without hope, stuck with himself 
as he experienced himself through reason alone (95–96).
For Will Percy, the road traveled reached the serenity that comes 
through the accepting of undeniable facts (176). Knowing the truth be-
comes heartening or invigorating only with patience, and eventually it 
becomes compatible with some personal happiness. Will knew that he was, 
in many respects, from his rational unbelief to his homosexuality, the excep-
tion to the rule, and so he knew that he was to some extent a tourist—a 
wanderer—wherever he was (156). He was, to a remarkable extent, at home 
with his homelessness, and his deep loneliness didn’t lead him to either 
suicidal despair or political fanaticism (158, 223, 348). He did his duty to 
his children and his community as a member of his class. Will Percy was not 
as lonely as a man can be; he was not nearly as displaced as the American 
Cartesian. No Cartesian could write: “I have seen the goodness of men and 
the beauty of things. I have no regrets. I am not contrite. I am grateful” 
(348).
The only way to think truthfully about death, for Will, is to surrender 
any vain or anguished claims for personal significance. It is to rise above 
Christian and aristocratic nobility in the usual senses. Being a Stoic in 
the full sense is learning how to die, to free oneself from fear and anguish 
through truthful self-surrender. In this respect, his advice was to listen to the 
thought of Buddha. Our anguish is called by our apartness or experiences of 
personal contingency. Why would we want this miserable experience, Percy 
asks, to continue after death? Death is the surrender of apartness through 
becoming nothing more than an indiscriminate part of the whole that is 
Creation. We know, Percy claims, that we are most ourselves when we’re 
most not ourselves, when we lose ourselves in another or in beauty. So death 
is a kind of coming home, the definitive cure for our homelessness (310–21).
For Walker Percy, Will’s personal loneliness was based on a misunder-
standing. Will also wrote he was most himself through his poetic sharing 
of what he knew through words that gave voice to experiences that many 
people held in common (172, 313). His deepest longings were personal, and, 
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although death surely cured his deep loneliness, it didn’t do so, in his own 
eyes, in a way that corresponded to his longing not to be alone, to be person-
ally transparent before another who loved him the way he was. Will loved 
the good things and the good persons of life too much to be a Buddhist, 
and he accepted death rather than embraced it. He was the least suicidal 
of the Percys, and he seems to have contemplated self-destruction far less 
than the Stoics in Percy’s novels, the real-life other Percys, and even Walker 
Percy himself.
For Walker, Buddhism, like science, expresses well who human beings 
are in general, but not the particular longings that are the sources of both 
our irreducible joys and our irreducible anxiety.26 For Walker, Will’s denial 
of the possible truth of Christianity was a kind of self-denial. Will—the won-
derer and wanderer—didn’t reflect sufficiently on the cause of his homeless-
ness, and so his life might have been more joyful and less merely serenely 
lonely. And Will, despite his protestations, never surrendered his concern 
for his personal significance as a rational being and a dutiful member of a 
noble class. His Socratic Buddhism, Walker also noticed, contradicted his 
Stoic pride. Will, in fact, knew well enough that his “democratic” account 
of the equal personal dissolution of us all couldn’t quite be satisfying to the 
aristocrat who overcomes his fear of death through his courage, even if both 
ways of overcoming fear or materialistic determination are marks of the 
true Stoic, of the philosopher-emperor.
Tocqueville would have denied that the serenity of Will Percy was 
inconceivable. Like Walker Percy, he would have appreciated him, as he did 
Pascal, as one of a kind. But even in Tocqueville’s own case, disbelief filled 
him with dizzying disorientation, the intellectual and emotional loneliness 
he discerns in the American Cartesian. His remedy was less serene and ac-
cepting than throwing himself into a passionate defense of political liberty. 
He embraced a cause that transcended material determination and would 
produce accomplishments that would stand the test of time.27
Tocqueville’s own experience, together with his observations con-
cerning the materialism generated by democratic, Cartesian skepticism, 
suggests that only if people believe that they’re more than the biological 
beings scientists describe or the empty leftovers the Cartesians describe 
can they live well—or achieve their true greatness—in this world (2.2.15). 
As Percy puts it, only if we have some credible explanation for our experi-
ences of homelessness can we be at home as well as can be with the good 
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things of this world.28 Christianity is the antidote to materialism, which is 
what Tocqueville calls the probably untrue and certainly pernicious theo-
retical diversion that makes the weak—the displaced “I”—weaker (2.2.15). 
Materialism can’t extinguish but it can intensify the experience of the “I” 
as pointless leftover in a world otherwise perfectly comprehensible by im-
personal theory. Materialism can have the effect of turning the sublimity 
of human longings—and the great thoughts and accomplishments—into 
nothing but dizzying, paralyzing disorientation. Christianity, we learn from 
the Stoic Will, may not be the only antidote to materialism, but it is the one 
that’s most credible and effective in democratic times, and it’s certainly the 
one most compatible with the egalitarian understanding of justice. So it 
is the antidote to materialism that corresponds mostly fully with what we 
really know about ourselves.
No materialist can explain the hopes and longings of the being capable 
of experiencing himself as existing for a moment between two abysses. And 
Tocqueville agrees with the Socratic Christian Percy that there’s nothing 
more mysterious and wonderful than the particular human being, the being 
who knows but who can’t be fully known to himself (2.1.17). Tocqueville, by 
connecting magnanimity and humility or pride and the anxious experience 
of personal insignificance, comes close, in his own way, to Thomism—mean-
ing a way of showing that aristocratic Christianity or classical Christianity 
or philosophic Christianity aren’t oxymorons. His Platonic or aristocratic 
affirmation of the truth about the soul or the sublimity of the highest forms 
of human thought and action isn’t meant to negate the distinctive contribu-
tion of Christianity to the whole truth about who we are.
We can say that Tocqueville offers a Platonic criticism of Pascal on 
behalf of the thought that our true greatness includes some justifiable pride 
in who we are, but he also offers a Pascalian criticism of the absolutely self-
sufficient pretensions of classical magnanimity and Socratic philosophy. We 
can see, in fact, that Tocqueville’s talking up of both the aristocratic and the 
egalitarian Christianity corresponds to the measured approach he takes to 
more pure or complete displays of aristocracy in America. That’s why he and 
Percy described for our qualified admiration what aristocracy they could 
find in America, and it’s why they made it clear that the aristocratic or Stoic 
criticism of the middle-class reduction of the human being to a being with 
interests—a consumer and producer—has great weight. The aristocrats are 
undeniably strong where the clueless, merely “leftover” democrats are weak.
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Tocqueville and American Aristocrats
Tocqueville, in the last chapter of Democracy’s volume 1 (1.2.10), reports 
that he found aristocrats in America among both the Indians and the 
southern slaveholders. In each case, men prided themselves on not working, 
and they regarded their leisure as noble. They ranked their own beautiful 
and useless activity over the productive lives of most men. They regarded 
themselves as more free than those whose lives were dominated by work, 
material desires, and slavish fear. Both the Indians and the southerners 
regarded the tasks worthy of men as hunting, fighting, and giving speeches 
about hunting and fighting (political life). Tocqueville rightly regarded the 
Indian way of life as defeated by its own vanity and the greedy techno-
power of the American middle class.
The southern aristocracy—although based on the monstrous institu-
tion of race-based slavery—was still in some ways a worthy alternative to 
the middle-class, democratic way of life of most Americans. Each alterna-
tive, Tocqueville makes clear, has its distinctive virtues and vices, and the 
southerners basically had the virtues and vices of any aristocracy. They were 
both more spontaneous and more spiritual than the northerners, and so 
they had a better sense of how to enjoy life. They found joy in leisurely 
self-contemplation, and they didn’t work themselves to death in a futile at-
tempt to transform themselves or their world. They were distinguished by 
their proud sense of who they are and what they’re supposed to do in ruling 
themselves and others as members of a particular class in a particular time 
and place. They were, as Percy writes, distinguished by the classical virtues 
of magnanimity and generosity, and they displayed the flourishing of a kind 
of natural human excellence in our hemisphere.29 But they were also lazy, 
selfish in the sense of privileging their class over humanity in general, and 
so unjust.
In some ways, Tocqueville presents the southern aristocracy as the 
result of an impulse opposite to that which animated the Puritans. New 
England was founded on selfless, egalitarian idealism. Its Puritanical vice 
was taking the idealistic formation of every human soul through political 
legislation far too seriously—or at the expense of individual liberty. Virginia 
Tocqueville presents as founded in pure selfishness. The first Virginians 
were “classless” in the precise sense: they lacked the manners and morals—
the decency—that come from being formed according to a moral code. 
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They were solitary adventurers—coming to America without family or 
friends—in search of easy money. They lacked the self-discipline that came 
either from being Christians or being productive members of the middle 
class. They unjustly wanted to have plenty of everything with very little 
work. They were pretty much pirates. It’s hardly surprising that slavery so 
readily took root in Virginia and the rest of the South (1.1.2).
That founding selfishness was transformed into an aristocracy through 
generations of experience with slavery. The Virginians began to take pride 
in their noble leisure, and they began to take on the habits and opinions of 
cultivated gentlemen. They began to think of themselves as members of 
an aristocratic class, and they developed both the virtues and vices of any 
such class. They were both better and worse than the Puritans. They were 
better insofar as they displayed a kind of intellectual and political greatness 
not characteristic of either Puritanical or later middle-class America. But 
that really meant that their selfishness was sublimated or elevated, and it 
continued to depend on the monstrous, increasingly spiritualized despotism 
of race-based slavery. They attempted to degrade a whole class of human 
beings to subhuman servitude, to reduced beings without the longings that 
flow from their freedom (1.2.10). The Puritans idealistically devoted them-
selves to displaying the qualities of soul of everyone through political and 
religious life, and they thought that no creature was above working both 
for himself and for the service of others. The Virginians, in the name of a 
certain vanity about their own souls, worked harder and harder to deprive 
other men of their souls, to turn them into beings fit for nothing more than 
working for others.
The Virginians’ criticism of the Puritans was their repressive moral-
ism. They regarded “abolitionism” as one example of many of the fanatical 
tendency to both criminalize every sin and to judge the diverse choices of 
others as sins. Aristocratic manners and morals, there are—there’s class! 
But it can’t be required by law. The Virginians weren’t about outlawing sin, 
and they had a sophisticated tolerance when it came to diverse displays 
of individuality. So it was a Virginian who wrote the unforgettable words 
about the inalienable rights of individuals and established in our country 
the principle of pure religious liberty. When the classical or Epicurean (or 
basically Greek and Roman) Jefferson thought about a free display of one’s 
individuality, he wasn’t thinking at all about the decent “bourgeois” material-
ism of members of the middle class. For him, religious liberty was primarily 
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about protecting the cultivated gentleman and his refined skepticism from 
those who would use popular piety as a political tool. Tocqueville rightly 
never describes the leading men—the aristocratic class—of the South as 
fundamentally Christian. When he says that it was a lucky accident that 
our Framers—the men who came up with the Constitution—were basically 
aristocrats, he was thinking in some large part about southerners (1.1.7).
Education for Civilization
The Puritan and the American aristocrat are, when it comes to justice 
and moral legislation, opposite extremes. But they unite in opposing the 
materialism of the solitary “I” or self-obsessed individual that is the purely 
middle-class American. They were clear on who they are and what they’re 
supposed to do as members of a class or community. And they agreed that 
education is, most of all, about the soul—for the cultivation of a being not 
determined by the impersonal forces that surround him or defined merely 
by the requirements of earning a living. The Puritans and the southerners 
were about, in different ways, civilization. Restlessly opposed to civilizing 
influences, Tocqueville shows, were middle-class Americans who thought 
of education as merely indispensable for acquiring technical skills, and who 
identified philosophy and science with technology or the transformation of 
nature with bodily need in mind. The American individualist is constantly 
running from civilization to some solitary place on the frontier (2.2.13). The 
individualistic or emotionally self-absorbed American, on his own, resists 
having his heart and soul enlarged by a particular “city” or political and 
religious society.
The aristocrat, in Tocqueville’s eyes, is about reading the Greek and 
Roman authors to learn how to govern himself and others, and to learn the 
proud truth about what it means to be a rational man born to use his leisure 
to take pleasure in discovering the truth for its own sake (2.1.4-10, 15, 20).
Aristocratic science, Tocqueville observes, is about pleasures of the 
soul, democratic science about pleasures of the body. The truth, the aristo-
crat believes, is pleasurable because it enhances his self-conscious pride in 
his soulful human greatness; the democrat is too skeptical about the soul or 
immaterial being to believe that he can know anything more than what he 
can use to sustain his biological being. About himself, the democratic “I” 
only knows that he’s not nothing, and he’s stuck with sustaining his charac-
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terless and so anxiously displaced being on his own. But the aristocrat, as 
they say, knows that he’s somebody, a being with the significance of both 
individuality and a secure location in a particular place or class. So he has 
confidence in his personal capabilities, that he, as a moral and political be-
ing, can have a real effect on the world.
Percy adds what Tocqueville couldn’t have known: the American 
southern masters—before, during, and after the Civil War—were only 
superficially Christian. They understood themselves, in a way Tocqueville 
would have appreciated had he known, as Roman patricians reading 
Greek philosophers. Their models were the Stoic philosopher Epictetus 
and especially the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius. They thought of 
themselves as a class of men generously and magnanimously responsible 
for others, men who would never think or do anything that was beneath 
them. The Stoic does right by you not out of love of you or out of respect 
for your rights. He does what’s right in all circumstances because he won’t 
compromise the “inner fortress” that is himself as a rational, moral being—
a self-understanding that finds its social embodiment in the honor code of 
his class. He displays his greatness of soul by benefiting his inferiors, while 
not forgetting who he is and why they are inferior.30
The southern Stoic, the true aristocrat, is both radically solitary and 
quite social. He doesn’t depend on anything outside of himself, which is 
why, as both Tom Wolfe and Admiral James Stockdale have shown us, the 
writings of the Stoic philosopher-slave Epictetus are best suited to guide a 
man in securing his freedom and dignity in a maximum security prison or 
as a North Vietnamese POW. He’s a member of a class that’s both natural 
and conventional.31 As both Colonel Pelham and Will Percy explain, they 
recognize their kind whenever they’ve appeared in history (61). So Stoicism 
in the South was a kind of conventional aristocracy displaying, at its best, a 
natural perfection—a perfection, as Marcus Aurelius said, available to all 
beings equipped with speech and so reason but achieved only by a few. It’s a 
perfection that is both theoretical and practical, linking together truth and 
courage by taking responsibility for what we can’t help but know. Tocque- 
ville, and of course Percy, didn’t think America could or should have 
aristocratic rulers. So Tocqueville recommends that, in democracy, those 
following literary careers should read the Greek and Roman authors in their 
original languages. We can easily say, after reading Percy, that Tocqueville 
recommends for democratic writers a kind of Stoic education, the education 
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Walker Percy received from Uncle Will. That way our writers will acquire 
aristocratic habits of mind, and they’ll learn how to read books written with 
care for a small audience that has the leisure to read closely.
The danger is that metaphysics and theology will lose ground in 
democratic language, and words will become more exclusively technical, 
commercial, and administrative (2.1.16). A corresponding danger is that 
people will lose confidence in being able to rule themselves and others, 
and so the very words they use will suggest their passive, fatalistic depen-
dency (2.1.20). One antidote to this abstract and shallow impoverishment 
of democratic language is the best aristocratic books. They can be expected 
to infuse democratic language with words that express the distinctions and 
longings democracy can’t help but neglect. Democratic prejudices or partial 
truths will be countered by aristocratic prejudices or partial truths. The 
truth is, Tocqueville says, that aristocrats unrealistically exaggerate, for ex-
ample, the effect of great men on historical change, just as democrats—with 
their impersonal theories all about “forces”—unrealistically or dogmatically 
deny that effect (2.1.20).
Tocqueville doesn’t recommend close study of the Greek and Roman 
authors for most Americans. It will arouse in them longings that can’t be 
satisfied in the routine of middle-class life, making them more restless 
and more dangerous than they need be (2.1.15). In most cases, it appears, 
Tocqueville is, in democratic times, for technical education supplemented 
by religion and some involvement in local politics. He’s with the Puritans 
insofar as he notices that everyone has the needs of the soul, which get 
distorted and disoriented when they’re ignored (2.2.12). That doesn’t mean 
that, on education, he was as idealistically egalitarian as a Puritan. Because 
the Puritan idea was radically Christian, it couldn’t distinguish between a 
class suited for what we call liberal education and a class suited for work 
in the ordinary or technical sense of the term. Both liberal education and 
work—truth and justice or leisure in the aristocratic sense and productivity 
in the middle-class sense—are for everyone. From Tocqueville’s view, the 
Puritans expected too much of ordinary people.
Tocqueville, insofar as he criticizes Americans for their lack of great 
literature and free thought, is for the development of some higher educa-
tion in America. He seems to be close to the suggestion that American 
higher education, outside of the sciences, should be some combination of 
aristocratic and Christian books. What’s best about the greatness of proud, 
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aristocratic individuality should be tempered by Puritanical devotion 
to egalitarian justice, and vice versa. Surely American education, in his 
eyes, wouldn’t be merely some combination of aristocratic prejudices and 
democratic technology. The Christian element, surely, would have to be 
somehow more than mere dogma; otherwise the educated American would 
embrace Christianity only for its political utility, with no sense of why he 
or she should be devoted to the proposition that all men are created equal. 
Surely he makes it abundantly clear that the Lockean/Cartesian defense of 
that proposition is inadequate. One way, of course, is by tellingly not talking 
about Mr. Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence.
So Tocqueville seems, from this view, most attracted to a kind of 
Catholicism purged of any connection with the prejudices of aristocratic 
injustice, which wouldn’t be so different from the Puritanism he described 
purged of a kind of un-Christian political fanaticism, a Puritanism trans-
formed by a criticism based on both the purely Christian and aristocratic 
views of freedom. Tocqueville would be most for a religion that corrected 
classical magnanimity—with its devaluing of the lives or freedom of most 
human beings—without obliterating it. He’s for preserving the real truth it 
teaches about human greatness and the real—if quite imperfect and finally 
ambivalent—pleasures of political life.
The dialectic between pride and anxiety or magnanimity and some-
thing like humility—between overvaluing one’s personal significance and 
experiences of utter personal contingency or insignificant emptiness—is 
what animated Tocqueville’s own life. It’s the one that expresses what’s 
true about both the aristocratic and too radically Christian (in his eyes, 
Pascalian) experiences of the human soul. In Tocqueville’s most truthful re-
flections about himself, he found his pride in personal, political significance 
and virtue to be genuine, but his anxiety about his real significance equally 
so. He presents the most characteristic human experiences as the pride or 
greatness of statesmanship (purely aristocratic truth) and the anxiety in the 
face of the truth about the personal contingency of us all (purely democratic 
truth). For anyone who really tells the truth to himself about himself, as 
Tocqueville says he does in his Souvenirs, self-confidence never exists with-
out self-doubt, and no confident display of human greatness is completely 
free from diversion.32 That’s why Percy says we have a right to our anxiety as 
an indispensable clue to the truth about our being, which is not to say that 
the truth revealed by anxiety—our homelessness or displacement—is the 
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last word about who we are. Self-doubt or self-irony may have overwhelmed 
the confidence of the Stoics in Percy’s novels, but that’s only because they 
couldn’t either properly understand their anxiety or see that it’s properly al-
leviated not only by pride but by personal love—by what displaced persons 
can share in common even in the midst of civilization’s decline and fall.33
The Delayed Contribution of the South
We have to remember Tocqueville doesn’t highlight the ways the southern 
aristocracy could contribute to a more general American understanding of 
who we are. He doesn’t describe the southerners as particularly attached 
to Greek and Roman literature (although they were) or as elevating the 
general quality of American language. He says there’s no American litera-
ture worth talking about, and he doesn’t, as anyone would today, talk about 
the distinctiveness of southern literature. That’s probably because, as Percy 
observes, the southerners expended all their literary energy in the decades 
immediately prior to the Civil War defending race-based slavery, a singu-
larly indefensible cause for any decent man. Tocqueville saw the South as 
doomed—and rightly so—and as making no contribution to our country’s 
or the world’s increasingly modern future. He really can’t explain why the 
study of the Greek and Roman authors won’t just wither away in America or 
why American education became more purely technical or utilitarian. From 
Percy’s perspective, Tocqueville’s American seems to need a more literary 
version of the aristocratic South than he could actually find.
The thought that the South might make an enduring contribution to 
curbing American pop Cartesianism, it seems, couldn’t be taken seriously 
until after the Civil War. The South, we might say, is liberated to make 
that contribution by being freed of the monstrous task of defending slavery 
in thought and deed. Orestes Brownson, in the unjustly neglected The 
American Republic (1865), said, immediately after the war, that the true 
interpretation of the American Constitution, the one that does justice to 
the whole truth about the material, political, and spiritual dimensions of 
being human, combines southern particularity with northern universality. 
The South is all about the assertion of the particular individual—by itself 
a tyrannical assertion—but an assertion that displays emphatically part of 
the greatness of who each of us is. The South is, in this sense, too personal.
The North—both in its materialism and in the fanaticism of Puri-
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tanical abolitionism—is too universal or general or destructive of human 
distinctiveness. The particular individual is dissolved into a kind of abstract 
humanitarianism—a seductive doctrine that preys upon the weakness of the 
displaced “I” in an anonymous world. Northern abolitionism, in Brownson’s 
expansive understanding, culminates in the homogeneity of both material-
ism and pantheism. But the North, of course, is also strong on the universal 
principles of justice, on not exempting proud individuals from the social and 
political responsibilities we are all share.
So Brownson suggests, thinking along lines remarkably similar to 
Tocqueville, that the proper combination of southern particularity—or its 
concern for particular persons and places—with northern universality—
especially at its highest levels of coming to terms with our shared embodi-
ment and equality under God—is pretty much the real truth about who 
we are as whole human beings. So it turns out, Brownson concludes, that 
America is the most Catholic of nations.34 I say this only in passing because 
his admirably subtle philosophic and poetic attempt to convince Americans 
of that fact didn’t catch on anywhere. I do say it in passing to show that a 
strongly antislavery, Yankee, very deep, and fairly astute thinker could say 
that the aristocratic South was partly right in its criticism of the emptiness 
of American Cartesianism. Surely Tocqueville writing later would have 
done the same.
We know, of course, that the southern aristocrats returned to power for 
a while after the Civil War. They lost the war, but through what amounted 
to a successful terrorist movement forced the Union troops out of their 
states and restored “white rule.” The southern Stoics viewed themselves as 
ruling the blacks and ordinary whites paternalistically, as gentlemen who 
by nature and education deserved to rule. Their class was displaced in the 
early twentieth century by more “populist” or angrily racist and vulgarly 
democratic political leaders, and the Stoic self-consciousness morphed into 
being members of an honorable class that had ruled responsibly, fought 
nobly against overwhelming force in a great war, and had been involved 
in a futile effort to resist its inevitable decline and fall in a democratized 
world where there would be no place for them. Freed from having to defend 
slavery, their literary efforts turned to the articulation of the experience of 
sustaining oneself in a world where one had been morally and politically 
dispossessed. It became a criticism of a world in which those in charge were 
incapable of recognizing who they are. It’s these dispossessed Stoics—such 
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as Will Percy—who achieved the greatest self-consciousness about who they 
are, writing, as did Tocqueville, at a privileged moment after the incomplete 
fall of aristocracy and just before the full rise of democracy.35
Tocqueville and Walker in Relation to Will: The Friendly 
Criticism of Both Aristocracy and Democracy
The southern Stoic, as presented by the Percys, is not so different from 
Tocqueville himself. They’re both open to the possibility that being human 
is some kind of cosmic accident, and they identify the loneliness of being 
lost in the cosmos as a truthful insight. Will Percy aside, most southern 
Stoics, like Percy’s characters in his novels, divert themselves through the 
pride that comes from knowing their place and doing their duties. He, like 
Tocqueville, experiences the political pleasure that comes from ruling him-
self and others; his high opinion of himself is confirmed by what he actually 
does. True individuality—true greatness—comes through the development 
of character, through the acquisition of the virtues that make easygoing, 
confident self-respect possible.
Walker Percy, we can say, didn’t write on behalf of political liberty, but 
to examine the predicament of the heir of the dispossessed Stoic, the being 
who, as “the last gentleman,” experiences life as pure possibility.36 He thinks 
he can’t be a Stoic, but he knows enough from the Stoics to be aware that 
the pop Cartesian expert doesn’t offer him even a clue about what a being 
like himself is supposed to do. Still, many of the differences that separate 
Tocqueville from the aristocrats he describes apply to Walker Percy too. 
They are both touched by the Christian, egalitarian claim for justice, and 
so they don’t join the Stoics in viewing progress toward democracy as noth-
ing but decline. Democratic progress, in truth, makes the world better in 
some ways and worse in others. There’s more promise and more greatness in 
ordinary lives than the Stoic aristocrats suggest. And so southern Stoicism 
failed, most of all, in mistaking the clamor for equal rights of the civil rights 
movement as ungrateful insolence.
Walker Percy comes close to Tocqueville in his balanced and quite 
political account of the strengths and weaknesses of the political dimension 
of his uncle’s singular version of southern Stoicism.37 He begins by noting, 
as Tocqueville does, that aristocrats are typically willfully naïve about the 
injustice or exploitation that accompanies any form of paternalism. Uncle 
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Will wrote, as Tocqueville would have also noticed, as if he was too noble to 
think about his self-interest, but it was in his interest, after all, to regard his 
sharecroppers as beings unfit to care for their own interests. The aristocratic 
doctrine of noble self-forgetfulness had its use as an ideology, which doesn’t 
mean it was completely untrue.
It’s true, after all, that words like noblesse oblige refer not to privilege 
but to magnanimous and generous duty. It certainly couldn’t have been 
wrong for the southern Stoic—such as Will Percy or Atticus Finch—to 
believe that his position in society entails a responsibility to others—to the 
poor, vulnerable, and the otherwise needy. Walker compares Will’s real-life 
courageous confrontation with the Klan on behalf of endangered Negroes 
(see also, of course, To Kill a Mockingbird) with a fearful and otherwise 
emotionally stunted individual in a democratic city closing his blinds rather 
than getting himself involved with a neighbor being murdered. It’s true 
enough that Uncle Will or Atticus Finch were wrong not to believe black 
people or white trash could rule themselves, and their relationship with 
their inferiors had nothing to do with love or rights. But justice understood 
simply as the protection of rights wouldn’t have inspired their undeniably 
noble and indispensable deeds.
Noblesse oblige, for Percy, is a criticism of what Tocqueville calls indi-
vidualism, meaning apathetic indifference to the virtue or welfare of others 
(2.2.2). From Percy and Tocqueville’s view, democratic relationships are 
more egalitarian and so more just, but also more utilitarian, less caring, 
and less personal. Individualism is the emotional result of the intellectual 
self-absorption of pop Cartesian skepticism. Because individualism is the 
cause of the passive detachment that makes us all easy prey for despots, 
Tocqueville actually claims it’s more dangerous for human liberty than the 
passionate selfishness of the aristocrat’s devotion to members of his class to 
the exclusion of others.
Percy, in that spirit, provocatively suggests that paternalism “might 
even beat welfare.” Welfare seems better because the individual is not 
treated as a child by being degraded by a particular person. But it’s really 
worse precisely because it’s so impersonal or unresponsive to the person’s 
real needs. Worse than the aristocratic form of aristocratic injustice (except 
racially based slavery), in Tocqueville’s eyes, is the schoolmarmishness of 
the bureaucratic control of every feature of our lives that would be the 
logical culmination of our creeping individualism (2.4.6). Equality would 
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be preserved insofar as people wouldn’t think of themselves as dominated 
by anyone in particular, but the result might be that we’d all be reduced 
to less than we’re really meant to be as free and relational persons. Better 
than paternalism, Percy suggests, would be a world that’s both egalitarian 
and personal, a world governed by charity. But his search for that Christian 
solution began with the southern, Stoic criticism of the impersonality that 
comes from a world full of equally contentless democratic “I’s.” That north-
erners have a loving concern for humanity and southerners for particular 
people is a criticism that is equally aristocratic and Christian.
Tocqueville was, compared to Percy, a little weak on Christian char-
ity and personal love, just as he was a bit too much about the anxiety of 
the wonderer and wanderer and not enough about the corresponding joy. 
He didn’t really seem to believe, with Pascal, that the true explanation of 
our homelessness—our wandering—is that our true home is somewhere 
else. Still, he did what he could to reconcile aristocratic greatness with 
democratic justice by trying to see with the eyes of the Creator. Aristocrats, 
he says, see things too particularly, and so they miss what’s true and good 
about what all of us share in general. Democrats think too generally, and 
so they miss what distinguishes one human being from another; they miss 
the particular content that is the source of irreducible personal significance. 
God himself, Tocqueville sees, doesn’t need general ideas or “theories.” He 
sees each of us as we really are in our unique particularity, in how we are 
alike and how we are distinguished. Democracy that does justice to human 
particularity, it seems to me, can only be grounded in a Christianity that 
preserves what’s true about aristocracy.
The first form of that mending—but not ending—of the aristocratic 
account of personal significance can be found in Thomas Aquinas’s real-
istic correction of Aristotle’s description of the classical virtue of magna-
nimity.38 Tocqueville and Percy continue that great tradition of Christian 
realism which, in our time, mends democratic tendencies toward personal 
emptiness and disorientation through elevation in the direction of our true 
greatness.
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